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Abstract 
 
 
 
How can we drive atomic renegades – states that run illegal nuclear weapons programs – 
into disarmament with the help of negotiations? This question, which puts the design of 
negotiation strategies at the focus of attention, has puzzled foreign policy makers for 
decades. It has, thus far, lost nothing of its relevance. But despite its importance, 
bargaining dynamics with atomic renegade states – so-called Nuclear Reversal 
Negotiations (NRN) – were largely omitted in International Relations (IR) literature. A 
systematic and theoretically grounded analysis on NRN is still missing.  
We chose to close this veritable research gap by a “single hard case approach” which 
studies the impact of diplomatic design that was affecting the U.S.-Libyan negotiations on 
the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapons program (1987-2011). Among the 14 examples of 
NRN we encounter in the history of the nuclear bomb, this bargaining process was 
particularly antagonistic and hostile and therefore signifies the “hard case” for successful 
negotiations.  
In order to evaluate the performance of the 20 individual design elements (and the 8 
alternative explanations) that shaped the American-Libyan diplomatic struggle, we 
applied the so-called “fit approach” – an analytical scheme that investigates whether and 
to which degree the solutions provided by the individual design elements fit into the 
scope and nature of the various challenges and hurdles that needed to be resolved in 
order to achieve a complete nuclear disarmament. 
Despite being the “hard case” among the different NRN examples, we revealed that the 
overall performance of diplomatic design was the most important explanation for Tripoli’s 
decision to abandon its WMD programs. This finding nourishes our general assumption 
that effective negotiations are possible even in relatively adverse strategic constellations 
– if they are only designed well. Diplomatic design is not an epiphenomenon but has 
genuine explanatory power for successful bargaining outcomes and is independent from 
broader structure-, actor-, or process-related impact factors.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are many similarities between rock n’ roll and International Relations (IR) – the 
discipline our PhD project belongs in.1 Both rock n’ roll and IR are relatively fragmented, 
plural, and marked by a variety of “styles”. It has occasionally been said that “rock n’ roll 
is dead”. Similar claims were made in recent years with regard to IR and its theories (e.g. 
special issue European Journal of International Relations, 2013, vol. 19, no. 3). Like IR, 
rock n’ roll is assumed to have had an important, although under-appreciated, impact on 
major historic events in world politics. Some claim, for example, that the demise of the 
Soviet Union and its satellite states could not be fully understood without taking the 
subversive power of secretly listening to Western rock n’ roll music into account (e.g. 
Ryback 1990; Troitsky 1987). Others have pointed out that rock n’ roll was essential for 
the rise of postmodern values which have heavily shaped the political landscape at least 
in the Western world (e.g. Inglehart 1997). Moreover, one could claim that famous IR 
scholars have many things in common with rock stars. Similar to the hits of prominent 
rock n’ roll bands and singers, there is a good chance that when we drop the names of 
famous IR thinkers, even first year undergraduate students could pinpoint their major 
contribution to the discipline.  
Yet, there is another similarity between rock n’ roll and IR which is of particular relevance 
for our PhD project. Both rock n’ roll and IR are “consumed” in very similar ways. While 
most of us follow a “more of the same attitude” most of the time, most of us do also 
adore “thrilling moments” which both IR and rock n’ roll are capable of delivering from 
time to time.   
The “more of the same attitude” is certainly the most common “pattern of consumption” 
in rock n’ roll and IR. After having tried and tested different schools and styles, most rock 
n’ roll fans develop a particular taste. They like to hear the same songs and albums over 
and over again and stay attached to certain bands and artists. The “more of the same 
attitude” is not necessarily an expression of musical narrow-mindedness or of an 
aesthetic tunnel vision. It is instead the logical reaction to the relatively large 
fragmentation and pluralism of styles and trends in the field. Likewise, cultivating an 
inclination for a particular style does not necessarily exclude innovation. Most rock n’ roll 
listeners are open to change and incrementally develop their taste over time within the 
margin of the style they have developed a weakness for. New bands and songs that 
                            
1
 The reader will find that this doctoral thesis was written in the first person plural. I speak about “our” 
project and the research that “we” conducted. I am aware that, if taken literally, this formulation could 
cause raised eyebrows. The last thing a PhD should be is teamwork. But I can assure critical readers that 
I use the first person plural exclusively for aesthetic reason. It is a matter of style which shall not 
obscure the fact that my doctoral thesis is the product of a lonely, arduous, and occasionally desperate 
academic journey which lasted four years in total.   
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contribute to the preferred schools are often welcomed for the fresh impulses they 
provide. In most of cases, this “within-style-innovation” results from selective integration 
and adaptive interpretation of influences and trends stemming from musical genres other 
than rock n’ roll such as blues, folk, or reggae.  
Readers of IR studies show a very similar “pattern of consumption”. Once they have 
developed an inclination for a particular “style”, they apply the same set of theories, 
analytical approaches, and methods over and over again. Often they stay attached to the 
same set of empirical puzzles. Like with rock n’ roll, there is nothing wrong with the 
“more of the same attitude”. Developing a genuine “taste” is rather a normal – if not 
even natural – expression of academic maturity. Like with rock n’ roll, this way of 
consuming IR is not opposed to change. The “more of the same attitude” is compatible 
with innovation. However, in most cases, innovation is synonymous with adapting 
approaches, methods, and (meta-)theories from neighboring disciplines.2  
In addition to the “more of the same attitude”, there is another aspect most of us love 
about rock n’ roll and IR: “thrilling moments”. From time to time, listeners of rock n’ roll 
music and recipients of IR research witness intriguing breakthroughs which cross the 
border of a particular style and qualify as something “completely new”. These thrilling 
moments do not signify innovation by selective integration and adaptive interpretation. 
Rather, “thrilling moments” are “innovation by discovery”. For example, rock n’ roll fans 
who had turned on the radio in the mid-1970s or early 1990s and were electrified by 
listening for the first time to a punk or a grunge song could still describe this “thrilling 
moment” in colorful details today (where were you when you listened for the first time 
to…?). They immediately knew that they were listening to something completely new – 
music that was transgressing the conventional styles.  
In general, “thrilling moments” are rare. But we also encounter them from time to time in 
IR when a new approach, method, or (meta)theory provides a new perspective into the 
“clockwork” of trans- and international politics that were nonexistent beforehand. For 
example, for many scholars in foreign policy, reading Graham Allison’s “Essence of 
Decision” was a “thrilling moment” (Allison 1971). According to John Ikenberry, Allison’s 
book was a “blockbuster” and “inspired generations of scholarship on bureaucratic 
politics and American foreign policy” (Ikenberry 1999). 
We know it is a very bold statement but we are convinced that our doctoral thesis gives 
readers the chance to satisfy their longings for both “patterns of consumption”. While 
most of our PhD project follows the “more of the same attitude”, it also allows for a 
“thrilling moment”. As we will outline in more detail towards the end of our research 
project (ch. 6.2), we unintentionally discovered a new mode of strategic action and 
decision making: the logic of wisdom (LoW). LoW has never been studied before. It is a 
completely new academic concept. It is promising to reveal a rare but very significant 
                            
2
 In the context of German IR, perhaps the most prominent example of this “within-style-innovation” 
was the adaption of Jürgen Habermas’ philosophical concept of “communicative action” (e.g. Müller 
1994, 2004).  
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phenomenon in foreign policy that is likely to be of particular relevance in strategic 
situations where actors are weak, in a hurry, or impelled to tackle challenging problems. 
In the following section, we will first give an introduction to the research we have 
conducted under the “more of the same attitude” (ch. 1.1) followed by a brief outline of 
the “thrilling moment” we discovered (ch. 1.2).  
1.1 “More of the Same”: Doing Research on the 
Design of Nuclear Reversal Negotiations 
What “style” of IR do we follow in our PhD project? Very briefly, this PhD project locates 
itself to the IR sub-discipline of negotiation research.3 It studies international negotiation 
dynamics and bargaining processes in the nuclear policy field through the lens of the so-
called Enlightened Rationalism, by applying qualitative methods with an orientation 
towards the practitioners of foreign policy, and by focusing on diplomatic design.4 Within 
this particular field, our project is certainly innovative. But typical for the “more of the 
same attitude”, the new findings and insights that we are revealing build primarily on 
selective adaptions of approaches, methods, and (meta)theoretical impulses originating 
from other fields and IR (sub-)disciplines.  
Nuclear Reversal Negotiations (NRN): We choose to contribute to the field of negotiation 
research by focusing on a relatively frequent, puzzling, but understudied type of 
bargaining dynamic: nuclear reversal negotiations (NRN). NRN are negotiations that aim 
for the complete elimination of illegal nuclear weapons programs run by atomic 
renegades – state actors that contest the global nuclear order by their quest for atomic 
bombs. After the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force (March 1970), this type 
of bargaining dynamic occurred relatively frequently. Since the early 1970s, we count 11 
successful and 3 failed cases of NRN.5 The most recent and prominent examples of NRN 
were certainly the negotiations that halted the Iranian nuclear program in July 2015 and 
the currently suspended talks on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions (the so-called Six-party 
talks).  
However, although NRN occurred relatively often in the history of the nuclear bomb and 
marked major events that were intensively debated among foreign policy practitioners, 
these types of bargaining dynamics were widely neglected in IR research. The diplomatic 
struggles aiming to disarm atomic renegade states are perceived primarily as isolated 
                            
3
 In general, we define negotiation as a communicative and interactive process between two or more 
actors that is characterized by the effort of combining conflicting positions into an agreement by joint-
decision making (see also: ch. 2.2.2).  
4
 Note that we use the “negotiation” and “bargaining” interchangeable in this PhD project.  
5
 Argentina, Algeria, Belarus, Brazil, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Spain, Libya, Pakistan, North 
Korea, Taiwan, and Ukraine  (see Table 3, ch. 2.2.2)  
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nonproliferation crises. And while individual negotiation events were often covered by 
detailed descriptive analysis, this particular type bargaining dynamic was never thought 
as a unique phenomenon of international politics. Thus, a comprehensive, systematic, 
and theory-based analysis of NRN is still absent.  
Apart of being understudied, NRN is an intriguing research objective because it signifies 
the most crucial explanation for one of the two major surprises in the nuclear policy field: 
the startling finding that most states that desire to acquire a nuclear weapon reverse 
their course after a certain time.6 Of the 40 nuclear weapon programs that were started 
in the history of the atomic bomb, 31 were reversed after a certain time. Nuclear reversal 
is therefore far more frequent than continued proliferation – a fact that explains why 
there are “only” nine states in possession of atomic bombs today (China, France, India, 
Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the UK, and the USA).  
The historic evidence suggests that this major surprise is primarily explained by NRN. In 
particular, after the end of the Cold War, bargaining dynamics became the major driving 
force behind the decision of atomic renegade states to abandon their nuclear weapons 
programs. Since the early 1990s, negotiations played apparently a central role in 11 of the 
14 cases of nuclear reversal. No other explanation – be it for example military 
intervention, technological problems, or internal regime shifts – had a comparable 
impact. At least after the end of the Cold War, nuclear reversal is first and foremost a 
“negotiated phenomenon”. Consequentially, it is impossible to think about effective non-
proliferation policy without taking diplomacy and bargaining dynamics into account.  
Obviously, the focus on NRN and nuclear reversal provides a new, more optimistic 
perspective on the nuclear policy field. It challenges the conventional narrative that 
describes the history of the atomic bomb primarily as an inexorable and accelerating 
pursuit of renegade states for the “absolute weapon” (Brodie et al. 1946). If we resist the 
temptation of the dominant view which perceives the evolution of the nuclear policy field 
as a series of proliferation crises, we will recognize, for example, that there is currently no 
state endeavoring to acquire a nuclear weapons capacity – a historic novelty that not 
occurred since the 1940s. All recent atomic renegades have either stopped their 
ambitions (Iran in 2015, Syria in 2007) or have managed to cross the “nuclear threshold” 
(North Korea in the late 2000s). Moreover, the perspective of nuclear reversal and NRN 
reveals the fact that in the last 20 years, no state has started a new nuclear weapons 
program – a remarkable fact given the high frequency of newly setup atomic programs in 
the previous 50 years of nuclear history. In addition, looking upon the history of the 
atomic bomb as a history of negotiated nuclear reversal is strongly emphasizing the role 
of the United States as a “benevolent hegemon”. No other states had so persistently 
campaigned in favor of non-proliferation than the United States and have put so much 
effort into maintaining the global nuclear order.  
                            
6
 The other major surprise of the nuclear policy field, which is closely related to nuclear reversal, is the 
fact that the pace of nuclear proliferation was relatively slow (Hymans 2010a). Most states that had the 
scientific and technological capabilities to start a nuclear weapons program have either not taken this 
step or have reversed it after a certain time – on average, after 15 years (ch. 2.2.1).  
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Policy Paradigm: But what exactly shall we study about NRN. NRN has many aspects one 
could possibly address in our PhD project – such as their genesis, their actor 
constellations, or their strategic environment. Consequentially, we have to decide about 
the focus of our research. What facilitates our choice is the overarching principle that is 
guiding our entire research project – the so-called policy paradigm.  
As we have already said, our PhD project is oriented towards the practitioners of foreign 
policy. We are convinced that policy makers and IR scholars need each other and that 
both spheres – academia and the world of practical foreign policy – could substantially 
improve their genuine functionality by dialogue and bridge building. In our view, there 
are two central aspects lying at the very heart of the policy paradigm. First, it is marked 
by the effort to study what policy makers should know about those phenomena in 
international politics they want to know about. Under the policy paradigm, revealing 
empirical puzzles is no end in itself but it is always done in order to improve foreign 
policy. Second, – and very closely connected to the first aspect – the policy paradigm is 
characterized by the simultaneousness between “backward-looking analysis” and 
“forward-looking prescription”. This paradigm is about studying past or present 
structures, events, process, and actors in world politics (backward-looking analysis) and 
developing on those basis analytical concepts and approaches that allow for improved 
strategic decision making and actions under given circumstances (forward-looking 
prescription).  
It is worth emphasizing that the policy paradigm is not synonymous with writing non-
theoretical and method-free policy briefs, op-eds, and think tank papers. On the contrary, 
sound analytical methods and theory in particular are very central to the policy paradigm. 
This paradigm is more than presenting academic findings in a non-abstract language and 
trying to infiltrate research results into the “foreign policy machinery”. Rather, the policy 
paradigm is first and foremost an academic approach. As we will explain in more detail 
later (ch. 2.1), many of those scholars who think their work would be very relevant for 
practical foreign affairs do not follow the policy paradigm.  
Diplomatic Design: In light of the central position of the policy paradigm, the question 
“what exactly shall we study about NRN?” is quickly answered. It has to be what we called 
the diplomatic design. Diplomatic design is defined as the varying, sub-dividable, and 
malleable shape of negotiations. Economic sanctions, rewarding strategies, or mediation 
interventions by third parties are presumably the most well-known examples of 
diplomatic design.  
In view of the policy paradigm, diplomatic design is an interesting and fruitful research 
template for the analysis of NRN. There is solid ground to assume that among the 
different elements of bargaining dynamics (such as their genesis, actor constellations, 
social and institutional environment, etc.), diplomatic design represents the aspect that is 
most relevant for foreign policy practitioners. Decision makers normally want to know 
about the malleable shape of negotiation dynamics. Studying diplomatic design is 
providing them with insights they should know about this particular phenomenon.  
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Diplomatic design is a newly coined term that we borrowed from the literature on 
institutional design – in the adaptive logic of the “within-in-style-innovation”. But 
although diplomatic design as a comprehensive analytical concept was introduced for the 
first time into research on international negotiations with our PhD project, the malleable 
and varying shape of international negotiations was, of course, previously studied by IR 
scholars (e.g. studies on sanctions and rewarding strategies applied in bargaining 
dynamics). However, by reviewing the literature on negotiation research we found that 
diplomatic design was thought of mainly as an epiphenomenon. It was studied most of 
the time as a “projection surface” for larger impact factors and was regarded as 
subordinated to broader structure-, actors-, or process-related explanations (see e.g. 
Kremenyuk 2002; Zartman 2009; Zartman 2002). By putting diplomatic design on the 
central stage, we emphasize it as an independent factor with genuine analytical powers. 
In this PhD project, we will show that diplomatic design is crucial for our understanding of 
success and failure in international bargaining dynamics. Like neo-liberal scholars who 
showed in the 1980s and 1990s that international institutions are not mere 
epiphenomena (e.g. International Organization, 1982, vol. 36, no. 2), it is one of the 
central objectives of our doctoral thesis to “liberate” diplomatic design and prove its 
autonomy. Although implicitly shared by numerous scholars, it is only in our PhD project 
that this central assumption is made explicitly for the first time. 
In that sense, our research project is in essence part of a general philosophic tradition 
which endorses the optimistic view on the performance of man-made procedures and 
structures. By giving priority to diplomatic design, we become advocates of the 
assumption that in general, each and every problem negotiation parties face in bargaining 
dynamics is resolvable with the right diplomatic design. Other impact factors in bargaining 
dynamics – such as varying actors’ constellations or the impact of historic trends – play a 
subordinated role and, if needed, could be leveled by proper design elements. Thus, in 
principle, one could even negotiate with the Devil and make him give in – if only the 
negotiation strategy is well designed (Mnookin 2010). 
The Fit Approach: Diplomatic design has many aspects. One could, for example, study its 
dissemination (the frequency with which particular design elements are applied) or its 
robustness (how resilient design elements are in light of changing negotiation 
environments). However, against the background of the policy paradigm that the most 
import aspect of diplomatic design is its performance. To which degree a particular design 
element is contributing to the resolution of a certain problem is the information that is 
most valuable to practitioners in foreign affairs. Insights into the performance of 
diplomatic design have immediate implications for practical foreign policy. 
Consequentially, we will focus in our PhD project on the performance of diplomatic 
design. 
Effectiveness is certainly the most common concept in IR to study performance. Broadly 
speaking, effectiveness is the degree to which a particular structure, process, or 
behavioral pattern helps to solve or to mitigate the problem that motivated its creation 
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(e.g. Underdal 2002; Young 1999; Young 2011). But despite its common use, we will study 
the performance of diplomatic design not through the lens of effectiveness, but instead 
apply a relatively young and less prominent analytical concept which we deem to be more 
relevant in terms of the policy paradigm: the fit approach.  
While the fit approach is a concept that is used constantly by scholars and laypersons 
alike, it was only rarely employed as a systematic scientific approach in the past. While 
primarily used in evaluation studies on international environmental policy (e.g. Brown 
2003; Folke et.al. 2007; Galaz et.al. 2008; Vatn & Vedeld 2012), we encounter only very 
few studies in the IR literature that recur explicitly to the fit approach (e.g. Ostrom 2007; 
Young 2002; Young 2008).  
The fit approach could be either used to prescribe, to evaluate, or to explore how a 
certain impact factor (such as diplomatic design elements) affects a given problem and 
contribute to its solution. The essential question is whether and to which extent the 
solution provided by the impact factor is matched with the scope and nature of a given 
problem. The fit approach is in effect studying functional coherence. Its immediate 
outcome is insights into the “varieties of (mis)fit”.  
At first glance, the fit approach shares many similarities with the conventional concept of 
effectiveness. Both study the performance of impact factors. And both concepts focus on 
the solution or the mitigation of real-world problems. However, a more careful look 
reveals that there is a thin but distinct line of demarcation between effectiveness and the 
fit approach. Real-world problems are studied from different angles. In essence, we could 
think of the fit approach as a more policy relevant extension of the effectiveness concept.  
Although there are numerous ways to study effectiveness (e.g. Mitchell 2008), what the 
different approaches all have in common is that they evaluate the degree of problem 
resolution by comparing real-world observations against a defined “standard of success”. 
Scholars who study effectiveness are primarily interested in whether and to which extent 
a defined problem is resolved. The fit approach goes one step further and gives particular 
priority to causal relations. It describes not only the varying degrees of problem 
resolution but also provides insights into the question of how a particular problem was 
resolved or mitigated. Unlike effectiveness, what is studied is less the problem solution 
but the strategy of problem solution. Moreover, effectiveness is normally analyzing the 
performance of single impact factor across a variety of problems.7 Research projects that 
study the “problem of fit” – such as our PhD project – are instead organized in the 
opposite way. A variety of impact factors are studied in light of a single problem. 
Consequentially, compared to effectiveness, the fit approach digs deeper into the micro-
structure of a given problem and focuses on its sub-components in more detail (ch. 2.4).  
Against that background, it is obvious that the fit approach is very much in line with the 
logic of the policy paradigm. Certainly, foreign policy leaders are also interested to learn 
                            
7
 See for example the studies on the effectiveness of international regimes: Miles et.al. 2002; Underdal 
& Young 2004; Young 1999.  
 
  
8 
 
more about the varying effectiveness of the different instruments they use. However, the 
fit approach is far closer to the questions that really haunt practitioners of foreign affairs: 
“What particular diplomatic tool is matching the actual problem I am facing in a given 
situation?” While effectiveness is providing decision makers with insights about general 
performance, the fit approach is revealing knowledge about the impact of a set of design 
elements in view of a specific problem. As David Baldwin has made clear, that is exactly 
the information that decision makers need. “Policy makers have little use for research 
findings regarding one technique of statecraft”, Baldwin said, but “need information that 
will help them choose among alternative policy-options” (Baldwin 2013: 289). Thus, the 
fit approach is answering what decision makers in foreign affairs should know about the 
questions they want to know about. 
As we will explain later in more detail, the best way to operationalize the fit approach is 
by fit taxonomies (ch. 2.4). Fit taxonomies condense the structure of real-world problems 
to a level of abstraction that the “optimal problem solution” – the so-called fit demand – 
becomes salient. According to Oran Young, fit taxonomies are “attempts to disaggregate 
(…) issues, identifying elements of individual problems that are significant from a 
problem-solving perspective and reaching conclusions about design features necessary to 
address each element” (Young 2002: 176). Elinor Ostrom has seconded that view and has 
conceptualized fit taxonomies as “nested multitier maps” (Ostrom 2007) which – when 
developed properly – would indicate the scope and nature of a problem in a way that 
gives scholars the decisive orientation to find well-matching design elements.  
The Fit Taxonomy and its Genesis: The fit taxonomy we developed in order to analyze the 
performance of diplomatic design in NRN is a “nested multitier map” which is composed 
of two problem dimensions (substantial and procedural negotiation problem) and three 
social traps (the colliding interest, the distrust, and the injustice trap). This structure is 
operationalized by two rationalist theories: game theory and the public bad approach – a 
sub-component of the broader Theory of Collective Goods (TCG) which was introduced 
into negotiation research for the first time by our PhD project.  
Our fit taxonomy had neither fallen from the sky nor represented as a pre-existing 
concept used in the past to analyze stalemates and deadlocks in negotiation dynamics. 
Rather, we have developed it by using an eclectic approach based upon the so-called 
“Inference to the Best Explanation” – the preferred way of logical reasoning in Scientific 
Realism (ch. 2.5).  
Eclecticism is in vogue in IR (e.g. Checkel 2013; Lake 2013; Sil & Katzenstein 2010). We 
saw in recent years growing interest in building middle-range theories beyond the Great 
Debates by integrating and merging approaches and ideas originating from different 
fields and IR sub-disciplines. The promise of eclecticism is innovation (in the logic of the 
“more of the same” attitude). It gives the chance to develop new concepts which could 
provide a more fruitful and detailed picture of social reality.  
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Our fit taxonomy delivers on that promise. Since it was condensed from a relatively large 
pool of academic and practical knowledge on difficult negotiations, the fit taxonomy 
signifies an approach that is exhaustive and detailed. Moreover, we will show in our PhD 
project that the fit taxonomy is also innovative and groundbreaking. With the parallelism 
of the substantial and procedural problem dimension, the three types of social traps, and 
the application of the underappreciated public bad approach, it allows a perspective on 
international bargaining that is thus far unknown in negotiation research. In addition, 
since our fit taxonomy was developed by “rummaging through” the extensive and 
amorphous literature on international negotiations originating from different policy fields 
and issue areas, there is amble ground to believe that it has relevance for diplomatic 
dynamics beyond the narrow focus on NRN and would also achieve fruitful insights in 
other fields of international security policy.  
The Research Question: All of what we have said thus far boils down to our central 
research question: How to design well-fitting NRN that drive atomic renegade states into 
nuclear disarmament.  
Apparently, this question encapsulates the different approaches and concepts we have 
introduced: nuclear reversal and NRN, diplomatic design, and the fit approach. But 
although less visible in its actual wording, the research question’s most essential part is 
the policy paradigm. This guiding principle, which spans across our entire PhD project, 
finds expression in the research question by the characteristic parallelism of “backward-
looking analysis” and “forward-looking prescription”. We deliberately shaped our 
research question in a way that it gives equal credit to both research orientations and 
could be read both forward and backward.  
On the one hand, we could read the overarching research question in terms of a “normal” 
research project where past events, trends, and actors in the nuclear policy fields are 
studied by a backward-looking inquiry. Scholars are asked to investigate historical 
diplomatic efforts that aimed to reverse atomic weapons program with the objective to 
reveal the “varieties of (mis)fit”. The backward-looking perspective calls upon identifying 
all the diplomatic design elements with a high fit-performance as well as the various 
challenges and hurdles that hamper their application. In that view, the central research 
question “how to design well-fitting NRN” translates into the sub-question, “What 
diplomatic design had a particular high fit-performance in previous bargaining dynamics 
with atomic renegades?”  
On the other hand, there is also a forward-looking spin to the research question. When 
moving from the “backward-looking analysis” to policy oriented prescription, the 
overarching research question (“how to design well-fitting NRN”) translates into the sub-
question: “how to compose a successful NRN bargaining strategy based on well-fitting 
design elements capable to drive atomic renegade states into nuclear disarmament”. 
What is now at the center of attention is the development of successful negotiation 
strategies. Our focus is no longer on diplomatic design but on the diplomatic designing. In 
terms of practical research, it is required that scholars take the results stemming from the 
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“backward-looking analysis” and apply them to a forward-looking mode. Scholars are 
asked to link the results of the previous “backward looking analysis” to the resolution of 
current and future negotiation problems.  
The overarching research question is probably the best proof that our PhD project 
endeavors to go beyond general references of political relevance and mere lip services 
payed to political orientation. Instead, the research questions function as its primary 
transmission belt that is implementing the logics of the policy paradigm onto the levels of 
practical research. That is challenging and demands extra work beyond “normal” research 
projects. In particular with regards to the prescriptive implications, the policy paradigm 
drives our PhD project to analyze aspects and respond to questions we would have 
normally not taken into account if we had applied a more conventional academic 
perspective.  
Sources & Data: Doing research on international security policy and nuclear weapons is, 
in general, challenging given that the relevant data is often relatively difficult to acquire. 
Research on NRN and on the fit-performance of its diplomatic design further aggravates 
this situation. First, data collection on NRN is complicated. Most of the bargaining 
processes took place behind closed doors and were withdrawn from the eyes of the 
public. Since negotiating about illegal nuclear weapons programs is sensitive, the level of 
concealment is high and the relevant sources are often classified. Biased or false 
descriptions about the actual diplomatic dynamics are also very common since the 
negotiating parties in NRN are often adversaries and rival states. In many cases, NRN are 
marked by relatively antagonistic and hostile bargaining dynamics. Moreover, NRN signify 
a relatively “elitist” bargaining process. These types of negotiations were normally not 
conducted by subordinated bureaucratic players but are, in most cases, directly managed 
by foreign policy leadership of the involved state actors – a fact that further reduces the 
accessibility of relevant information. Second, the research on the performance of 
diplomatic design is particularly “data hungry“. In order to reveal whether and to which 
degree individual diplomatic design elements fit or misfit to a particular negotiation 
problem, we have to disclose in detail the scope and nature of their impact by digging 
deep into the microstructure of their causal performance. Third, the fit approach and in 
particular the parallel research orientation of the policy paradigm – “backward-looking 
analysis” and “forward-looking prescription” – further increases the amount of data we 
have to take into consideration in order to arrive at a satisfactory answer to our 
overarching research question. In particular, the development of the fit taxonomy is 
absorbing – as will be shown later in chapter 3 – considerable academic resources and 
demands information and sources (i.e. data about the beliefs, world views, and desires of 
the involved actors) that are different from those required to investigate the performance 
of diplomatic design.  
Practical Operationalization – the Libyan NRN: It is obvious that this challenging data 
situation is immediately affecting the way we operationalize our PhD project. On the one 
hand, we decided to apply the “qualitative research paradigm”. Our attempt is to answer 
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the central research questions of the technical “thick description” and process tracing of 
past bargaining dynamics (ch. 4). On the other hand, we chose to analyze NRN by a 
“historic single case study” investigating the performance of diplomatic design applied in 
the bargaining dynamic between the United States and the Qaddafi regime about the 
Libyan nuclear weapons program. The U.S.-Libyan negotiations took place between the 
late 1980s and the mid-2000s and found its climax in the public announcement on 19th 
December 2003 when Tripoli declared it would reverse all its nuclear and chemical 
weapons related activities, allow inspections into its clandestine WMD sites (weapons of 
mass destruction), abandon all its strategic missile capabilities and return to the 
institutional architecture of the “global nuclear order”.  
Of course, in an ideal world, we would have rather preferred a mixed-method approach 
and a comparative analysis of different historic NRN cases. If we had applied a 
comparative case study approach and had studied two or more historic examples of NRN, 
we would have arrived at a broader and more representative understanding about the 
performance of diplomatic design. If we had applied, in addition, a large-N analysis based 
on quantitative-statistical data, we could have tested, broadened, and extrapolated the 
findings stemming from the qualitative process tracking and thick descriptive analysis.  
However, under the given circumstances, a qualitative single hard case study seems to be 
the best choice. A comparative case study instead of a single hard case analysis would 
have provided us with broader insights into the nature of NRN. But it would have done so 
at the expense of an in-depth analysis of complex causal relations that lies at the very 
heart of the fit approach. And speaking more in terms of “research economics”, the very 
fact that a detailed study on the Libyan NRN already consumed nearly 160 pages shows 
that there is relatively little room for a more comparative approach if we want to stay 
within the margins of a reasonable readable doctoral thesis. Moreover, diplomatic design 
of NRN is a research objective where the quantity of relevant impact factors is high and 
the number of available cases is low. Social research on such constellations has generally 
a relatively strong leaning towards the “qualitative research paradigm” given that, in 
practical research, scholars are confronted with numerous methodic challenges – such as 
complex causal relations, over-determination of the independent variable, equi-finality or 
multi-finality – which are particularly difficult to handle with quantitative research 
designs. In these situations, an in-depth and triangulated analysis of historic process and 
events based on multi-sourced data acquisition is more reliable.  
Least Likely Case Selection & the “Double Hard Case”: While single case studies allow 
detailed studies of complex phenomena, their results are neither generalizable nor 
representative. However, all those who would have preferred to gain broader insights 
into the understudied phenomenon of NRN and the performance of diplomatic design 
beyond the American-Libyan negotiations must not despair. There is at least a little 
remedy to the lacking representative. Our choice for the Libyan NRN was not taken at 
random. Rather, it is the outcome of a deliberated “least-likely case selection”. The 
American-Libyan negotiations on the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapons program 
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represent the “hard case” among the 14 historic examples of NRN. Given the relatively 
challenging “negotiation environment” that both sides faced, the Libyan NRN was a case 
where diplomatic design had a priori relatively little chance to lead to successful nuclear 
reversal. The conditions for an effective and fruitful bargaining process were relatively 
low in comparison to all other examples of NRN. 
The “least likely case selection” has two central advantages: First, we chose to apply this 
approach because it makes our research project safe against accusation of “confirmative 
research design” where those examples are chosen that allow the most straightforward 
validation of the central hypothesis – a very common methodic problem in case study 
approaches (e.g. Leuffen 2007). Second, among the different procedures one could 
possibly apply, the “least-likely approach” represents the concept that – ceteris paribus – 
produces results with the highest relevance beyond the studied “hard case”. As we have 
said above, the results of single case studies are never representative or generalizable. 
But the results achieved by studying a “hard case” are – in comparison to non-hard case 
studies – assumed to have higher relevance beyond the specific settings where these 
findings were revealed. Factors that were found to exert impacts under particular 
challenging conditions of the “hard case” are generally expected to yield even better 
results in more favorable settings. Consequentially, in the literature, the “hard case” 
approach is occasionally labeled as the “Sinatra inference” – referring to Frank Sinatra’s 
famous song “New York, New York” and the prominent verse “If I can make it there, I’m 
gonna make it everywhere” (Levy 2002; Leuffen 2007: 210). Applied to our research 
project, the Libyan “hard case” encourages the assumption that diplomatic design 
elements that were found to have a high fit-performance would – in all probability – work 
in other bargaining dynamics even more effectively and efficiently.  
Moreover, we dare to claim that in our PhD project, the least-likely logic goes beyond the 
U.S.-Libyan negotiations. As we have said above, NRN represent a relatively challenging 
type of international negotiations where the relationship between the involved players is 
often tense and antagonistic. While the diplomatic process on the Qaddafi regime’s 
nuclear weapons program represents the “hard case” among the different NRN examples, 
NRN is likely to represent a “hard case” for a series of less difficult and conflict-laden 
bargaining dynamics in other fields of international security policy. Thus, the Libyan NRN 
signifies in essence a “double hard case”. Although we could only speculate about the 
exact scope of the “double hard case logic”, we assume that the lessons we draw about 
well-fitting design elements from the Libyan NRN have at least some relevance beyond 
the nuclear policy field in general.  
Results & Findings: Turning to the results of our PhD project, it becomes clear that our 
innovative multi-layered research design is not merely “academic shadow-boxing” but 
has considerable explanatory power. The painstaking development of the analytical 
concepts and (meta)theoretical positions was worth the effort. We were able to provide a 
complete and comprehensive response to our overarching research question and 
revealed numerous new and counterintuitive findings about the U.S.-Libyan negotiation 
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dynamic. In the end it is not an exaggeration when we say that we unearthed a new 
narrative of Libya’s nuclear reversal.  
Above we have explained that our overarching research question is determined by the 
policy paradigm and therefore requires both a “backward-looking analysis” as well as 
“forward-looking prescription”. Consequentially, we present the summary of our findings 
likewise along these lines.  
The central finding of the backward-looking analysis was that – despite the relatively 
challenging and difficult circumstance – the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear reversal was “won” 
by diplomacy. The overall performance of diplomatic design is the most important 
explanation for Tripoli’s decision to abandon its WMD programs. Alternative explanations 
– non-diplomatic interventions or structural factors – played a certain role at some point 
in the 23 years of the American-Libyan diplomatic struggle (in particular, ideational and 
liberalist explanations). However, when taken in isolation, none of these rival factors 
could properly explain Libya’s disarmament. It speaks volumes in favor of diplomatic 
design as the major explanation that we counted in the American-Libyan negotiation 
process in totality 20 individual design elements but only 8 alternative impact factors (five 
structural factors and three non-diplomatic interventions) (ch. 6.1.1.1). The case of the 
Libyan NRN is therefore nourishing our general philosophical assumption that 
negotiations could succeed even under adverse circumstances – if they were designed 
well.  
However, despite its convincing overall performance, the impact of diplomatic design and 
its individual elements was relatively diverse. In the diplomatic struggle between 
Washington and Tripoli, we encounter a very distinct “variety of (mis)fit” (ch. 6.1.1.2).  
While some categories of design elements – such as confidence building measures – 
achieved a relatively successful “fit performance”, other diplomatic tools – such as 
coercive instruments or design elements providing positive inducement and rewards – 
had at best only a limited impact and were at some points even counterproductive. And 
process related design elements (such as quiet diplomacy or confidential communication 
channels, see ch. 6.1.2.1) were even described as “hidden champions” in the effort to 
resolve diplomatic struggles. These factors had a relatively high “fit performance” but 
received in the past relatively little attention from policy makers and IR scholars. 
Apart from their actual contribution to the problem resolution in the Libyan NRN, design 
elements varied also with regard to the causal pathways. We encountered, for example, 
multiple (mis)matching design elements which positively or negatively shaped the 
American-Libyan bargaining process on several occasions (ch. 5.3.2.2). Ambiguous 
(mis)matches instead were diplomatic impact factors which had opposite implications 
during the different negotiation phases or regarding the negotiating parties. Another 
distinct causal pattern we revealed were the so-called “evergreen matches” – design 
elements that have relatively stable positive implications over time and contributed to 
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the resolution of negotiation problems not just in one but across several phases of the 
diplomatic process (ch. 5.3.2.2).  
Moreover, the performance of diplomatic design was also diverse with regard to the two 
problem dimensions we identified to be central for the analysis of stalemates in 
diplomatic struggles – the substantial and procedural negotiation problem. While the 
procedural negotiation problems Washington and Tripoli faced were relatively 
convincingly resolved by the diplomatic tools, they achieved only unsatisfactory results 
with regard to the substantial negotiation problem. Starting from a relatively hostile and 
antagonistic situation in the late 1980s, the United States and the Qaddafi regime 
managed to overcome, peu à peu, the numerous procedural problems. With the help of 
game theory, we have described this incremental movement from a malign constellation 
in the late 1980s to a relatively benign situation in the mid-2000 as the passage through a 
five-stage cascade of social traps (deadlock game (1987-1990), imposed deadlock game 
(1990-2003), first alibi game (March - December 2003), second alibi game (December 
2003), biased stag hunt game (since January 2004). On the substantial problem dimension 
– which we analyzed with the help of the public bad approach –the performance of 
diplomatic design elements, however, remained limited and incomplete. While the 
infrastructure of the Libyan nuclear weapons program was swiftly dismantled in 2004 
after the United States and the Qaddafi regime had achieved a major breakthrough in 
their diplomatic engagement in December 2003, other elements of the substantial 
problem dimension remained unresolved – for example, the Libyan strategic missiles 
program. As a consequence, the “WMD issue” remained a continuing factor in the slowly 
improving American-Libyan ties until the Muammar al-Qaddafi and his entourage was 
toppled in 2011 and lead occasionally to veritable crises and set-backs (e.g. halted 
removal of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or failure to destroy all Libyan chemical 
weapons (ch. 5.3.5)).  
Certainly, the dissimilar resolution of the substantial and the procedural negotiation 
problems does not belittle the fact that Libya was “won” by diplomacy. However, it is still 
an annoying finding for all those practitioners and academics – including ourselves – who 
are implicitly or explicitly inspired by the assumption that bargaining and diplomacy is in 
essence the “engine room” of today’s inter- and transnational affairs capable of providing 
solutions for all different kinds of problems and challenges. After all, this finding 
nourishes traditional suspicions against negotiation and bargaining and is fueling the 
argument that diplomacy is – in comparison to non-diplomatic interventions (such as 
military force) – more likely to fail when asked to handle “real global issues” and provide 
solutions beyond procedural hurdles.  
Another surprising shortcoming of diplomatic design revealed in the Libyan NRN was the 
varying “fit performance” with the regard to the three different types of social traps 
which build an important part of our fit taxonomy, and lie at the very heart of intractable 
bargaining dynamics (i.e. the distrust, the injustice, and the colliding interest trap). While 
the diplomatic tools applied in the 23 years of the American-Libyan negotiation process 
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were found to have a relatively high “fit performance” in terms of overcoming distrust 
and suspicion between the conflict parties, they were remarkably weak in resolving states 
of unjust and unequal distributions of gains and losses between Washington and Tripoli. 
By and large, one can say that (in)justice was not on the agenda in the American-Libyan 
bargaining dynamic. Even more surprising was the finding that diplomacy is also weak in 
resolving the colliding interest trap. That is remarkable given that we encountered in the 
struggle on the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapons programs numerous diplomatic tools 
aiming to contribute to the resolution of interest conflicts between Libya and the United 
States. Moreover, while the “(in)justice problem” of trans- and international negotiations 
was widely discussed among IR scholars in recent years (e.g. Albin 2009; Albin & 
Druckman 2014; Müller & Druckman 2014), we found no reference in the IR literature 
that bargaining dynamics would be weak in resolving interest conflicts. On the contrary, 
the idea of the colliding interest trap and the chance to resolve by diplomatic 
interventions is rather situated at the very heart of negotiation research. Again, this 
finding does not change the fact that the Libyan NRN was a “diplomatic success story”. 
But it is adding to the overall diagnosis that the performance of diplomacy was, in the 
Libyan hard case, very amorphous as soon as we dig deeper into the causation of the 
individual design elements.  
Finally, the performance of diplomatic design was also varying with regard to negotiation 
parties. Libya’s inactivity was, in that regard, particularly remarkable. Apart from a single 
instrument (i.e. Tripoli’s failed charm offensive in the late 1980s) and the series of back-
door initiatives Libya launched through various intermediaries starting by the early 1990s, 
we saw no independent diplomatic efforts by the Qaddafi regime to shape and influence 
the negotiation dynamic. Instead, Libya showed a reactive and passive behavioral pattern. 
Almost all of Tripoli’s bargaining activities took place within the margins of formats, 
actions, and initiatives where the United States was involved in equal terms or which had 
been even initiated by Washington in the first place. The Qaddafi regime’s strategic 
lethargy is in particular astonishing given that it stood in stark contrast to the 
adventurous and ambitions activities the Qaddafi regime showed in other fields of its 
foreign policy. 
Apart from “backward-looking analysis”, the “forward-looking prescription” is likewise 
essential to respond to the central research question of our PhD project. As we have 
explained above, the “forward-looking prescription” represents the second essential 
research orientation that is mandatory for the policy paradigm as we understand it.  
The prescriptions of successful problem resolution are obviously difficult to formulate if 
we do not have a particular atomic renegade state in mind (such as North Korea). How to 
design well-fitting strategy to reverse WMD programs by diplomacy is, in essence, an 
empirical question that has to be subjected to individual cases. After all, it is one of the 
central assumptions of the fit approach that there are no “blue print” or “one size fits all 
solutions” to real-world problems. Thus, the most general answer we could give to the 
question “how to design well-fitting NRN” is therefore methodic in nature. IR scholars and 
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foreign policy makers who face nuclear proliferation crises and search to resolve it by 
diplomacy should (1) take the general fit taxonomy we developed and apply it in 
prescriptive mode to the given strategic constellation, (2) with its help, identify the 
“optimal problem solution”, (3) consider on that basis the available diplomatic tools – 
including unconventional measures – which are likely to fit well to the ascertained 
problem and (4) compile them into a coherent negotiation strategy.  
For all those readers who think that our response to the forward-looking part of our 
research question is a little feeble, we have run a prescriptive “thought experiment” in 
the conclusion of our PhD based on our analysis of the Libyan NRN (ch. 6.1.2) in order to 
show the “forward looking”, policy oriented capacity of our findings. We have asked 
ourselves: In light of the findings we achieved in our PhD project, what could Libya and the 
United States have done differently in order to improve the negotiation outcome, if they 
have had the chance to rerun the bargaining dynamic by systematically applying the fit 
approach?  
Certainly, elaborating this “thought experiment” in length and detail would necessitate an 
extra research project. However, in the conclusion chapter, we will at least cursorily 
outline five examples of critical aspects that could have led to a better negotiation 
outcome – if Tripoli and Washington had been aware of the insights we disclosed and 
given that they had the willingness to act accordingly. These five strategic leverages that 
would have allowed an even more successful NRN on the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear 
weapons program are the following recommendations:  
(1) Use “hidden champion” design elements (e.g. process related diplomatic design 
elements). 
(2) Take systematic advantage of “evergreen” and “multiple fitting” diplomatic tools.  
(3) Give special credit to the design of agreements.  
(4) Tap the “dormant resources” of negotiation dynamics. 
(5) Unleash the impact of coercive diplomacy (such as economic sanctions) and 
positive inducement by thinking both design elements in terms of the “shotgun” 
and the “pre-modern cannon analogy”. 8 
Since the Libyan NRN in essence signifies a “double hard case”, there is a good chance 
that these five “lessons learned” would also improve the outcome of negotiation 
dynamics in other fields of international security policy.  
                            
8
 For  detailed discussion of these leverages see ch. 6.1.2 
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1.2 The Thrilling Moment: The Logic of Wisdom 
(LoW) 
The different results we achieved within our PhD project are new and intriguing. They 
reveal groundbreaking insights about NRN and the performance of its diplomatic design. 
However, returning to our parable of rock n’ roll, we have to admit that these findings 
remain within the margin of negotiation research. They do not push the border of this 
particular “style”. All the pioneering results we achieved represent in essence “within-
style-innovation”. Be it the diplomatic design, the problem of fit, Enlightened Rationalism, 
or the public bad approach. All these concepts signify selective adaptation from analytical 
schemes stemming originally from neighboring (sub-)disciplines.  
However, while the large majority of our research followed the “more of the same 
attitude”, we also encountered a “thrilling moment” in this PhD project. Without having 
searched for it, we unintentionally discovered a new mode of strategic action and 
decision making: the logic of wisdom (LoW, or the wise strategy).  
In the common sense view, wisdom is primarily perceived as a static stock of knowledge, 
a personal competence, or even a virtue. We however claim – based on the discovery we 
made in the Libyan NRN – that wisdom is first and foremost a behavioral pattern. What 
we describe as the LoW is not reserved to elderly, knowledgeable, experienced, and 
charismatic personalities. It is not esoteric hermeticism or a secrete science. Rather, LoW 
signifies a purposive and strategically applicable approach of decision-making and action. 
It is a systematic process, which is scientifically explainable and understandable. It is a 
rational strategy relevant for ordinary people – such as foreign policy makers.  
Residing in the realm of rational choice, LoW is clearly distinct from ideational or 
constructivist approaches of social change. However, LoW also differs from the logic of 
conventional rational strategy. In its general reading, the conventional rational strategy is 
understood as “the art or science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field of 
conflict” (Bull 1968: 593). LoW represents exactly the opposite. What was unintentionally 
discovered in our PhD project is the idea of a “strategic self-manipulation” of one’s own 
desires. LoW represents the rare but influential act where actors deliberately adapt their 
ends (E) to the available means (M) and the given strategic context (S) (i.e. the trans- or 
international problem in a given situation). In essence, LoW is a phenomenon most of us 
might have already experienced at some point in our professional careers or in private 
lives. It is in many respects synonymous with the painful but liberating decision to let go 
of cherished but increasingly unrealistic goals for the sake of regaining new opportunities. 
If ordinary people apply this strategy, why should state actors not do the same?  
LoW is the research desiderate of our PhD project. It is not the finding of our analysis in 
the narrow sense of the meaning since LoW was neither part of our research question nor 
have we actively studied it. It is rather an interesting question we stumbled upon. What 
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we believe to have discovered en passant, is in essence a new strategic mode that is rare 
but highly relevant since it is assumed to apply particularly to those situations where 
power differences are prominent, where foreign policy challenges are high, or foreign 
policy makers are impelled to take decisions and actions under high time pressure.  
At the moment, LoW is nothing more than an intriguing hypothesis that is urgently 
demanding further research. But given that we found evidence for this phenomenon on 
several occasions in the Libyan NRN, there is solid ground to assume that at least some of 
the great success stories and some of the big failures we saw in the general history of 
foreign policy are the product of a proper or a false application of “wise strategy”. 
Although we find fragments of LoW in recent IR studies and in the writings of historic 
intellectuals seen as the founding fathers of modern strategic studies (see ch. 6.2), LoW 
has never been studied before. It is a completely new academic concept. In that sense, 
LoW has all what is needed to qualify for a real scientific “discovery”. It goes beyond the 
conventional innovation by translation or interpretation. Provided that future research 
will show that this phenomenon has relevance beyond the Libyan NRN, the “wise 
strategy” is likely to push the border of the discipline at least in the specific field of 
foreign policy and strategic studies. After IR scholars have debated the role of hard, soft 
and smart power for the last two decades (Nye 2011), the time has come to think about 
“wise power”. 
1.3 Plan of the PhD  
Before we get started, we would like to make a final remark. While appearing as a banal 
platitude at first sight, it is nevertheless important to bear in mind that this is a doctoral 
thesis and not a book proposal. This distinction is essential for an understanding of how 
we have organized our study.  
Many PhD candidates endeavor to write doctoral theses that are at least close in 
structure and logical for a future book proposal. Having one’s eye on what editors and 
publishers like to read gives priority to a single, attention-drawing argument, a brief and 
concise theory chapter, mainly uncontroversial methods, and straightforward testing of 
hypotheses preferably on a reasonable broad empirical basis comprising three or more 
cases. However, we have thought our PhD project more in terms as a proof of “analytical 
mastery” and not as a future book proposal. These days, doctoral theses (and maybe 
Habilitationen) are presumably one of the few genres in academic literature that allow 
the freedom to dig deep into (meta)theoretical considerations, apply unconventional 
methods and research design, and give new and untested analytical templates a trial. We 
wanted to take advantage of it. If we had written our PhD project in view of a future book 
proposal, we would have boiled down the theory section (namely the development of the 
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fit taxonomy), we would have been less innovative with regard to the different new 
approaches we introduced (such the fit approach or the public bad approach), and we 
would have studied more historic cases less in-depth in order to give a broader overview 
on the understudied phenomenon of NRN.9  
With this general structure in mind, the plan of our PhD is as follows: We will at first 
introduce in detail the different analytical concepts we have presented in the 
introduction. Apart from the policy paradigm (ch. 2.1), we will explain the understudied 
phenomena of nuclear reversal and NRN (ch. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2), diplomatic design (ch. 2.3), 
and the fit approach (ch. 2.4). In addition, we will elaborate on Scientific Realism in a 
meta-theoretical section and will show why the “logic of consequence” and not the “logic 
of persuasion” or the “logic of appropriateness” is the preferred action-theoretical 
approach of our analysis (ch. 2.5.1). Based on a critical review of Orthodox Rationalism, 
we will then introduce the reform project of Enlighted Rationalism explaining in detail 
several of its characteristic features that we deem as particularly relevant for our PhD 
project – such as a revised concept of rational motivation, the chances and difficulties of 
surveying endogenic motivations, and dynamic sequencing (ch. 2.5.2 and ch. 2.5.3). 
Finally, we turn to the general epistemological question of how Scientific Realists draw 
conclusions and introduce the so-called “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE) (ch. 
2.5.4). The major focus of this last section is to propose ways and means of how this 
epistemological approach could be applied in practical IR research – an aspect that was 
thus far neglected by the literature (ch. 2.5.4.2).  
The following chapter is marked by the fit taxonomy. In the first part, we introduce the fit 
taxonomy and its different components highlighting the structure of two problem 
dimensions, three social traps, and two rationalist analytical approaches (ch. 3.1). With 
the help of two fictitious examples (the problem of fare-dodging and the famous 
metaphor of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)), we will show how fit taxonomies are operating 
and how they could be used to identify the “optimal problem solution” (ch. 3.2). Finally, 
we will describe how the fit taxonomy was developed based on a systematic IBE selection 
process (ch. 3.3).  
In the fourth chapter, we elaborate on the applied methods and the case selection in 
detail. Apart from briefly introducing the way we employ the “qualitative research 
paradigm” (ch. 4.1), we will focus in particular on the mapping of endogenic motivations 
which we realize by the “interest profile approach” (ch. 4.2.1) and the concept of 
“operational codes” (ch. 4.2.2). This section is followed by the introduction of the so-
called “re-enactment method” – a scheme we have developed in order to allow a 
                            
9
 But, despite being no book proposal, this doctoral thesis shall nevertheless not disgrace the norm of 
readability and the “loveliness” of a clear line of argumentation. In order to keep our PhD project within 
the margins of a reasonable number of pages and not running the risk of losing out in terms of 
innovation and (meta)theoretical conceptual depth, we decided to radically shorten (!) our empirical 
analysis. We chose to discard two NRN examples we have likewise analyzed (the negotiations on the 
successfully dismantled South Korean nuclear weapons program (1975-1976) and the failed bargaining 
efforts on the Indian nuclear capacity (1990-2001)) and instead concentrated on the Libyan “hard case” 
as the most important and intriguing example of nuclear reversal.  
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systematic and structured translation of the surveyed actor’s motivations in concrete and 
action-guiding strategic constellations (ch. 4.3). Finally, we will apply the “least-likely case 
selection” and show how the American-Libyan negotiations were identified among the 14 
historic examples of NRN (ch. 4.4).  
In the fifth chapter, we will study the Libyan NRN. Following the logic “interpretative 
validation” – an important quality criterion in qualitative research – we will at first give 
the reader an overview on the evolution of the negotiation process and the Qaddafi 
regime’s nuclear weapons program (ch. 5.1). In the following section, we apply our fit 
taxonomy to the Libyan case (ch. 5.2). Based on the public bad approach and the concept 
of dilemma games, we will identify a “nested multitier map” of the problematic 
bargaining constellations Tripoli and the United States faced in their effort to reverse 
Libya’s nuclear weapons program by diplomacy. With help of the fit taxonomy, we are 
able to study the “fit performance” of the numerous diplomatic design elements applied 
during American-Libyan negotiation process in detail (ch. 5.3).  
In the final chapter – the conclusion of our PhD project – we will summarize the revealed 
findings and respond to our overarching research question (ch. 6.1). The most interesting 
part of the conclusion chapter is, however, our elaboration on the “thrilling moment” – 
the discovery of the “logic of wisdom” (ch. 6.2).  
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2. THE SETUP CHAPTER – KEY CONCEPTS 
AND APPROACHES  
In the introduction we have touched upon a series of analytical approaches and 
(meta)theoretical concepts: the policy paradigm (ch. 2.1), nuclear reversal and NRN (ch. 
2.2), diplomatic design (ch. 2.3), the problem of fit and fit taxonomies (ch. 2.4), as well as 
on Enlighted Rationalism and the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) (ch. 2.5). All 
these approaches are new and innovative in the sense of the “more of the same 
attitude.” None of them was thus far systematically discussed in negotiation research. In 
this chapter we will elaborate in detail on these concepts.  
2.1 The Policy Paradigm 
There is hardly any research project in IR that would not claim to be relevant for policy 
makers. As Gunther Hellmann has pointed out, almost all IR scholars emphasize that their 
work has important implications for actual decision makers (Hellmann 2006a: 19). 
However, the policy paradigm how we understand it goes beyond these ubiquitous claims 
for relevance.  
Of course, there is already a considerable stock of literature discussing policy-oriented 
research in IR (e.g., George 1994; George & Smoke 1974: 616-642; Hellmann 2006b; 
Lepgold & Nincic 2001; Nau 2008; Nye 2009a; Perthes 2007). In recent years the debate 
rotated primarily around the questions: Is there a gap between academia and practical 
foreign policy or not? Is it widening or not? And how can we bridge it (e.g., Jentleson 
2002; Martinsen & Rehfeld 2006; Nye 2008a; Walt 2005)? However, what has remained 
underdeveloped and unprecise is a clear understanding of the actual mission of the policy 
paradigm, what it meant for the role of the individual researchers, and how it differs from 
other general paradigms in IR. 
 As we have already said in the introduction chapter (ch. 1.1), the central mission of the 
policy paradigm is, in our view, that IR scholars study what policy makers should know 
about those phenomena in world politics they want to know about. On the one hand, this 
postulate expresses the conviction that practitioners of international and transnational 
politics – be it state actors or non-governmental players – need IR scholars and their 
advice. Decision makers are often “in the dark” about important problems and 
challenges. Foreign policy is improving if based on sophisticated IR research. But, on the 
other hand, the policy paradigm is not only encouraging for a self-confident engagement 
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with policy makers. It is also calling for a realistic self-restraint. It signifies a plea for 
focusing IR research on those aspects that are important for practical foreign policy and 
for studying those questions that haunt governmental and non-governmental decision 
makers in transnational and international affairs.10  
But the symbiotic relationship between academia and politics which lies at the very heart 
of the policy paradigm shall not be confused with an appeal to turn IR into a “service 
industry” for decision makers. It is not demanding for uncritical “court jesters” (Perthes 
2007), hectic adaption of scientific research to the frequency of the day-to-day business 
of foreign affairs, or efforts to boil down each and every research result to formats that 
are immediately usable for policy makers. Certainly, the policy paradigm is opposed to 
the “ivory tower”, to “academic escapism”, “meta-theoretical esoteric”, and “scholastic 
word games” (e.g., Hacke 2003: 364; Hellmann 2006a: 15; Wallace 1996: 305). But as long 
as there are bridges and dialogue, the policy paradigm – as we understand it – is not 
against the gap between academia and the policy. On the contrary, this gap has its 
benefits and even signifies one of the major cultural achievements of modern times. The 
gap separates two spheres which follow two distinct logics. It bestows the academic 
world with calm and with a shelter that allows the development of new ideas and 
concepts, and avoids that scholars fall easily prey to seductive political manipulation 
(Behrens 2010: 104; Martinsen & Rehfeld 2006: 47; Offe 2008: 72-3). Moreover, given 
that IR (at least in Germany) was for a long time in many respects a “political surface 
science” (politische Oberflächenwissenschaft; Hellman 1994; see also: Czempiel 1986) 
with little theoretical and methodic depth, it is only logical that the gap between 
academia and practical policy has widened in the last two decades (Kruzel 1994; Lepgold 
& Nincic 2001: 3; Newsom 1995-6; Nye 2009a).11 Rather, it appears that the widening gap 
was a necessary “evolutionary consequence” of the welcoming professionalization 
process the discipline underwent during the 1990s and 2000s.  
Consequentially, the policy paradigm is not opposed to theory development or abstract 
philosophical debates as long as they signify necessary academic practice for the 
resolution of empirical puzzles and not self-referential customs. What is essential for the 
policy paradigm is not immediate usability but a general transferability of IR research. 
That scientific results are instantly applicable is in general more illusion than reality. Even 
the outputs of disciplines which are believed to have a high practicability – such as 
engineering, business, or medicine – often have no direct usability and normally run 
through a “translation process” until they reach “marketability.” Against the background 
that the foreign policy machinery is characterized by decision making under high time 
pressure, constant shifting between different crises hotspots, and an “oral culture” (in 
                            
10
 Of course, IR scholars could also focus on aspects policy makers – from the governmental or from the 
non-governmental side – do not want to know about. In such a scenario research is used to set the 
agenda for urgent problems in world politics. However, it is illusory to assume that IR scholars, who 
attempt to “speak truth to power” (Nau 2008), would achieve any meaningful impact in constellations 
where policy makers tend to ignore their message. In such a situation of “public deafness,” scholars 
could only make themselves hear by leaving academia and becoming themselves political players – 
performing a metamorphosis from “academics” to “intellectuals” (j’accuse). Thus, highlighting what 
policy makers should know about phenomena in world politics they do not want to know about is not 
part of a genuine research paradigm anymore but a political effort. 
11
 According to a survey conducted in 2011 (Teaching and Research in International Politics (TRIPS)), 
85 % of the interviewed U.S. IR scholars claim that there is a gap between the academia world and 
practical politics and that it was growing in size (Maliniak et al. 2012: 66).  
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contrast to the written culture in the academia world; Nye 2008c: 654), the direct 
usability of IR research is in particular unlikely (George 1993). 
Apart from the effort to study what policy makers should know about those phenomena 
they want to know about, another central element of the policy paradigm is, in our view, 
the simultaneousness between “backward-looking analysis” and “forward-looking 
prescription.” The policy paradigm is about studying past or present structures, events, 
process, and actors in world politics (“backward-looking analysis”) and is developing on 
that basis analytical concepts and approaches that allow to improve strategic decision 
making and actions under given circumstances (“forward-looking analysis”). The 
parallelism of these two orientations is a distinct feature of the policy paradigm that 
makes this approach an academic concept through and through. The policy paradigm is 
about methods, research in line with strict scientific quality criteria, and – most important 
– it is about theory.12  
The central role of theory must come as a surprise for all those scholars who deliberately 
write un-theoretical and method-free studies in non-abstract language (e.g., think tank 
papers, op-eds, policy brief, etc.) in order to increase the receptiveness of their research 
by foreign policy leaders. But in light of what we defined as the policy paradigm, one 
could say that these scholars are wrong. They misleadingly water-down crucial substance 
of IR research in exchange for relatively meager tactical communication gains. 
Consequentially, many of those scholars who think their studies would be very relevant 
for practical foreign affairs miss the point.  
The history of the discipline shows that IR research was most relevant to foreign policy 
leaders and substantially influenced the conduct of foreign affairs when theoretical 
concepts, which had both backward-looking descriptive and forward-looking prescriptive 
implications, were put at central stage. The “success stories” of IR research which were 
widely adopted by policy makers in the 20th century – such as deterrence theory, balance 
of power, research on arms control regimes, or the theory of democratic peace – were all 
following this playbook (Daase 2010; George 1993; Nye 2008c: 650-1).13 Moreover, 
foreign policy leaders appear to have a “longing” for IR theory (Mearsheimer & Walt 
2013; Silver 2012: 96-7). As Joseph Nye has put it “in practice, theory is unavoidable” (Nye 
2008c: 648). And, as was shown by a recent survey, the aspect of IR research that is most 
relevant to senior U.S. foreign policy makers is – theory. The authors, Paul Avey and 
Michael Desch, conclude: “Policymakers appear to want mid-range theory (…) They seem 
not so much to be looking for direct policy advice as for background knowledge to help 
them put particular events into a more general context (…) [T]he thing policymakers most 
want from scholars are frameworks for making sense of the world they have to operate 
in” (Avey & Desch 2014: 244).  
                            
12
 Against that background it is only logical that Alexander George explicitly used the term “policy 
theory” to describe what we understand to be the policy paradigm (George & Smoke 1974: 616; George 
1993). 
13
 Alexander George has further specified three stocks of theoretical IR knowledge that are most 
relevant to policy makers: “abstract conceptual models of strategies”, “generic knowledge of 
strategies”, and “actor-specific behavioral models” (George 1993: 115-134). 
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Consequentially, the non-theoretical and method-free descriptive studies provided by 
think tanks and alleged policy-oriented scholars often “talk past” their designated 
audience. Practitioners of foreign policy often have a very detailed understanding about 
the scope and nature of the challenges they face. In particular, are they very well aware 
of the bureaucratic dimension and the various fault lines of (inter-) departmental “turf 
wars” that are attached to nearly every issue in international affairs – an aspect that is in 
many cases not visible for external observers. Moreover, in terms of topicality and degree 
of detail, IR scholars could, in most fields, not stand up to journalists and the intelligence 
community (George 1993: 132). Thus, without theories and methods policy-oriented IR is 
abandoning its “unique selling point.”  
Moreover, non-theoretical and method-free policy-oriented IR research is potentially 
superfluous and is, in addition, sowed with numerous analytical pitfalls. For example, 
scholars who follow that path are particularly endangered to get trapped into incorrect 
historic analogies (Neustad & May 1986), have – in order to attain more attention by the 
media and policy makers – often an inclination for naysaying and alarmism (Schneckener 
2006), tend to draw “oversimplified and/or irrelevant generalization to their present crisis 
or problem” (George & Smoke 1974: 625), and often apply without knowing 
inappropriate, incomplete, and contradicting theories (Daase 2006: 205-7). After all, even 
scholars and think tankers who indulge the attitude of theory-free policy research do use 
theories and conceptual frameworks “whether consciously or not” (George 1993: xviii). As 
John Maynard Keynes once said, “practical men [sic], who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist” (cited by Nau 2008: 635).  
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2.2 Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Reversal, and 
Nuclear Reversal Negotiation 
Nuclear weapons are an “evergreen issue” in international affairs. It emerged in the 
course of the Second World War when Allied powers were racing against Nazi Germany in 
an effort to acquire an atomic bomb. Since then, the nuclear issue has lost nothing of its 
actuality. It continues to occupy the minds of foreign policy leaders and international 
security experts around the world. Considerable parts of our strategic thinking today are 
still rotating around the question of nuclear weapons and their proliferation.14 
The “evergreen issue” of nuclear weapons has many facets. In the last two decades policy 
makers puzzled, for example, about the nature of nuclear deterrence, the state of arms 
control regimes (e.g., Cirincione et.al. 2005; Müller 2009), the danger of nuclear or 
radiological terrorism (e.g., Bunn & Wier 2005; Neuneck 2002), or the prospects of global 
nuclear disarmament – also known as “global zero” – which is currently closely 
intertwined with the so-called “humanitarian approach” (e.g., Sauer & Pretorius 2014). In 
the following section we will show however that nuclear reversal negotiations (NRN) are 
the most relevant aspect of the nuclear issue. This type of international bargaining not 
only has a high relevance for the practitioners of foreign policy, NRN signifies in addition a 
relatively frequent, puzzling, and understudied phenomena in international security 
policy.  
However, before we move on to NRN, we have to say some words about nuclear reversal 
– the broader phenomenon NRN are part of. Without a clear picture on nuclear reversal, 
our understanding of NRN will remain limited and incomplete.  
2.2.1 Nuclear Reversal – Frequent, Understudied, and Puzzling 
Ariel Levite was one of the first scholars who studied nuclear reversal. According to him, 
nuclear reversal signifies a process “in which states embark on a path leading to nuclear 
weapons acquisition but subsequently reverse course” (Levite 2003: 61).15  
The nuclear ambitions of those states that strive for an atomic bomb vary widely and are 
often relatively diverse (Table 1). In the history of nuclear proliferation, we encounter, for 
                            
14
 While the vast majority of experts think that the spread of nuclear weapons is a global problem, there 
is a small group of analysts who draw an optimistic picture of nuclear proliferation. These “proliferation 
optimists,” of whom Kenneth Waltz is the most prominent protagonist, argue by referring to the historic 
lessons of the Cold War that the spread of atomic bombs has positive implications for international 
security. They postulate the assumption that nuclear deterrence would bring strategic stability to world 
regions which are today plagued by wars and violent conflicts (for the debate between the 
“proliferation pessimist” and “proliferation optimists” see: Sagan & Waltz 2003).  
15
 Note that other scholars have used other expressions which coincide or overlap with the notion of 
“nuclear reversal” such as “deprolifertion” (Müller & Schmidt 2010), “inhibition” (Gavin 2015), “nuclear 
forbearance” (Paul 2000), or “nuclear renunciation” (Potter 1995).  
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example, states actors that have embarked on this pathway only briefly and with great 
caution (e.g., Canada and Norway). Others have instead invested considerable resources 
and have pursued their objectives persistently (e.g., Libya or North Korea). And again 
others have “inherited” their nuclear weapons capacities when the chaotic demise of the 
Soviet Union turned them virtually overnight into nuclear weapons states (Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan).  
Table 1: Cases of Nuclear Reversal  
 
The most obvious way to categorize these different nuclear weapons programs is to 
systematize them according to their “maturity.” Following the concepts introduced by 
State Nuclear Deliberation Nuclear Pursuit Nuclear possession Nuclear Reversal Reference (Selection)
Algeria (a) (b) 1983-1991 - - 1994
e.g. Albright & Hinderstein (2001), 
Fitzpatrick (2008a) 
Argentina (a) 1968-1990 - - early 1990s
e.g. Redick, Wrobel & Carasales 
(1995), Goldemberg (2006)
Belarus (a) (c) 1990-1994 - - 1994 e.g. Potter (1995), Reiss (1995) 
Brazil (a) 1966-1974 1975-1990 - early 1990s
e.g. Carasales (1995) , Redick 
(1998)  
Chile (b) late 1960s - - early 1990s e.g. Müller/Schmidt (2010)
Iraq 1970-1973 1974-1991 - 1991 e.g. Samore (1994), Solingen (2007) 
Kazakhstan (a) (c) 1990-1994 - - 1994 e.g. Potter (1995), Reiss (1995) 
Libya (a) 1970 1970-2003 2003 e.g. Bowen (2006)
Nigeria (b) late 1970s - early 1990s  - - approx. 1991-1995 e.g. Adibe (1997) 
Post Revolution Iran (a) 1984 1984 till 2015 - 2015
e.g. Fitzpatrick (2008b), Perthes 
(2008) 
South Africa 1969-1973 1974-1977 1978-1991 1991
e.g. Burgess (2006), Liberman 
(2001), Villiers (1993)
Syria 1995 1996-2007 - 2007 e.g. Laipson (2004), Spector (2010), 
Ukraine (a) (c) 1991-1992  1992-1994 - 1994
e.g. Martel (1998), Reiss (1995), 
Sokov (2010)
Australia 1956-1973 - - 1973
e.g. Broinowski (2006), Hymans 
(2000), Walsh (1997)
Pre-Revolution Iran 1974-1979 - - 1979
e.g. Fitzpatrick (2008b), Perthes 
(2008) 
Romania (b) late 1970s 1981 bis 1989 - 1989 e.g. Prosser (2010)
South Korea (a)
1969-1970 and again 1976-
1982 
1971-1975 - 1982
e.g. Hersman & Peters  (2006), 
Pollack & Reiss (2004)
Spain (a) (b) 
approx. between 1971 or 1975-
1986
- - late 1980s e.g. Vinas (1985) 
Taiwan (a)
1967-1976 and again 1987-
1988
1982-1988 - 1976 and again 1988
e.g. Mitchell (2004), Wang (2008), 
Harkavy (1981)
Yugoslavia 
1949-1952 and again 1974-
1982
1953-1963 and again 1982-
1987
- 1963 and again 1987 
e.g. Hymans (2011), Mukhatzhanova 
(2010), Potter (2000)
Canada 1945 - - late 1940s
e.g. Bratt (2002),  Buckley (2000), 
Clearwater (1998)
Egypt 
1955-1962 and 1968-1970 and 
again 1980-1981 
- - 1962, 1970 and again 1981
e.g. Einhorn (2004), Rublee (2006), 
Walsh (2001)
Indoensia 1964-1967 - - 1967 e.g. Cornejo (2000)
Italy 1955-1957 - - 1957 e.g. Kelle (1996), Nuti (1993)
Japan 1941-1945 - - 1945
e.g. Campbell & Sunohara (2004), 
Solingen (2007)
Nazi Germany 1939-1945 - - 1945 e.g. Müller (2003), Schneider (2015) 
Norway late 1940s -1962 - - 1962 e.g. Forland (1997) 
Post War Japan  late 1960s-1970 - - 1970
e.g. Campbell & Sunohara (2004), 
Solingen (2007)
Sweden 1946-1970 - - 1970
e.g. Agrell (1990), Cole (1997), 
Fehrm (1985)
Switzerland 1945-1969 - - 1969
e.g. Jasper (2013), Stüss-
Lauterbach (1995), Falkenstein 
(1997) 
West Germany 1956 -1960 - - 1960 e.g. Müller (2003), Schneider (2015) 
(c) "Inheritance" (nuclear weapons and atomic programs on the territory inherited form former empire or occupation force) (Müller/Schmidt 2010: 158)
P
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There are a number of states which were suspected of having pursued at least some nuclear efforts in the past but on which the information is still relatively dim and uncertain: Finnland (Levite 
2002/3), Greece (Levite 2002/3), Burman (Selth 2010), Venezuela (Noriega 2010), Turkey (Fuerth 2004; Varnum 2010), Saudi Arabia (al-Marashi 2010; Fitzpatrick  2008a; Lippman 2004), and 
the Netherlands (Levite 2002/3)
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Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (March 1970)  
End of Cold War (November 1990)
NUCLEAR REVERSAL* 
* This table builds upon previous research on "nuclear reversal": Prosser (2011), Bleek (2010), Müller/Schmidt (2010), and  Levite (2003)
(a) Cases were negotiations played an improtant role 
(b) Under-studied cases. No comprehensive research haven been conducted so far (vgl. Müller/Schmidt 2010)
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Bleek (2010), Posser (2010), and Müller & Schmidt (2010), we distinguish three “stages of 
maturity” (Table 1): 16  
(1) “Nuclear Deliberation”: In this stage, atomic renegades explore the possibility to 
start a nuclear weapons program. This phase is primarily marked by secret studies 
on the utility and feasibly of nuclear weapons acquisition. 
(2) “Nuclear Pursuit”: In that phase, state actors actually start to acquire nuclear 
weapons and take practical steps in that regard. Setting up and operating a nuclear 
program is the major characteristic of the “nuclear pursuit stage.” That includes 
concrete actions such as the constructing of facilities for the production of 
weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, the development of the necessary means of 
delivery for a future nuclear weapon (i.e., special aircrafts, ballistic missiles, or 
cruise missiles), and the testing of nuclear explosive devices.  
(3)  “Nuclear Possession”: This phase signifies the final “stage of maturity” where state 
actors have eventually managed to cross the “nuclear threshold” and have acquired 
militarily deployable atomic weapons.17 
Nuclear reversal is an interesting and relevant phenomenon in international security 
policy because it is frequent, understudied, and puzzling. Moreover, studying nuclear 
reversal gives rise to a new and more benign narrative of the nuclear policy field and is 
challenging the conventional perspective that describes the history of the atomic bomb 
primarily as an inexorable and accelerating pursuit for nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear Reversal is Frequent: Nuclear reversal has occurred relatively often in the 71 
years history of the atomic bomb. Of the 40 nuclear weapons programs that were started 
since the Second World War, 31 were reversed after a certain time (Table 1). On average, 
it took 15 years until a state decided to abandon its unconventional weapons program.18 
Nuclear reversal is therefore far more frequent than continued proliferation. Compared 
to the 31 examples of nuclear reversal, there are “only” nine that have started and 
continued their quest for an atomic bomb (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see Table 2).  
                            
16
 With regard to the dates and periods of historic nuclear reversal cases, we would like to raise a point 
of caution (cf. Table 1). Coding nuclear (non)proliferation is a challenging task which involves a 
significant proportion of uncertainty. It is, for example, difficult to say when exactly a state has started 
“nuclear deliberation” and when it moved over to the stage of “nuclear pursuit.” Consequentially, the 
different evaluation projects (e.g., Bleek 2010; Prosser 2011; Müller/Schmidt 2010; Levite 2003) showed 
variations in terms of timelines and also in the number of coded cases. Prosser (2011), for example, had 
not taken Chile and Nigeria into account even though these states were – according to Müller & 
Schmidt (2010) – at least deliberating to start a nuclear weapons program. Bleek (2010) instead had not 
coded Canada – although the country played together with the UK and the USA an important role in the 
“Manhattan Project.” The data on nuclear reversal presented in table 1 is the effort to harmonize the 
different coding projects. In cases of inconsistencies, we conducted our own research in order to close 
gaps and resolve contradictions.  
17
 Note that there is a debate about the question of when exactly a state becomes a nuclear weapons 
state: see in particular Hymans 2010b.  
18
 Note that there are also cases of “swaying” nuclear proliferation. That is when a nuclear weapons 
program is suspended and restarted several times (see, e.g., Egypt, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, and South 
Korea, table 1).  
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Nuclear Reversal is Understudied: The literature on nuclear weapons is very much 
focused on the opposite trend of nuclear reversal – nuclear proliferation. What is 
primarily at the center of academic attention is the spread of nuclear weapons, as well as 
the proliferation of related technologies, materials, and know-how. The most prominent 
analytical approaches on nuclear weapons still circle about the question when, how, and 
why states cross the “nuclear threshold.”19 Although the number of studies on nuclear 
reversal have increased in recent years thanks to the work of several protagonists who 
have actively advocated for this research object (e.g., Levite 2003; Müller 2008; Paul 
2000; Reiss 1995; Yager 1997), it still represents a phenomenon that is underappreciated 
by IR research.20  
However, even though nuclear reversal signifies a relatively young field of study, we still 
could distinguish roughly three generations of research. The “first generation” (mainly 
from late 1990s to the early 2000s) focused primarily on exploring and defining the 
general nature of this phenomenon (e.g., Campbell, Einhorn & Reiss 2004; Doyle 1997; 
Levite 2003; Reiss 1988; Reiss 1995, Schneier & Dowdy 1998). The “second generation” of 
research (mainly from the early 2000s to the late 2000s) started to study nuclear reversal 
more systematically. This phase was primarily marked by large-N studies that tried to 
reveal generalizable insights about trends and factors that affect the decision-making of 
atomic renegade states (e.g., Müller & Schmidt 2010; Prosser 2010).21 The “third 
generation” (mainly from the late 2000s onward) of which our PhD project is part of is 
studying specific explanation factors of nuclear reversal. This last generation is 
characterized by the fact that most of the studies do not exclusively focus on nuclear 
reversal but also take cases and aspects of nuclear proliferation into consideration – a 
feature that made the research more fruitful and in-depth but also more amorphous. 
Another characteristic of the “third generation” is the increasing importance of 
theoretical explanations. Following the scheme of general IR theories, we could 
distinguish in that context ideational, liberal, and neo-realist research projects on nuclear 
reversal.22  
Scholars who are associated with the ideational approach have studied nuclear decision 
making by looking upon the attitudes, identities, norms, and role concepts of state 
leaders (e.g., Chafetz et.al. 1996; Chafetz 1993; Hymans 2006; O’Reilly 2015; Schneider 
2015). Maria Rost Rublee has, for example, analyzed how international nonproliferation 
                            
19
 For an overview on the different approaches on nuclear proliferation, see: Hymans 2006b; Monteiro 
& Debs 2014; Ogilvie-White 1996; Sagan 2011; Thayer 1995. 
20
 In that context, we should emphasis that studying nuclear reversal is not simply reading its opposite 
trend (i.e., nuclear proliferation) backwards. Although the approaches on nuclear proliferation provide 
valuable “food for thought” for the research on nuclear reversal, both types of nuclear decision making 
are following divergent logics. To put it simply: Trying to obtain something is different from abandoning 
something that one has already obtained.  
21
 In that context, we should also mention several quantitative studies that focused primarily on nuclear 
proliferation but revealed also fruitful insights about nuclear reversal (e.g., Bleek 2010; Jo & Garzke 
2007; Singh & Way 2004).  
22
 Interestingly, the approach of neo-liberal institutionalism which played in IR in general a very 
important role is, apart from some exceptions, nearly inexistent as an explanation for nuclear reversal 
(see e.g., Hymans 2010: 26-7; Reiss 1995).  
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norms affected state actors’ decision making in favor of nuclear restraint (Rublee 2009; 
see also: Müller, Fischer & Kötter 1994). Another ideational analysis was, for example, 
applied by Ursual Jasper, who recurred to a linguist-pragmatist approach and studied 
nuclear (non)proliferation as an intersubjective discourse of conflicting interpretations on 
armament and disarmament (Jasper 2013).23  
Other research projects have applied a liberal template and have focused on the domestic 
structures of state actors striving for nuclear weapons. Etel Solingen has, for example, 
studied whether and to which extent nuclear reversal is promoted by the rise of an 
“outward-looking” elite that is interested in free trade and economic reforms (Solingen 
1994; Solingen 2007). Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt have studied whether the 
change in states’ domestic political system – namely the transformation from autocracy 
to democracy – is conductive in terms of nuclear disarmament (Müller & Schmidt 2010). 
Other scholars have instead analyzed how national crises of political legitimacy (Cho 
2009) or struggles of different domestic bureaucratic actors affect nuclear reversal (Walsh 
2001; Walsh 2006: 35-47).  
Table 2: Official & Unofficial Nuclear Weapons States 
 
 
 
While neo-realism is the “standard approach” for the opposite trend of nuclear reversal 
(i.e,. the spread of nuclear weapons), we encounter in the literature also several 
neorealist concepts that explain nuclear disarmament by recurring to threat, power, or 
alliance relations. For example, some scholars have pointed out that atomic renegade 
states are likely to embark the pathway to nuclear reversal, if those external threats 
decline which once initiated the decision to start a nuclear weapons program (e.g., 
Costanzo 1998; Paul 2000). Another neo-realist explanation is based on strategic alliance 
and the quality of nuclear guarantees. Those scholars emphasize that guarantees by 
powerful nuclear allies (e.g., the United States) have a positive impact on nuclear decision 
making and could propel atomic renegade states into nuclear reversal (e.g., Betts 1993; 
                            
23
 In his single case study on the Indian nuclear weapons program, Itty Abraham has shown that the 
perception of nuclear weapons as a “natural insignia” of high-modern states is leading to nuclear 
proliferation. According to Abraham, state actors are ready to embark the pathway of nuclear reversal 
when they start to internalize “post-modern” values which render the quest for nuclear weapons into 
an “old-fashion fetish” (Abraham 1998, Abraham 2009). 
State Nuclear Deliberation Nuclear Pursuit Nuclear Possession 
China - 1955-1963 1964
France 1945-1953 1954-1959 1960
Russia (UdSSR) - 1945-1948 1949
United Kingdom - 1945-1951 1952
United States early 1940 1941-1945 1945
India 1947-1971 1972-73 1974
Israel 1948-1954 1955-1965 1966
North Korea 1962 1963-2005 late 2000s
Pakistan - 1972-1986 1987
* The figure builds upon previous research on "nuclear reversal": Prosser (2010), Bleek (2010), Müller/Schmidt (2008), and  Levite 
(2003)
Official NPT 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
States 
De Facto 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
States
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Davis 1993; Reiss 2005). Other scholars have turned the conventional realist explanation 
for nuclear proliferation upside down. They claim that state actors chose nuclear reversal 
because of external threats. Running a nuclear program is risky, they say, and makes 
atomic renegades vulnerable for vigorous counter-proliferation measures by Western 
states (e.g., military intervention). Nuclear reversal is a viable option to avoid this risk, 
these authors say (e.g., Gerzhoy 2012).24 
Figure 1: Historic Trajectory of Newly Started Nuclear Weapons Programs  
 
Nuclear Reversal is Puzzling: Situations where actors change accustomed behavioral 
patterns and take costly decisions to overcome path dependencies signify in general 
interesting research objects and promising academic riddles. The puzzling nature of 
nuclear reversal, however, goes beyond conventional “U-turning.” Nuclear reversal 
provides a new and more benign perspective onto the nuclear policy field. It challenges 
the dominating neo-realist research of nuclear proliferation which gave rise in the past 
decades to a pessimistic if not even alarmistic perception of the nuclear issue.25 If we look 
through the neo-realist lens and assume that the international order is structured 
according to the principle of anarchy where actors rely on the strategy of self-help and do 
not indulge the hope to be rescued by the international community when facing severe 
threats, nuclear reversal is indeed puzzling. Why should state actors who live under these 
circumstances abandon their nuclear weapon programs and give away the chance to 
acquire the “absolute weapon” (Broodie et al. 1946) which would make them 
untouchable for potential external aggressors? Moreover, given that all permanent 
members of the UN Security Council are at the same time in possession of nuclear 
weapons, makes abandoning the quest for atomic bombs synonymous with turning down 
                            
24
 Moreover, we could refer in context of neo-realist approaches also to the “high posture” assumption 
introduced by Enid Schoettel. According to Schoettel nuclear proliferation is unattractive for smaller 
aspirant states as long as the big powers have substantive nuclear weapon capacities. But if the big 
players disarm, the value of smaller arsenals is rising and so do the incentive to set up a nuclear 
weapons program (Schoettle 1979).  
25
 Some authors have described the academic fixation on the spread of nuclear weapons as an 
“obsession” (Mueller 2009) or as a false and potentially harmful historic narrative (Pelopidas 2011). 
And, in the overview chapter of their recent compendium on nuclear proliferation, William Potter and 
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova said that the “pendulum” in the research on nuclear weapons has in recent 
years “swung far in the direction of alarmism” (2010: 1). 
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the prospect of obtaining one of the most crucial insignias required to be regarded as a 
great power.  
In addition, nuclear reversal is also puzzling for all those scholars who analyze the nuclear 
policy through the prism of the so-called “technological pull theory.” This approach, 
which was in particular prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, assumes that nuclear 
proliferation is triggered by scientific and technological progress. Nuclear arms races are 
regarded as a “natural” process that is kicked off as soon state actors have acquired the 
necessary ability to start nuclear weapons programs. Following the “technological pull 
theory,” U.S. policy makers and security experts have described the history of the atomic 
bomb for a long time as an inexorable and accelerating pursuit for nuclear weapons. The 
number of nuclear weapons states was assumed to rise constantly.26  
Figure 2: Chronology of Nuclear Reversal  
 
 
A New & Optimistic Narrative: Studying nuclear reversal is refuting these pessimistic 
descriptions and is instead providing a more optimistic perspective on the nuclear policy 
field. The analytical template of nuclear reversal emphasizes that the nightmares of the 
“technological pull theory” have not come true. With “only” nine states having crossed 
the “nuclear threshold,” we live today not among a “nuclear armed crowd” (Wohlstetter 
1976; see also Table 2).27 The vast majority of the around 50 states that have the scientific 
and technological abilities to pursue successful nuclear weapons programs have either 
not taken this step or have abandoned their quest for atomic bombs in the past (Hymans 
2010a; Stroll 1996).   
Protagonists of the pessimistic view have often claimed that the conventional 
nonproliferation tools and institutions – first and foremost the Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) – are ineffective and would promote a “false sense of security” (Cirincione et al. 
                            
26
 For example, the Kennedy administration expected that the international order would be shaped in 
the foreseeable future by approximately 25 nuclear weapons states (Potter & Mukhatzhanova 2010). 
27
 The closest the world ever came to the scenario of a “nuclear armed crowd” was in the year 1990 
when 12 states had crossed the “nuclear threshold” (apart from the official five nuclear powers: Israel, 
India, South Africa, Pakistan, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (Sagan 2011: fig. 1))  
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2005: 20). However, if we describe the history of the atomic bomb first and foremost as a 
series of nuclear reversal, we discover that the NPT had a very decisive impact. If we 
analyze the historic trajectory of newly started nuclear weapons programs in the past 71 
years, we find that the entry into force of the NPT in the spring of 1970 ushered the 
entire nuclear policy field into a new era. It brought an abrupt end to the phase of 
accelerated nuclear proliferation we witnessed after the end of the Second World War 
(Figure 1). In all probability, the NPT functioned as a sort of “show stopper” for the all 
those states that were toying with the idea to set up a nuclear weapons program. While 
we count in the 30 years before the NPT (1940-1970) 29 cases of newly started nuclear 
weapons programs, this number decreased significantly in the 30 years after the NPT 
entered into force (1970-2000). In that period, only 11 states started to strive for nuclear 
weapons (Figure 1). 
Moreover, studying the nuclear policy field through the prism of nuclear reversal also 
reveals that the post-Cold War era was in particular benign in terms of nuclear 
nonproliferation. While the entry into force of the NPT coincides with a sharp decline of 
nuclear proliferation, the end of the Cold War appears to correlate with an abrupt 
increase of nuclear reversal (Figure 2). In the first half of the 1990s alone we saw as many 
cases of nuclear reversal (10 examples) as during the first 30 years after the Second World 
War (1940-1970). If we resist the mainstream perspective to perceive the evolution of the 
nuclear policy field as a series of proliferation crises, we will recognize that there is 
currently no state endeavoring to acquire a nuclear weapons capacity – a novelty in the 
history of the atomic bomb. All recent atomic renegades have either stopped their efforts 
to acquire an atomic bomb (Iran in 2015, Syria in 2007) or have managed to cross the 
“nuclear threshold” (North Korea in the late 2000s). Moreover, the perspective of nuclear 
reversal highlights the historic fact that in the last 20 years (since the start of the Syrian 
program in the mid-1990s), no state has started a new nuclear weapons program – a 
remarkable development given the high frequency of newly set up atomic programs in 
the first 50 years of nuclear history (Figure 2).28 
                            
28
 However, while the phenomenon of nuclear reversal provides us with a more benign picture of 
nuclear history, we should not be too optimistic either. Although the dominant “alarmist view” is 
certainly incorrect, there are at least five arguments why we should be cautious in postulating a bright 
future. First, the relevance of those atomic weapons possessed by the nine “nuclear haves” appears to 
increase. In recent years we saw across the board in all nine nuclear weapons states efforts either to 
modernize or augment national nuclear arsenals (e.g., Thränert 2016). Second, it is certainly true that 
the nine nuclear weapons states make a percentage of less than 6% when put in relation to the totality 
of UN member states (Müller/Schmidt 2010). However, if we take into consideration that only 
approximately 50 states today have the necessary technological and economic capability to build 
nuclear weapons (Hyman 2010; Stoll 1996), the nine nuclear possession states represent a proportion 
of 20%. Third, the likelihood of nuclear reversal appears to decrease with growing “maturity” of the 
nuclear programs. Nuclear reversal occurs primarily in the stage of “nuclear deliberation” (65%) or 
“nuclear pursuit” (36%). But there was in history only one state (South Africa) that abandoned its 
nuclear weapons program after having crossed the “nuclear threshold” (table 1). In most of the cases, 
achieving the stage of “nuclear possession” represents in terms of nuclear reversal a “point of no 
return.” Thus, the chance to alter the course of a state that already possesses nuclear weapons (i.e., 
North Korea, India, and Pakistan) is very dim. Fourth, we observe that the pattern of nuclear 
proliferation had changed with the entry into force of the NPT. While the number of states striving for 
nuclear weapons has decreased significantly since the early 1970s, those who continue their efforts 
were more determined in achieving their objective. In the era before the NPT entered into force, all 
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2.2.2 Nuclear Reversal Negotiations (NRN) – Frequent and Even 
More Understudied and Puzzling  
Nuclear reversal is in general a very interesting research objective. Nevertheless, we will 
not study nuclear reversal but rather will focus only on a particular aspect of this 
phenomenon which we deem especially intriguing and interesting: NRN.  
NRN signify a specific type of bargaining dynamic that has never been systematically 
studied thus far. With our PhD project, NRN are for the first time introduced into IR 
research. This veritable research gap is astonishing since NRN occurred relatively frequent 
in the history of the nuclear bomb. In particular after the end of the Cold War, diplomacy 
and negotiation became the primer instruments to handle nuclear proliferation crises. 
The most recent and prominent examples in that regard were certainly the negotiations 
that halted the Iranian nuclear program and the suspended talks on North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions.  
The Nature of International Negotiations: But before we start elaborating on NRN we 
will first of all say a few general words about negotiations in general. We define 
negotiation (or bargaining dynamics) as a communicative and interactive process between 
two or more actors that is characterized by the effort of combining conflicting positions 
into an agreement by joint-decision making.29  
Inter- and transnational negotiations vary with regard to the involved parties (e.g., state 
actors, NGOs, International Organization, etc.), the number of actors (e.g., bilateral, mini-
lateral, or multilateral negotiations), and the outcome (e.g., tacit agreements or binding 
treaties). What, however, all negotiations have in common is the presence of conflicting 
positions and their resolution by joint decision making. This central aspect we highlighted 
in our definition is independent to the varying shape of negotiation dynamics in trans- 
and international affairs. Conflicts or conflicting views on certain issues urge parties to 
start bargaining processes and the outlook to resolve conflicts and common problems by 
joint agreement, impelling parties to maintain and complete diplomatic dynamics. This 
particular parallelism and overlap of conflict and cooperation makes negotiation distinct 
from other general concepts of conflict management such as voting, adjudication, or 
obedience (Zartman 2009; Lewicki et al. 2002: 4-6).30 Bargaining actors are in essence 
                                                                            
states that choose nuclear reversal have not moved beyond the stage of “nuclear deliberation” (Table 
1). This picture changed after 1970. More than the half (55%) of those states that either continued or 
started a nuclear weapons program after March 1970 moved forward into the stage of “nuclear 
pursuit” and managed to cross the “nuclear threshold.. Thus, nuclear proliferation has become less 
frequent but more persistent and aggressive since the early 1970s. Fifth, although the spread of nuclear 
weapons is currently no real issue if we only resist the alarmist reflex, there is nevertheless no 
guarantee that this state will prevail. For example, it is in the realm of possibility that North Korea’s 
recent rise as a nuclear weapons state and its accelerated efforts to improve its ballistic missile capacity 
might trigger proliferation attempts by East Asian states.  
29
 For other definitions of international negotiations, see, for example, Druckman 2007; Jönsson 2002; 
Zartman 1977; Odell 2013.  
30
 Although we have used Fred C. Iklé’s famous quotation already at other occasions in our PhD project 
(see ch. 1.1 and 3.1.1), it is still helpful to refer again to his words. Iklé expressed in a very concise way 
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opponents and future cooperation partners in one. And, unlike other concepts of conflict 
management, all negotiation parties are bestowed with a veto. If the bargaining outcome 
does not reflect the interests of a negotiating party this actor would simply refuse to give 
its final consent and thereby would render joint-decision making impossible. Successful 
problem resolution is only possible if all involved actors work together and arrive at the 
end at outcomes that serve the interests of all sides. 
Another central aspect of our definition is the postulate that negotiations are in essence 
communicative and interactive processes. Bargaining is a dynamic social practice. In 
comparison to negotiations, the alternative modes of conflict management (e.g., voting 
or adjudication) are more structure oriented and more demanding in terms of agreed 
upon procedures. As a consequence, bargaining dynamics require in most of the cases 
relatively little preconditions when applied to prevent, manage, or resolve conflicts and 
common problems.31 The more structure-oriented alternative concepts of conflict 
management necessitate in comparison far more requirements (e.g., voting = 
parliament/institutionalized assembly, adjudication = court/law, obedience = 
hiearchy/power/moral). This undemanding nature makes negotations in partiuclar 
attactive for all those situations where agreed procedures and structures of social 
interaction are amporphous, manifold, overlapping, contested, or inexistent. Many 
scholars are convinced that these situations increase in postmodern times and have 
become more and more common in nearly all areas of social life. This assumption gave 
rise to the argument that the relevance of bargaining dynamics is growing and that we 
are, in essence, at the dawn of a “negotiation century” where nearly everything is 
negotiated and negotiable (Fisher & Ury 2011; Hampson et al. 2007; Zartman 2009).   
While we are inclined to believe that the assumption of the “negotiation century” is 
correct for social life in general, we are very certain that this view holds true under the 
specific conditions of inter- and transnational relations where agreed upon structures and 
procedures are availabe but far more shaky and frail than in other fields and areas of 
social reality. Negotiations are therefore one of the most central modes of (inter)action in 
world politics, building the groundwork for both conflict and coopertion. Bargaining is, so 
to speak, the “engine room” of international politics.  
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that negotiations are not limited to high-level 
meetings where foreign policy leaders of conflicting parties congregate at the negotiation 
table to bargain and sign agreements. Negotiations are not limited to summits and 
conferences. Rather, bargaining dynamics are complex and prolonged processes that 
could track on for considerable time and often last for years, if not even for decades. In 
essence, every bargaining process is divided in several phases, each characterized by a 
particular negotiation modus, strategic task, and specific actor constellation. In most of 
the cases we could distinguish between the pre-negotiation, the pre-agreement, the 
                                                                            
the just-mentioned parallelism of conflict and cooperation by saying “without common interest there is 
nothing to negotiate for, without conflict nothing to negotiate about” (Iklé 1964: 2).  
31
 The only crucial requirement for negotiations is the so-called “ethos of equality” (e.g., Faure 2002; 
Zartman 2009). Negotiation parties have to acknowledge each other as potential future cooperation 
partners.   
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agreement, and the post-agreement phase (for more details on negotiation phases see 
ch. 5.1). 
With that general understanding of negotations in mind, we define NRN as international 
bargaining dynamics that aim to drive atomic renegade states into nuclear disarmament 
and make them abandon their outsider status to the global nuclear order.  
What is the global nuclear order? And what is an atomic renegade state? The meaning of 
these two concepts, which signifies two important building blocks in our NRN definition, 
are not self-explanatory and therefore need to be elaborated upon.  
The Global Nuclear Order: The “global nuclear order” includes many elements. Important 
to mention in that regard is, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as 
the central export control regime in the field, or the different Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zones. However, the most crucial element of the “global nuclear order”, its backbone, is 
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty, which came into force in March 1970s and 
was extended indefinitely in 1995, codifies the basic structure of the global nuclear order. 
With today 191 member states, the NPT is an international treaty that has almost 
reached universality. While calling for a cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear 
disarmament (Art. VI), the NPT is de facto identifying five legal nuclear weapons states 
(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United Sates; Art. IX, 3). For all other 
states the acquisition, development, and production of nuclear weapons is prohibited 
(Art. II).  
Atomic Renegades: States – regardless of whether they are members of the NPT or not – 
which have started or continued nuclear weapons programs after spring 1970 are deviant 
to the “nuclear global order” and contest its fundamental norms and principles. We call 
these actors atomic renegade states.32  
 
 
 
 
 
                            
32 Following the work of Miroslav Nincic (Nincic 2005: 46-72) we use the term “renegade state” instead 
of alternative approaches. Nincic has defined “renegades” as regimes “that defy core norms of the 
international behavior embraced by most members of the international community” (Nincic 2010: 138).  
On the one hand, the renegade concept is more precise than other terminologies used in the past which 
only emphasized the “outsider character” but neglected the aspect of contesting existing orders (for 
example, “atomic pariah” (Betts 1993; Harkavy 1981), “maverick state” (Arnold 1996), or “outlier 
regimes” (Litwak 2012)). On the other hand, the expression “renegade state” is less politically and 
morally charged than the expression “nuclear rouge state” (Lennon & Eiss 2004; Rubin 2014; Senn 
2009). 
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Table 3: Overview of Successful & Failed Nuclear Reversal Negotiations (NRN) 
 
The Nature of NRN: Following this logic and applying the argumentum e contrario, there 
were no atomic renegade states before the “global nuclear order” was established. States 
that strived for nuclear weapons before March 1970s – among them all permanent 
members of the UN Security Council – were not deviant to any meaningful order. They 
were not contesting essential principles and norms the majority of the international 
community embraced. Moreover, since there were by definition no atomic renegade 
states before spring 1970 there were, consequentially, also no NRN. The different 
diplomatic efforts that were undertaken to reverse nuclear weapons programs during the 
pre-NPT era (for example, the US attempt to halt the Israeli nuclear program (Cohen 
1999: 193; Engelhardt 2004)), could not be regarded as NRN but as a “precursor” of this 
particular type of negotiations. These early bargaining dynamics were different with 
regard to their orientation and objectives. They marked individual diplomatic endeavors 
that were not embedded in a general normative framework. The outcomes of these 
negotiations were different from those of the later NRN since they were primarily 
structured according to the logic of regional stability and balancing.33  
Thus, only when conceptualized in correspondence to the global nuclear order, 
negotiations with atomic renegades turn from isolated bargaining efforts into examples 
of a unique and distinct diplomatic phenomenon. And only when thought as 
implementation of the “global nuclear order’s” norms and principles, NRN become 
distinguishable from other negotiation dynamics in the nuclear policy field.  
For example, an important characteristic feature of NRN is their prohibitive orientation. 
Their goal is not to limit or contain the activities of atomic renegades but to reverse their 
nuclear weapons capacity. In light of the “nuclear global order”, this orientation is only 
                            
33
 With regard to the Israeli nuclear weapons program, Francis Gavin said that “[n]either Nixon nor 
Kissinger thought halting nuclear proliferation merited sacrificing other geopolitical goals” (Gavin 2012: 
105). Avner Cohen seconds that view by saying: “Nixon and Kissinger accepted exceptions to the 
principle of nonproliferation and believed that this might be the case where the U.S. national interest 
permitted a state friendly to the United States to build its own nuclear arsenal” (Cohen 1999: 336).   
State Negotiating Party Negotiation Periode Nuclear Reversal
Algeria China, USA 1991 yes 
Argentina Brazil 1980-1994 yes 
Belarus  Russia, USA 1990-1994 yes 
Brazil Argentina 1980-1994 yes 
India USA 1990-2001 no
Iran China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, and USA  2003-2015 yes 
Kazakhstan Russia, USA 1990-1994 yes 
Libya UK, USA 2003 yes 
North Korea Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and USA since 1993 no
Pakistan USA 1990-2001 no
South Korea USA 1975-1976 yes 
Spain USA 1973 and 1977-1981 yes 
Taiwan USA 1976-1978 again 1987-1988 yes 
Ukraine Russia, USA 1990-1994 yes 
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logical given that the possession of nuclear weapons by any state other than the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council is outlawed by the NPT. And it is this 
prohibitive orientation that makes NRN clearly distinct from other negotiation dynamics 
in the nuclear policy field – such as arms control negotiations (e.g., the recent New START 
Treaty negotiations between the United States and Russia). The objective of arms control 
negotiations is not prohibition in the sense of disarmament. Rather, the central idea is to 
(re)establish strategic balance between two or more adversaries and avoid future arms 
races.34 
The bipolar structure is another example which highlights that the “global nuclear order” 
determines the unique nature of NRN. Regardless how many parties participate in NRN, 
the actor constellations are always marked by two antagonistic blocs with the atomic 
renegade on the one side and varying numbers of protagonists acting on behalf of the 
norms and principles of the “global nuclear order” on the other side. In the nuclear policy 
field, this particular bipolar structure makes NRN, for example, clearly distinct from 
regime formation and modification negotiations (for example, the eventually failed 
negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)) which are characterized by 
multipolar positions and actor constellations.35  
But NRN are not only a unique and distinct phenomenon in international security policy, 
they mark – as we have already said above – also a very intriguing research objective 
which goes in terms of relevance even beyond what we have explained in the previous 
section with regard to nuclear reversal (ch. 2.2.1). NRN are even more puzzling and 
understudied than nuclear reversal. Moreover, NRN signify the most comprehensive 
explanation for nuclear reversal and help to highlight the role of the United States as the 
“benevolent hegemon” for the nuclear policy field.  
Even more Puzzling and Understudied than Nuclear Reversal: NRN is even more puzzling 
than nuclear reversal. Those scholars, who are already startled with regard to nuclear 
reversal, will be even more bewildered by NRN. That a hard-boiled atomic renegade 
would abandoned its nuclear weapons program because of such peaceful, non-kinetic, 
and relatively soft impact factors like diplomacy and negotiation must seem strange when 
looking upon world politics through a (neo)realist’s lens. That tough renegade states 
would change course because of bargaining dynamics appears in that view relatively 
                            
34
 Consequentially, arms control negotiations could in some cases even lead to rearmament for the sake 
of strategic stability (Müller & Schöring 2006). 
35
 The bipolar nature and prohibitive orientation are certainly the two most central features of NRN. 
However, there are more characteristic elements of NRN that stem less from the global nuclear order 
but nevertheless signify a crucial element of this type of bargaining dynamic. First, NRN are conducted 
relatively often in a hostile environment. Not in all but in many historic examples the diplomatic 
struggles about illegal nuclear weapons programs took place between negotiating parties that had poor, 
unfriendly, or even antagonistic ties (e.g., the cases of the North Korean, the Iranian, or the Libyan 
nuclear weapons programs; Table 3). Second, the vast majority of the NRN cases were marked by 
relatively strong power asymmetries. The atomic renegade states had across the board fewer power 
resources than their diplomatic counterparts. Third, NRN is a state-centric type of bargaining. Although 
non-state actors (such as the IAEA or the European Union) played in some cases a certain role (e.g., the 
recent negotiations with Iran), state actors were the key players.  
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naïve. Military intervention, internal regime changes, or technical and management 
problems signify explanations that would be easier to accept by these analysts.  
Moreover, NRN are remarkably understudied and were widely neglected in IR research. 
While numerous studies have been conducted on individual bargaining efforts to disarm 
atomic renegade states,36 there is no systematic approach on NRN.37 The few studies that 
addressed negotiations with atomic weapons states in a more comprehensive way (e.g,. 
Avenhaus, Kremenyuk & Sjönstedt 2002; Clemens 2009; Siler 1992), have the character of 
preliminary studies and suffer from a weak theoretical foundation. Hence, there is thus 
far no systematic and theory based study on NRN.  
NRN – The Most Comprehensive Explanation for Nuclear Reversal: Like nuclear reversal, 
NRN is a relatively frequent phenomenon. In the period after the NPT entered into force, 
we count 14 cases of failed and successful nuclear reversal negotiations (Table 3). In 
particular, NRN became common after the end of the Cold War. The vast majority of 
cases took place at that time (11 out of 14 cases, see: Table 3).  
However, NRN is not only a relatively frequent phenomenon it appears that it is also the 
most comprehensive explanation for nuclear reversal – in particular in the post-Cold War 
era. NRN coincides significantly with successful nuclear reversal. In most of the cases 
where policy makers decided to bargain with atomic renegade states, nuclear reversal 
was the outcome. Cases where NRN did not lead to nuclear reversal occurred instead 
relatively seldom (e.g., India, Pakistan, and North Korea; Table 3). Hence, if we scrutinize 
the major explanations of nuclear renunciation since the 1970s by a cursory analysis, we 
find that NRN is apparently the most central driver for nuclear reversal (Table 3).38 Other 
factors such as military interventions (e.g., Iraq and Syria), technological and 
management problems (e.g., Yugoslavia), or internal regime change (e.g., South Africa) 
played in comparison to NRN a less prominent role. Moreover, apart from military 
intervention, NRN is in many cases overlapping with these alternative explanations.39 
Consequentially, it is impossible to consider effective non-proliferation policy without 
taking negotiation and diplomacy into account. 
                            
36
 See, for example, the different studies focusing specifically on the negotiations dynamic with Iran or 
North Korea (e.g., Blechman & Brumberg 2010; Curtis 2007; Saeed 2010; Miller 2008; Parsi 2012; 
Pickering, Luers & Walsh 2008; Saccone 2003; Sigal 1998; Snyder 1999). 
37
 Of course, there is vast research on nuclear arms control negotiation (e.g., Arbatov 2002; Jensen 
2006; Hopmann 2002). However, given that arms control negotiations differ in orientation, structure, 
and logic from NRN, we could not transfer the insights stemming from this field.  
38
 Nuclear reversal is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon where numerous different factors mesh. 
Uni-causal explanations are seldom. In that regard, the analysis of apparent explanations expressed in 
Figure 3 signifies only a brief overview on the major driver of nuclear disarmament. In-depth analysis of 
the individual cases would certainly bestow us with a more colourful and nuanced picture than this 
cursory table. Moreover, the three alternative explanations (military intervention, internal regime 
change, and technical and management problems) represent only a selection of the most prominent 
impact factors. There are other explanations for nuclear reversal – such as nuclear guarantees and 
alliance relations – that were not taken into account. However, all this does not change the fact that 
NRN is – in all probability – the most dominant explanation for nuclear reversal.  
39
 For example, it would be difficult to study the impact of internal regime changes on nuclear reversal 
without taking bargaining dynamics into consideration since both explanations overlapped in a number 
of cases (i.e., Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, and Spain; Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: General Explanations for Nuclear Reversal after 1970
 
 
The “Benevolent Hegemon”: We could describe NRN not only as a particular type of 
negotiations but also as a unique tool of U.S. foreign policy. NRN are inseparably 
linked with Washington’s firm nonproliferation stand. Except for the bilateral 
negotiations between Brazil and Argentina (1980-1994), Washington was in all NRN 
the key player (Table 3). Even when other actors took part in the bargaining process – 
such as in the negotiations with Iran and North Korea – the United States was always 
de facto in the “driver seat.” That we saw so many diplomatic efforts to reverse 
nuclear weapons programs is owed to Washington’s unrelenting nonproliferation 
effort. NRN is therefore a good indicator that the United States is in essence acting as 
a “benevolent hegemon” and provides in that role by far the most crucial 
contribution to maintain the global nuclear order (for a more detailed discussion on 
that aspect see also Gavin 2015).   
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2.3 Diplomatic Design – Successful Bargaining 
even with the Devil 
The policy paradigm has steered our research interest towards analyzing bargaining 
dynamics with atomic renegade states. But now we have to make a choice since we 
cannot analyze each and every aspect of NRN (such as their genesis, their actors’ 
constellations, their strategic environment, etc.). Confronted with the question “what 
part of NRN shall we study?”, the policy paradigm provides us again with guidance. It 
leads us to focus on the diplomatic design.  
What is Diplomatic Design? Diplomatic design is a newly coined term.40 We have 
borrowed it from the research on the design of international regimes and institutions 
(see, e.g., Duffield & Mitchell 2003; Haas et al. 1993; Hasenclever & Mayer 2007; Mitchell 
1994; Wettestad 2001).41 With this PhD project, we introduce the notion of diplomatic 
design for the first time into the research on international negotiations. We define 
diplomatic design as the supplementary, sub-dividable, varying, and malleable shape of 
negotiations characterized by an intermediated and non-violent performance.  
In general, “design” does not cover the constitutive elements of a particular 
phenomenon. Rather, design has by definition a supplementary nature. For example, “car 
design” contains all supplementary add-ons to an automobile. “Car design” is everything 
that goes beyond the car itself. Having four wheels, a coachwork, and an engine are not 
aspects we would not describe as “car design.”  
The supplementary nature of “design” implies a subdivision into individual design 
elements. For example, when discussing the “design” of a particular automobile, we 
usually distinguish elements such as its color, its shape, its sound, or its performance. The 
“design” of a phenomenon is in that view the totality of its individual design elements.  
Another central feature of “design is its varying shape. Design is plural. There are always 
several types of “design.” For example, if there would only be one single “car design” 
defining the shape of all manufactured automobiles around the globe, “design” as a 
                            
40
 While diplomatic design is in substance a new concept, we should note – for the sake of 
completeness – that this term had been occasionally used in the past to describe the work of in-house 
graphic artists and designers employed at the United Nations and other international organizations 
(Dobush 2014). 
41
 At that point it is noteworthy that our understanding of “design” is distinct from the research on 
“rational design” (e.g., Koremenos et.al. 2001a, 2001b; Duffield 2003). Apart from the fact that the 
research on “rational design” is focused on international institutions and not on negotiation dynamics, 
the most distinct difference is that IR scholars who follow this approach see the “design” primarily as 
the dependent variable while we (as well as the above cited protagonists of the research on regime 
design) conceptualize “design” as an independent variable. “Rational design” scholars focus in essence 
on the formation of international institutions. Our research interest is instead the performance of 
design (consequentially, it would have been more appropriate if one had labeled this research approach 
not “rational design” but “rational designing”).   
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genuine concept would be senseless since “car design” would indistinguishably coincide 
with the very nature of “car.” The supplementary nature of “design” would collapse.  
Furthermore, “design” implies malleability. In the general reading, “design” is regarded as 
the product of a creative process. It is made by designers. And, in most of the cases, 
designers have the chance to alter, modify, and adapt it. But while assumed to be 
inherently malleable (or designable), the expression of “design” does not necessarily 
imply intention. Design and its individual elements could emerge either planned or 
unplanned. For example, there are numerous aspects of a “car’s design” (such as its 
sound or its ergonomic shape) which were not intendedly designed but rather signify the 
unplanned by-product of technical necessities.  
Diplomatic design is marked by all these central characteristics we just described. For 
example, the supplementary nature of diplomatic design is expressed by the various 
features added on a certain negotiation process – such as sanctions, incentives, or 
mediation by third parties. It comprises all aspects that go beyond the very core of 
negotiation itself (i.e., the communicative and interactive processes between two or 
more actors that are characterized by the effort of combining conflicting positions into an 
agreement by joint decision making). By the same token, in bargaining dynamics we could 
also observe the malleable but often unintended nature of design. For example, 
negotiations always have an agenda, a venue, and involve a certain array of actors. These 
features are malleable, vary often considerably between different bargaining dynamics, 
and have on many occasions significant impact on the negotiation outcome (see, e.g., 
“hidden champions” of diplomatic design, ch. 6.1.3). However, these design elements 
have frequently an unintended nature and are often regarded by policy makers and 
diplomats not as strategic instruments but as “unpolitical” byproducts of bargaining 
dynamics.  
Turning to the performance of diplomatic design, we could identify two additional 
characteristic features which are both inseparably linked with the very nature of 
diplomacy and international negotiation.  
First, the performance of diplomatic design is intermediate.  Diplomatic design affects the 
actions of targeted actors indirectly by changing their strategic calculation (see also case 
D, Figure 5). It is operating through the “manipulation of the mind.” Unlike non-
diplomatic policy tools in foreign policy (for example, the use of military force), diplomatic 
design is not resolving problems by directly intervening into the behavioral patterns of 
targeted actors. Diplomatic design elements are not aimed at actively preventing, 
stopping, or slowing undesired actions. Rather, it is one of the core ideas of diplomacy 
and international negotiations that the initiator of a diplomatic intervention is primarily 
giving the impetus for the resolution of a particular problem but that the actual act of 
problem resolution (for example the actual dismantlement of WMD programs) – including 
the majority of the associate costs – are shouldered by the target actor.42 In that sense, 
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 Admittedly, the line between diplomatic and non-diplomatic instruments is often very thin. For 
example, in order to “manipulate the mind” of target actor, diplomatic interventions often affect the 
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diplomatic design is clearly distinct form non-diplomatic tools – such as military 
intervention – where the costs of problem resolution are primarily taken on by the 
initiators.  
Because of the intermediate performance, diplomacy and international negotiations are 
in general assumed to be relatively inexpensive in comparison to non-diplomatic foreign 
policy tools (e.g,. Kristof 2008). The flip side is, however, that the intermediate 
performance renders diplomatic design into relatively complex and uncertain 
instruments. The intermediate principle, where changes in the behavioral patterns of 
targeted actors are achieved through the “detour” of manipulating this very actor’s mind, 
makes diplomatic interventions in particular prone to interference, planning errors, or 
implementation mishaps. It is, for example, often uncertain whether applied diplomatic 
design elements really affect the strategic calculation of the recipients or whether they 
overshoot this target. Likewise, it is often uncertain whether diplomatic interventions 
truly produce the outcomes the senders intended to achieve or whether they provoke 
unexpected and undesired results. Due to the intermediate nature of diplomatic design, it 
is marked by an “inexpensive-uncertainty trade-off.”  
Second, the performance of diplomatic design has in general a non-violent nature. Being 
different from the use of physical force is presumably the most outstanding feature of the 
common-sense understanding of diplomacy (e.g., Cohen 1999: 4; Jönsson & Aggestam 
2009). However, being non-violent does not mean that bargaining dynamics and 
international negotiations are the opposite of war. Diplomatic initiatives are often closely 
interwoven with military actions and warfare. According to Karin Fierke “[d]iplomacy is 
among the oldest forms of intervention to limit recourse to war but it has also been its 
handmaiden” (Fierke 2005: 21). The list of historic examples where important negotiation 
events took place within the midst of heavy military confrontation are long (e.g., the 
negotiations for the Westphalian Peace Treaty 1643 - 1648; Burkhardt 1992). Moreover, 
limited military actions could also be part of the “diplomatic repertoire” and often signify 
themselves as design elements. When military force is exclusively applied to alter an 
opponent calculation’s (for example, in the form of credible military threats) and is not 
used as a tool to intervene directly into the targeted actor, it is still operating under the 
intermediary logic that is characteristic for diplomatic intervention (see, for example, the 
concept of “coercive diplomacy” (Art & Cronin 2003; George 1991; George 1994)).43 
                                                                            
actions of actors. But unlike with regard to non-diplomatic interventions, the goal is to alternate in first 
place their strategic calculations and not to change by direct intervention behavioral patterns. A good 
example that highlights how the thin line between intermediate and direct performance of foreign 
policy tools is often blurred is the debate about the pros and cons of economic sanctions. Policy makers, 
but also IR scholars, often tend to confuse the impact of sanctions (the degree to which they, for 
example, affect the economic system of a targeted states) and their actual effect (the degree to which 
the impact of sanction is affecting the strategic calculations of the political elites in the targeted states). 
For example, the sanctions that were imposed in the 2000s on Iran had for a very long time no effects 
on Teheran’s actual decision making although they had relatively severe impact for the Iranian economy 
(Fitzpatrick 2008: 33-55; Parasiliti 2010).  
43
 The most prominent protagonist of a “diplomatization” of warfare was certainly Carl von Clausewitz 
(Clausewitz 2003 [1882]). Although he did not use the term “diplomacy” but “politics,” the idea to 
“manipulate the mind” of an opponent is nevertheless central in his theory of warfare. According to 
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Why Diplomatic Design Provides the Best Analytical Access to NRN. At the beginning of 
this section we said that the policy paradigm has steered our research interest towards 
diplomatic design. There are at least four arguments why diplomatic design signifies the 
best choice among the different aspects of NRN and provides the best analytical access to 
this particular type of bargaining dynamic.  
First, studying diplomatic design is implementing the policy paradigm as the central 
guiding principle of our PhD project. Since policy makers normally want to know about 
the malleable shape of bargaining dynamics, studying diplomatic design is providing them 
with findings they should know about this particular aspect of inter- and transnational 
negotiations.  
Second, diplomatic design allows a comprehensive view on bargaining dynamics since it 
focuses on the entire malleable shape of international negotiations and thereby covers 
not only policy tools that decision makers intendedly and purposefully apply (such as 
economic sanctions, rewarding strategies, or mediation efforts by third parties), but is 
also taking the unintended byproducts of bargaining dynamics into account, which are 
commonly not perceived as foreign policy instruments (such as the structure of the 
diplomatic process, see ch. 6.1.1.2). This broad perspective makes the analytical template 
of diplomatic design in particular promising for revealing new, unexpected, and counter-
intuitive findings about negotiations dynamics.44  
Third and finally, the focus on diplomatic design allows the analysis of inter- and 
transnational negotiations to be embedded in a broader philosophic tradition. Research 
on diplomatic design is expressing in general an optimistic view, first, on the overall 
performance of human-made procedures and structures and, second, on the chance to 
change and alter them according to one’s needs. It builds on the assumption that with 
design elements conflict parties have a leverage to steer the bargaining process into the 
direction that would best meet their desires and beliefs. In that view, negotiation 
dynamics are a “vessel” that gains its particular character only when filled with distinct 
diplomatic design. Consequentially, most of the scholars who implicitly or explicitly follow 
this approach would share the assumption that each and every problem conflict parties 
face in negotiation dynamics is resolvable, if only the diplomatic strategy is designed well. 
Other factors in bargaining dynamics – such as varying actors’ constellations, the legal, 
social or ideational setting of negotiations, or broader historic trends and structural 
changes – play a subordinated role. It is assumed that – if needed – the impact of these 
factors could be outbalanced by sophisticated diplomatic design.  
                                                                            
Clausewitz, war is a wrestling match in which physical violence is only the instrument to affect the other 
side motivation or – as Clauswitz has put it – an “act of force to compel our enemy to fulfill our will” 
(Clausewitz 2003 [1882] Book 1, ch. 1).  
44
 In that sense, diplomatic design goes beyond the governance approach, which is broadly defined as a 
mode of coordination between autonomous but interdependent actors orientated towards the 
provision and/or maintenance of collective goods. Most scholars who apply this concept focus on 
intentional and purposive actions and structure. Byproducts and unintended side-effects are not 
explicitly part of the governance approach.  
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With that optimistic view on human-made structures and procedures, the research on 
diplomatic design aligns itself with a broader philosophic-theoretical tradition. The 
research on diplomatic design is, for example, in many respects on the same page with 
the thoughts of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s conviction that the shape of the structures and 
procedures could contribute to the resolution of even complex and difficult problems, 
was most prominently expressed in his seminal book “Perpetual Peace” in which he 
emphasized that “[T]he problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be 
solved even for a race of devils” (Kant [1795] 2010: 1st supplement). But the research of 
diplomatic design stands certainly also in the philosophic tradition of federalist thinkers 
around James Madison and Alexander Hamilton who have likewise expressed the view 
that well-crafted institutional design such as the constitutional concept of “checks and 
balances” could resolve even delicate situations where neither “men [sic] where angles” 
nor where “angels were to govern men [sic]” (Federalist Paper no. 51). Most advocates 
who implicitly or explicitly follow the diplomatic design approach would share this general 
philosophic conviction and would assume that a properly designed diplomatic 
intervention allows successful negotiations even with the Devil (e.g., Mnookin 2010).  
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2.4 Problem of Fit and Fit Taxonomies 
 
In the introduction chapter, we have made clear that we will evaluate and explore the 
performance of diplomatic design and its individual elements with the help of the fit 
approach.  The “problem of fit” is still a relatively young research objective. Thus far, it 
was primarily used to evaluate international environmental policy (e.g., Brown 2003; 
Folke et al. 2007; Galaz et al. 2008; Vatn & Vedeld 2012). In general IR literature we only 
rarely encountered the fit approach (e.g., Ostrom 2007; Young 2002; Young 2008). 
Against that background, it is little surprising that this concept was never applied in 
negation research.  
It is one of the most central premises of the fit approach that there are no “blueprint 
solutions.” There are no “one size fits all” tools in world politics (Ostrom et al. 2007; see 
also: Epstein 1997; Korte 1980). Rather, the instruments available to foreign policy 
makers vary. Their performance is unstable and is dependent on the given strategic 
context. Foreign policy tools that exert positive impact in one case could provoke 
negative consequences in other situations. Consequentially, studying “varieties of 
(mis)fit” is the core objective of the fit approach. In a concrete research situation the 
essential goal of the fit approach is to identify the “optimal problem solution” (also 
known as the fit demand) that would – if only satisfied comprehensively (for example, by 
a diplomatic design element) – lead to the complete resolution of a given problem. In that 
sense, the fit approach studies the problem constellations, the degree of their resolution, 
and the performance of resolution interventions.  
In the following section, we will elaborate primarily on the question “how to 
operationalize the fit approach.” We will conclude that fit taxonomies are the most 
suitable concept in that regard (ch. 2.4.2). Moreover, we will develop a six-stage yardstick 
that allows evaluating the varying “fit performance” of impact factors (ch. 2.4.4).  
2.4.1 The Diagnostic Method: Design Principles and Fit Taxonomies 
The under-appreciation of the fit approach is astonishing, given that this approach is in 
essence omnipresent in ordinary life. Regardless of who applies the fit approach – 
scholars or lay people – it always operates along two-step diagnostic methodic (Figure 4). 
Users of the fit approach acquire in the first step in-depth and detailed knowledge about 
the structure of a particular problem (i.e., the explanandum). The goal is to achieve as 
much “problem accuracy” as possible. The outcome of the first diagnostic step is the so-
called “optimal problem solution” (also occasionally labeled as the fit demand). The 
“optimal problem solution” is an analytical statement that condenses the knowledge 
about the structure of a given problem in a way that makes its solution salient or even 
explicit. In the second step, a selected impact factor (i.e., the explanans) is compared with 
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the findings acquired about the problem structure. It is obvious that the more accurate 
the problem diagnosis was in the first step, the easier it is to run the second step. How 
close the impact factor is matching to the scope and nature of the problem structure is 
deciding whether we have a fit or a misfit or something in between (overfit, partial fit, 
and underfit; see ch. 2.4.1). Thus, the fit approach is studying causality in essence by 
functional coherence.  
Figure 4: Diagnostic Method of Fit 
 
 
Take for example, the daily practice of a country doctor (see also: Young 2002: 176). 
When examining the illness of her patients, she first investigates the complaints in order 
to decide on a second step based on her diagnosis which cure might fit best. 
Administering painkillers is in general a tempting option for many sufferings. However, 
there are often better matching treatments.  
It is one of the strengths of the fit approach that it could be applied in three different 
ways. After having conducted the first diagnostic step and having identified the “optimal 
problem solution,” we could, first, evaluate the “fit performance” of a particular impact 
factor. In this most obvious application of the fit approach, we studied whether and to 
which degree a given intervention is able to meet the “optimal problem resolution.” 
Second, the fit approach could also be applied in an explorative mode. Once we have 
diagnosed the scope and nature of a particular problem and observed the degree to 
which it was resolved we could – in a backward-looking analysis – search for the impact 
factor that has caused this movement. This “search function” bestows the fit approach 
with an innovative potential and allows disclosing new, unconventional, and counter-
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intuitive findings. Third, the fit approach has also prescriptive implications since applying 
the “optimal problem solution” to current problems provides guidance in terms of the 
question: what impact factors should be employed in order to achieve the most “optimal 
problem solution”?  
The diagnostic method is essential and applies to all research projects that endeavor to 
study the “problem of fit.” However, there are different ways to operationalize this 
diagnostic method (see case A, B, and C, in Figure 4). Among them, fit taxonomies (case C) 
signify the concept that is most suitable to the requirements of our PhD project.  
Case (A) – The unrestraint fit diagnostic: In that situation, the fit approach is studied 
without reducing the complexity of social reality in a given situation. The explanans and 
the explanandum are studied in a genuine and pure way. The matching between the 
problem structure and the studied impact factor(s) are not “funneled through” an 
analytical concept. The advantage is obvious. The risk of distorted findings, false 
interpretation, or over-simplifications is relatively limited. However, the 
operationalization of the fit approach by the unrestraint diagnosis quickly reaches its 
limits in situations where the data is thin or partly unavailable, where the problem 
structure is complex, and where the number of studied impact factors is high.45  
Case (B) - Design principles: In comparison to the “unrestraint fit diagnosis,” the 
operationalization of the fit approach by “design principles” is more promising for 
research in international affairs.46 “Design principles” systematize and structure the 
matching between the problem structure and the studied impact factors. “Design 
principles” signify a small set of selected sine qua non conditions for the “optimal 
problem solution.” They intervene into the second diagnostic step (Figure 4). The central 
idea is to define preconditions which impact factors have to meet in order to fit to the 
given problem structure. For example, Nobel Prize laureate Elinor Ostrom has identified 
in her study on regulatory regimes a series of design principles (including monitoring, 
collective-choice arrangements, graduated sanctions, and conflict-resolution 
mechanisms) and was suggesting that scarce common pool goods would be successfully 
supplied and maintained, if these conditions were met (Ostrom 1990: 90).47 
While it is certainly appealing – in particular in view of policy-oriented research – to have 
a small set of requirements that specify the conditions for successful problem solution, it 
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 At that point it is also important to note that research on diplomatic design has – similar to the 
research on policy tools or governance instruments – a tendency towards over-determined 
independent variables. Most research projects are marked by too many variables and too little cases 
(for further discussion on that problem see Scharpf 2000: 52-61). Design principles or fit taxonomies are 
not resolving this problem. However, both provide guidance and help to sort the “causal chaos” that 
could easily result from over-determined independent variables.  
46
 “Design principles” is a terminology primarily coined by Elinor Ostrom (1990: 90-1). It is not related to 
the concept of “diplomatic design” we introduced in the previous chapter.  
47
 Other IR scholars have also used the concept of “design principles” – although they have explicitly not 
associated themselves with the fit approach. In his study on the implications of two-level gaming for the 
formation of international regimes, Bernhard Zangl has, for example, identified three design principles 
assuming that they were essential preconditions for success international regimes: sanction, 
control/monitoring, and distribution (Zangl 1994: 285-287). 
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was primarily Oran Young who revealed that the concept of “design principles” is 
problematic (Young 2002: 166-175). Two points of critique are in particular important. 
First, there is no agreed standard about relevant “design principles” in a given problem 
constellations. Scholars have in the past proposed different “design principles” for similar 
problem constellations (see Young 2002: 166-175). Second, the nature and scope of 
problems in international affairs are manifold and complex. Not every set of “design 
principle” applies to every problem in world politics. By using “design principles,” scholars 
are already very close to the “one size fits all” trap. 
Case (C) - Fit taxonomies: In view of these shortcomings, scholars have started to analyze 
the “problem of fit” primarily through fit taxonomies (e.g., Galaz et.al. 2008; Mitchel 
2008: 112-113; Ostrom 2007; Young 2002; Young 2008).48 According to Oran Young, fit 
taxonomies are “attempts to disaggregate (…) issues, identifying elements of individual 
problems that are significant from a problem-solving perspective and reaching 
conclusions about design features necessary to address each element” (Young 2002: 
176).49 Elinor Ostrom has instead used the expression “nested multitier maps” to describe 
the logic of fit taxonomies (Ostrom 2007).  
Fit taxonomies intervene in the first diagnostic step (Figure 4). Unlike “design principles,” 
they do not systematize the potential problem solutions but the actual problem structure. 
Consequentially, the “fit taxonomies” look at first sight very similar to conventional 
problem typologies. What makes “fit taxonomy,” however, distinct from the ordinary 
typologies we often encounter in IR literature (see, e.g., Miles et al. 2002) is the level of 
abstraction. “Fit taxonomies” go beyond the detail description of inter- and transnational 
problems. They condense the problem structure in a given constellation to a degree that 
the “optimal problem solutions,” which is crucial to evaluate “fit performance” of impact 
factors against, becomes either salient or is even made explicitly.  
Since fit taxonomies signify, in many cases, drastic reduction of complexity, it stands to 
question why they are assumed to be more suitable than the concept of “design 
principles.” Unfortunately, this question was thus far not addressed in the literature. 
However, in our view, the “locus of intervention” makes “fit taxonomies” superior to 
“design principles.” The central research objective of the fit approach is to evaluate, 
explore, and prescribe impact factors – be it an international regime or a diplomatic 
intervention. Speaking in methodic terms, the fit approach represents an x-centered 
research endeavor (Sieberer 2007). Studying the problem structure is not an end by itself. 
Rather, it is only of importance as long it helps to reveal insights into the “fit 
performance” of the studied impact factor(s). Consequentially, the overall relevance and 
validity of a research project is exposed to higher risk when we reduce the complexity on 
the side of the explanans as it is done by the concept “design principles.” Fit taxonomies 
instead reduce complexity on the side of the explanandum. It is quite an academic 
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 Even advocates of the “principle design,” such as Elinor Ostrom, have eventually started to apply “fit 
taxonomies” (e.g., Ostrom 2007). 
49
 Note that Oran Young had introduced the term “institutional diagnosis” as an alternative label to “fit 
taxonomy” (Young 2002: 176).  
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challenge to develop and apply fit taxonomies. Analytical mistakes and errors are likely to 
occur. But in comparison to “design principles” these negative impacts would be less 
harmful and more limited if they occur in a taxonomy-based study. When instead the 
application of “design principles” is provoking misinterpretation, there is a high danger of 
distorting the core results of the entire research project since they affect immediately the 
explanans – the core research interest of the fit approach. “Design principles” are in that 
sense the “open-heart-surgery” of the fit approach. 
2.4.2 Which Fit Taxonomy? Descriptive vs. Analytical Approach 
Since we have come to the conclusion that fit taxonomies are the best way to 
operationalize the fit approach, we have to focus on the question of “how to develop 
them.” Most important in that regard is the so-called “specification-abstraction trade-
off.” One the one hand, “fit taxonomies” have to cover comprehensively and exhaustively 
all aspects of a given problem structure. If we are already uncertain about the nature of 
the explanandum, we would be even more uncertain about the impact the explanans has 
on it. Moreover, with underspecified and under-complex fit taxonomies, we would be 
excessively exposed to the typical pitfalls scholars face when doing causal analysis – such 
as equi-finality, multi-finality, or false causality.50 On the other hand, fit taxonomies have 
to have a certain level of abstraction since systematic descriptions of real-world problems 
always imply the danger of being hijacked by over-exhaustive details and unnecessary 
specifications. If taxonomies remain too closely rooted in an actual problem constellation, 
the risk is high that scholars will not succeed in revealing the means and ways leading to 
the solution of the given problem. In such a situation, the fit demand – the “optimal 
problem solutions” – remains hidden in details and is neither made salient nor explicit.  
Consulting the nascent literature on “fit research” in international environmental policy, 
we find that scholars have resolved the just described “specification-abstraction tradeoff” 
by building “descriptive fit taxonomies” which provide detail accounts of the factual 
problem structure. For example, Oran Young has proposed a “descriptive fit taxonomy” 
for the study of international environmental regimes based on three general categories: 
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 All these three analytical problems occur if the explanadum (i.e., the problem structure) is not 
covered probably by fit taxonomies. False causality is, for example, the consequence when “fit 
taxonomies” cover irrelevant aspects that are not or only partly applicable for the “optimal problem 
resolution.” Equifinality instead would be ubiquitous in a taxonomy with limited level of detail. In such a 
situation we would not be able to say with certainty whether the studied impact factor or an alternative 
explanations with a very similar “causal fingerprint” was responsible for the actual outcome. But an 
underspecified fit taxonomy is also likely to lead to the problem of multifinality. These are situations 
where our understanding about the problem structure and the “optimal problem resolution” remains at 
the surface and were we could not pin down with certainty the actual impact scope of the individual 
factors we study. While acknowledging that the studied factors have an impact, we could not say how 
far their impact is reaching and what aspects are included (e.g., George & Bennett 2005: 157-8; Ragin 
2006).  
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structural, process-oriented, and linkage-orientated aspects. Within these categories, he 
is listing a series of more detailed descriptions (Young 2002: 61).51 
While acknowledging that “descriptive fit taxonomies” might be relevant in some policy 
fields and issue areas, it is relatively obvious that this concept is, with regard to the 
“specification-abstraction-continuum,” relatively far on the specification side.52 Already 
for the development of detailed taxonomies, we have to have extensive expertise and 
knowledge of the nature and structure of the given problem. Developing “descriptive fit 
taxonomies” without nitty-gritty insights upon a given problem is hardly possible. Thus, 
“descriptive fit taxonomies” are always exposed to the danger to drift off into over-
excessive details and exaggerated specifications, which renders the practical 
operationalization of the fit approach difficult if not even impossible. Take, for example, 
the study of Arun Agrawal, who has identified in this “descriptive fit taxonomy” on 
resource regimes more than 30 relevant variables (Agrawal 2001). Elinor Ostrom and her 
team have even listed 42 relevant factors (Ostrom 2007). 53  
In light of these shortcomings, we propose an alternative concept – the so-called 
“analytical approach” to fit taxonomies. We claim that this approach is more balanced in 
view of the “specification-abstraction continuum.” Its central idea is to “bring theory back 
in.” The “analytical approach” of fit taxonomies makes usage the strengths of theories – 
namely their descriptive, analytical, specifying, and prescriptive powers – in order to 
systematically decipher the scope and nature of the problem structure in a given 
constellation.  
Due to their more universal nature, “analytical fit taxonomies” have a higher “travel 
ability” and apply not only to the specific context where they were developed but are 
likely to have relevance across different issue areas and policy fields. Apart from being 
familiar with relevant theories, analytical fit taxonomies require rather modest in-
advance expertise and knowledge about the actual nature and scope of the studied 
problems. Moreover, given that abstraction is one of the principle characteristics of 
theories, the danger of being entangled and embroiled in over-excessive details is 
likewise relatively low. In addition, the risk of too abstract, under-specific, and distant 
analysis is likewise limited, given that “analytical fit taxonomies” are unlikely to stick to 
just one theory but instead represent “nested multitier maps.” In most of the cases, 
different aspects of a given problem structure are grasp by different theories and 
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 (1) structural aspects: complexity, homogeneity, interdependence (2) process-oriented aspects: 
productivity, growth, stabilization, change (3) linkage-oriented aspects: boundary conditions and 
transboundary interactions (Young 2002: 61). 
52
 For other examples of descriptive fit taxonomies see: Agrawal 2001, Galaz et.al. 2008, or Ostrom 
2007. 
53
 In addition to that, “descriptive fit taxonomies” are closely bound to the specific problem structure 
and have often little use in other policy fields and issue areas. Oran Young has self-critically admitted 
that apart from the “(…) diagnostic method itself” the concept of “descriptive fit taxonomies” are hardly 
“transportable” across different cases (Young 2008: 143).  
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approaches which are built into a single fit taxonomy. Consequentially, fit taxonomies 
signify in the end eclectic analytical schemes.54   
2.4.4 Varieties of (Mis)Fit:  The Yardstick of Fit Performance 
Now that we have decided to operationalize the fit approach through fit taxonomies, we 
have to think also about a scale of “fit performance” that allows us to evaluate the impact 
of diplomatic design and its different elements. What we need for the practical 
application of the fit approach is a series of benchmarks that reveals the “varieties of 
(mis)fits.” 
As we have explained in the introduction chapter (ch. 1.1), the fit approach operates on a 
different logic than the effectiveness approach. Nevertheless, the “standard of success” 
of the effectiveness approach – the degree of problem solution – is also relevant to the fit 
approach. It likewise signifies an appealing yardstick for our PhD project. We will 
therefore incorporate it into our scale of “fit performance” – as a benchmark, not as an 
analytical evaluation concept. In addition, another interesting and relevant benchmark for 
the evaluation of “fit performance” is efficiency.  
Table 4: Varieties of (Mis)Fit 
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 “Analytical fit taxonomies” are among the different ways to operationalize the fit approach, the 
concept that is most akin to the daily work of the country doctor we have mentioned above. When 
examining patients, she will – in all probability – rely on a scheme of symptoms that indicate the scope 
and nature of the illness and allow, in a second step, to choose a well-fitting treatment (case C, Figure 
4). Her scheme of symptoms is intervening in the first diagnostic step (i.e., the examination of the 
patient) and is systematizing the problem structure (i.e., the range of possible illnesses) to a degree that 
the “optimal problem solution” (i.e., the most suitable cure) becomes salient. Certainly, based on what 
we know from the history of medicine (e.g., Eckart 2008), healers and shamans who were no charlatans 
but instead were really interested in curing illnesses, have examined their patients in pre-modern times 
according to the same diagnostic principles. They, however, used schemes of symptoms that were akin 
to “descriptive fit taxonomies” building on years of experience and in-depth practical knowledge on 
treating patients. Since the country doctor in our metaphor is a figure of modern times, her concept of 
symptoms is different. It is primarily based on medical research, bio-chemical theories, the application 
of the latest medical technologies, and is ideally reflecting the newest research findings. In essence, her 
scheme of symptoms signifies a “nested multitier map” of appropriated medical treatments applicable 
to range of illnesses – a constellation that is very much akin to the concept of “analytical fit 
taxonomies.”  
 
Varities of 
(Mis)Fit 
Overall 
Performance
Combined Benchmarks (Effectiveness 
& Efficiency)
Explanation 
fit  effective and efficient
Efficient problem solution. The evaluated impact factor has 
resolved the problem. The allocated resources were 
appropriate. 
overfit  effective but inefficent 
Inefficient problem solution. The evaluated impact factor is 
overdosed in terms of allocated resources. 
partial fit   only partly effective but efficient 
Some but not all aspects of the defined problem are solved with 
an appropriated allocation of resources.
underfit  ineffcient and only partly effective 
Partial effective problem solution because of too little or toom 
many invested resources. 
misfit  ineffective and inefficient 
The problem was not resolved. The invested resources are 
squandered.
negative fit   problem increasing The given problem is intensified by the studied impact factor. 
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Efficiency is defined by appropriate allocation of resources. It is regarded as the “little 
brother” of effectiveness, since it is logically subordinated to “optimal problem solution”. 
The achieved degree of problem resolution is the major yardstick for evaluating the 
appropriated allocation of resources. Efficiency signifies an outcome where the allocated 
resources harmonize with the degree of problem resolution. The appropriate allocation of 
resources does only make sense in the light of the overall problem solution. It is only in 
that context that we are able to ask how many resources had been invested to achieve 
this goal and whether a given problem could have been resolved more efficiently. 
Inefficiency instead represents a result where either too little or too many resources have 
been invested in light of the achieved problem resolution. If a given problem remains 
unresolved, all investments were for nothing. In that case, inefficiency and ineffectiveness 
coincide and efforts to analyze the appropriate allocation of resources make no sense. By 
definition there is no efficient ineffectiveness.  
However, apart from being logically subordinated, the other reason why efficiency is 
regarded as the “little brother” of effectiveness is that it was rarely studied in IR and 
decision makers appear to primarily focus on problem solution and are less concerned 
about the costs of foreign policy (e.g., Mitchell 2008; Wolter 2007).55 However, efficiency 
is not irrelevant. On some occasions, the appropriated allocation of resources could play 
an important role in decision making and affect foreign policy (e.g., Stiglitz & Bilmes 
2008).  
If we combine these two benchmarks – problem resolution (i.e., effectiveness) and 
appropriate allocation of resources (i.e., efficiency) – we are able to develop a 
comprehensive six-stage yardstick which allows to evaluate the “varieties of (mis)fit” 
(Table 4).  
(1) Fit: Fit is certainly the most important stage of our evaluation scheme. It represents 
situations where the studied impact factor resolves a given problem under the condition 
of an optimal allocation of resources. If we identify a fit, it represents a problem solution 
that is effective and efficient. If an impact factor is fitting, it is perfectly matching – in 
both qualitative and quantitative terms – to the “optimal problem solution” identified by 
the fit taxonomy.  
(2) Overfit: The overfit, instead, represents an inefficient problem solution. While 
matching with the nature of the problem, the impact factor is “overdosed.” The problem 
would have been resolved even with fewer resources. The overfit is a situation where 
foreign policy makers would celebrate the successful problem solution but would deplore 
the avoidable extra-costs. In that sense, overfits signify effective but ineffective 
outcomes.  
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 Efficiency is often too narrowly thought of in terms of financial costs. But there are numerous other 
resources – such as social or political capital – that could likewise be studied thorough the lens of 
appropriate allocation.  
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(3) Partial Fit: Partial fits are situations where the performance of an impact factors do 
only address certain aspects of a given problem. The performance of the impact factors 
are imperfect and do not fully match with the “optimal problem solution.” But while 
being only partially effective, the aspects of the problem that were resolved where 
achieved with an appropriate allocation of resources. Consequentially, a partial fit is an 
outcome that is efficient but not full effective.  
(4) Underfit: The underfit is in many respects the mirror-inverted constellation of the 
partial fit. Underfits signify only partly effective but inefficient outcome. The evaluated 
impact factor is only in parts matching with the problem structure and contributes only to 
a certain degree to its resolution. Moreover, underfits are situations where the allocation 
of resources are disproportional. Either because too little resources were invested to 
achieve a better “fit performance” or too many resources were allocated despite the 
mismatching problem resolution.  
(5) Misfit: Misfit is the opposite of fit. It signifies a state where the performance of the 
studied impact factors are not contributing to the problem solution and where the 
resources invested were for nothing. Misfits represent ineffective and inefficient 
outcomes.  
(6) Negative Fit: Finally, there is the negative fit. It signifies constellations where impact 
factors are not only ineffective and inefficient but where they even further increased the 
problem. In the realities of world politics, negative fits often occur in the form of 
unintended side effects to diplomatic interventions.  
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2.5. Meta-Theoretical Foundation: Scientific 
Realism, “Enlightened Rationalism” and the 
“Inference to the Best Explanation”  
Since we are primarily interested in resolving empirical puzzles, we try to keep the part on 
the (meta-)theoretical foundations of our PhD project as brief and concise as possible. 
However, it is important to flag that this section is not a “scholastic finger exercise” we 
felt obliged to write because every doctoral thesis has to have a theory chapter. Rather, 
all the methodological remarks we made have immediate implications for the analysis of 
NRN and its diplomatic design.  
Probably the best example to show the direct linkage between theory and practical 
research is the problem of fit we elaborated in the previous chapter (ch. 2.4). While being 
an intriguing and fruitful research template, this approach builds on three basic premises, 
which all refer back to our meta-theoretical position: First, the fit approach is expressing 
the view that problems are products of lacking solutions. This perspective implies that 
there is, in principle, a solution to every problem. The remedy to every deplorable state in 
international affairs is synonymous with designing a well-matching cure. The fit approach 
operationalizes problems primarily as “projection screens” for problem resolution. And, 
admittedly, since problems and solutions are always though in parallel, the “fit approach” 
turns a blind eye on situations that are either inherently unresolvable56 or that follow the 
logic of “auto-resolution”.57 Second, applying the fit approach determines a particular 
concept of causality. When studying the “problem of fit” we apply the “logic of 
compatibility” (Young 2002: 20). This is an essential feature of the fit approach and is 
therefore independent of the applied methods and research. The central assumption is 
that the “fit performance” is increasing the more and the particular factor (in our case 
diplomatic design) is matching to the scope and nature of a given problem (in our case 
negotiation problems). Third, the fit approach is, in general, relatively optimistic about 
the cognitive and creative capabilities of “designers.”58 In order to establish fitness, 
designers have to have a relatively detailed understanding not only about the available 
design elements but also about the scope and the nature of the relevant problem – even 
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 For example, the geo-political impact of non-human-induced climate change (see, for example, the 
“Little Ice Age” in Early Modern Europe; Dipper 1991: 10-18).  
57
 “Auto-resolution” of problems is, for example, common in closed ecological systems (e.g., reduction 
of overpopulation despite lacking predators by epidemics; Kalchreuter 1984). But it is also an important 
aspect in political thinking – see, for example, dialectic historic development as they were described in 
classical Marxism (Marx 1932 [1872]).  
58
 As we are now talking about the “designer” it is time for a general note: The notion of “fit” is 
obviously borrowed from Evolution Theory original introduced by Charles Darwin. The Evolution Theory 
is operating on the mechanism of “trial and error” and is also a good example of “auto-resolution” that 
was just described (see footnote 57). While “designers” (e.g., policy makers) are essential in fit 
approach that we apply, it was the most criticized part of the Evolution Theory (even until today, see: 
Creationism) that it operates without a “designer” (e.g., God). The concept of the “designer” is 
therefore the most important distinction between the natural scientific and the social scientific “fit 
approach.”  
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when they are themselves a genuine part of it. Moreover, the fit approach also implies 
that designers are capable to overcome path-dependencies and have the flexibility, 
power, and greatness to discard accustomed and cherished policy tools in order to 
choose more appropriate but less pleasant strategies. Of course, in reality a well-fitting 
design element that is resolving a particular problem is often the outcome of a 
complicated and protracted process which the involved players often only partly 
understand. However, studying the “fit performance” would be reduced to absurdity if 
we do not accept the principle assumption that “designers” (e.g., foreign policy makers) 
are rational actors who are – under favorable circumstances (e.g., after having received 
training and consultancy by IR scholars) – in principle capable to design well-matching 
problem resolution strategies. Analyzing the “problem of fit” would make little sense if 
we do not accept the assumption that actors are rational and capable of purposive 
actions.  
In short, these three basic assumptions make clear that the fit approach builds on a 
rational foundation. It inevitably requires that actors not be determined by the given 
social context or by discourses but have, in principle, a chance to act autonomously and 
are provided with an independent epistemological access to the outside-world(s). The fit 
approach is certainly incompatible with a post-positivist ontology. But that does not 
necessarily impel us to side with positivism either. Since our primary interest is not 
“theoretical puritanism” but empiric research, we opt for a methodological approach that 
is assumed to signify the middle ground between the positivist and post-positivist poles: 
Scientific Realism.59 Situated on the continuum between these two opposite meta-
theoretical approaches, Scientific Realism is assumed to bring together the “best of both 
worlds.” 
Without going too much into detail and by recurring to the most influential Scientific 
Realists in IR – Alexander Wendt60 – one can very briefly say that this methodological 
approach revolves about three central ideas.61 
First, Scientific Realism embraces an ideational ontology and, thereby, takes a non-
positive stance.62 According to Wendt, social reality is constituted by “ideas all the way 
down” (Wendt 1999: 68) and has an unobservable nature which cannot be studied 
beyond any doubts in experiments and laboratories. Scholars have to accept, Wendt says, 
that our entire knowledge about the outside-world (as well as our knowledge about the 
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 For an introduction on Scientific Realism see: Chernoff 2009; Chernoff 2002; Dessler 1999; Jackson 
2008; Joseph & Wigh 2010; Patomäki and Wight 2000.   
60
 At that point we highlight that Alexander Wendt’s understanding of Scientific Realism has also 
provoked criticism. While some scholars have followed his approach (e.g., Patomäki and Wight 2000), 
others have revealed certain flaws and inconsistencies in Wendt’s argumentation (e.g., Guzzini 2006; 
Kratochwil 2000: 89).  
61
 Opting for the “via media” is thereby in the tradition of negotiation research. Scholars who have 
studied international bargaining and negotiation dynamics have in the past avoided to side with one of 
the contesting paradigms of the so-called Third Debate (Jönsson 2002: 227).  
62
 Note that “Scientific Realism” is often debated within IR under the alternative label of “critical 
realism” (see, e.g., Jackson 2010).  
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unobservable elements of the natural world – such as atoms or electrons) is inescapable 
theory-laden (Wendt 1999: 62).63  
Second – and despite its ideational ontology – Scientific Realism is also challenging post-
positivism by taking a clear pro-science orientation underscoring the relevance of causal 
research. According to Alexander Wendt, there is a social reality beyond ideas. He has 
emphasized that all elements of the outside world are “[t]o varying degrees (…) materially 
grounded, self-organizing phenomena with intrinsic powers and dispositions that exist 
independent of the minds and/or discourse” (Wendt 1999: 77). Of course, false discursive 
descriptions take place constantly and distort the actual nature of the outside world all 
the time. However, social reality has, according to Alexander Wendt, the chance to resist 
against misinterpretation and incorrect ascriptions.64 The central proof in Scientific 
Realism for the assumption that the outside-world is not determined by interpretation is 
“scientific progress.” The self-organizing nature of social facts bestows them with the 
power to oppose false discourses. Over time social facts challenge – based on their self-
organized internal structure – incorrect descriptions. Thereby they bring theories and 
social science into line with actual reality (Wendt 1999: 73), provide a better 
understanding of the outside world, and allow scientific progress.  
Third, scholars (and laypersons) are able to access social reality via scientific methods. 
Theories – in particular “mature theories”65 – play in that regard a central role for 
Scientific Realism. Our observation of social reality is assumed to consist first and 
foremost of ideas and theories. Consequentially, scholars have to take this “single-access 
point” to the outside-world serious. According to Alexander Wendt, “[o]bservation may 
be theory-laden, but it is not (…) theory-determined” (Wendt 1999: 63).  
We believe that among the other available methodological positions Scientific Realism is 
the most fruitful and most suitable approach for our PhD project. Scientific Realism as a 
“via media” (Wendt 1999) merges the “ontology of social construction with the 
epistemological practices of so-called ‘positivist’ science“(Jackson 2008: 129). With regard 
to the so-called Third Debate in IR, it is Alexander Wendt’s declared goal to “adopt an 
idealist and holistic ontology while maintain a commitment to science” (Wendt 1999: 47). 
Moreover, Scientific Realism has a relatively high adaptability in academic debates. Many 
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 Wendt goes on and explains further that there is no “rigid distinction between theory and 
observation” (Wendt 1999: 62). “What we see in the world is always and necessarily mediate by the 
background understandings we bring to bear on our inquiries” (Wendt 1999: 106). 
64
 Probably the one most salient example Wendt gives to bolster his argument of the “resisting power” 
of social facts is the collapse of the Aztec empire and the lethal fate of the Aztec king Montezuma II 
(Wendt 1999: 56-7 and 74). Although the Aztec interpreted in 1519 the arriving Europeans as Gods, the 
Spanish conquistadors had a “self-organized internal structure” that was independent of the Aztec 
discourse and eventually led to resistance to the false interpretation with the dire consequence that 
Montezuma II was “killed and his empire destroyed by an army hundreds of times smaller than his own” 
(Wendt 1999: 56). Wendt takes this cruel example as a proof that the social world is not synonymous 
with discursive patterns but displays an internal structure. 
65
 According to Alexander Wendt, “mature scientific theories” are those causal and descriptive 
explanations which have not been dismissed by “rebellious reality” and have survived ongoing 
resistance by social facts. With regard to IR, Wendt is listing three approaches that would in his view 
meet the standard of mature theories: rational choice, democratic peace, and balance of power (Wendt 
1999: 68; Wendt 2004: 56). 
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IR scholars follow this approach either implicitly or explicitly (Alker 2000: 141; Krasner 
2000: 131).66  
As a broad meta-theoretical approach, Scientific Realism provides us only with basic 
coordinates. However, when turning towards practical research we have to be more 
precise on the nature and scope of our theoretical fundaments.67 Our scientific realist 
position needs further specification. There are three aspects that appear in that regard in 
particular relevant for our Ph.D project:  
Frist, action is the primary nature of negotiation and diplomatic dynamic. 
Consequentially, we have to be precise about the action theoretical position. In terms of 
action theory, Scientific Realism is relatively flexible and allows the application different 
approaches (Risse 2003). In the following section we will show that the “logic of 
consequences” is the most appropriate concept for our research project (ch. 2.5.2). Given 
the adverse and unfavorable context conditions that dominate international security 
policy, the two alternative action-theoretical approaches – the “logic of appropriateness” 
and the “logic of persuasion” – are instead unlikely to apply (ch. 2.5.1).  
Second, while the “logic of consequences” is assumed to be relatively convincing for the 
study of behavioral patterns in NRN, this particular action-theoretical approach has 
shortcomings too. In its conventional application, the “logic of consequences” is closely 
related to “Orthodox Rationalism.” “Orthodox Rationalism” has a solid footing in micro-
economic research and was vehemently challenged during the last two decades by post-
positivist scholars. Addressing this critique, we base the “logic of consequences” on a 
more moderate and revised version of rationalism: the so-called “Enlightened 
Rationalism” (ch. 2.5.3).  
Third, causal inference is central for studying the “fit performance” of diplomatic design. 
Consequentially, we have to elaborate in detail about the mode of reasoning preferred by 
Scientific Realists – the “Inference to the Best Explanation” (ch. 2.5.4). IBE will play a 
central role not only in the causal analysis of diplomatic design elements but in particular 
in the genesis of our fit taxonomy (ch. 3.3).  
2.5.1 Why the “Logic of Appropriateness” and the “Logic of 
Persuasion” Are Unlikely to Apply 
In reality the different action-theoretical logics debated in IR literature do not necessarily 
exclude each other. As Duncan Snidal said, it is perfectly plausible that real-world actors 
follow more than just one behavioral script (Snidal 2013: 94). However, if we evaluate the 
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 In the “academic biotope” of German IR Scientific Realism – occasionally labeled as “soft positivism” 
or “hermeneutic informed positivism” – it appears to be the most dominant methodological position 
(e.g., Wolf & Hellman 2003: 598-99; Zangl & Zürn 1996: 34).  
67
 Of course, there are many other aspects one could possibly discuss about Scientific Realism – such as 
its intellectual genesis or its dissemination. As we have said, we have no inclination to do so. We leave 
this debate to scholars specialized in this field and instead follow an “empirics-first” attitude.  
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three action-theoretical approaches in light of the strategic conditions that dominate 
international security policy, we come to the conclusion that the “logic of 
appropriateness” and the “logic of persuasion” are unlikely to apply in NRN.   
For an action-theoretical approach, the “logic of appropriateness” is very structural. It 
starts from the assumption that real-world actors are not identical with the concept of 
the homo economicus but instead represents homo sociologicus. Consequentially, 
behavioral patterns are assumed to be determined by socio-cultural settings (Deitelhoff 
2006: 79-80; Rothstein 2005). According to March and Olsen – the two scholars that 
made this action-theoretical approach known to a wider audience in IR – the “logic of 
appropriateness” is based on the hypothesis that policy makers “follow rules that 
associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual 
opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice 
dilemmas and more general concepts of self and identities” (March & Olsen 1998: 951).  
There are two reasons why the “logic of appropriateness” is – in all probability – 
irrelevant for our bargaining dynamics in security policy in general and for the bargaining 
dynamics with atomic renegade states in particular:  
First, when the “logic of appropriateness” is asked to explain social change – for example, 
by the concept of norm cascades (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998) – it is in essence recurring 
to the “logic of consequences” and utilities maximizing actors. In the “logic of 
appropriateness,” shifting collective identities and socio-cultural settings are primarily 
attributed to the work of “norm entrepreneurs” – actors who contest existing normative 
orders and endeavor to replace them with alternative social scripts. While the concept of 
“norm entrepreneurs” has undoubtedly revealed new and intriguing insights about 
change in trans- and international politics, it nevertheless lacks a genuine explanation as 
to why these actors take all these efforts. Since “norm entrepreneurs” are obviously 
opposing the existing normative order, their behavior is unlikely to be determined by the 
dominant socio-cultural setting – the major explanation for actions under the “logic of 
appropriateness.” Consequentially, “norm entrepreneurs” have to operate according to a 
different rationality – a finding that leads us back to the rational concept of self-interest. 
While not necessarily striving for material goods, “norm entrepreneurs” are expected to 
follow the “logic of consequence” and aim to maximize utilities (e.g., Deitelhoff 2006: 75-
6). Thus, when it comes to change, the “logic of appropriateness” is recurring to the “logic 
of consequences.” 
Second, the “logic of appropriateness” builds with social norms, collective identities, and 
cultural settings on relatively static and enduring formations. Consequentially, under the 
“logic of appropriateness” change could only occur in terms of as a relatively slow and 
gradual process when, for example, prevailing social norms are disapproved as 
inappropriate and step-by-step substituted by alternative socio-cultural scripts (see, e.g., 
Checkel 2001; Keck & Sikking 1998; Klotz 1995; Price 1995; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; 
Tannenwald 2007). Negotiations are, however, relatively dynamic phenomena marked by 
often and abrupt changes. Sharp U-turns and game-changing outcomes are not unusual. 
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The relatively static orientation of the “logic of appropriateness” is therefore unlikely to 
apply.68 
But it is not only the “logic of appropriateness” that is unlikely to apply for bargaining 
dynamics in international security policy. The “logic of persuasion” is also assumed to fall 
short as an appropriate action-theoretical approach. Communicative action and the “logic 
of persuasion,” originally developed by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1981, 1992) 
and introduced into the IR debate by Harald Müller (1994), became prominent academic 
templates in recent years – in particular in German IR. It not only sparked lively debates 
(cf. ZIB debate69) but also lead to a series of empirical studies (e.g., Albert et al. 2008; 
Crawford 2002; Holzinger 2001b).70  
Unlike the “logic of appropriateness,” the “logic of persuasion” is a relatively dynamic 
action-theoretical approach which is assumed to have high relevance for the research on 
international negotiations.71 However, it is relatively apparent that the “logic of 
persuasion” is sensitive to contextual conditions. After all, Jürgen Habermas has 
developed this approach as a general philosophic concept and had not thought about the 
specific situations of international security policy (Müller 1994). It is certainly true that 
the “arguing techniques” are applied constantly in international affairs in very different 
settings and under very diverse circumstances (e.g., Holzinger 2001a, 2001b). But 
“arguing” does not per se lead to persuasion. In recent years the protagonists of this 
action-theoretical approach have therefore specified a number of “scope conditions” 
listing the contextual requirement needed for successful persuasion (Deitelhoff 2006; 
Ulbert & Risse 2005; Risse & Kleine 2010; Checkel 2005).72 The problem, however, is that 
most of these “scope conditions” are unlikely to apply in the conflict-laden context of 
                            
68
 In international affairs there are numerous examples where even antagonistic and hostile 
negotiations between foes and opponents arrived in the end to a successful outcome (take, for 
example, the Dayton Agreement that ended the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid-1990s). 
Based on the “logic of appropriateness” it would be difficult to analyze these bargaining dynamics. In 
the perspective of this action-theoretical approach, conflicts primarily signify struggles over 
contradicting social norms and identities. Consequentially, conflict-laden negotiations would be first 
and foremost “shouting matches” where representatives from different socio-cultural settings clash at 
each other. While this description is certainly correct for some bargaining situations in world politics, it 
nevertheless does not cover those dynamics where conflicting parties arrive at sudden cooperation and 
where hostile diplomatic struggles are U-turning into successful negotiation outcomes.  
69
 See, e.g., Keck 1995; Müller 1994; Risse-Kappen 1995; Schimmelfennig 1997; Schmalz-Bruns 1995; 
Schneider 1994; Zürn & Zangl 1996.  
70
 The “logic of persuasion” bases on the power of the “better” argument. In a case of successful 
persuasion, actors manage to alter the preferences of their audience, establish a collective consensus 
(Verständigung), and thereby trigger profound and self-sustained social change. This is achieved by 
“arguing techniques” which primarily represent the discursive practice of reason-giving and justification 
(Müller 2004; Risse 2000). 
71
 It is obvious that there is a close link between the “logic of persuasion” and diplomatic processes. 
Negotiations are the places were arguing and persuasion take place. Advocates of this action-
theoretical approach point out that the “logic of persuasion” is in particular suitable to grasp the abrupt 
and sudden changes. It is therefore not astonishing that evidence for the relevance of “arguing” and 
“persuasion” was in particular found in multilateral negotiations or in institutionalized bargaining 
process such as in the context of the European Union (e.g., Gehring & Kerler 2008; Joerges & Neyer 
1997; Niemann 2006). 
72
 Note that a consensus about the actual set of “scope conditions” is still missing.  
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international security policy such as the WMD issue area. To illustrate our argument we 
sign three examples:  
First, persuasion is assumed to be dependent on a favorable negotiation environment. 
Jeffrey T. Checkel has, for example, explained that the communication actions of 
“arguing” would have a higher impact if the targeted actors (i.e., the audience) do already 
belong or want to belong to the same “in-group” as the arguing actors (Checkel 2005: 81). 
Nicole Deitelhoff is supporting this argument by pointing out that persuasion is promoted 
by overlapping social realities (Lebenswelten) and shared yardsticks to evaluate the 
quality of exchanged arguments (Deitelhof 2006: 21-23). However, in international 
security policy, this favorable negotiation environment is often missing. Actors who are 
embroiled in diplomatic struggles usually do not share the same Lebenswelt and often 
disagree about the yardsticks applied to evaluate the quality of their arguments.  
Second, the authority of the speaker is often is assumed to be another “scope condition” 
for successful persuasion. The protagonists of this action-theoretical approach 
underscore that “arguing” in international negotiations is more likely to succeed if the 
involved actors are able to base their authority “on expertise and moral competence” or 
if there is a “neutral chair” within the negotiation process (Risse & Kleine 2010: 714). 
While this “scope condition” might be met in many bi- and multilateral bargaining 
dynamics, it is a requirement that is unlikely to apply to antagonistic and hostile 
diplomatic encounters where negotiating counterparts regard themselves as foes and 
opponents.  
Third, the requirements of no-lecturing and a serious deliberation of arguments are 
another “scope conditions.” Checkel has, for example, made clear that persuasion is only 
possible if the actors do not “lecture or demand” but instead act under the “principles of 
serious deliberative argument” (Checkel 2005: 813). Nicole Deitelhoff has made a similar 
argument by emphasizing the absence of power politics as essential scope condition. 
What is required is an open, nonpartisan, and inclusive discussion (Deitelhoff 2006: 21-
22). It is relatively apparent that this “scope condition” is likewise seldom met in conflict-
laden negotiation dynamics.  
2.5.2 “Logic of Consequences” and Orthodox Rationalism  
Since the “logic of appropriateness” and the “logic of persuasion” are assumed to have 
little to no exploratory power for negotiations with atomic renegade states, the 
behavioral pattern of actors who are embroiled in NRN is – in all probability – guided by 
the “logic of consequences.”  
In this third and most “classical” action-theoretical approach, actors are conceptualized as 
rational goal seekers who endeavor to realize individual goals. According to Jon Elster, 
being rational signifies “consistent, future-oriented, and instrumentally efficient 
behavior” (Elster 1989a: 35). David Lake and Robert Powell second this definition by 
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underscoring that rationalism assumes that “actors make purposive choices, that they 
survey their environment, and to the best of their ability, choose the strategy that best 
meets their subjectively defined goals” (Lake & Powell 1999: 6-7).  
Both the “logic of appropriateness” and the “logic of persuasion” explained change by 
ideational shifts. The motivation of actors is either altered by persuasion or by a gradual 
change in the general social and cultural setting. In the “logic of consequence,” social 
change is achieved through a different avenue. The motivation of actors – their beliefs, 
desires, and preferences – is assumed to be stable. Change occurs not by ideational shifts 
but first and foremost by the modification of the strategic environment (Lake & Powel 
1999: 19). Alterations in the behavioral patterns are the consequence of external 
manipulations of an actor’s strategic calculation. The primary techniques in that regard 
are “credible threats and promises” (Elster 2007: 419). 
The “logic of consequence” is able to explain change and dynamics in situations in which 
the two alternative action-theoretical approaches are too demanding, static, and too 
protracted. As John Elster has pointed out correctly “[i]t is usually easier to change 
people’s circumstances and opportunities than to change their minds” (Elster 2007: 170). 
Manipulating the strategic environment of actors in international affairs by threats and 
promises is assumed to operate even under difficult circumstances.  
However, the “logic of consequence” has also its limits. While it can explain swift 
behavioral changes under adverse conditions, it is weak in covering profound, 
sustainable, and self-supporting motivational shifts that endure even when the external 
manipulation is dwindling. As soon as the stimuli comes to an end and does not affect the 
strategic calculations anymore, the targeted actors are assumed to return to their 
accustomed behavior given that the original intentions have remained stable and have 
not changed.73  
However, since international negotiations signify primarily dynamic and rather short- or 
medium-term phenomena, this particular shortcoming of the “logic of consequence” is 
not completely irrelevant but less important than in other fields (such as in the research 
on international institutions). Far more relevant is instead to risk to be regarded as an 
“Orthodox Rationalist” as soon as we speak of rational actors and the “logic of 
consequence.” It is, however, one of the core arguments of our PhD project that the 
“logic of consequences” is not embroiled in a “Faustian pact” with Orthodox Rationalism 
but instead is free to strike a league with the more moderate Enlightened Rationalism – 
the meta-theoretical approach we prefer in our doctoral thesis.  
Orthodox Rationalism is in general a very dominant approach in social sciences. 
Originated from micro-economic theory, it is associated with the assumption of homo 
economics and a materialist view on social reality. Orthodox Rationalism has 
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 The way out of this situation is to build lasting incentive structures (such as international institutions). 
Consequentially, the weakness of the “logic of consequence” in terms of long-term behavioral changes 
was widely debated in the literature on international institutions and regimes (e.g., Hasenclever, Mayer 
& Rittberger 1997).  
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shortcomings. Some of its weaknesses were identified by rationalist scholars (i.e., the 
approach of “bounded rationality”; Jones 1999). But most critiques came from post-
positivist approaches. Challenged for more than two decades, the list of critical reviews 
has grown over the years.74 We share many aspects of the critique and will introduce 
three outstanding shortcomings which are in particular important for our PhD project:  
First, Orthodox Rationalism was often criticized for building on naïve hyper-rational 
assumptions. It is simply unrealistic, critics of this approach say, that actors are optimally 
informed about the entire set of potential strategic options. It is unlikely that real-world 
actors have in-depth knowledge about their opponents’ preferences, and that they 
dispose powerful calculation capabilities allowing them to draw always under all 
circumstances well-matching strategic conclusions. Real-world actors are no “walking 
encyclopedias.” Rather, the rationality of individuals or groups is assumed to be 
“bounded” to their cognitive capabilities, emotional dispositions, and the scope and 
nature of the available information (Deitelhoff 2006: 84; Jervis 1976; March 1986; Ostrom 
1991; Stein 2013).75  
Second, Orthodox Rationalism was often criticized because it perceives the motivation of 
real-world actors as exogenous and given (Milner 1991; Ruggie 1998: 862-3). In particular 
(neo)realists scholars have often presumed fixed preferences and have inferred the 
assumption of the general striving for survival and self-help from the anarchic structure of 
international system and the distribution of power resources among state actors (e.g., 
Waltz 1979). Critics, however, have emphasized that actors’ intentions are endogenous 
and contingent. The motivations of state actors change over time and vary considerably 
even when they are operating under the same systemic conditions or when they have 
similar power capabilities (e.g., Barnett 1998; Checkel 1998; Finnemore 1996; Wendt 
1994).  
Third, Orthodox Rationalism is assumed to be weak in explaining dynamic processes. Its 
overall focus is rather on static situations. When dynamic forces are introduced into 
rationalist research designs, they often build on relatively simple concepts such as 
exogenous power shift. By neglecting change and dynamic forces, Orthodox Rationalism 
is turning a blind eye one of the most important and intriguing part of international 
politics, critics say (e.g., Deitelhoff 2006: 20; Snidal 2013: 99).  
But while the critique is justified, we see that constructivist and post-positivist IR scholars 
tend to hold all other rationalist scholars hostage for Orthodox Rationalism (Snidal 2013; 
Stein 1999). It is often ignored that rationalism has moved onward the last two decades. 
Constructivist and post-positivist critics turn too often a blind eye on the numerous 
efforts that was undertaking to overcome or at least to mitigate the shortcomings and 
flaws of Orthodox Rationalism. In the following section we will introduce some of these 
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 For a comprehensive summary of the critical debate about rational choice in IR including its strengths 
and shortcomings see, e.g., Snidal 2013.  
75
 In that context we would like to mention that there are numerous experimental studies showing that 
individuals often fail to act rationally (Kydd 2008: 430; Schneider 1994: 363; Jones 1999: 297). 
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reform efforts which were undertaken by a number of scholars we grouped together 
under the label of Enlightened Rationalism.  
2.5.3 Enlightened Rationalism: An Ongoing Reform Project  
 
The expression Enlightened Rationalism was originally coined by Jeffrey T. Checkel 
(Checkel 2001: 569).76 Instead of being a well-defined methodological approach, 
Enlightened Rationalism signifies rather a “hotchpotch” of the different reform efforts. It 
is an (slowly) ongoing debate and an umbrella term uniting the numerous attempts to 
revise and modernize rationalism in light of the vehement critique this approach has 
faced in the last decades. Although the individual perspectives and concepts differ, we 
can say in general that Enlightened Rationalists have a tendency to downgrade 
conceptual rigidness and parsimony for the sake of a broader and more holistic view on 
social reality (Snidal 2013: 87). 
What we will discuss in the following sections is a selection of enlightened rationalist 
arguments. We will focus on those aspects that are in particular relevant for our research 
project. To illustrate our argumentation we will on numerous occasions refer to one of 
the most influential metaphors in social science: the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD).77 Signifying 
a very concise description of a social dilemma where individual rationality leads to 
collectively sub-optimal outcomes, we deem the PD as a particularly useful example to 
clarify the (meta-)theoretical assumptions and logics of Enlightened Rationalism. 
2.5.3.1 The Structure of Rational Motivation 
Rationalism “is subjective through and through” (Elster 2007: 209). It puts individual 
actors – regardless whether they are individuals or collective entities – at the center. 
Consequentially, the motivations of actors are essential in order to understand and 
explain behavioral patterns (e.g., Scharpf 2000: 110).  
                            
76
 Other expressions used in the literature are, for example: “soft rational choice” (Kydd 2008: 
429) ”nonmathematical approach of rationalism“ (Snidal 2013: 87), “weak cognitivism” (Hasenclever, 
Mayer & Rittberger 1997), “actor-centered institutionalism” (Scharpf 1997; Zürn & Zangl 1999), 
or ”second generation models of rationality“ (Ostrom 1998).  
77
 In IR literature we find many descriptions of the PD metaphor (e.g., Luce & Raiffa 1957: 94-5; Axelrod 
1987: 112-3; Oye 1986: 7-8). In the conventional form it reads as follows: Imagine two criminals who 
were arrested by the police for committing a crime together (for example, burglary). Both are 
imprisoned in separate cells without the chance to communicate with each other. Since both decline to 
testify, the sharp-witted chief inspector offers each prisoner a deal with three options: (1) In case only 
one of the suspects testifies, the confessor goes free while his comrade will be jailed for 10 years (2) If 
both admit they committed crime, both will be sentenced for 5 years (3) If both, however, remain silent 
they will both be punished with 1 year in prison for a minor crime they have been already convicted for 
(for example, illegal possession of firearms). If we assume that the criminals are rational actors who 
follow the logic of individual utility maximization, they would, in all probability, both break their silence, 
fearing that their counterpart is choosing option (1) and they would suffer the worst case scenario of 10 
years in prison. Option (2) is therefore the most likely outcome. The smart chief inspector has fulfilled 
her mission and has convicted both suspects. But by following the logic of individual rationality the two 
prisoners have, however, missed the collective optimum which would have been the best choice for 
both of them (option 3).  
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Against that background one would assume that IR scholars who follow the “logic of 
consequence” have a clear concept of rational motivations. But, strangely, that is rarely 
the case (e.g., Aggarwal 1996: 15-98; Frieden 1999; Stein 1999). Despite frequent calls for 
a “theory of motivation” (e.g., Allan 1983; Cohen 1990; Oye 1985; Powell 1994; Rittberger 
& Zürn 1990a; Snidal 1986; Stein 1999: 204), the current situation is still bleak. What is 
meant by “motivation” appears to vary widely among IR scholars. Definitions are often 
unspecific or mingled with other non-motivational aspects of rational choice theory – 
such as strategies or incentives (e.g., Frieden 1999: 39 & 47; Stein 1999: 204). Moreover, 
the debate about actors’ “motivations” is marked by an “inflation” of terminologies. The 
spectrum stretches from rather colloquial expression such as “goals,” “objectives,” 
“interests,” or “wishes” to relatively technical terms such as “utility concepts” or 
“payoffs.”78 
Figure 5: Motivational Concept 
 
However, it appears that those scholars we have associated with the reform project of 
Enlightened Rationalism do agree about the structure of rational motivation (Figure 5). 
                            
78
 In order to avoid additional confusion in terms of terminology, we have decided to follow the 
vocabulary introduced by Jon Elster – probably one of the leading philosophical experts on rationalism 
(see in particular Elster 1989a and Elster 2007). Only with regard to “preferences” we differ from 
Elster’s terminology since this aspect is in his concept relatively imprecise. Although Elster elaborates 
explicitly on the idea of “preferences” at several occasions in his writings (for example, in his analysis of 
collective decision making (Elster 2007: ch. 25)), he has not incorporated “preferences” into his 
motivation concept. 
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There is a certain consensus that the motivation of real-world actors is not monolithic but 
consists of different components, namely: opportunities, preferences, beliefs, and desires 
(e.g., Lake & Powel 1999; Elster 1989b 30-41, Zürn & Zangl 1999: 353-4). In particular, 
with regard to the ideational non-material concept of beliefs, the enlightened rationalist 
concept of motivation becomes clearly distinguishable from Orthodox Rationalism, which 
is dominated first and foremost by a materialist world view.  
Opportunities: Opportunities are the set of all possible choices available to actors in a 
given strategic situation. Opportunities are all what actors possibly could do. For example, 
in the PD metaphor illustrated above (footnote 77), the arrested criminals have four 
possible opportunities – (1) confess together (2) remain silent together (3) unilateral 
confession (4) or remaining silent while the counterpart is confessing. However, while the 
opportunities of an actor represent a crucial element of his or her motivational concept, 
opportunities themselves are not motivation in the strict sense since they have not an 
ideational nature. Motivations (i.e., desires, beliefs, and preferences) are purely 
subjective. They are internal to actors. Opportunities, instead, are creatures of the 
outside world. They are objective and external to actors (Elster 1989a: 20).  
Desires: Obviously, not all available opportunities are wanted by actors. Just because 
actors can do something does not mean that they also preferred the doable. Desires are 
(together with beliefs) crucial for the selection of opportunities. Desires are what actors 
want. ”Desires define what, for the agent, counts as the best” (Elster 2007: 165). For 
example, the desire of the two prisoners in the PD metaphor is in all probability 
“freedom.” They strive to avoid a prison sentence or at least endeavor to reduce their 
time in confinement to the minimum. Desires of actors vary. In many cases real-world 
actors have more than just one desire. Moreover, desires are assumed to be relatively 
stable formations (see also ch. 2.5.3.3). They are by and large supposed to be relatively 
independent for the particular interaction or the general strategic environment. For 
example, we could assume that the desire for “freedom”, we assigned to the two 
criminals of the PD metaphor, is an integral part of their motivation and likely to prevail 
regardless of whether they are sentenced to several years in prison or set free.  
Preferences: Enlighted Rationalists appear to agree that desires (and beliefs, see 
following section) do not directly affect the choice of opportunities but work through 
preferences (e.g., Elster 2007: 402; Lake & Powell 1999: 10; Powell 1994: 318; Zürn & 
Zangl 1997). Preference signifies the situation-specific implementation of desires (Frieden 
1999: 41; Lake & Powell 1999: 9-10). While desires represent what actors want in general, 
preferences are the manifestation of this general will within a specific strategic 
constellation and in correspondence to the available opportunities. Preferences are in 
essence “desired opportunities.”79 Thus, preferences are not freely chosen by actors. 
Rather, preferences are the strict situation-specific implementation of desires (and 
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 At that point we shall note that the transitive nature signifies another important feature of 
preferences. Expressed by an example introduced by Andrew Kydd, transitive preferences mean that “if 
I prefer victory to a stalemate and a stalemate to defeat, I must prefer victory to defeat” (Kydd 2008: 
429). 
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beliefs) (Figure 5). Actors have to translate their desires in light of the available 
opportunities and rank them in terms of “betterness.”80 That actors are capable of 
stringently converting their desires (and beliefs) into preferences is a core assumption of 
rationalism. After all, being rational is defined by consistency between what actors want 
and what they do (Elster 1989a: 35). 
Unlike desires, preferences are not stable. They are contingent upon concrete 
interactions and specific situations. When the set of available opportunities is changing, 
preferences change too – despite stable desires. In light of the available opportunities the 
very same desires are in these situations translated into different preferences. For 
example, with some imagination we could assume that the entire situation of the PD 
metaphor is changing because the case of the two arrested criminals is taken to court. 
The original PD is now transforming into a “juridical game.” Since a lawsuit differs in many 
respects from an interrogation situation with the general prosecutor, the set of 
opportunities available to the two prisoners is changing leading to different behavioral 
patterns despite the fact that the desire for “freedom” is assumed to remain stable. Due 
to the altered situation, the preferences of the two criminals are likely to vary. For 
example, in courtroom situations the two criminals would be supported by lawyers. As a 
consequence, the worst-case scenario of the PD metaphor (10 years of imprisonment if 
only one of the suspects is confessing) appears less threating since the two suspects 
expect that their legal representatives are able to alleviate this draconic punishment. 
Consequentially, the inclination for a swift confession – inherent in the original setting of 
the PD metaphor – becomes less dominant. However, all that does not change the fact 
that “freedom” is the ultimate desire of the criminals.  
Beliefs: Beliefs are another central component of rational motivation. Beliefs signify 
general cognitive assumptions actors have about the world and the nature of politics 
(Keck 1995: 8; Elster 2007; Lake & Powell 1999: 11; Scharpf 2000: 114-116). Unlike 
desires, beliefs signify convictions and not aspirations. While desires are what actors want 
to get in a given situation, beliefs are what they think they could get.81  
Beliefs are assumed to affect the behavioral patterns of rational actors in two ways (case 
A, Figure 5). First, and similar to desires, beliefs work through preferences. Together with 
desires they lead to a ranking of available opportunities in a given strategic situation. 
Recurring again to the PD metaphor we could, for example, assume that one of the 
                            
80
 It is important to keep this particular point in mind since the translation of desires (and beliefs) into 
preferences by the so-called “reenactment method” will play a crucial part in our study on Libya’s 
nuclear reversal (see ch. 4.3).  
81
 Beliefs are purely subjective. Although they build on the knowledge and historic experiences of 
actors, it is important to underscore that beliefs are neither true nor justified information. Beliefs could 
be biased and false. Consequentially, in the quest to realize their desires, actors are exposed to the 
danger of “belief traps” (Elster 2007: 136-144, 211; Eslter 1989: 19). For example, the desires actors 
have could, on the one hand, negatively influence their beliefs and distort the cognitive conviction 
about the nature of social reality (case B, Figure 5). In these situations actors are enthusiastic about 
certain opportunities (Schwärmerei) that would – if only they were real – fulfil what they so desperately 
want. On the other hand, false beliefs could also distort desires. In such a scenario actors only want 
what they believe they could get – a constellation we normally describe as fatalism (case B, Figure 5). 
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criminals believes that fellow human beings are in general benign and trustworthy. It is 
very likely that this cognitive conviction has implications on how the imprisoned suspect 
is ranking the four options available in the PD situation.82 Second, and unlike desires, 
beliefs are assumed to directly influence the set of opportunities (case A, Figure 5). In the 
end it is the actors’ general convictions about the world that determine what is regarded 
as an opportunity and what is not. For example, due to a particular belief system, actors 
could be unaware of certain opportunities which are in reality available to them – a 
situation the former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has famously described 
as the “unknown unknowns” (Rumsfeld 12. Feb. 2002; see also: Elster 2007: 126). 
Returning again to the PD metaphor, one could, for example, imagine that one of the 
criminals has a particular negative belief system. The cooperative option of remaining 
silent together would in his eyes not qualify as a proper opportunity. Even though that 
option would – when only viewed soberly – fulfil his desire for freedom, he still would 
decline that opportunity, believing that this is a naïve and, in practice, nonexistent option. 
2.5.3.2 The Substance of Rational Motivation  
Enlightened Rationalists appear to have a relatively clear and multifaceted concept about 
the structure of actors’ motivation and thereby distance themselves from Orthodox 
Rationalism. However, their understanding about the substance of rational motivation 
seems to be more conventional.  
Most Enlightened Rationalists would agree that actors are “hybrid goal seekers” who are 
not exclusively focused on realizing instrumental rationality in the senses of utilitarian 
maximization of materialist benefits.83 Rather, real players are assumed to strive also for 
social and immaterial desires such as general public welfare, a stable and clean 
environment, or the survival of endangered species (Keck 1995: 10-11, 1997; Schneider 
1996: 361; Snidal 2002: 75; Elster 1989a: 46-49; Satz & Ferejohn 1994). In that sense, 
Enlightened Rationalists clearly demarcate themselves from Orthodox Rationalism.  
However, the actual scope and nature of “hybrid goal seeking” remains unclear. In 
practical research, egoist utility maximization still remains the central orientation for 
Enlightened Rationalists – despite the assumption of the “hybrid goal seeker.” Since self-
interested actions retained a “special place,” Enlightened Rationalists are in terms of the 
“substance” of motivation de facto very similar to Orthodox Rationalism (Kydd 2008: 427; 
Scharpf 2000: ch. 2). Constructivist critics have pointed out that, despite the theoretical 
possibility of social and immaterial intentions, Enlightened Rationalists quickly recur to 
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 The role of beliefs in actual decision making is assumed, in particular, high under the condition of 
uncertainty. When actors have only limited information, they recur strongly to general convictions. Lake 
and Powell have, for example, pointed out that Thomas Schelling’s (1961) description of a nuclear crisis 
is a good example for the role of beliefs in foreign policy decision making. A nuclear crisis is “a 
competition in risk taking”, they say, where “each state is unsure of the risk the other state is willing to 
run, but actors must still make some probabilistic assessments of whether the other is risk averse or risk 
acceptant” (Lake & Powell 1999: 11).  
83
 In that context, the advocates of the “logic of consequence” have also emphasized that rational 
choice applies even for altruism – i.e., the state where an actor finds itself “deriving pleasure from other 
people’s pleasure, even when there is no obligation or indeed no occasion to act for the sake of 
promoting their pleasure” (Elster 1989b: 47; see also: Keck 1995: 10-11). 
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egoist-utilitarian goal maximization as soon as they turn to empirical research (Müller 
1995: 372).84 
However, in light of this critique it is important to underscore that the “pitch” for a 
reform on the substance of rational motivation is limited. Individual goal seeking is at the 
very heart of rationalism and signifies a central methodological building block of this 
methodological position that could not be abandoned. The assumption of actors (be it 
individuals or collective entities) aiming to maximize their goals (be it material or 
immaterial objectives) by intentional actions (be it physical or communication action) 
based on a calculation of costs and benefits (be it in favor of an individual actor or a larger 
community) is essential and inevitable in order to remain within the realm of the “logic of 
consequences.” In their attempt to revise and reform rationalism, Enlightened 
Rationalists could not move beyond these principle requirements.  
2.5.3.3 Surveying Endogenic Motivation  
Enlighted Rationalists demarcate themselves from Orthodox Rationalism by assuming 
that the motivation of actors is neither given nor fixed. Rather, they claim that desires, 
beliefs, and preferences have an endogenic nature and vary over time and between 
actors.85 While this assumption allows drawing a richer picture of social reality, it comes 
at a price. If we discard the approach applied by Orthodox Rationalism and refrain from 
using theories (such as neo-realism or market theories) to infer the general interest of 
actors (such as such as political power or economic well-being), the assessment of 
desires, beliefs, and preferences turns into a demanding empirical endeavor. It requires a 
careful and case-specific mapping, a detailed study of different types of data (such as 
historical documents, interviews, and/or memorials of relevant decision makers), and the 
application of methods that are not genuine to rationalism but instead originate from 
socio-psychology or constructivist research. In addition to these practical challenges there 
are two methodological obstacles that further complicated the survey of endogenic 
motivations: (1) the “revealed-preference-problem” and (2) “varying degrees of 
unobservability.” 
(1) Revealed Preference Problem: Intuitively it might appear logical that deeds reveal an 
actor’s intentions. But the attempt to disclose motivations by analyzing real-world 
players’ actions signifies, in essence, an analytical pitfall we often encounter among 
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 Against that background post-positivist critics have stressed that rationalism is unsuitable to analyze 
unselfish and intrinsically motivated actions. Scholars who follow the “logic of consequence” are unable 
to study ethic or moral orientations and dispositions, they say. Because rational choice is inevitably 
bound to individual goal seeking, it has only a “weak concept of altruism” in the sense that of “second 
order egoism” (Deitelhoff 2006: 85; Risse-Kappen 1995: 176; Müller 1995: 372; Schimmelfennig 1997: 
222; Schmalz-Bruns 1995: 354). Undoubtedly, the critics have a point. However, while there are certain 
fields in international affairs where unselfish and intrinsically motivated actions do play a role (e.g., 
development aid, human rights, or disaster relief), their general relevance in world politics is very 
limited (Müller 1994: 372). The “weak altruism” of rationalism is more a theoretical than a particular 
problem of rational IR research.  
85
 However, at that point we shall quote James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, who said that only very 
few Orthodox Rationalists are full-heartily “committed to the assumption (…) that preferences really are 
stable, for all time. For most it is merely a “methodological bet,” an analytical convenience that allows 
them to answer the question that interests them” (Fearon & Wendt: 64).  
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academics and policy makers alike. This particular challenge was widely discussed in IR 
literature under the label “revealed preference approach” (e.g., Snidal 1986: 40-1; Lake & 
Powel 1999: 18, 33; Zürn 1992: 238-9). On the one hand, the motivations of an actor are 
not necessarily reflected in his or her behavioral pattern. There are numerous frictions 
and translation problems which make it difficult to read intentions from actions. 
Misinterpretation and distorting simplifications are likely. On the other hand, such an 
approach implies the danger of tautology. The “revealed preference approach” bases in 
essence of a circular argumentation. When insights about an actor’s intentions, which 
were in a first step distilled from an actor’s behavior, are applied to analyses the behavior 
of the very same actor, the exlanadum and the explanas is likely to coincide. In that case 
we have, obviously, a situation of “ex post rationalization” of past behavioral patterns 
which has no independent explanatory power.86 
The “revealed preference problems” highlights that we cannot study the motivation of 
actors through an observation of their behavior. Rather, we have to tap other, more 
“ideational” data. Surveying of actors’ motivation has therefore to focus directly on 
beliefs, desires, and preferences. That requires that we use methods that are specified for 
these tasks. Since there is no genuine rationalist approach to study ideational features of 
social reality, Enlightened Rationalists have to recur primarily to methods that originate 
from constructivist or social psychology (such as cognitive maps, or operational codes; 
see ch. 4). In terms of practical research, the need to study ideational formations often 
leads to a schizophrenic situation. Major parts of Enlightened Rationalist projects turn de 
facto into “constructivist” research endeavors. During this phase one would – given the 
applied methods and the studied data – have difficulties to identify the “rationalist 
nature” of the relevant research project. Moreover, the requirement to investigate 
ideational data makes Enlightened Rationalist projects often complicated, protracted, and 
demanding efforts. To considerable extent scholars have to do at first constructivist 
research before they could proceed to the actual “rationalist core” of their project – the 
analysis of the “logic of consequence.”  
However, this particular survey of endogenic motivation also has benefits. Scholars who 
shoulder this burden are rewarded with detailed insights into the ideational nature of 
their research objective. As a consequence, they could clearly identify to which degree 
constructivist explanations challenge their rationalist approach. In terms of a rich and 
broad reflection of social reality, Enlightened Rationalist research projects not only 
exceed the Orthodox Rationalism but also the work of constructivist scholars.  
(2) Varying Degrees of Unobservability: It is conventional wisdom that the motivations of 
actors are not directly observable. It was often said that IR research is difficult because 
scholars have no chance “to look into the mind” of foreign policy decision makers. 
Certainly, motivations are always invisible. What is, however, ignored by this general 
statement is the fact that the different components of the just introduced concept of 
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 For prominent examples of studies that have applied the ”revealed preference approach” see, for 
example, Snyder & Diesinger 1977 or Oye 1986.  
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rational motivation differ in terms of their “unobservability.” Surveying preferences is 
more difficult than mapping beliefs and desires.  
As we have explained above, preferences are situation-specific. Unlike desires and beliefs, 
their appearance varies depending on the available opportunities in a given strategic 
situation. Consequentially, preferences are the most dynamic and most short-lived 
component of an actor’s intention. Moreover, preferences are normally poorly 
documented. Policy makers tend to spell out their desires and beliefs. Both often find 
expression – in written or in verbal form – in strategic reflections (e.g., position and 
strategy papers, White Books, or foreign policy speeches and debates). But since 
preferences are the situation-specific translation of desires and beliefs, they often stay in 
the minds of decision makers or make – at best – appearance in backroom discussions 
where leaders weigh and consider their strategic options with their close confidantes.87 
Consequentially, IR scholars often have very little chance to decipher preferences in 
retrospective from the available historic evidence and data.  
Hence, it is only logical to base the mapping of motivation primarily on desires and 
beliefs. With that, however, researchers who follow the template of Enlighted 
Rationalism put themselves in a dilemma. In analytical terms, preferences are the most 
interesting component in the rational concept of motivation since they directly affect 
actions. While desires and beliefs are rather distant from an actor’s behavioral pattern, 
preferences directly shape actions in given situations (case A, Figure 5). Consequentially, 
analytical approaches in rationalism – such as game theory – build primarily on 
preferences. A survey that is based exclusively on desires and beliefs is therefore 
incomplete and limited in terms of analytical applicability – although it is in most of the 
cases the only way to study an actor’s motivation. 
In order to mitigate this dilemma we introduced the so-called “reenactment method.” 
When using the “reenactment method,” scholars are asked to replay the translation and 
weighting process that real actors do all the time when facing new strategic situations. As 
we have outlined in the concept of rational motivation, preferences are dependent on the 
available opportunities. When facing a new situation, real actors normally do not know 
their preferences by heart. Rather they develop them by a translation and weighting 
procedure. The “reenactment method” builds on that very logic (for more detail 
discussion see ch. 4.3). Scholars, who have completed a comprehensive mapping of 
desires and beliefs, put themselves “into the shoes” of the relevant players in the field 
they are studying and ask the very same question these very actors were confronted with 
when impelled to take strategic action: how to rank the available opportunities in 
consistency with the given desires and beliefs? By replaying this procedure, scholars have 
the chance to decipher at set preferences which would be otherwise inaccessible. 
                            
87
 In addition, in practical research it is often very difficult to distinguish preferences from opportunities. 
In social reality preferences find first and foremost expression in the way actors order opportunities. 
They are “desired opportunities,” as we have explained above. Therefore, preferences and 
opportunities are phenomenologically very close. 
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2.5.3.4 Dynamics through Sequencing 
The lack of dynamics is another shortcoming of Orthodox Rationalism. Given that we live 
in a dynamic world, the critique of being too static and “motionless” is serious. Certainly, 
not all elements in international affairs are subjected to constant change. But 
negotiations and diplomacy – the research objective of this PhD project – certainly are 
unstable phenomena. Process is their primary nature. Assuming that there is no change in 
an actor’s motivation and that all dynamics are introduced by external factors would 
simply represent an unrealistic portrayal of social reality. Consequentially, those IR 
scholars we have associated with on the reform project of Enlightened Rationalism are in 
general very eager to introduce dynamic forces into the rationalist research. While 
acknowledging that motivations are neither fixed nor given, Enlightened Rationalists still 
assume that desires and beliefs are in general stable. While occasional change is likely 
and does occur from time to time, it is assumed that desires and beliefs have first and 
foremost a static nature. The assumption of “relatively stability” is one of the core ideas 
of rationalism.  
“Sequencing” is the primary remedy Enlightened Rationalist proposes to overcome the 
static tradition in rationalism (e.g., Aggrawal 1996; Zangl 1999; Zürn 1992; see also: Snidal 
2002: 83). It represents a way to work around this “dynamic-stability problem.” 
“Sequencing” allows for a certain degree of dynamic while, at the same time, maintains 
the core orientation of the rationalist research program: Exploring how variations of 
external factors (i.e., the explanans) affect the stable motivations of actors and their 
behavioral of patterns in a given strategic situation (i.e., the explanadum). What is at the 
very heart of the “sequencing approach” is the idea of a strategic cascade – a succession 
of different stable constellations. Apart from moments where one strategic sequence is 
transformed into another, stability is the norm. “Sequencing” is narrowing dynamic forces 
down to a limited number of strategic metamorphoses. In essence, this approach builds 
on the assumption that important and decisive changes in social reality do not occur in 
the form of incremental trends or gradual processes but rather take place through salient 
turning points and significant shifts. 
At first glance, “sequencing” appears only as a weak solution for the shortcoming of 
Orthodox Rationalism, since this method is in the end more characterized by stability 
than by dynamics. However, we will show that close-meshed “sequencing” with a high 
frequency of strategic cascades could even cover fast-moving processes. It is able to 
register endogenic dynamics to an extent that even constructivist research – which is 
often claimed to be particular sensitive for change – could hardly surpass.  
In order to study even swift changes in international affairs, we suggest two overlapping 
modes of sequencing: (1) “sequencing by translation,” a large-scale approach which is 
based on shifts in an actor’s motivation and (2) “sequencing by weighting,” a more small-
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scale procedure which works through alternation in the set of an actor’s opportunities 
(case C, Figure 5).88  
(1) Sequencing by Translation: “Sequencing by translation” is in essence a byproduct of 
the motivation survey. When we discover significant shifts in an actor’s beliefs and/or 
desires, these changes are translated by the “reenactment method” into altering 
preferences which lead to new strategic constellation. However, “sequencing by 
translation” is by itself not sufficient to cover fast-moving social processes. As 
alternations in ideational structure (i.e., beliefs and desires) are assumed to be rather 
slow, “sequencing by translation” is limited in terms of dynamics. We could only capture 
large-scale shifts and ideational evolution similar to what constructivist scholars study 
when they analyze social change. We therefore introduce “sequencing by weighting,” an 
additional method which allows for a higher frequency in the cascade of strategic 
constellations  
(2) Sequencing by Weighting: Apart from “ideational shifts” in desires and/or beliefs, 
endogenic change in an actor’s intention could also occur through an alternation in the 
opportunity set. 
 In bargaining situations it is not unusual that the involved parties evoke by their own 
actions new opportunities. In the history of international affairs there are many examples 
where diplomatic breakthroughs and conflict settlements through negotiations have led 
to completely new constellations with new options for the involved players to take.89 
Acknowledging this particular avenue of change in international negotiations, scholars 
have introduced different concepts to phase bargaining dynamics which highlight that the 
diplomacy process go far beyond the actual meetings at the “negotiation table” but are 
rather marked by extended pre-negotiation, pre-agreement, and post-agreement phases 
(e.g., Druckman 2001; Hopmann 1996; Saunders 1985; Stein 1989; Zartman & Berman 
1982). What is in terms of sequencing in particular important is each of these phases is 
assigned to distinct sets of opportunities.  
Certainly, a new set of opportunities does not automatically result in a new strategic 
constellation. In many situations where we witness changes in opportunities, the 
preferences of the involved actors are assumed to remain stable. However, there is 
ground to believe that in some situations, when the shifts in an actor’s opportunities set 
are decisive and profound, the motivation will become affected too, causing new 
strategic constellations. Dramatic changes in the set of an actor’s opportunities let stable 
                            
88
 As we will show in the method chapter in more detail (ch. 4.3), both concepts of sequencing are 
operating on the “reenactment method.” 
89
 One has not only to think about the epochal diplomacy events like the Westphalian Peace (1648) or 
the Vienna Congress (1815) (Kissinger 2014: ch. 1 & 2). IR scholars doing research on international 
negotiations have revealed that even in more ordinary bargain dynamics the involved actors often 
change by their own actions the opportunity sets and thereby trigger new strategic constellations.  
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desires and beliefs “appear in a different light,” affect thereby the translation of 
preferences, and could lead to changing strategic constellations (see case C, Figure 5).90 
The idea of “weighting” allows different preferences and strategic behavioral patterns 
despite the fact that the desires and beliefs of the actors have not changed. Thus, 
“sequencing by weighting” is a concept that allows for a higher frequency of strategic 
cascades. It allows introducing additional dynamics in situations where the “sequencing 
by translation” is – due to stable desires and/or beliefs – not accounting for change and 
alternation. In the case study on Libya’s NRN we will elaborate this idea in more detail 
and will give practical examples.  
2.5.4 How Scientific Realists Draw Conclusions – Inference to the Best 
Explanation (IBE) 
 
Action theory is crucial when doing practical research on international negotiations. But 
the mode of reasoning signifies another methodological aspect that is likewise essential 
for practical research. The way we draw inference becomes in particular relevant when 
we aim to investigate unobservable facts which cannot be scrutinized directly but only 
through proxies – for example, the “fit performance” of diplomatic design.  
As we have outlined above, Scientific Realism is, unfortunately, relatively indifferent in 
terms of action theory – a fact that obliged us to elaborate in detail on the nature of 
Enlightened Rationalism. However, when it comes to the drawing of conclusions, 
Scientific Realism gives relatively precise guidance. Most scholars who build their 
research on the fundaments of Scientific Realism apply – either intendedly or 
unintendedly – a particular mode of reasoning: the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) 
(e.g., Harman 1965; Lipton 2000, Lipton 2004; Wendt 1999: 62-3).
91 This type of 
inference, which was in modern philosophy of science primarily introduced by Charles S. 
Peirce (Reichertz 2010), is closely interwoven with Scientific Realism and could be 
regarded as a constitutive element for this methodological approach. Thus, believing in 
Scientific Realism goes hand in hand with applying to IBE.  
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 Take, for example, the PD metaphor. Above we have described the scenario in which the PD game is 
transforming from an interrogation situation into a lawsuit constellation. This shift is assumed to affect 
the set of opportunities of the two suspects – despite the fact that their motivation (i.e., the desire for 
freedom) remains unchanged. In a courtroom situation it is likely that the desire for freedom could 
appear in a “different light” due to the availability of well-vexed lawyers. As a result, the two criminals 
are likely to weight the translation of their desires into preferences in light of changed opportunities.  
Knowing they have the support of a lawyer, the worst case scenario of 10 years imprisonment becomes, 
for example, less threatening. The two criminals expect that their lawyers are able to alleviate this 
draconic punishment. Consequentially, the inclination for a swift confession – inherent in the original 
setting of the Prisoner’s Dilemma – becomes less dominant and increases the likelihood of joint 
cooperation.  
91
 Instead, IBE scholars have often used alternative labels such as “abduction,” “method of hypothesis,” 
“hypothetic inference,” “method of elimination,” “eliminative induction,” or “theoretical interference” 
(Hartman 1965: 88-89).  
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However, it is crucial that IBE is not only of relevance for our research project because it 
is a central expression of Scientific Realism. IBE has also very tangible and down-to-the-
earth implications for practical research. We claim that this mode of reasoning allows 
research under conditions where the conventional approaches of inferences (i.e., 
deduction and induction) are likely to fail. Thus, even if we were not believing in Scientific 
Realism, there would be nevertheless good practical reasons to apply IBE anyway.  
In the following section we will give a short introduction on IBE, highlighting two aspects. 
First, we will very briefly summarize the philosophical debate about the scope and nature 
of IBE. Second, we will propose a concept how IBE could be applied in the practical 
research – an aspect that was thus far widely neglected in the relevant literature. 
2.5.4.1 IR Scholars as Detective – What is IBE?  
It is very common in IR to study unobservable phenomena (such as power, motivation, 
ideas, norms, etc.). Consequentially, in numerous research projects, proxies and inquires 
by inferences play a central role. When we say “inference,” most of us will at first think 
about the deduction and induction. In the logic of deduction we draw conclusions about 
unobservable facts by inferring from law-like theories. If we want to know, for example, 
whether the sun is rising tomorrow morning, we would refer to planetary theories which 
specify the rotation of the earth and the inclination of the earth’s axis. With this 
information we could very precisely conclude the time at which the sun will rise the next 
morning. In the logic of induction we infer about unobservable facts based on our past 
empirical observation. Given that the sun has always risen in the morning hours since 
time began, we conclude that it will rise tomorrow too (Lipton 2000).  
Figure 6: Inference to the Best Explanation  
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IBE represents a third approach of reasoning which is clearly distinct from the two 
conventional approaches of inference (Figure 6). IBE starts with a singular observation (E) 
which is regarded as puzzling and unusual. This initial observation (E) is so-called the IBE-
trigger. The reasoning process then starts by specifying the nature and scope of the 
observation (P1…Pn). Based on these “starting facts,” the relevant background knowledge 
(W) is consulted. The background knowledge serves as a pool from which scholars (and 
laypersons) derive a set of potential hypotheses (H1…Hn) which could possibly explain 
the observation (E). In the following step the actual hypothesis (Hg), which is the “best 
explanation” of the observation (E), is selected from the set of potential hypotheses. The 
advocates of IBE conclude (C) that the selected hypothesis (Hg) ought to be “true” given 
that it is closer to the observation (E) than any other hypotheses (Glass 2012; Harman 
1965).92  
There is ample ground to assume that academics and laypersons have applied IBE ever 
since. In natural sciences we could, for example, list a series of breakthrough and major 
achievements which are based in first place on IBE. For example, in the first half of the 
19th century the astrophysicists John C. Adams and Urbaine Le Verrier observed an 
unusual deformation in the orbit of the planet Uranus. Recurring to IBE, they inferred that 
the “best explanation” for this distortion in Uranus’ trajectory was in all probability 
caused by the gravitational force of another yet undiscovered planet. Several years later 
when space telescopes improved their colleague, Johan G. Galle, was able to spot this 
undiscovered planet – Neptune (Lipton 2000; Schurz 2006: 53).93  
Certainly, in situations where we have either law-like theories or where we could recur to 
large-N empirical observations, there is little room for IBE. In these situations one could 
question the added value of this particular mode of inference.94 But in international 
politics in general in and international security policy in particular these favorable 
conditions are often not met. First, there are no unerring theories on international 
security policy. Democratic Peace is in general regarded as a very reliable IR theory. 
However, many would have doubts to ascribe to Democratic Peace the characteristic of a 
law-like theory. Consequentially, the chance to recur to deduction is limited. Second, 
international security policy is haunted by multifaceted data problems. As we have 
already outlined in the introduction chapter (ch. 1.1), the available data is thin and often 
marked by propaganda and misrepresentation.  
IBE allows for epistemological sound inferences even in situations where there are no 
law-like theories. And in order to operate IBE, scholars do not need large and uniformed 
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 For a critical review on the procedure of IBE see: Day & Kincaid 1994. 
93
 Charles Darwin’s Theory of Evolution is another example of IBE. On his expedition into the Pacific, 
Darwin was puzzled by phenomenological variations within the same species and inferred that the “best 
explanation” for this observation was the adaption to varying environments based on the process of 
natural selection (Lipton 2000; Paavola 2004; Schurz 2006: 53).  
94
 It is important to note that some Scientific Realists regard IBE as the only way of reasoning which is in 
methodological terms sound and reliable. Others instead propose a “contextualized” usage of IBE, 
meaning that it has priority in situations where the two conventional approaches of inference – 
deduction and induction – are unlikely to achieve solid results. We follow the latter approach of a 
contextualized IBE (for more detail discussion see: Day & Kincaid 1994; see also: Reichertz 2008).  
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observations but could yield comprehensive scientific results even when observations are 
ephemeral, varying, irregular, or exceptional. Thus, when scholars face difficult conditions 
which challenge conventional ways of doing research and foreclose a proper application 
of deduction or induction, IBE provides a chance to “bringing science back in.” It allows IR 
scholars to become active in fields that where beforehand considered as inaccessible and 
unexplorable for social science.  
In essence, when using IBE the research of IR scholars becomes very similar to the 
strategies detectives and policy inspectors apply (at least in movies and novels) when 
investigating tricky crimes.95 Normally detectives have not personally witnessed the 
crimes they investigate. Instead, they draw inferences by reconstructing circumstantial 
evidence based on their forensic background knowledge (W) (e.g., scene of the crime, 
trails of blood, the murder weapon, etc.). Starting from that point, detectives formulate 
different hypotheses about the crime and the murder (H1…Hn). From that set of potential 
hypotheses they eventually select the actual hypothesis (Hg) which provides the “best 
explanation” for the crime (E).  
Of course, in the 1950s some viewer of crime movies might have believed that there is a 
law-like theory which applies to all murder cases (“it is always the gardener”). However, 
since there is in reality no “murderer theory,” deduction could not be applied to convict 
culprits. Moreover, induction is likewise not a viable option when required to investigate 
murder cases, given that each crime has a varying, singular, and irregular nature. For a 
police inspector it is certainly of interest that statistically males in their late teens and 
early twenties represent the most criminal section of the population. But this information 
is too general to help resolve a particular murder case. Thus, if there is no confession or 
an assured witness statement, detectives have no other choice but to follow the logic of 
IBE. IR scholars often are confronted with very similar challenges – in particular if they 
study international security policy – and they often work like detectives.  
2.5.4.2 Proposal of Practical IBE Application 
Although IBE has long historical roots,96 its nature and scope is still an objective of 
ongoing contentious debates which mainly take place in the inner circles of the discipline 
of “philosophy of science” (Liption 2004: 2; Klärner 2003: 214; Mackonis 2013: 976).97 
What is, however, for our research project most important are not abstract philosophical 
debates but practical guidance on how to apply IBE in actual research. While there is 
growing interest in IBE within social science and growing numbers of IR scholars became 
in recent years engaged in theoretical debates about this mode of reasoning (e.g., 
Chernoff 2002; Chernoff 2009; Hellmann et al. 2009; Hollis & Smith 1991; Jackson 2010; 
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 Note that the metaphor of “the scientist as detective” was often used in the literature on IBE (see, 
e.g., Eco & Sebeok 1988; Sebeok & Umiker-Sebeok 1980).  
96
 Even though IBE was introduced into modern philosophy by the U.S. pragmatist thinker Charles S. 
Peirce, it was for the first time systematically addressed by Julius Pacius (1550-1635) (Reichertz 2008, 
2010). 
97
 Typical issues in these philosophical discussions are, for example, the question how IBE relates to 
“truth” (Is IBE truth? Could it only produce “approximate truth”? Or could it only track truth?) or to 
Bayesian logic (see, e.g., van Fraassen 1989; Glass 2012: 412).  
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Wendt 1998), there is, thus far, no discussion on how to apply this epistemological 
approach in practical research.98 In this section we made a first step to address this 
particular problem. Reading the philosophical literature through the lens of practical 
research, we found two aspects that are in that regard of particular relevance: (A) the 
criteria that help to select the “best explanation” (B) and the mode how to proceed with 
background knowledge.  
A. What Makes the Best Explanation? – Breadth, Depth, and Coherence  
Probably the most crucial working step in the application of IBE is selecting the “best 
explanation” (Hg) from the set of potential hypotheses (H1...Hn). The question “what 
makes the best explanation and how do we know it when we see one?” is for the 
practitioners of IBE very essential. The advocates of this epistemological approach are 
aware of this problem. Peter Lipton said, for example, “[t]he difficulty of articulating IBE is 
compounded when we turn to the question of what makes one explanation better than 
another” (Litpon 2000). While scholars agree that IBE is in need for “quality criteria” (also 
called “explanatory virtues”) which give guidance to the selection process of the “best 
explanation,” there is currently no consensus on a concrete yardstick. Rather, we 
encounter in the literature numerous proposals ventilating different sets of “quality 
criteria.”  
Following in many respects the argumentation of Adolfas Mackonis (2013), we will show 
that among the different potential “quality criteria,” breadth, depth, and coherence are 
likely to represent the best candidates. If we apply these three “explanatory virtues” in 
conjunction, the chance to identify among the set of potential hypotheses the “best 
explanation” is relatively high. But how did we arrive at that conclusion? What made us 
believe that breadth, depth, and coherence are the most promising quality criteria for 
IBE?  
First, we excluded the so-called “non-explanatory virtues.” “Non-explanatory virtues” are 
criteria that make no statements about the relationship between the explanans and the 
explanadum. They focus instead on “academic accesoirs” and not on the puzzling 
observation itself. “Non-explanatory virtues” are, for example, the various aesthetic 
yardsticks such as elegance, symmetry, regularity, or visibility (e.g., Barnes 1995: 273; 
Kuipers 2002: 299). Other “non-explanatory virtues” have an “inward look” and focus 
primarily on the adaptability of explanations for scientific debates. Typical criteria that fall 
into that category are, for example, theoretical fertility, testability, systematic, or 
familiarity (e.g., Rheinwald 1998).  
“Non-explanatory quality criteria” are not trivial. An explanation that is, for example, 
elegant is certainly better than one that is not. However, since these criteria are not 
focused on what we see as the very heart of social science – resolving real-world puzzles 
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 The lack of systematic application is widely known among the advocates of IBE. Peter Lipton said, for 
example, that IBE is still “more a slogan than an articulated philosophical theory” (Lipton 2004: 57). 
And, according to David Glass, one of the key challenges IBE is facing is “how exactly” this approach “is 
to be understood and made precise?” (Glass 2012: 412). 
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– we decided to put them on the back-burner and will not use them as the primary 
yardstick in the IBE selection process.  
Second, we review the explanatory virtues – those criteria that actually make reference 
about the actual observation – and sort those out which are absorbed by other, more 
broad yardsticks or which have a limited explanatory power. The two quality criteria that 
fall off the list are parsimony and empirical adequacy.   
Parsimony (or simplicity) is an explanatory virtue that is held in high esteem by many 
scholars (e.g., Zellner 1984). It is therefore little astonishing that it was often proposed as 
a potential criterion for the selection of the “best explanation” (e.g., Beebe 2009; Sober 
2001). However, parsimony is in many respects a “non-explanatory virtue” which is 
implementing aesthetic criterion (i.e., parsimony for the sake of elegance) and which has 
an “inward look” on academic discourse and debates (i.e., parsimony for the sake of 
higher testability). In addition, the function of parsimony is in many respects absorbed by 
the quality criterion breadth. Like parsimony, breadth is aiming to avoid trivial arguments 
(Mackonis 2013: 986-990; Schurz 2008: 219). However, unlike parsimony, breath is not 
only boiling an explanation down to its essentials but is, in addition, prescribing how to 
operate this reduction: by climbing up the “ladder of abstraction.” Parsimony instead 
gives scholars no guidance on how to arrive at more simple and unifying explanations. In 
that sense, parsimony is absorbed by the more unifying criterion of “breadth.”  
Empirical adequacy (or empirical accuracy) is another explanatory virtue that is often 
listed as a potential criterion for the selection of the best explanation (e.g., Rheinwald 
1998). However, we decline empirical adequacy too. As Mackonis has pointed out 
correctly, empirical adequacy is less a “quality virtue” but rather an outcome of IBE. He 
said that this criterion is the “necessary effect of an inference that is actually best 
explanation” (Mackonis 2013: 989).  
Breadth, depth, and coherence are the only three “quality criteria” that are left over. We 
will apply all three in our IBE selection process since we assume that all three have 
sufficient explanatory power. But what exactly is the nature of these three quality 
criteria? 
Breadth: Breadth (or unification) works according to the principle “the more, the better.” 
Breadth signifies a wide explanatory range and indicates descriptions that provide the 
greatest degree of understanding (Mackonis 2013: 983-5; Psillos 2002).
99
 An analytical 
finding is assumed to have more explanatory power, the more aspects of a particular 
observation it covers. Consequentially, the quality criterion of breadth has a 
“systematizing force” (Bartelbroth 2002). An explanation that is bestowed with breadth is 
assumed to absorb less unifying descriptions and is in that sense synonymous – as we 
have said already above – with “climbing up the ladder of abstraction.” Breadth appears 
at first sight more like an aesthetic or an “inward-looking” criterion given that it is very 
                            
99
 In essence, breadth is by and large synonymous with what Peter Lipton has described by the term 
“loveliness” (Lipton 2000).  
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close to the principles of elegance, simplicity, or theoretical fertility. But, despite its 
appearance, it is in terms of functionality clearly an “explanatory virtue.” More abstract 
and unifying explanations have, for example, more explanatory power, as they make facts 
of an observation comparable which have beforehand thought as separated.  
Depth: The explanatory quality criterion of depth operates according to the principle 
“more of the same.” An explanation is assumed to be better than another if it is based on 
more knowledge. The primary value of depth is making an explanation more solid, 
accurate, and reliable by supporting it with more data. Depth is, for example, the central 
logic behind the qualitative research approach of “thick description” (Geertz 1973).  
Coherence: Coherence is probably the most powerful explanatory criterion in IBE 
(Huemer 2009; Mackonis 2013: 980-3). Coherence signifies the “hanging together” 
between explanas and explanadum (BonJour 1985: 93). It is denotes the degree of 
“closeness” between an observation and its explanation and is broadly understood as 
“logical consistency.” David Glass said, for example, ”roughly speaking the coherence of a 
set of beliefs describes how well they fit together or to what extent they support each 
other and this seems to be what is required for IBE” (Glass 2007: 282).  
B. How to Use Background Knowledge? 
The background knowledge (W) is central for the application of IBE (Figure 6).100 When 
facing a puzzling observation (E), IBE users will turn to the available background 
knowledge in order to derive a set of potential hypothesis (H1…Hn). Unfortunately, the 
role and nature of the background knowledge has received thus far very little attention in 
the philosophical debates about IBE. For the practical application of IBE, this omission is 
problematic given that the background knowledge has (a) analytical, (b) innovative, and 
(c) pragmatic implications.  
(a) A thoughtless and unsystematic selection of the background knowledge could 
reduce the analytical impact of an IBE-based research project. It would lead to an 
inappropriate set of potential hypotheses (H1…Hn) which might obscure the 
inference to the “best explanation” (Hg). In essence, this argument was already 
uttered in the critique on IBE most prominently uttered by Bas van Fraassen. Van 
Fraassen has pointed out that IBE users could only draw on hypotheses that are 
available to them and that availability is not necessarily the primary characteristic 
of the truth (van Fraassen 1989: 143-6). 
                            
100
 While having put the practical argument for the choice of IBE up front, it is important to note that 
giving priority to this mode of reasoning is – of course – also in meta-theoretical terms justified. That 
becomes in particular clear if we are now turning to discuss the role of “background knowledge” (W). 
Scientific Realists hold the conviction that access to social reality proceeds through theories. According 
to Patrick T. Jackson, Scientific Realists “argue that the objects under investigation in the social sciences 
are irreducible theoretical – their essential character is intimately intertwined with theories about 
them“ (Jackson 2008: 140). As we have already pointed out above (ch. 2.5), “mature theories” are in 
that regard in particular important for Scientific Realists. Inferring the “best explanation” from the set of 
potential hypotheses which originate from the background knowledge (and not from actual 
observations) is therefore very much in line with Scientific Realism.  
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(b) In addition, the inappropriate handling of the background knowledge could also 
undermine the innovative potentials of IBE. IBE is known to have a “selective” as 
well as a “creative” dimension (Day & Kincaid 1994: 272; Schurz 2008: 203). In 
social science IBE is widely perceived as an approach that allows “to make new 
discoveries in a logical and methodological ordered way” (Reichertz 2010: 7). 
What is in that regard, however, crucial is that much of this innovative potential 
emerges at the interface between puzzling observations (E) and the background 
knowledge (W). One the one hand, innovation is triggered when IBE users are 
confronted with new, surprising observations that are not consistent with the 
conventional background knowledge. Innovation could, on the other hand, also 
set in motion when it turns out that the background knowledge that is usually 
used to explain to a particular observation is partially or completely mismatching 
(e.g., Aliseda 1997; Peirce 1934, 5.189). Thus, tapping the inappropriate 
background knowledge could pull the plug on the creative power of IBE.  
(c) Moreover, if background knowledge is inappropriately selected, users of IBE 
could face serious practical challenges. In many fields, social scientists are 
confronted with the problem that there is not just one but several stocks of 
knowledge. The insights and available information about a particular 
phenomenon is often very large and amorphous (see, e.g., the knowledge about 
negotiation). When scholars are overwhelmed by vast background knowledge, 
IBE becomes unfeasible.101 According to Gerhard Schulze IBE users have to have a 
clear understanding about the “search space” where to look for potential 
hypothesis. And expressing the same idea, Charles S. Peirce – the ideas man of 
modern IBE (or abduction, as he has called it) – has underscored the importance 
of the “economy of research” which is assuring the practical applicability of this 
epistemological approach (Peirce, cited at Paavola 2004: 276; see also: Hintikka 
1998). 
In light of these three challenges, we propose to apply two criteria when selecting the 
appropriate background knowledge: relevance and exoticism.  
Understandably, the background knowledge scholars “rummage through” in order to 
identify the set of potential hypothesis (H1…Hn) must be relevant to the observation (E). 
Relevance is given when we are able to distill from the background knowledge meaningful 
and substantive statements about the observation. Relevance is crucial in terms of the 
practical and the analytical problems we normally encounter with regard to selection the 
background knowledge in IBE reasoning. But relevance alone is not sufficient.  
Despite meaningful and substantive statements, we could never exclude that the most 
substantive and meaningful hypothesis (Hg) is hiding out in remote corners of our 
                            
101
 To further clarify the practical problems that arrive when IBE is applied at a too-large and too-
complex background knowledge, Gerhard Schurz has given an revealing example: ”think about someone 
in a hurry who asks an IBE-philosopher for the right way to the railway station and receives the 
following answer: ‘Find out which is the shortest way among all ways between here and the train 
station which are accessible to you – this is the way you should chose’” (Schurz 2008: 204). 
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background knowledge we would intuitively regard as little relevant. When we browse 
through the available stocks of knowledge in search of pertinent insights, we are always 
endangered to embark the “beaten tracks” laid out by previous research projects – a 
severe analytical pitfall. Thus, we need an additional criterion that is applied in parallel to 
relevance and that is impelling scholars to penetrate unexplored fields. We assume that 
exoticism fulfils this requirement. It is widening the scope of IBE projects and makes 
scholars explore parts of the background knowledge they would have normally not taken 
into consideration.  
Applying these two criteria in parallel represents as mutual corrective. While relevance 
without exoticism could give rise to boring repetition of past findings, exoticism without 
relevance might lead to conclusions that appear at first sight innovative but signify in 
essence odd absurdities. 
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3. THE FIT TAXONOMY & ITS GENESIS  
In the previous chapter we have explained that analytical taxonomies are essential to study 
the “problem of fit”. The fit taxonomy we developed in order to analyze the performance of 
diplomatic design in NRN is a “nested multitier map” comprised of two problem dimensions 
(the substantial and procedural problem dimension) and three social traps (the colliding 
interest, the distrust, and the injustice trap). This structure is operationalized by two 
rationalist theories. First, dilemma games – a sub-approach of the larger game theory and, 
second, the public bad approach – a sub-component of the broader Theory of Collective 
Goods (TCG) – which was introduced for the first time into negotiation research by our PhD 
project 
The fit taxonomy is a product of eclecticism. Its different “ingredients” were pieced 
together by the stringent application of the “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE) – the 
preferred way of logical reasoning in Scientific Realism. The central advantage of the IBE 
approach in comparison to other eclectic approaches is that it provides a genuine and 
meta-theoretical sound concept.110 We have not merged pre-existing theories and concepts 
but have systematically built a coherent model step-by-step by distilling the relevant 
components from the totality of potential hypotheses available in the background 
knowledge on problematic negotiation dynamics taking not only scientific results into 
account, but also insights and thoughts stemming from the practitioners’ literature on 
international negotiations. Given that the fit taxonomy was condensed from a relatively 
large pool of academic and practical knowledge negotiations, there is ample ground to 
believe that it has relevance for diplomatic dynamics beyond the relatively narrow focus on 
NRN and would also achieve fruitful insights in other fields of international security policy.  
Moreover, the numerous innovative aspects of our fit taxonomy are likewise a direct 
outcome of the IBE selection process. It was only by this strict application of this 
epistemological approach that we were impelled to also take counter-intuitive and exotic 
aspects into consideration. With the parallelism of the substantial and procedural problem 
dimension, the three types of social traps, and the application of the underappreciated 
public bad approach, the fit taxonomy provides a detailed and comprehensive perspective 
on international bargaining unknown to negotiation research. Without the IBE approach, 
the eclectic development of a fit taxonomy would have certainly taken another route and 
would have probably looked more similar to the concept conventionally applied in 
negotiation research.  
                            
110
 According to Jeffrey Checkel, efforts to build eclectic and theoretical pluralist approaches in IR recurred 
in the past primarily to the strategies of “scope conditions” (i.e. enlarging the picture on social reality by 
combining theories which explain different “home domains”) and “temporal sequencing” (i.e. combining 
theories which explain different “evolutionary stages” of real-world phenomena) (Checkel 2013; see also: 
Caporaso, Checkel & Jupille 2003: 21-23). 
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In this chapter we will, first, explain in detail the fit taxonomy and its different “ingredients” 
(ch. 3.1). Second, we will show with the help of two fictitious examples (the problem of 
fare-dodging and the PD metaphor which has already been discussed on several occasions) 
how the fit taxonomy is operating (ch. 3.2). Finally, we will elaborate in detail how the 
model was developed with the help of the IBE selection process (ch. 3.3).  
Figure 7: Fit Taxonomy 
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3.1 Fit Taxonomy & Its Components 
As we have outlined in the Setup chapter (ch. 2.4), analyzing the “problem of fit” 
necessitates the application of fit taxonomies which are understood as “nested multi-tier 
maps” that allow us to identify the “optimal problem solution” – the so-called fit demand – 
for a given problem. In this section we will describe the different “ingredients” of our fit 
taxonomy in detail and explain how they relate to each other.  
3.1.1 Two Problem Dimensions: Substantial and Procedural 
Negotiation Problems 
 
The two-dimensional structure was revealed in the IBE selection process as the best general 
template to study negotiation problems (ch. 3.3.1). All other potential hypotheses found in 
the background knowledge in terms of the three IBE quality criteria breadth, depth, and 
coherence achieved less convincing results.111  
Bargaining dynamics have to have an issue. Otherwise there would be no need to 
negotiate. Herbert Kelman has, for example, emphasized that negotiations always start 
with “a shared problem which needs to be solved by addressing the underlying causes and 
the dynamics of the conflict in an interactive process” (Kelman 1996: 99). The nature and 
scope of the negotiation issue signifies the substantial problem dimension. When studying 
the substantial problem dimension, we analyze the different features of the negotiation 
issue such as its degree of “malignity” or its actor constellation. Since the substantial 
problem dimension constitutes the overarching setting of negotiation dynamics, it is very 
obvious that its scope and nature is decisive for the way those parties involved in the 
conflict bargain. The substantial problem dimension determines to a considerable degree 
the chance to arrive at satisfying diplomatic solutions.  
Substantial problems are necessary but not sufficient criteria for negotiation problems. A 
negotiation issue alone does not constitute a challenging bargaining process marked by 
stalemates and deadlocks. What is required in addition are conflicting views of the involved 
parties on how to resolve a given negotiation issue. If there is full agreement on how to 
handle the substantial negotiation problem, there would be no need for a bargaining 
process. Rather, short coordination meetings where the involved actors communicate over 
uncontroversial resolution strategies would be completely sufficient. In some cases, 
substantial issues are even resolved without communication by “tacit consensus”.  
All the conflicts on how to resolve the substantial problem represent the procedural 
dimension of negotiation problems. The procedural dimension is the totality of operational 
hurdles that the negotiating parties face in challenging bargaining dynamics. What is at the 
                            
111
 Such as the “bargaining & problem solution concept” (H1.1), the “communicative approach” (H1.2), 
and “the value-claiming & value-creating bargaining approach”(H1.3), see Figure 14.  
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very heart of the procedural problem dimension is a conflict-laden process of 
interdependent decision making. In that sense, procedural problems are constituted by the 
various patterns of uncooperative behavior. Defection and delaying strategies and 
insufficient commitment to work jointly towards the resolution of the actual negotiation 
issue are the typical indicators of procedural problems.  
The two dimensions of negotiation problems are closely interwoven. The substantial 
problem dimension represents the overarching frame for the procedural dimension. If 
negotiating parties fail, in the end, to resolve the central negotiation issue, all efforts 
undertaken to overcome the procedural problems were in vain. By the same token, when 
the conflict parties do not manage to resolve all procedural problems, the bargaining 
process is likewise doomed for failure. After all, overcoming the procedural problems and 
building a solid relationship is the indispensable precondition for a lasting and sustainable 
resolution of substantial problem dimension.112 The resolution of the one dimension is 
unthinkable without the other.113 
While we find in negotiation research many references to the substantial dimension of 
negotiation problems,114 the literature appears nevertheless biased in terms of the 
procedural dimension – a fact that is not so astonishing given that negotiations are 
primarily understood as social processes.115 As Anthony Wanis-St. John and Christophe 
Dupont put it: “In general, issues per se have been increasingly neglected in negotiation 
analysis and uncritically accepted” (Wanis-St. John & Dupont 2012: 211). In that sense it is a 
particularity of our PhD project – stemming directly from the innovative potentials of the 
IBE process – that we are studying these two dimensions in parallel.  
3.1.2 Three Social Traps 
When we moved on and searched with the help of the IBE selection process for further 
“ingredients” for our fit taxonomy, we came to the conclusion that negotiations problems – 
both on the substantial and procedural dimension – consist in essence of three social traps: 
the injustice, distrust, and the colliding interest trap (Figure 7).116 We claim that we find in 
                            
112
 In the conventional wisdom on negotiation strategies – expressed for example in journalist analysis 
and policy papers – these two essential dimensions of negotiation problems are often blurred or 
neglected. In particular, in those situations where the resolution of the substantial negotiation issue 
appears simple, salient, and straightforward, the procedural dimension is often regarded as a superfluous, 
diplomatic shadow-boxing which one could easily skip, if all negotiation parties would pull themselves 
together and work jointly towards resolution.  
113
 In general, one cannot say which of these two dimensions are more demanding in terms of problem 
resolution. Since substantial problems represent the actual negotiation issues, one might be inclined to 
regard this dimension as more challenging. But there are situations where overcoming procedural 
problems might be even more demanding than the resolution of substantial problems, and could wreck 
the entire bargaining dynamic.  
114
 The focus on the substantial problem dimension gave, for example, rise to a different sub-disciplines in 
negotiation research which are structured along particular issue areas such as the specific research on  
arms control, trade, environmental or crisis bargaining (e.g. Jönsson 2002: 223; Kremenyuk 1991).  
115
 See for example our definition of international negotiations and the following discussion of its 
elements in Ch. 2.2.2.  
116
 Of course, in the background knowledge on international negotiations we encountered several 
alternative hypotheses that could have been likewise used as tangible concepts to analyze substantial and 
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every problematic bargaining situation at least one of these social traps – regardless of the 
actual negotiation issue, the involved parties, or the actual negotiation setting. The varying 
degrees of intractability real-world actors face in bargaining dynamics is in that sense a 
function of the number of social traps encountered both on the procedural and substantial 
dimension.   
But what exactly is a social trap? There is solid ground to assume that social traps denote 
one of the most meaningful concepts that rationalism has contributed to social science. 
Social traps have been used to analyze problems in all spheres of social life reaching from 
conflicts between superpowers to martial crisis. In that sense social traps represent a 
“meta-problem” in social science (Rothstein 2005: 21).117  
Social traps signify a strategic interaction where the quest for egoist utility maximization 
renders all involved actors worse-off. But social traps are not only deplorable in terms of 
individual goal realization. Actors entangled in social traps also miss the so-called 
“collective optimal outcome” which would represent an attractive outcome for all parties. 
Put in the words of Anatol Rapoport – a forerunner in game-theoretical analysis – social 
traps defined by a “bifurcation of rationality into individual and collective rationality” 
(1988: 457).118 And according to Elinor Ostrom, social taps are given when at least “one 
outcome exists that yields greater advantage for all participants” (1998: 4).119  
                                                                             
procedural negotiation problems – such as power struggles (H2.2), cultural clashes (H2.3), or inadequate 
and dysfunctional institutional negotiation environments (H2.6) (Figure 13). However, applying the three 
quality criteria of the IBE selection: (coherence, depth, and breadth), we found that only interest conflicts, 
distrust, and injustice signify a best contribution to our fit taxonomy (Ch. 3.2.2).  
117
 Since social traps are a central analytical concept in social science, we encounter numerous alternative 
labels such as “social dilemma” (e.g. Ostrom 1990) “public good problem” (Olson 1971), “the free-rider 
problem” (Grossman & Hart 1980), the “tragedy of common” (Hardin 1968), or the “shirking” (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972). However, we decided to use the expression, “social trap” since it provides the best picture 
for this particular phenomenon (see also footnote 111).  
118
 The PD metaphor to which we have referred to at many occasions in our PhD project, is presumably 
the most often used concept to describe the nature of social traps. Individual rationality drives the two 
suspects to confess as soon as possible to the public prosecutor. But when following this strategy, both 
prisoners are worse off since a “double confession” gives rise to the unpleasant outcome of a 5 years long 
prison sentence for both suspects. The egoist and self-oriented quest for individual freedom steers both 
prisoners into a social trap. If they would follow the logic collective rationality instead, both would remain 
silent and achieve a far better result (1 year in prison). Certainly, the “collective optimum” is for the 
individual prisoners less attractive than their individual optimum (immediate release from prison) but it is 
certainly better than the social trap.  
119
 While the bifurcation of collective and individual rationality denotes the core criterion of social traps, 
there are additional characteristic features that make social traps distinct from other types of problems 
(such as misinformation, lack of resources, inappropriate incentive structure, etc.). First, social traps are 
particularly serious social problems since they have a “systematic character”. Even when triggered by a 
rather small minority or a single actor, social traps often lead to a vicious cycle and cause a race to the 
bottom that affects, in the end, the well-being of larger communities – and in extreme cases (see e.g. 
environmental pollution) the entire planet. Second, – and similar to actual traps – social traps have often a 
strong element of surprise. In the perception of the involved actors, social traps appear as a sudden 
deterioration. Negotiation parties who step into a social trap often find their goals and behavioral 
patterns subjected to a “strategic roller coaster” and quickly end at a completely different situation they 
had initially expected to achieve. For example, the two suspects in the PD metaphor find themselves all of 
a sudden confronted with the prospect of a 5 years sentence while they have indulged the minute before 
the hope to be set free due to their swift confession of the committed crime. Third – and again similar 
actual traps – once established social traps are likely to endure and the chance for trapped actors to break 
free are relatively limited. The more the participants become entangled in a self-enforcing spiral of 
reciprocal self-help, the more hopeless is the chance of escape. 
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We encounter social traps everywhere in social reality. In negotiation dynamics, however, 
they are in particular ubiquitous. Certainly, not each and every problem a real-world actor 
faces in a diplomatic process is a social trap. But social traps and the logic of negotiations 
are closely interwoven. The reason for this close connection lies in the interdependent 
decision making that resides – as we have explained in detail in the set up chapter (ch. 
2.2.2) – at the very heart of bargaining dynamics. Actors who are involved in negotiations 
are bestowed with a veto – a characteristic feature that makes negotiations distinct from 
other types of conflict management (such as voting or adjudication). Consequently, 
successful problem resolution is only possible if all parties work together and arrive with 
outcomes that serve the interests of all actors. Lasting negotiation results are instead 
impossible if the involved parties stick to egoistic utility maximization. Rationality assumed, 
the disadvantaged actors will either veto biased bargaining proposals or will try to 
circumvent partial negotiation outcomes. Due to the characteristic interdependent decision 
making, sustainable resolution of substantial and procedural negotiation problems is only 
possible if the bargaining dynamics achieves a “collective optimum”. All negotiation parties 
would yield collectively more benefit if they worked jointly towards a cooperative problem 
management. Thus, negotiation problems are synonymous with social traps. And 
overcoming negotiation problems – both on the procedural and substantial dimension – is 
synonymous with the resolution of social traps.  
Of course, the world is populated with biased negotiation agreements that miss the 
“collective optimum” and make one side better-off than the other involved parties. Most of 
the partial negotiation outcomes signify, however, ineffective and unstable situations. It 
requires, ceteris paribus, considerable governance resources (such as positive or negative 
sanctions and verification) to make the disadvantaged actors accept the unfavorable 
outcome – investments that would be unnecessary if a “collective optimum” had been 
achieved. Moreover, collective sub-optimal negotiation results are in general assumed to 
be unstable. It is very likely that biased outcomes are “gnawing” at the disadvantaged 
conflict parties and that these actors try – over time – to circumvent the negotiated 
agreements. Rationality assumed, cheating and noncompliance are the logical 
consequences of biased agreements.  
With the help of the IBE selection process, we revealed that social traps in bargaining 
dynamics could occur in three distinct phenotypes: the distrust, the injustice, and the 
colliding interest trap. Sustainable resolution of negotiation problems could only be 
realized if the interests of all actors are fulfilled, if all involved parties have sufficient trust 
in their counterparts, and if the benefits of negotiation agreements are equally 
distributed between the conflict parties. If one of these three aspects is missing, lasting 
problem resolutions are impossible.120  
                            
120
 Enlightened Rationalists have in the past criticized the approach of social traps as too narrowly bound 
to the idea of colliding interests and have demanded for a broader conceptualization which allows for a 
more realistic analysis of real-world actors’ motivation and behavioral patterns (e.g. Ostrom 1998; 
Rothstein 2005). By studying the distrust trap, the colliding interest trap, and the injustice trap in parallel, 
we make an attempt to fulfill this demand.  
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For example, just and attractive negotiation outcomes that serve the interests of all 
involved actors and establish an equal distribution of gains and losses are still likely to fail if 
distrust continues to prevail. Suspicion and doubts in the sincerity of the counterparts could 
quickly spoil negotiation dynamics. The same logic applies to situations that are regarded as 
unjust by the negotiation parties. Even in a state where the involved actors have 
collectively an interest in a joint solution and enjoy in general a trustworthy relationship, 
injustice could easily sabotage a diplomatic process. When the underprivileged actors 
become aware that they would, in fact, benefit from an agreement but do not gain as much 
as their counterparts, they are likely to challenge the negotiation outcome.121 Moreover, a 
negotiation outcome that is not serving the interest of the involved actors and is therefore 
falling short in resolving the colliding interest trap is likewise doomed to failure even 
though the negotiating parties have sufficient trust in each other’s honesty and regard the 
unattractive negotiation outcome as just in the sense of equal distribution.  
While it is obvious that these three social traps have a different form of appearance, they 
are all three marked by the characteristic bifurcation of individual and collective rationality. 
In the following section, we will elaborate this fact in more detail and provide an exact 
definition of these three social traps based on the general assumption that our entire PhD 
project is guided by the logic of Enlightened Rationalism.122 
But before we go on, we have to highlight that there is in our fit taxonomy a “division of 
labor” between the three social traps. In general, we assume that all three social traps 
apply to both dimensions of negotiation problems. However, in the IBE selection process, 
we have revealed that in light of our particular research objective (the Libyan NRN), only 
the colliding interest trap has relevance for both dimensions (ch. 3.3.2). The injustice trap is 
primarily significant for substantial negotiation problems. The distrust trap, instead, applies 
first and foremost to procedural negotiation challenges (Figure 7).123  
                            
121
 Of course negotiating parties are not always willing to resolve unjust constellations. Often they are 
content if they are able to resolve interest conflicts or overcome distrust. Research on conflict resolution 
has, for example, revealed that conflict parties who are plagued by war and violence are prepared to deal 
peace against justice (e.g. Albin 2009). However, in a medium and long-term perspective, stable and 
sustainable negotiation results are more likely if the condition of justice is met. Unjust and unfair 
bargaining outcomes are assumed to produce – over time – frustration and discontent.  
122
 The parallelism of different action concepts (interest, trust, and justice) allow us to distant ourselves 
from the “hyper-rationality” assumption held (at least implicitly) by many Orthodox Rationalists. It is one 
of the core results stemming from decades of experimental research that actors do not always strive to 
maximize their utilities but also follow different scripts – expressed in our PhD project by (dis)trust and 
(in)justice).  
123
 In general, injustice traps apply to both procedural and substantial problems. On the procedural 
dimension, inequality signifies a biased representation of conflict parties. Procedural justice – the question 
of equal participation and recognition in negation process and forms – plays an important role in 
multilateral negotiations where normally many and different bargaining parties take place (i.e. state 
actors, international organizations, and NGOs). However, since NRN are dominated by states actors and 
have mainly a bilateral nature, procedural (in)justice is widely irrelevant in this particular type of 
bargaining dynamic. Against that background, we decided to focus injustice only on the substantial 
problem dimension  (Figure 7). 
With regard to the distrust trap, the opposite logic applies. In general, distrust has also implications for the 
substantial problem dimension. After all, the suspicion of bargaining actors often arises from the specific 
nature of the negotiation issue. However, distrust is first and foremost a procedural aspect. It surfaces in 
the negotiation process and materializes in the form of operational bargaining hurdles. Therefore, we 
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3.1.2.1 Distrust Traps & the Maximin Solution (M) 
Distrust in the other side’s sincerity is very common in international negotiations. 
Negotiating parties could either overcome this problem jointly (for example by applying 
mutual confidence building measures) or by recurring to individual self-help (for example 
by intelligence reconnaissance). While self-help might yield positive results in a short-term 
perspective, it is very likely to increase the distrust among conflict parties over time. 
Expressing the characteristic bifurcation between individual and collective rationality, 
unilateral confidence building is assumed to incite the other actor’s distrust and likewise 
breeds mutual suspicion. Thus, the chance to achieve the “collective optimum” is 
foreclosed if the negotiation parties attempt to reduce distrust by a self-help strategy.  
Speaking in more technical terms, scholars who follow the meta-theory of rationalism could 
describe the distrust trap by the so-called Maximin Solution (M) (also known as Minimax 
Solution) (e.g. Lendenmann & Rapoport 1980; Scharpf 1990: 475; Ullmann-Margalit 2004: 
70-1; Zürn 1992: 317-8). The Maximin Solution is the self-help strategy rational actors chose 
it they expect malevolence. When negotiating parties assume the worst-case scenario, the 
Maximin Solution guarantees at least a minimum benefit. When bargaining dynamics turn 
towards a major breakdown, the Maximin Solution allows negotiating parties to “hedge 
their bets”. It operates according to the “sure-thing principle” (Lendenmann & Rapoport 
1980) and expresses extreme cautious and risk adverse thinking. However, signifying 
individual rationality, the Maximin Solution leads in most cases to collectively sub-optimal 
results. Consequently, it is a concept that indicates distrust traps. And in order to resolve 
the distrust trap the involved actors have to engage in mutual confidence building. 
Inactivating the Maximin Solution is in that perspective synonymous with resolving the 
distrust trap.124 
What is important to bear in mind, however, is that the Maximin Solution is not 
operationalization “trust” but the various degrees of “distrust”. It is at best a “negative 
concept” of trust. “Distrust” and not “trust” is the primary criterion of the Maximin 
Solution. Rather, what is crucial in order to overcome the Maximin Solution is that the 
actors are able to reduce their worst-case thinking and give joint cooperation a chance. 125  
                                                                             
decided to study the distrust trap in the Libyan NRN exclusively on the procedural problem dimension 
(Figure 7). 
124
 For example, in the metaphor of the PD, the Maximin Solution represents the strategic choice where 
both players confess the crime and face a five-year long prison sentence. Characteristically for a social 
trap, the Maximin Solution is an unattractive outcome. But if the prisoners are risk adverse and firmly 
expecting malevolence, this choice provides the best protection against the worst-case scenario – the 
situation where one suspect confesses and the other remains silent. Five years in prison is in that view a 
calculated risk that is a little shocking in light of the prospect of the ten year long sentence the suspects 
would have to bear under the worst-case scenario (Figure 8).  
125
 The Maximin Solution conceptualized (dis)trust as a “motivation” – a perspective that consequentially 
recurs strongly to the individual benefits of actors. But it is important to note that (dis)trust could be also 
operationalized as an “ability”. In order to highlight the difference between (dis)trust as “ability” and 
“motivation”, Jon Elster gives the following examples: “In German-occupied countries during World War 
II, it happened from time to time that resistance members were killed because they were thought to be 
German agents [i.e. motivation, author’s note]. It also happened, although more rarely, that they were 
killed because they could not be trusted to hold their tongue [i.e. ability, author’s note] (…) To take a 
more mundane example, I might question a car mechanic’s skills or I might question his honesty” (Elster 
2007: 345-6).  
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3.1.2.2 Colliding Interest Traps, the Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+) & the Nash 
Equilibrium (N)  
The colliding interest trap is presumably the most standard expression of a social trap. 
When we speak and theorize about social dilemmas, we normally refer to the colliding 
interest trap where actors strive selfishly for utility maximization without taking the interest 
of their counterparts into consideration and thereby render the “collective optimum” 
impossible.126 Colliding interest traps signify win-lose constellations. Consequently, 
resolving colliding interest traps is synonymous with applying a win-win approach that is 
implementing the “collective optimum” in a given sitution.  
Speaking in more technical terms, the resolution of the colliding interest trap is resolved if 
negotiation parties manage to achieve the Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+) (e.g. Hovi et.al. 
2003: 88; Zangl 1994: 290; Zürn 1992: 156-7). The Qualified Pareto Optimum is an 
extension of conventional pareto-efficient constellations (P). Conventionally, Pareto-
efficiency signifies a strategic situation from which the involved parties could not depart 
without imposing costs to at least one player. It represents a state in which the available 
goods “could not be reallocated to make anyone better off without making at least some 
person worse off” (Cudd 1996: 1). However, it is relatively obvious that many of the pareto-
efficent constellations we encounter in negotiation dynamics are incompatible with our 
intuitive understanding of attractive and social desirable outcomes. For example, a 
situation where one actor is harvesting all available profits while its counterpart gains 
nothing but remains in the status quo, would signify a pareto-efficient constellation as the 
winning party has not deteriorated the disadvantaged party’s situation. Tellingly, there is a 
consensus in the relevant literature that conventional Pareto-efficiency is not a reliable 
indicator for the “collective optimum” (e.g. Cudd 1996; Nida-Rümelin 2012; Ritsert 2012: 
29; Zürn 1992: 155-7).  
However, not all pareto-efficient situations are problematic. In some constellations, all 
involved actors gain net benefits. These constellations signify the just mentioned Qualified 
Pareto Optimum (P+). Since the Qualified Pareto Optimum represents among the different 
pareto-efficient situations the constellation that provides most benefits to all players, it is 
expressing a state of collective rationality. Consequently, in bargaining dynamics, the 
colliding interest trap is resolved if the negotiating parties manage to achieve the Qualified 
Pareto Optimum.127 The colliding interest trap, however, continues to prevail in all those 
situations where the Qualified Pareto is missed.    
In essence, the Qualified Pareto Optimum builds on the so called Nash bargaining solution 
– an axiomatic-mathematical bargaining concept introduced by John F. Nash (Nash 1950, 
Nash 1953). In an ideal bargain situation where actors are rational and have symmetric 
preferences, negotiation problems are resolved – according to the Nash Solution – when a 
                            
126
 For example, when Garrett Hardin introduced in his seminal paper of the “Tragedy of the Commons” 
(1968), he described a colliding interest trap.  
127
 In the metaphor of the PD, the Qualified Pareto Optimum represents the situation where both 
suspects remain silent and get away with one year in prison for a minor offence (such as illegal possession 
of fire arms). Obviously, this strategic choice is individually not the best outcome. But it indicates the 
“collective optimum” where both prisoners achieve collectively a relatively attractive result (see Figure 8). 
   
91 
 
state is achieved where the utility gains for all involved actors are maximal (e.g. 
Berninghaus et.al. 2002: 149-87; Holler & Illing 1991: 189-225; Lambertini 2011: 148-54; 
Thomson 1994: 149-87).  
For analyzing prevailing colliding interest traps, we could instead return to the so-called 
Nash equilibrium (N) (e.g. Rapoport & Guyer 1966). The Nash equilibrium (not to be 
confused with the just mentioned Nash bargaining solution) is an indicator often applied to 
identify the bifurcation of individual and collective rationality. The Nash equilibrium occurs 
if all involved negotiating parties strive selfishly to maximize their individual utilities. Once 
established, the actors cannot depart from this interaction result unilaterally without 
rendering themselves worse off.128 In that sense the Nash equilibrium describes the very 
nature of a colliding interest trap that has “snapped shut”.129    
3.1.2.3 Inequality Traps & Egalitarian Optimum (E+) 
Equality is a social constellation that is per definition balanced and unbiased. Consequently, 
the best indicator for inequality is when some actors claim to be “more equal than others” 
(Orwell 1966). Once rational negotiating parties have stepped into an inequality trap, they 
could collectively not escape from this situation by returning to the self-help strategy. 
Individual attempts to overcome inequality are instead likely to further deepen this social 
trap. Unilateral efforts of one negotiation party to undo a biased distribution of gains are, in 
all probability, prone to trigger more inequality for its counterparts. In the logic of zero-sum 
interaction, the improvements that one actor is achieving, is deteriorating the situation for 
the other involved parties. The resolution of unjust and unfair constellations is only possible 
if the negotiating actors abandon the logic of individual rationality and apply cooperative 
strategies that take the distribution of gains and losses of all involved parties into 
consideration.  
Speaking again in more technical terms, inequality traps are resolved if the negotiating 
parties manage to achieve the so-called Egalitarian Optimum (E+). According to our 
definition, the Egalitarian Optimum represents a state where the utilities gains of all actors 
are equally disturbed. If an Egalitarian Optimum is given, all involved actors are better off to 
the same extent. Thus, the Egalitarian Optimum signifies the collective optimum.130 In 
                            
128
 In the metaphor of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Nash equilibrium coincides with the outcome where 
both actors confess to the public prosecutor and face a five year’s long prison sentence. Although joint 
confession represents a deplorable situation, it would be still irrational for the two suspects to depart 
from this strategic constellation unilaterally. Such a step would trigger for the departing party an even 
worse outcome of the 10 year long prison sentence (see Figure 8).   
129
 While the distrust trap and the Maximin Solution is assumed to build primarily on the beliefs of actors 
(i.e. the conviction that counterparts in bargaining dynamics are in principle insincere and dishonest) the 
colliding interest trap and the Nash Equilibrium is assumed to be constituted primarily by the desires of 
actors (i.e. the attempt to realize one’s egoistic wishes).  
130
 While we have with the Egalitarian Optimum a distinct concept to operationalize inequality traps and 
their resolution, we have in rationalism no genuine explanation for the emergence of inequality traps. It is 
not per se rational to strive for inequality. In rational choice, there is no general desire for wickedness. 
Deriving pleasure from other people’s displeasure is similarly irrational as unselfish altruism. Such an 
intention would contradict the logic of individual goal seeking which is at the very heart of rationalism. 
Consequently, inequality traps emerge as by-products of the actors’ egoistic strive for utility maximization 
(i.e. the colliding interest trap and the Nash Equilibrium) or their quest to take unilateral precaution 
measures against the expected malevolence of their counterparts (i.e. the distrust trap and the Maximin 
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bargaining situations, it is a state that assures sustainable negotiation results which renders 
all involved actors content with the achieved agreement. The inequality trap, however, 
continues to prevail in all situations where the bargaining parties fail to achieve this 
outcome.131 
In essence, the Egalitarian Optimum builds on the so-called Egalitarian Bargaining Solution 
(Kalai 1977; Myerson 1977). The Egalitarian Bargaining Solution is an axiomatic-
mathematical concept and represents a modification of the above mentioned Nash 
Bargaining Solution.132 While the Nash Bargaining Solution is focused on maximal gains, the 
Egalitarian Bargaining Solution defines the optimal negotiation outcome (the so-called 
“agreement point”) by a state where the benefits of the involved players are equality 
distributed (e.g. Lambertini 2011: 154).133 
3.1.3 Dilemma Games & Public Bad Approach   
The next “ingredients” we add to the fit taxonomy are two analytical concepts – dilemma 
games and the public bad approach (Figure 7). In terms of depth, coherence, and breadth, 
both approaches were found in the IBE selection process as the best contribution (ch. 
3.3.3).134 Public bads and dilemma games are sub-categories of two rather broad theories – 
the Theory of Collective Goods (TCG) and game theory – which are both clearly located in 
the “realm of rational choice”. Public bads and dilemma games allow for a comprehensive 
and systematic analysis of the three social traps since both approaches have strong 
explanatory powers in terms of describing the bifurcation of individual and collective 
rationality. In addition, these two analytical approaches help us to discern the numerous 
“within-social-trap” variations and thereby provide us with a multifaceted picture of the 
various degrees of intractability foreign policy makers encounter in real-world bargaining 
dynamics. However, the most relevant contribution to the fit taxonomy is their ability to 
systematically identify the “optimal problem solution” – the central yardstick when 
                                                                             
Solution). In that sense, inequality traps “piggyback” on the same mechanisms that give rise to colliding 
interest and distrust traps. With regard to their genesis, they are subordinated to these two logics. 
However, while inequality traps emerge as by-products, they have – once they are established – a genuine 
nature which is independent and distinct – as we have shown above – from the two other types of social 
traps.  
131
 In the metaphor of the PD game, the Egalitarian Optimum (E+) coincides for example with the situation 
where both prisoners chose to remain silent and spend only one year in prison. In this constellation the 
two suspects are gaining in the sense that they are collectively better off than they would be in any other 
situation and their gains are equality distributed in the sense that both sides are able to realize in equal  
terms their second best outcome (see Figure 8).  
132
 Since the Egalitarian Bargaining Solution is a derivative of the Nash Bargaining Solution, it not 
surprising that the concept of the Qualified Pareto Optimum and the Egalitarian Solutions are closely 
connected. In essence, the Qualified Pareto Optimum is the precondition for the Egalitarian Optimum. But 
while there is no Egalitarian Optimum without a Qualified Pareto Optimum, not all Qualified Pareto 
Optima are identical with an Egalitarian Optimum (see e.g. the Imposed Deadlock Game in the Libyan 
NRN, ch. 5.3.2.1).  
133
 For the sake of completeness, we would like to mention that there is – apart of the Nash and the 
Egalitarian Bargaining Solution – also the so-called Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution which operates not along 
maximal or equally distributed benefits, but instead builds on the logic of proportional gains (Kalai & 
Smorodinsky 1975; see also: Lambertini 2011).  
134
 The other candidates we discussed in the IBE selection process were the GRIT, the BATNA, and the 
ripeness approach (Ch. 3.3.3).  
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studying the fit performance of diplomatic design. The public bad approach and the 
concept of dilemma games offer us insights into the question of how to design diplomatic 
intervention in order to resolve negotiation problems in an effective and efficient way. 
Similar to the three social traps, there is in our fit taxonomy also a “division of labor” 
between these two analytical concepts (Figure 7). The approach of public bads is first and 
foremost a structural concept. It studies the undersupply or overuse of services, means, 
and goods as well as spill-overs that negatively affect outsiders in their efforts to satisfy 
their desires (i.e. “negative externalities”). Therefore, this approach is in particular suitable 
for analyzing the colliding interest and the injustice trap that defines the substantial 
dimension of negotiation problems. Dilemma games are instead particularly feasible for the 
study of bargaining dynamic and processes. Since this approach puts problematic 
constellation of interdependent decision making at a central stage, we apply it for analysis 
of colliding interests and distrust traps situated on the procedural dimension of negotiation 
problems. 
3.1.3.1 The Public Bad Approach  
While we encounter in IR literature many general references to the Theory of Collective 
Goods (TCG), there are relatively few systematic and analytical applications of this theory 
(e.g. Barrett 2007; Holzinger 2008; Kaul et.al. 2003; Kocks 2010; Sandler 2004). This holds 
true, in particular, in the research of international negotiations where scholars have only 
occasionally touched upon TCG. The view becomes even dimmer if we turn to the approach 
of public bads – a sub-discipline of TCG which was in the past only rarely applied in IR 
research (e.g. Arce & Sandler 2005; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2009; Göker 2013; Jervis 
2009; Moxnes & van der Heijden 2003).  
This little appreciation for the public bad approach is deplorable. Since this concept allows 
us to study systematically the varieties of “trans-sovereign problems” (Rittberger, Kruck & 
Roemund 2010: 346) – a field that is primarily characterized by descriptive analysis and is 
thin on genuine theoretical concepts. The public bad approach is in that sense extending 
the conventional TCG by an additional analytical layer. In essence, the public bad approach 
represents the “dark side” of TCG. With the help of this approach we make issue areas 
accessible to detailed and multifaceted analysis for which we would have, beforehand, only 
reported the absence of collective goods. For our research project, the public bad approach 
is in particular fruitful since it highlights the negative reciprocity between public bads and 
collective goods and provides us with a genuine concept to study social traps on the 
substantial dimension of negotiation problems.  
But what exactly is a public bad? A public bad is a structural entity that imposes 
uncompensated costs to third parties that have not or not fully participated in its 
production or consumption. These uncompensated costs are described in TPG literature as 
“negative externalities”. “Negative externalities” are in essence “disutilities” that are 
spilled-over into the public sphere (e.g. Cornes & Sandler 1996: 39; Kaul, Grunberg & Stern 
1999; Kölliker 2005: 203; Rittberger, Kruck & Romund 2010: 345-6).  
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While there are also natural public bads (such as tsunamis, earthquakes, or infectious 
diseases), most of the public bads in international affairs are believed to be human-made or 
have at least a significant anthropogenic proportion. Thus, many of the trans-sovereign 
problems we encounter in today’s world politics – such as cross-border pollution, 
transnational crime and terrorism, or global financial crises (e.g. Ferdowsi 2007) – could be 
described and analyzed as human-made public bads.  
Individuals – the so-called bad sufferers – who are exposed to “negative externalities” 
might occasionally perceive public bads as a personal stroke of fate. However, public bads 
always have implications beyond the single actors and negative affect collective entities. 
Publicness is a constitutive element of public bads. Public bads are in that sense clearly 
distinct form individual bads (e.g. severe illness or private bankruptcy). 
While the effects of human-made public bads could be disastrous, they are not “irrational 
evil”.  Rather, public bads are logical and purposive. Like public goods, public bads have 
both a supply and a demand side. The so-called bad doers produce and supply public bads 
because they want to consume their benefits.135 Thus, at the very heart of every human-
made public bad – be it international terrorism or a global financial crises – resides a “good” 
from which individual bad doers or a group of bad doers take advantage of. “Negative 
externalities” are not only by-products that arise from and supply of public bads. “Negative 
externalities” are also constituted by the exclusive consumption of a public bad’s benefits.  
Bad doers and bad sufferers are inescapably intertwined in their struggle to maximize their 
utilities. The bad doers’ intention to supply and consume public bads imposes “negative 
externalities” to the bad sufferer. However, to fend off “negative externalities”, most public 
bads are confronted with countermeasures (e.g. transnational crime and terrorism is 
tackled by cooperation of national police and security authorities; bank regulations are put 
in place to confront financial crisis; etc.). In that sense, the bads sufferers’ intention to 
contain, reduce, or even erase “negative externalities” inflicts costs to the bad doers since 
they reduce the benefits resulting from the consumption of public bads. The utility 
maximization of the bad doers is undermined with the consequence that the livelihood of 
all those who profit from the supply and consumption of the public bad are threatened.  
The conflict between bad doers and bad sufferers materializes in the struggle between 
public bads and collective goods. Collective goods signify the opposite of public bads. 
Collective goods are marked by “positive externalities” and in the sense that they provide 
positive spill-overs to third parties. The consumption of collective goods varies in terms of 
rivalry and excludability. That fact has lead scholars to distinguish different sub-categories 
of collective goods such as pure public goods, common pool, club, and network goods.136 
                            
135
 Note that those actors who supply public bads are not necessarily identical with those actors who 
consume the public bads’ benefits.  
136
 In the literature we often encounter the following scheme: Common pool goods = rivalry in 
consumption but no excludability (e.g. high sea fishing grounds); club goods = no rivalry in consumption 
but excludability (e.g. cable TV); network goods = no rivalry in consumption and growing utility growing 
numbers of consumers (e.g. technical standards) (see Rittberger, Kruck & Romund 2010: 345-6). Among 
these different categories of collective good, the pure public good (i.e. public parks) is unique since it 
signifies a structural constellation where consumption is neither rivalrous nor exclusive. No actor is 
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Apart from pure public goods, collective goods are often underused, undersupplied, poorly 
provided, overused and have various access problems (e.g. Kaul et.al. 2003: 26). In many 
cases, these problems could be traced back to the impact of public bads.  Supplying and 
consuming public bads is undermining collective goods – and vice versa. Public bads and 
collective goods are intertwined in a negative reciprocity. That aspect is important for the 
operationalization of social traps as we will show in the following section.  
A) The Substantial Colliding Interest Trap 
In order to analyse the colliding interest traps situated on the substantial dimension, we 
could apply to the just mentioned negative reciprocity between public bads and collective 
goods. The bad doers and the bad sufferers are trapped in a struggle where they 
reciprocally undermine their efforts to maximize their utilities. Neither the bad doers nor 
the bad sufferers could unilaterally escape from this situation without facing prohibitive 
costs. If the bad sufferer would, for example, stop to fend off public bads, they would face 
growing “negative externalities”. Thus, the bad doers and the bad sufferers are embroiled 
in an uncooperative situation which signifies a Nash Equilibrium (N) and which is rendering 
both sides worse off in view of the optimal situation they individually expect to achieve. 
Both sides are entangled in a substantial colliding interest trap.  
It is very obvious that the resolution of this social trap requires the elimination of the 
“negative externalities” emitted by a public bad. If only the public bad is rendered harmless, 
the bad sufferers are able to realize their desires and have the chance to consume 
peacefully their collective good(s). What is required is a diplomatic intervention that 
“liberates” the bad sufferers from the negative impacts of pulibc bads.  
Intuitively removing the cause that originally gave rise the substantial negotiation problem 
appears to be at first sight the most appropriate solution to this task. However, due to the 
negative reciprocity between bad doers and bad sufferers, undoing public bads alone is not 
leading to sustainable negotiation results. It rather represents a pareto-ineffcient outcome 
which is not dissolving the bifurcation between individual and collective rationality that is at 
the very heart of social traps. Such an approach would signify a win-lose strategy where the 
bad sufferers “take it all” and the bad doers are “left out in the rain” deprived of the 
benefits which were constituted by the public bad. Thus, applying diplomatic interventions 
that exclusively implement the “liberation” of the bad sufferer from “negative externalities” 
will leave the substantial colliding interest trap unresolved. 
Of course, in some constellations, the bad doers might accept remorsefully their fate and 
“do penance” for the harm they have caused to the bad sufferer in the past. But in most 
situations, there is a high chance that the bad doers will reject pareto-inefficient 
negotiation outcomes and will try unilaterally either to restart their public bad or search for 
alternative replacements which might likewise cause “negative externalities”.  
                                                                             
prevented from consuming the benefits of pure public goods. Neither the quality nor the quantity of pure 
public goods is diminished if additional actors take part in its consumption.  
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A lasting resolution to substantial colliding interest traps is therefore only possible if 
bargaining parties manage to implement a strategy that is not only inspired by liberation 
but also by substitution. The Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+) where both sides gain 
collectively is only achievable if the “negative externalities” of the public bad are 
eliminated and if the bad doers receive an appropriate substitution for the abandoned 
public bad which will provide them with alternative means to assure their benefits 
without causing new “negative externalities”.137 A “liberation-substitution strategy” is 
assumed to lead to negotiation outcomes where both sides are collectively rendered better 
off and the colliding interest trap is sustainably resolved.138 
The requirement of the “liberation-substitution” strategy provokes two puzzling questions. 
First, how do we identify the appropriate substitution for the bad doer? How do negotiating 
parties assure that they provide – both in quantitative and qualitative terms – the suitable 
surrogate for the abandoned public bad? Delivering too little or too much of the 
appropriate substitution is problematic. But providing a replacement that is not or only 
partly suitable in qualitative is problematic too. Second, how do we operationalize the 
“liberation strategy”? How do conflict parties assure that the relevant public bad is 
abandoned completely without eliminating aspects of the bad doer’s strategic portfolio 
which are unproblematic causing negative side-effects which could – in a feed-back loop – 
further complicate the negotiation process? The public bad approach, as we understand it, 
provides answers to both questions. It identifies the “optimal problem solution” for the 
“substitutive” and “liberating interventions” and qualifies thereby as a suitable analytical 
approach for our fit taxonomy.  
 
 
                            
137
 The logic of “substitution” is expressing a pragmatic and forward-looking approach towards public 
bads. What is at the focus is to avoid future problems? In that sense, the “substitution strategy” is clearly 
distinct from the backward-looking paradigms of “punishment” and “repentance” which traditionally 
dominate in domestic affairs the policy to confront bad doers – be it criminals or sinners. Consequently, 
the “substitution strategy” might be rejected by all those who demand compensation and reparation for 
damage and harm caused in the past. The fact that bad doers are gaining something in return for 
abandoning their bad behaviors might appear in the backward-looking perspective paradox – if not even 
disgusting. However, since “punishment” and “repentance” make sense only if we assume that the bad 
doers are members of the same “in-group”, share a common normative order and are expected to return 
to the “normal society” – a requirement that is in international security policy often not the case – the 
forward-looking approach of substitution seems to be an appropriate strategy for international bargaining 
dynamics.  
138
 Apart from the “liberation-substitution interventions”, we could identify with the help of the public 
bad approach an additional and more fundamental resolution to colliding interest traps: the supply of 
pure public goods. Since there is no rivalry and no excludability in the consumption of pure public goods, 
all actors – the bad doers and the bad sufferers – would benefit from such a constellation. Once supplied, 
the pure public good signifies a “collective optimum” that make the rational cause to supply and consume 
public bads disappear. However, the provision of pure public goods goes clearly beyond the resolution of 
issue specific colliding interest traps. Pure public goods (such as public parks) have far-reaching positive 
externalities. In theory, all interest third parties (including future generations) could benefit from pure 
public goods even though they were in the first place neither negatively affected by the public bad nor 
have participated in the actual bargaining process. Thus, as a resolution for a particular substantial 
negotiation problem, the provision of pure public goods is therefore in many respects oversized. As a 
practical solution to a given public bad, supplying pure public goods is too demanding in terms of the 
required resources.  
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General Strategy Varities of Public Bads Optimal Problem Solution
(1)
The entire "fabrication chain" is composed by public bads  (e.g. worldview 
Chaliphate as pictured by Sunni terrorist groups)
No negotiation & no substitution (if applicable the provision of 
pure pub lic goods ) 
(2) 
"Fabrication chain" is oriented towards a final good. The pub lic bad signifies an 
intermediate step in the manufacturing proces (e.g. nuclear proliferation). 
Substitute the intermediate good in correspondence with the 
final good(s) of the original "production chain"
(3) 
The "fabrication chain" consistes of intermediary goods . Only  the "final product" 
signifies a pub lic bad
Substitute the final good in correspondence with the 
intermediate good(s) of the original "production chain"
(4) 
Private Public Bad: rivalry and excludablity in consumption (e.g. water removale by 
up-stream state)
Elimination
(5) Club Bads: excludability but no rivalry (e.g.  street gangs) Externaliztion and/or eliminate 
(6) Common Pool Bads: rivalry but no excudablity (e.g. speeding) Internalization and/or eliminate
(7) Summation aggregation (e.g. fare doding) Undiscriminating but standardized countermeasures
(8) Threshold aggregation (e.g. public dringing) Containment 
(9) Best shot bad aggregation (e.g. product piracy)
Focuse on the most potent bad doer  and its capacity for the 
"single strike" 
(10) Weakest link aggregation  (e.g. loophole in the fire wall)
Intensive preventive measures focused on all potential bad 
doers 
(11) Cross-territorial and cross-sectoral externalities (e.g. global financial crises) Inclusive-multipolar representation
(12)
Cross-territorial but no cross-sectoral externalities (e.g. proliferation of chemical 
weapons) 
Exclusive-mulitpolar representation
(13) No cross-territorial but cross-sectoral externalities (e.g. bilateral border dispute) Inclusive-bipolar representation
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Exclusive-bipolar representation
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manufacturing process (Kaul & Mendoza 2003: 101). Step by step the “fabrication chain” is 
producing public bads.  
Final products signify the ultimate outcome of this multi-stage manufacturing process. They 
represent the “end product” and denote the preferred social state bad doers are aiming to 
achieve. In light of the concept of rational motivation we have introduced above (ch. 
2.5.3.1), final products would represent issue specific desires. They represent a preferred 
structural constellation.139 However, realized final products are rare. It is relatively safe to 
assume that most of the structural entities we encounter in international affairs are 
intermediate products. Intermediate products signify a preliminary stage of “fabrication 
chain”. In the manufacturing process, they represent precursors.140  
The length of “production chains” is dependent on the scope and nature of individual public 
bads. While some “production chains” require only a few intermediate steps to achieve the 
final products, others signify complex and multi-dimensional manufacturing pathways. How 
much “up-stream” production has already been invested and how much “down-stream” 
production is still required to achieve the final bad (or final goods) is therefore an empirical 
question that needs to be answered in each individual case.  
However, even more important than the length of “production chains” is their composition. 
The manufacturing pathway of public bads is rarely “pure”. Production chains that are 
entirely built of public bads are infrequent. In most cases, public bad “production chains” 
are built of components that are themselves rather unproblematic. In the multi-stage 
manufacturing of public bads, not only collective goods but also private goods often play an 
important role – both in the “down-stream” and “up-stream production”. Moreover, not 
every “fabrication chain” endeavors to produce final bads. Of the outcome of the 
fabrication process is rather unproblematic and it is only the intermediary production steps 
that impose “negative externalities”. This logic of “good ends justifying bad means” applies 
for example to nuclear proliferation. While illegal nuclear weapons programs clearly signify 
public bads that impose “negative externalities” to the outside-world and cause harm to 
bad sufferers, the “up-stream production” of these programs often builds on “dual use” 
technologies which signify themselves not as a public bad but represent components that 
are widely used in civil nuclear science and the atomic energy industry. Moreover, nuclear 
weapons programs are intermediate pubic bads since they are not an end by themselves. 
The final outcome of the “fabrication chain” that nuclear bad doers aim to achieve is in 
most cases unproblematic and often represents “normal” desires such as national security 
or national prestige (see no. 2 Table 5).  
With the help of the “fabrication chain”, we are able to study – in quantitative and 
qualitative terms – the appropriate substitute of the abandoned public bad. At first, 
negotiating parties have to identify whether the public bad in a given situation is just a sub-
                            
139
 For example, the utopia of a worldwide caliphate which is mercilessly enforcing a strict interpretation 
of the Sharia would signify the final bad desired by radical Salafism. 
140
 For example, IR scholars have often described international regimes as “intermediate goods”. Be it 
though the provision of cross-border surveillance systems, transnational infrastructure, or aid programs, 
international regimes could be conceptualized as the means that help to produce “final goods” 
(Hasencelver et.al. 1997: 95-99; Kaul & LeGoulven 2003: 373-9 Young 1989b: 21, fn. 31). 
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component of the bad doer’s “fabrication chain” or whether the entire “fabrication chain” 
is composed by public bads.141 If both the intermediate steps and the final outcome builds 
on public bads, substitution is impossible and the effort to achieve a sustainable problem 
resolution by diplomacy is senseless (see no. 1 Table 5). If, however, the public bad 
represents just a sub-component of the larger “fabrication chain” and has an 
intermediating character – as it is assumed to be the case in most real-world negotiation 
dynamics (see no. 2 Table 5) – appropriate substitution is given when the negotiating 
parties manage to fill the gap caused by the removal of the public bad in a way that the 
multi-stage manufacturing process is preserved and retains its functionality. The nature and 
the scope of the “fabrication chain” is in that sense the yardstick for appropriate 
substitution. Provided that negotiation parties have a detailed understanding of a particular 
public bad’s “fabrication chain”, they are able to design well-matching surrogates.  
A well-matching substitution of an intermediate public bad requires that the provided 
replacement corresponds with the final good(s) of the bad doer’s “fabrication chain”. “Gap 
filling” is the central obligation. The former bad doer has to have the chance to continue its 
“fabrication chain” without the intermediate public bad.142 That criterion highlights that not 
every reward offered to bad doers fulfills the standard of the “substation strategy”. Apart 
from qualitative correspondence with the final good(s), it is also important that the 
provided surrogate matches in quantitative terms to the broader “fabrication chain”. The 
bad doer is only able to restore its “fabrication chain” and to continue its quest for the 
desired final good if the surrogate is sufficiently large to fill the gap in the manufacturing 
pathway.143  
(2) Liberation Strategy: The liberation of the bad sufferers – the second step to resolve 
colliding interest traps on the substantial dimension of negotiation problems – could be 
achieved through different avenues. For example, a public bad could be rendered harmless, 
if the bad doers internalize all “negative externalities”. In such a case, the negative by-
products that emerge from the supply or the consumption of public bads are all born by the 
bad doers themselves and are no longer emitted to by-standing third parties. 
Externalization of the public bad’s benefits is another approach to deactivate public bads 
and undo “negative externalities”. In the case of externalization, third parties would still 
face negative consequences but their suffering would be compensated by the entitlement 
                            
141
 As we just said, “production chains” that are exclusively composed of public bads are infrequent. The 
just mentioned worldwide caliphate pictured by Sunni terrorist groups would, for example, signify a rare 
example of a “pure public bad fabrication chain”. The early production stages such as fundamental Islamic 
street gangs intimidating their Muslim peers in Western European cities signify a public bad that is not in 
scope but in nature similar to public bads situated further down-stream on the production chain (such as 
terrorist attacks or efforts to establish territorial sovereignty in parts of the Middle East) (See no. 1 Table 
5).  
142
 Of course, it is also possible that the public bad has in the “fabrication chain” not an intermediate 
character but instead signifies a final bad – although we assume that this constellation occurs less often in 
international affairs (See no. 3 Table 5). Substituting final bads is more complicated since it requires a 
relatively delicate mission to manipulate the desires of bad doer. However, in terms of the yardstick for 
this intervention, the same logic applies: it is essential that the functionality of the “fabrication chain” is 
preserved. In that sense, when substituting the final bad, it is important that the provided surrogate is by 
and large in harmony with the unproblematic intermediate goods.  
143
 However, oversized substitutions are also problematic  given that such a constellation represents an 
inefficient strategy that is causing exaggerated costs for those actors who provide the replacement.  
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to take part in the consumption of the public bad’s benefits. Of course, complete 
elimination of the entire public bad would likewise diminish all “negative externalities” and 
would signify another possible approach (see no. 4-6 Table 5).144  
As we said above, it is important to apply the “liberation strategy” as a “surgical 
intervention” that is neither cutting off too much nor too little but only removes the 
“negative externalities” of a given public bad. Consequently, doing away with a public bad 
and its “negative externalities” could not be done a gusto. Negotiation parties could not 
freely choose between an elimination, externalization or internalization strategy. While 
there are several concepts to differentiate the scope and nature of public bads (see the 
following section C on the varieties of public bads) the “bad consumption” is with regard to 
the “liberation strategy” the most important criterion (see no. 4-6 Table 5).  
As we explained above, at the very heart of the every human-made public bad resides in 
essence a “good” from which the bad doers benefit. In essence it is the envisioned benefits 
that drive the bad doers to produce and supply public bads. The “goods” that underlie 
public bads could – similar to collective goods (see footnote 136) – be distinguished 
according to criteria of “(non) excludablity” and “(non)rivalry”. How the “liberation 
strategy” is applied, is dependent on the “good foundation” of the relevant public bad.  
A private public bad is, for example, a public bad that is marked by rivalrous and excludable 
consumption (no. 4 Table 5). Apart from a single bad doer, no other party could take 
advantage of its benefits. For example, an up-stream state that is imposing “negative 
externalities” to all down-stream riparian states by excessively removing river waters and 
discharging sewage would signify a private public bad since the benefits of this behavior are 
reaped by a single actor while all other affected parties have to bear the related costs. 
Elimination is the only feasible “liberation strategy” when facing a private public bad. Due 
to the rival and exclusive consumption, internalization of negative costs or externalization 
of consumption is in such a constellation not a doable option.145  
Club bads instead represent constellations where the consumption of a given public bad is 
exclusive but not rival (no. 5 Table 5). All those actors who are inside the “club” take 
advantage of the public bad while the outside third parties have to bear the “negative 
externalities”. For example, an urban street gang would represent a club bad. The “fruits” 
of their illegal activities (such as wealth, power, or respect) are by and large shared among 
all gang members. The inhabitants of the neighborhood face instead the “negative 
externalities” of the street gang’s crime business (e.g. gun violence, dilapidation, downward 
trend of real estate prices). In terms of the “liberation strategy”, the handling of the club 
bads is marked by a two-fold option: completely eliminate the club bad or externalize its 
                            
144
 At first sight it appears that the externalization and internalization strategy would render the need of 
substitution needless since the bad doers would in these situations retain the public bad. However, both 
strategies are costly for the bad doers and would render (although in a less radical way than the 
elimination strategy) the original “fabrication chain” dysfunctional. Substitution would in these situations 
still be necessary in order to ensure the functionality of the “fabrication chain”.  
145
 For example, unilateral removal of river water would be senseless from a rational perspective if we 
imagine that the up-stream state is sharing the removed water with all down-stream states (i.e. 
externalization of benefits). 
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benefits to new members. Following the logic “if you can’t beat them, join them”, 
teenagers in a deprived urban area could, for example, try to become members of the bad 
doers himself and take part in the consumption of its benefits. Due to the exclusiveness of 
street gangs, becoming a member is not an easy solution. Admission is limited and follows 
strict rules. Often committing crimes is required in order to ascend into this exclusive club. 
In that sense the new members still suffer negative consequences when applying the 
“externalization strategy”. But now they are at least entitled to take part in the 
consumption of the public bad’s benefits.  
A common pool bad would instead represent a situation where the benefits for the bad 
doers are non-exclusive but rival (no. 6 Table 5). For example, speeding could be described 
as a common pool bad. Speeding does not only impose “negative externalities” to the 
outside world (e.g. the increased danger of accidents), it is also characterized by non-
excludability. Exceeding the speed limit could be done with expensive sports cars. But one 
could also drive excessively fast with old clumsy rattletraps. However, the benefits of 
speeding are marked by rivalry. If all road users speed and speeding becomes “the normal 
thing to do” when boarding a car, it is losing much of its thrill. Elimination or internalization 
of “negative externalities” (which would represent, in the case of speeding, the imposition 
of high fines which bore all the negative consequences of speeding) are the two central 
strategic options when facing common pool bads (no. 6 Table 5).146 
B) The Injustice Trap   
Although it is not an automatism, we still assume that in many international bargaining 
situations the colliding interest trap goes hand in hand with an injustice trap. While there 
are certainly situations where the resolution of the colliding interest trap leads to an 
outcome where the benefits are equally distributed between the bad sufferers and the bad 
doers, there is solid ground to believe that biased and uneven allocations of gains are 
common in many real-world negotiation situations.147  
Certainly, not all conflict parties might regard inequality as a problem. In some cases, 
negotiators are already content that they have resolved the colliding interest and do not 
dare to ask for more. However, in many situations, the disadvantaged actor(s) will perceive 
biased bargaining results as an obstacle for stable and lasting problem resolution – in 
particular because there is a tendency to see international negotiations through the lens of 
the “war” or the “sports metaphor” where in the end everything boils down to the essential 
questions: who has won (e.g. Gadlin, Kupfer-Schneider & Honeyman 2006)? Consequently, 
unjust and unfair bargaining outcomes are “gnawing” at the disadvantaged actors and 
produce – over time – frustration and discontent. In these situations, the injustice trap 
                            
146
 Note that we could further extend the discussion on the variations of the “liberation strategy” if we 
would take further differentiations of public bads into account such as network bads or congestible bads. 
147
 Of course, (in)justice in the sense of (in)equal distribution of gains and losses is in many respects a 
question of perception. While we take this aspect into account in our single hard case study on the Libyan 
NRN, “perception” is not a genuine aspect for the public bad approach given that this concept is first and 
foremost about the tangible structure of negotiation issue.  
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becomes a substational negotiation issue which the individual actors could not resolve 
unilaterally without further deteriorating the problem.  
Speaking in more technical terms, injustice traps determine the question of whether the 
Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+), which was established by the resolution of the colliding 
interest trap, coincides with an Egalitarian Optimum (E+) which signifies justice in the sense 
of egalitarian distribution. As we have already explained above, (ch. 3.1.2), parallelism 
between the Qualified Pareto Optimum and the Egalitarian Optimum requires not only that 
both players gain but that they gain to an equal degree. 
But how exactly do we identify the Egalitarian Optimum with the help of the public bad 
approach? The Egalitarian Optimum is realized when the just introduced “substitution” in 
favor of the bad doer and the “liberation” in favor of the bad sufferer arrive at an equal 
distribution of gains and losses. The most obvious yardstick indicating that this 
requirement was met is when both sides are able to realize their desires in a harmonized 
way after the liberation and substitution intervention. That outcome is achieved when the 
bad doer is provided with a fully functioning “fabrication chain” that is sufficiently replacing 
the eliminated public bad, and where the bad sufferer is able to realize without negative 
inference its desired collective good. In such a case, neither the former bad sufferer nor the 
former bad doers are disturbed in the consumption of their desired final goods. Thus, the 
injustice trap adds an additional layer of coherence. Successful “substitution strategies” are 
required to match with the “fabrication chain” of the bad doers. The well-matching 
“liberation strategy” has to correspond to the “good foundation” of public bads. The 
successful resolution of the injustice trap is instead required to establish coherence 
between the outcomes of the “liberation” and the “substation” strategy. The benefits that 
the former bad doers gain by “substitution” shall not exceed the profits the former bad 
sufferers receive from the “liberation intervention” – and vice versa. Otherwise we would 
arrive at an unequal distribution of gains that is not resolving the injustice trap.  
C) Varieties of Public Bads  
Apart from analysis of the very nature of injustice and colliding interest traps, the public bad 
approach allows to systematically describe relatively broad variations in the appearance of 
substantial negotiation problems. The numerous “within-trap-variations” help to further 
fine-tune negotiation strategies and thereby improve the analytical power of the fit 
approach.  
Two additional concepts of the public bad approach in terms of a more detailed problem 
description are in particular noteworthy: (1) the concept of aggregation technology and (2) 
the scope of “negative externalities”. Since both concepts will play for the later analysis of 
the Libyan NRN, an important role, we will explain them in more detail.148 
                            
148
 In TCG literature we encounter additional concepts that would allow further differentiation of a public 
bad’s nature and scope – such as group size, heterogeneity of the bad doers, or the institutional-juridical 
environment of bad production (see e.g. Kocks 2010).  
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(1) Aggregation Technology of the Bad Production: In the literature on collective goods, 
we often encounter the concept of “aggregation technology” (e.g. Hirshleifer 1983, 
Hirshleifer 1985; Sandler 2004). Scholars have applied this approach to analysis “the way 
individual contributions add up to the social available quantity of a good” (Holzinger 2001: 
118). With the help of “aggregation technologies”, we could study how collective goods are 
produced and when they become supplied. The summation, threshold, best shot, and 
weakest link are presumably the “aggregation technologies” most often discussed in the 
literature.149 Applied in a mirror-inverted way, aggregation technologies are also fruitful for 
the analysis of public bads. In essence, this concept signifies an additional criterion for fine-
tuning the “liberation strategy” discussed above (no. 7-10 Table 5).  
In the summation technology, public bads are produced by a step-by-step approach 
(Sandler 2004; Kocks 2010). Each contribution of each bad-doer is of equal value and adds 
up equally to the production of the relevant public bad. According to Todd Sandler, “[t]he 
primary distinguishing feature of summation is that every contributor’s efforts are perfectly 
substitutable for those of others” (Sandler 2004: 61). Fare dodging would, for example, 
signify a public bad that is produced by the summation technology (no. 7 Table 5). 
Regardless of who is free riding (a rich uptown kid or a poor teenager from a deprived 
inner-city neighborhood), every unpaid ride on the tube is increasing the problem of fare 
dodging to an equal degree.150  
Threshold bads (no. 8 Table 5) are instead only supplied if the bad doers manage to 
transgress a certain level (e.g. Sandler 2004: 64-66; Holzinger 2008: 69-82). If this threshold 
is not crossed, the public bad remains in an unfinished production stage and unfolds none 
or only limited “negative externalities”. For example, if a certain level of escalation is not 
crossed, drinking in public is not much of a problem and could be regarded as an important 
ingredient for a vibrant night live in European cities. But when a certain threshold is 
crossed, negative spin-offs appear that outweigh the benefits (e.g. violence, noise, 
disgraceful scenes).151 
In the best-shot aggregation, public bads are supplied by the “single best effort” (Barrett 
2007: 199). Best-shot bads often signify a technical or scientific breakthrough by a single 
actor and have the nature of a “single strike” (Kocks 2010: 249-50; Sandler 2004: 66-68; 
Barrett 2007: 31-32). The contributions of other actors to the best-shot bad are mainly 
unimportant. It is the provision of the single most potent bad doer that is in the end 
decisive as to whether or not the public bad is supplied (no. 9 Table 5). For example, we 
                            
149
 Other less prominent “aggregation technologies” are, for example, the lumpy- or the weighted-sum-
production (Kocks 2010; Hampton 1987; Taylor 1982; Thompson 1987; Sandler 2004: 68).  
150
 On the one, hand public bads that are produced according to the logic of the summation technology 
are problematic since every bad doer, regardless of its individual capabilities, commitment, and its intent 
is equally important and has to be taken into consideration by a resolution strategy. A focused resolution 
strategy which is dedicated only to particular relevant and notorious fare dodgers is therefore insufficient. 
However, summation bads allow – due to their symmetric production – on the other hand, for 
indiscriminating and standardized counter-measures (no. 7 Table 5). 
151
 Containment and prevention is the crucial strategy with regard to public bads that is built according to 
the logic of threshold aggregation. As long as policy makers manage to avoid the crossing of the 
threshold, the negative implications of this particular type of public bad are controllable even with 
relatively little governance resources (no. 8 Table 5). 
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could describe product piracy as a best-shot bad. The best and most affordable 
counterfeiting of a certain product – for example the imitation of Italian luxury handbags – 
has the biggest negative impact. As soon as the most potent imitator enters the market, the 
public bad of product piracy is obtaining a new quality and is unfolding significant impact 
for the individual manufacturers of luxury handbags. All efforts of all less sophisticated 
forgers become more or less irrelevant since only very few people would buy an imitation 
of the imitation which is visibly a counterfeit.152 
Public bads that are fabricated by the weakest-link aggregation mark the opposite to the 
best-shot bads (no. 10 Table 5). Here a public bad is not produced by the most potent actor. 
In fact, it’s the opposite. Weakest-link bads emerge already by the most minimal 
contribution. Even the weakest bad-producer could cause high impact in terms of “negative 
externalities” and is believed to outdo even more potent bad doers (e.g. Barret 2007: 47-
73). For example, a loophole in a firewall that allows a software virus to slip through and 
cause severe damage to a sensitive system or a critical infrastructure, would represent a 
weakest-link bad. In such a case, it is irrelevant whether other hackers later use the same 
security loophole to place malware or whether the virus they have programmed has in 
general a higher ability to circumvent firewalls. The first-mover with a less sophisticated 
virus has already caused considerable damage to which nothing or little could be added to 
by second-moving bad-doers.153  
(2) Scope of “negative externalities”: Apart from their “aggregation technology”, public 
bads could be further distinguished by the nature and scope of the “negative externalities” 
they cause to the public sphere. A common approach – which we, again, translate from the 
conventional TCG literature – is the distinction between cross-territorial and cross-sectoral 
externalities (e.g. Kölliker 2005; Rittberger 2008; Rittberger et.al. 2010: 354-357).154 
“Negative externalities” have cross-territorial implications if they inflict costs on third 
parties across state borders. Cross-sectoral externalities are instead given, if a public bad 
has negative consequences not only to “identifiable functional subsystem of the society” 
(such as security or environmental policy) but is also “affecting several societal subsystems 
or the society as a whole” (Kölliker 2006: 205) (see no 11-14 Table 5).  
For the analysis of substantial negotiation problems, the scope of “negative externalities” is 
important to identify the group of bad sufferers and address the question of who shall 
participate in a negation process? In order to arrive at a comprehensive and lasting 
resolution of the substantive negotiation problem, those who are affected by the problem 
                            
152
 Consequently, a focused approach that concentrates on the most potent bad doer and its capacity for 
the “single strike” is crucial when trying to resolve public bads that are produced according to the logic the 
best-shot aggregation. Wasting one’s time on fighting imitators and forgers which impose anyway little 
“negative externalities” is, however, an important stumbling block for the resolution of best-shot bads 
(no. 9  Table 5). 
153
 Weakest-link bads are in particular difficult to handle. Intensive preventive measures including “red 
teaming efforts” simulating a potential “attack” of bad doers is required to approach this type of challenge 
(no 10 Table 5). The handling of weakest link bads is costly since it requires to take even the most unlikely 
bad doers into account. 
154
 Another concept to differentiate the scope of “negative externalities” would be the temporal 
dimension which would, for example, allow for a study focused on cross-generational implications of a 
public bad (e.g. Kaul et.al. 1999: 10-11). 
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should “have a say” in the resolution process. If this principle rule of representation in 
negotiation dynamics is not respected, it is likely that not all aspects of a certain public bad 
are addressed. Re-negotiation or – in the worst case – a violation and non-compliance with 
the achieved agreement would be the logical consequence. For example, an exclusive-
bipolar negotiation format which only includes the actual bad doer and the immediately 
affected bad sufferer would be sufficient, if the scope of a public bad has neither cross-
territorial nor cross-sectoral implications (e.g. a bilateral conflict on diplomatic 
aggregation). However, the question of participation becomes more challenging when the 
“negative externalities” have a cross-territorial and a cross-sectoral nature – such as, a 
global financial crisis. Financial crises do not only affect economies but often have negative 
implications across sectors as they could, for example, undermine the social welfare system 
or negatively interfere with the political system causing the emergence of radical parties. In 
order to assure that the interests of all affected parties are taken into consideration, a 
suitable resolution strategy has to have an inclusive-multipolar structure representing not 
only state parties or players from the banking sectors but also the relevant civil society 
actors (see no. 11-14 Table 5). 
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3.1.3.2 Dilemma Games  
The concept of dilemma games is the analytical approach we have chosen in the IBE 
selection (ch. 3.3.3) in order to study the scope and nature of procedural negotiation 
problems and identify their “optimal solution” – the necessary requirement for evaluating 
the “fit performance” of diplomatic design.155 While the public bad approach represents a 
rather “exotic” concept in negotiation research, dilemma games signifies presumably one 
of the most essential building blocks in the research on international bargaining dynamics 
(Jönsson 2002: 218-9). The development of game theory and the research on international 
negotiation is densely intertwined and evolved for considerable time as a mutually 
reinforcing symbiosis (e.g. Raiffa 1982; Rapoport 1960; Sebenius 1991; Schelling 1960).  
Figure 8: 2x2 Prisoners' Dilemma Game 
 
Although the knowledge of dilemma games is widely spread among IR scholars, we still 
decided to briefly introduce this concept and explain how we use this approach to 
conceptualize the colliding interest, the distrust trap, and its different variations.  
A) Colliding Interest Traps on the Procedural Dimension   
When applying dilemma games to the colliding interests trap, the basic concepts we have 
already introduced in the context of the public bad approach remain unchanged. The Nash 
Equilibrium (N) as well as the Qualified Parteo Optimum (P+) is central for both the public 
bad approach and the concept of dilemma games. However, in terms of practical 
operationalization, these two concepts differ – as we will explain in this section by recurring 
again to the PD metaphor (Figure 8).  
When we translate the PD metaphor with its four different opportunities into a 2x2 game 
matrix with an ordinal scaled hierarchy of preference (the so-called payoffs), we are able to 
show precisely what we have verbally already outlined beforehand.156 If both bargaining 
parties strive to maximize their individual utilities and opt for confession (D), they become 
trapped in the situation of mutual defection (DD) which constitutes a bifurcation of 
individual and collective rationality indicated by the Nash Equilibrium (N). Moreover, the 
2x2 game matrix shows clearly that joint cooperation (CC) is the solution to this colliding 
                            
155
 For a concise and non-technical introduction into game theory, see for example Muthoo 2000; Zürn 
1992: 323-335.  
156
 Note that we have in the 2x2 PD game indicated the Egalitarian Optimum (E+) which we have 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter (Ch. 3.1.2) in order to show that this concept does also apply to 
dilemma games and the procedural negotiation problems although we apply injustice traps in the specific 
setting of our PhD project only on the substantial dimension of negotiation problems. 
remain silent [C] confess [D]
remain silent [C] 3,3 E+,P+ 1,4 P
confess [D] 4,1 P 2,2 E,M,N
C = Cooperation E+ = Egalitarian Optimum P = Pareto Optimum 
D = Defection M = MaxiMin Solution P+ = Qualified Pareto Optimum 
E = Equal Distribution N = Nash Equilib irum 
Suspect A
Suspect B
Players' hiearchy of preference:   DC > CC >  DD > CD
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interest trap. When both players choose to remain silent (C) they are rewarded with the 
Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+) which provides collectively the best interaction result. 
Figure 9: Pure Deadlock Game 
 
While the bifurcation of individual and collective rationality is in general the standard 
definition of social traps, this aspect alone is insufficient if we want operationalize 
procedural negotiation problems with the help of dilemma games. An additional aspect has 
to be taken into consideration: the failure to achieve the outcome of joint cooperation (CC). 
Diplomatic deadlocks and bargaining impasses are the very nature of procedural 
negotiation problems. But a standstill in the negotiation process is not only problematic by 
itself. As we have explained above (Ch. 3.1.1), overcoming the procedural problem in a 
bargaining process is the precondition for the resolution of the substantial negotiation 
process. As long as the negotiating parties fail to resolve the procedural negotiation 
problems the overarching conflict issue, which originally gave rise to a diplomatic process, 
remains unresolved. Our definition of procedural colliding interest traps has to take this fact 
into consideration. Thus, a colliding interest trap is given if there is at least one Nash 
equilibrated interaction result (N) that does not coincide with a Qualified Pareto Optimum 
(P+) or the outcome of joint cooperation (CC).157 
Admittedly, our definition is not meeting the standard of parsimony. Other scholars have 
used more elegant definitions (e.g. Ostrom 1998; Rothstein 2005; Rapoport 1988; Taylor 
1979: 19 & Liebrand 1983: 124 cited at Zürn 1992: 154). But the objective of these scholars 
was to describe social traps in general and not the particular type of colliding interest traps 
in the sense of procedural negotiation problems.158  
                            
157
 Note that there are numerous dilemma games that are marked by more than just one Nash 
Equilibrium.  
158
 Our definition is relatively broad and applies also to problematic negotiation constellations that would 
not be regarded as a social trap when applying a more narrow definition. Take for example the pure 
Deadlock Game (Figure 9). By standard definition, this strategic constellation would not represent a social 
trap since the Nash Equilibrium (N) coincides with the Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+). Although both 
players are entangled in a deadlock constellation, they regard this outcome as little disturbing since they 
are collectively achieving the best possible outcome. The pure Deadlock Game is in that sense expressing 
the logic of “splendid confrontation”. Mutual defection is regarded as a “normal form of interaction”. 
However, when thought as a procedural negotiation problem, the Deadlock Game is indeed problematic 
since the involved players are unable to work jointly towards a diplomatic solution of the substantial 
negotiation problems. The central issue of the bargaining process remains unresolved – a fact that must 
(rationality assumed) disturb over time even the deadlock game players. 
Cooperation  [C] Defection [D]
Cooperation  [C] 2,2 E 1,4 P
Defection [D] 4,1 P 3,3 E+,M,N,P+
C = Cooperation E+ = Egalitarian Optimum P = Pareto Optimum 
D = Defection M = MaxiMin Solution P+ = Qualified Pareto Optimum 
E = Equal Distribution N = Nash Equilib irum 
Player A
Player B
Players' hiearchy of preference: DC > DD > CC > CD  
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B) Distrust Traps  
Apart from colliding interest traps, the bargaining process is also the place where suspicion 
and distrust of negotiating parties materializes. The negotiation struggles represent the 
perfect “biotope” to grow worst-case thinking and expectations of malevolence. When 
distrust becomes excessive, even minor steps of diplomatic progress turn into burdensome 
and complicated challenges and the bargaining parties become trapped.  
In dilemma games we operationalize distrust by the Maxmin Solution (M). As we have 
already outlined above (ch. 3.1.2) the Maximin Solution signifies the state where actors, 
who are anticipating the worst-case, choose a strategy that allows them to “hedge their 
bets”. In that logic, a distrust trap is given if the Maximin Solution (M) differs from joint 
cooperation (CC) or the Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+). In the 2x2 PD Game, the distrust 
trap, indicated by the Maximin Solution, coincides with the outcome of mutual defection 
(DD) (Figure 8). In terms of individual rationality, this choice provides for the players the 
best protection against the worst-case scenario (i.e. unreciprocated cooperation (CD)).  
C) Varieties of Dilemma Games  
Although not all strategic game constellations are dilemma games, their number is still 
relatively high (see e.g. Rapoport & Guyer 1966; Robinson & Goforth 2005). By the 
approach of dilemma games, we therefore have the possibility to grasp a broad variety of 
different procedural negotiation problems and draw relatively rich pictures of real-world 
bargaining dynamics.  
Take for example the group of Aversion Games (also known as brinkmanship dilemmas) 
(Figure 10). In IR literature, these game constellations were, for example, used to study the 
nuclear arms race or the harmonization of national conventions (e.g. Snyder 1971; Jervis 
1978; Zürn 1992: 185). The most prominent historic event that was explained by applying 
this particular type of dilemma game was certainly the Cuban Missile Crisis (Brams 1985: 
48-62; Langlois 1991).159  
Aversion Games are characterized by the double Nash Equilibrium. Moreover, they have in 
common that the involved players have a strong distaste (or aversion) for the outcome of 
mutual defection (DD) (Figure 10). Although both negotiation parties have a preference for 
defection, the outcome of mutual defection (DD), which represents for both players a 
disaster, functions as a catalyst for joint cooperation (CC). Even though cooperation is not 
the most attractive outcome, both sides have an inclination for that strategy since it avoids 
the disaster (see e.g. Goldstein 2010; Schwartzman 1988; Stein 1982).160   
                            
159
 Other international crises that are believed to represent an Aversion Game are, for example, the 1938 
Munich negotiation over Czechoslovakia, the 1948 Berlin blockade or the 1958 Lebanon crisis (Snyder & 
Diesing 1977: 108-22).  
160
 In the context of Aversion Games, IR scholars have often referred to the cult movie, “Rebel without a 
Cause” (1955) – staring James Dean – since one scene is believed to signify an Aversion game metaphor 
and refers to a “test of courage” U.S. beatniks used to do in 1950s. Back then, teenagers used to drive 
their cars with high speed straight at each other. The driver who swerved first was dubbed the “chicken” 
while his/her counterpart had proven his/her courage and therefore was cheered as the winner. If both 
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Figure 10:  Aversion Games 
 
 
The approach of dilemma games has a high explanatory power since it allows to identify 
strategic variations even among the relatively similar Aversion Games. What is particularly 
noteworthy with regard to Aversion Games (apart from other variations) is the difference in 
the likelihood of achieving lasting resolutions of the colliding interest traps. For example, in 
the Chicken Game, the outcome of joint cooperation (CC) coincides with the Qualified 
Pareto Optimum (P+). It is therefore – rationality assumed – relatively safe to expect that 
the players are likely to maintain their cooperative course once they have taken the 
decision to work jointly towards the resolution of a particular issue. While both sides might 
“sneak a glance” at unilateral defection (D) and the utility maximization which this move 
might bring, the looming worst-case scenario of mutual defection (DD) is believed to have a 
disciplining effect on the players (Figure 10).  
The situation is different in the Battle of Sexes and the Hero Game. Here the Qualified 
Parteo Optimum (P+) is situated on the outcome of unreciprocated defection (CD) and 
coincides at the same time with the Nash Equilibrium (N). That makes lasting cooperation 
more difficult. More effort (for example in terms of diplomatic design) is required to keep 
the players on a cooperative course. And once one of the bargaining actors chooses to 
defect, the parallelism of the Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+) and the Nash Equilibrium (N) 
makes it very difficult to reestablish joint cooperation Figure 10). The players would 
hesitate to depart from this situation since it is collectively attractive (P+) and since they 
would render themselves worse off by such a step due to the Nash Equilibrium (N).  
                                                                             
swerved at the same time, the test of courage ends undecided. However, if neither of two teenagers was 
swerving, the consequences were dire as both drivers end in a head-on collision which might be fatal 
(Russell 1959: 30; Goldstein 2010: 136-7) (By the way: in the James Dean movie “Rebel without a 
Cause“ the two beatniks do not drive their cars at each other but towards a cliff. In that sense, it is not an 
example of an Aversion Game).  
CHICKEN GAME HERO 
cooperate [C] defection [D] cooperate [C] defection [D]
cooperate [C] 3,3 E+,M,P+ 2,4 N,P cooperate [C] 2,2 E,M 4,3 N,P+
defection [D] 4,2 N,P 1,1 E defection [D] 3,4 N,P+ 1,1 E
BATTEL OF SEXES 
cooperate [C] defection [D]
cooperate [C] 2,2 E,M 3,4 N,P+
defection [D] 4,3 N,P+ 1,1 E
ASYMMETRIC BATTEL OF SEXES 
cooperate [C] defection [D]
cooperate [C] 2,3 M,P 3,4 N,P+
defection [D] 4,2 N,P 1,1 E
Player B 
Player A 
Game No. 66 in Rapoport & Guyer (1966) 2x2 Games Taxonomy 
Players' hiearchy of preference:    DC > CC > CD > DD
Player B 
Player A 
Players' hiearchy of preference:  CD > DC > CC > DD  
Game No. 69 in Rapoport & Guyer (1966) 2x2 Games Taxonomy 
Player B 
Player A 
Players' hiearchy of preference:   DC > CD > CC > DD 
Game No. 68 in Rapoport & Guyer (1966) 2x2 Games Taxonomy 
Player B 
Player A 
Player A's hiearchy of preference:   DC >  CD > CC > DD 
Game No. 67 in Rapoport & Guyer (1966) 2x2 Games Taxonomy 
Player B's hiearchy of preference:   DC >  CC > CD > DD 
LEGEND: 
C Coopeation 
D Defection 
E Equal Distribution 
E+ Egalitarian Optimum 
M MaxiMin Solution 
N Nash Equilibrium 
P Pareto Efficiency
P+ Qualified Pareto Optimum 
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Rambo Games represent another distinct group of dilemma games (Figure 11).161 Rambo 
Games were for example used to describe the conflict on inner-German river pollution 
during the Cold War era (Efinger & Zürn 1989; Zürn 1992: 211-2) or the First Morocco Crisis 
(Snyder & Diesing 1977: 107-118). The difference to the group of Aversion Games is 
relatively obvious. Rambo Games are marked by an asymmetric strategic structure 
indicated by a single Nash Equilibrium (N) that coincides with the outcome of unilateral 
defection (DC). One side – the Rambo player – is able to realize its maximal utility gains by 
defection while its counterpart is cooperating in order to avoid the outcome of mutual 
defection (DD) (Dombrowsky 2007: 149-50; Martin 1993: 103-6; Zürn 1992: 209-220).  
Figure 11: Rambo Games 
 
Again, the explanatory power of the dilemma game approach becomes obvious by the 
variations we could pinpoint even within this group of very similar games. For example, in 
almost all Rambo Games, the distrust trap, indicated by the Maximin Solution (M), 
coincides with the outcome that is favoring the Rambo player (Figure 11). The Suasion 
Game, however, is different. In that strategic constellation, the Maximin solution lies on the 
outcome of joint cooperation (CC). Unlike all other sub-categories of Rambo Games, there 
is no distrust trap in the Suasion Game but only a colliding interest trap. This particularity 
has implications for the resolution strategy. Distrust is normally thought to be 
counterproductive to bargaining dynamics. In the Suasion Game, a certain level of suspicion 
is instead conducive for resolving the colliding interest trap since it makes the players more 
inclined to choose joint cooperation (CC). In essence, in the Suasion Game, one could 
“outdo” the desire for egoistic utility maximization by the actors’ unilateral quest for 
precaution measures against the worst-case-scenario and thereby create a situation that is 
encouraging joint cooperation. Obviously, if we would apply this strategy to any other types 
                            
161
 Note that the concept of Rambo Games was originally introduced by Michael Zürn (1992).  
"ORIGINAL" RAMBO GAME CALLED BLUFF GAME 
cooperate [C] defection [D] cooperate [C] defection [D]
cooperate [C] 4,2 P+ 2,4 M,N,P+ cooperate [C] 3,3 E+,P+ 2,4 M,N,P
defection [D] 3,1 1,3 defection [D] 4,1 P 1,2
BIG BULLY GAME SUASION GAME 
cooperate [C] defection [D] cooperate [C] defection [D]
cooperate [C] 3,2 P+ 2,3 M,N,P+ cooperate [C] 4,3 M, P+ 3,4  N,P+
defection [D] 4,1 P 1,4 P defection [D] 2,2 E 1,1 E
BULLY GAME 
cooperate [C] defection [D]
cooperate [C] 3,2 P 2,4  M,N,P+
defection [D] 4,1  P 1,3 
Rambo Player 
Non-
Rambo 
Player
Rambo Player 
Non-
Rambo 
Player
Rambo player's hiearchy of preference:   DC > CC > CD > DD 
Non-Rambo player's hiearchy of preference:   CC > CD > DC > DD 
Rambo player's hiearchy of preference:   DC > CC > DD > CD 
Non-Rambo player's hiearchy of preference:   DC > CC > CD > DD 
Rambo Player 
Non-
Rambo 
Player
Rambo player's hiearchy of preference:   DD > DC > CC > CD 
Non-Rambo player's hiearchy of preference:  DC > CC > CD > DD 
Rambo Player 
Non-
Rambo 
Player
Rambo player's hiearchy of preference:   DC > DD > CC > CD 
Non-Rambo player's hiearchy of preference:   DC > CC > CD > DD 
Rambo Player 
Non-
Rambo 
Player
Non-Rambo player's hiearchy of preference:   CC > DC > CD > DD 
Rambo player's hiearchy of preference:   DC > DD > CC > CD 
LEGEND: 
C Coopeation 
D Defection 
E Equal Distribution 
E+ Egalitarian Optimum 
M MaxiMin Solution 
N Nash Equilibrium 
P Pareto Efficiency
P+ Qualified Pareto Optimum 
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of Rambo game, (for example, if we mistake the Called Bluff Game with the Suasion Game), 
the outcome would be counterproductive.  
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3.2 How the Fit Taxonomy Operates  
In the light of the different “ingredients” we have introduced, the reader might have gained 
the false impression that our fit taxonomy is relatively complex. In order to show that this is 
not the case, we will briefly apply our concept to two fictitious negotiation problems: the 
substantial problem of fare dodging (ch. 3.2.1) and the procedural problem of the PD game 
(ch. 3.2.2). With the help of these two examples, we will show how the fit taxonomy 
operates – how it is applied to analyze the nature of a given problem, how it identifies the 
“optimal problem solution”, and how it allows us to study the “fit performance” of 
diplomatic design elements and alternative explanations.   
3.2.1. Substantial Problem Dimension: The Example of the Fare 
Dodging Bad 
As we already explained above, fare dodging is a public bad which is produced by the 
summation technology. Regardless of who is free riding (a rich uptown kid or a poor 
teenager from a deprived inner-city neighborhood), every unpaid ride on the tube is 
increasing the problem to an equal degree. Likewise, it is insignificant whether the 
“negative externalities” are caused by a rather small group of fare-dodgers who free-ride 
intensively or by a rather large group that only occasionally chooses to jump the turnstile. 
In addition, fare dodging is a public bad that has neither cross-sectoral nor cross-territorial 
implications. Fare dodging is imposing “negative externalities” to the public transport 
company and to all passengers who buy regular tickets. But apart from these negative 
implications, the harmful externalities of fare dodging are relatively limited. Unlike rowdies 
and mockers – two other types of bad doers in public transportation – fare dodgers are not 
necessarily unpleasant fellow passengers. Once on the tube, the only thing that 
distinguishes them from the average commuters is the absence of the ticket.  
When assuming the fictitious constellation that the fare-dodgers and the traffic association 
would negotiate with each other in order to overcome the problem of free riding, we could 
demonstrate the performance of the public bad approach.  
Free-riders and the traffic association are interwoven in a negative reciprocity. While fare 
dodging is causing “negative externalities”, the counter-measures taken by the traffic 
company are undermining the free-rider’s ability to maximize their utilities. As a 
consequence, neither the fare-dodgers could realize their final goods (i.e. affordable 
transportation) nor is the traffic company able to achieve its desires (efficient provision of 
public transportation).  
Against that background, the essential question is: what is “optimal problem solution”? 
What do the required diplomatic design elements have to fulfill in order to arrive at a 
sustainable resolution of fare dodging?  
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Of course, to fend off the “negative externalities” emerging from fare-dodging, the traffic 
company could rely on self-help and apply non-diplomatic interventions. Common 
strategies in that regard are, for example, an intensified deployment of ticket inspectors or 
improved technical measures to avoid tree cross jumping at the entrance of metro stations. 
Both measures intervene directly into the course of the fare-dodgers’ actions since they 
either caught them in the act (more ticket inspectors) or physically stop them from entering 
into the system (more sophisticated tree-crosses) (Figure 12). However, these non-
diplomatic interventions are expensive and annoy ordinary passengers who have bought 
regular tickets. Most importantly, however, more ticket inspectors and more sophisticated 
entrance controls are unlikely to systematically change the fare-dodger’s intention to free-
ride. Some fare dodgers might be deterred by these measures. Others are likely to continue 
their delinquent behavior and will try to circumvent and undermine the non-diplomatic 
interventions. Thus, these two non-diplomatic interventions would in our fictitious example 
signify underfits (Figure 12). While both self-help approaches are partly effective, their 
impact is limited because of their inherent inefficiency. Increasing the impact of these two 
non-diplomatic instruments would require a prohibitive high investment of resources. If the 
traffic association would have unlimited means, it could, for example, deploy swarms of 
ticket inspectors and thereby achieve a lasting resolution of the fare dodging problem. But 
since the funds of public traffic association are normally restricted, the effectiveness of 
these tools remains limited due to the inefficiency of these tools.162  
Since individual self-help is not a suitable approach, we assume that in our fictitious 
examples the fare-dodgers and the traffic company engage in a bargaining process in order 
to achieve a diplomatic solution. Applying our fit taxonomy, we could think about a series 
of potentially well-fitting design elements that would resolve the negotiation issue that 
both sides are facing.  
To address the colliding interest trap, the first central requirement is to render the public 
bad of fare dodging harmless. The bad sufferers (i.e. the traffic association and its clients) 
have to be “liberated” from the costs the free riders inflict on them. In order to make the 
fare-dodgers abandon their delinquent habit, the traffic association could, for example, 
apply during the bargaining process a coercive strategy. To implement this strategy, the 
traffic company could orchestrate a media campaign against fare-dodging highlighting the 
negative implications of free-riding to regular passengers. But since riding the tube without 
a ticket represents a public bad that is produced by summation technology, this strategy 
has its limits and signifies only a partial fit. The group of fare dodgers is simply too large and 
amorphous. And while such a media campaign might have positive implications on the 
calculation of a certain proportion of free-riders, others are likely to remain unmoved. 
                            
162
 Raising ticket prices is another self-help instrument traffic associations often apply to cushion the 
revenue losses caused by fare dodging (Figure 12). In that case, the burdens of the “negative externalities” 
are shared among all passengers. But this non-diplomatic intervention is only temporarily curing the 
symptoms of fare-dodging. In terms of an effective and efficient problem resolution, raising regular ticket 
prices even represents a negative fit. Higher fares are changing in the opportunity set of the fare dodgers. 
Free-riding becomes even more attractive compared to buying a regular ticket. Rising ticket prices is not 
only failing to fight fare dodging, it is over time even increasing the problem.  
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Moreover, the impact of a temporal media campaign is assumed to fall apart after a certain 
time and has little effect on the next generation of fare-dodgers (Figure 12). Increasing the 
fines for fare-dodging would, for example, represent a more promising coercive strategy 
and would represent in terms of the requirement of the “liberation strategy” a fit. It builds 
on a deterrent effect and is likely to be more stable over time in light of new generations of 
free-riders.  
Figure 12: Varieties of (Mis)Fit in the Diplomatic Effort to Resolve the Fare-Dodging Bad 
 
But, regardless of what diplomatic design element the public traffic company would apply, 
rendering the public bad of fare dodging harmless would always signify only one side of the 
coin. In addition to the “liberation” strategy, a sustainable resolution of the colliding 
interest trap would always require the provision of an appropriate substitute – a diplomatic 
intervention that is compensating the bad doers in a way that allows a restoration of their 
“fabrication chain”.  
The application of coercive diplomacy tools – be it by raising fines or by media campaign – 
is likely to change the calculation of the fare-dodgers. But the underlying problem, that the 
free-riders are searching for affordable transportation, would nevertheless remain 
unresolved. If the fare-dodgers give up their delinquent behavior and receive no suitable 
substitute that is in line with that desire, no diplomatic resolution for this public bad will be 
stable or sustainable.  
Substitution could, for example, be provided in the form of empowerment (Figure 12). That 
is when the traffic association is helping the fare-dodger to achieve through alternative 
means their desire of affordable public transportation system – such as helping to build ride 
sharing initiatives, providing support for improved cycle paths, or an affordable bicycle 
purchasing program for former free-riders. However, such a strategy would signify an 
underfit. The relatively high costs for such interventions are likely to undermine their 
effectiveness. Moreover, empowerment for alternative forms of transportation implies the 
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danger that the traffic company is funding concepts that could in medium-terms grow into 
a meaningful competition to its own business model. When this strategy becomes 
successful and – for example – cycling is regarded as an attractive alternative to tube riding, 
the traffic company has undermined its one economic success.  
In that light a “free ticket program” would signify a more promising alternative. All tax 
payers of the communities that the traffic company is serving would be committed to buy a 
monthly tube ticket. This rule would apply to all tax payers regardless of whether they are 
fare dodgers, regular passengers, or residents that had relied thus far on private 
transportation. Since costs for functioning public transportation are now spread to a 
relatively large group of clients, the ticket prices could be reduced considerably. In essence 
the ride on the tube becomes itself a collective good. Moreover, the negotiation proposal 
of a “free ticket program” would signify a multiple fit (Figure 12). On the one hand, it would 
render fare dodging senseless, eliminate the public bad, and thereby implement the 
“liberation strategy”. On the other hand, it would represent an appropriate substitute 
which is perfectly in line with the final good of the fare dodgers’ “fabrication chain” since it 
would fulfill their cherished desire for affordable transportation. Consequently, the public 
transportation agency and the free-riders would arrive at a Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+) 
signifying the resolution of the colliding interests trap.  
However, the colliding interest trap resolved, the negotiation between the fare-dodgers 
and the traffic association in our fictitious example would still be plagued by an injustice 
trap. By the “free ticket program”, both sides are gaining. But, there is solid ground to 
assume that the traffic association is gaining more since it shakes off the problem of fare 
dodging and gains at the same time a large proportion of new clients (former free-riders 
and consumers that have used in the past their private vehicle.  
The former free-riders, instead, are only marginally improving their position. The free fare 
ticket would brink only a minimum improvement in comparison to the occasional fines fare-
dodgers had to pay when caught by ticket inspectors. It is likely that the fare dodgers 
regard at the beginning this imbalance as unproblematic and negligible. However, over 
time, it is likely that this biased distribution of gains might start to disturb them and is 
causing grievance and frustration. Despite having managed to resolve the colliding interest 
trap, both sides are entangled in in an injustice trap.  
In order to address this problem, the two sides could, for example, negotiate a single 
installment the traffic company is paying to the former fare dodgers – for example 
providing the first monthly ticket without charge. Such a step could resolve the unequal 
distribution of gains. When done in a way that off-sets the biased distribution of gains, such 
an initiative would represent a fit since it allows for both sides to arrive at the state of the 
Egalitarian Optimum (E+) (Figure 12).  
Obviously, what this fictitious example is not covering are the various procedural problems 
that are likely to arise during the bargaining dynamic. In order to show how the fit 
taxonomy is operating with regard to the procedural problem dimension, we will discuss in 
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the following section potential negotiation strategies to resolve the often discussed PD 
metaphor. 
3.2.2 Procedural Problem Dimension: The PD Game Metaphor 
Let’s assume the Prisoners’ Dilemma, which we have already illustrated at various 
occasions in our doctoral thesis, would represent a negotiation situation.163 The two 
suspects would face two challenges: a colliding interest and a distrust trap. As we have 
already outlined above, these two traps coincide with the outcome of mutual defection 
(DD) and are technically defined by the Nash Equilibrium (N) and the Maximin Solution (M) 
(Figure 8). The presence of a double trap makes the Prisoners’ Dilemma a relatively difficult 
procedural negotiation problem. A well designed diplomatic intervention is needed to make 
the two suspects overcome the Nash Equilibrium and the Maximin Solution and move than 
towards joint cooperation (CC) – the state which would resolve the colliding interest and 
distrust trap.  
Figure 13: Varieties of (Mis)Fit in the Diplomatic Effort to Resolve the Prisoners’ Dilemma  
 
It is a typical feature of procedural negotiation problems and a clear distinction from the 
substantial problem dimension that the “fit demand” is procedural too. As we will see in 
particular in our “single hard case study” on Libya’s NRN, procedural negotiation problems 
are normally not overcome in a single shot but are resolved step by step in a bargaining 
process which is running through different stages – a so called “strategic cascade”.  
In order to highlight the multi-stage nature of procedural problems, we differentiate the 
fictitious negotiation process of the PD metaphor in (1) a preventive situation (i.e. the 
phase before the suspects have stepped into the distrust and the colliding interest trap) and 
                            
163
 Obviously, describing the PD Game as a negotiation situation is a deviation from the original metaphor 
where one of the premises was that the two suspects have no possibility to communicate with each other.  
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(2) a reactive phase (where the two prisoners have become entangled in the double social 
trap) (Figure 13).  
 (1) Preventive Situation: In a preventive situation, the goal is to avoid that the bargaining 
parties step into the two social traps that are inherent to the PD Game. In the preventive 
situations, the players have not yet experienced the deadlock outcome (DD). Both prisoners 
are therefore assumed to indulge the hope that they can achieve their individual optimum.  
To avoid that the colliding interest trap “snaps shut” due to both side’s quest for egoist 
utility maximization, the “optimal problem solution” requires a meaningful “manipulation” 
of the two suspects’ intentions (Figure 13). In the preventive situation, it is insignificant 
whether the requirement of “interest manipulation” is implemented by positive or negative 
sanctions. What, however, is important is that diplomatic interventions are applied with a 
sufficient magnitude. Assuming rationality, the two prisoners are only expected to bridle 
their inclination for unilateral defection if the manipulation applied to them is 
compensating the difference between their best option (unilateral defection/collision of 
interests) and their second best outcome (joint cooperation/resolution of the colliding 
interest trap).  
Let’s assume the local mafia boss want both suspects to remain silent and not cooperate 
with the police. She could, for example, offer both suspects a reimbursement of the sum 
equivalent to the average value of stolen goods they would normally rob within the period 
of one year. Such an overture would represent a well-matching design element that is likely 
to manipulate the two suspects’ intention in favor of joint cooperation and would signify a 
fit (Figure 13). This rewarding strategy would compensate for the “income losses” both 
prisoners face when choosing cooperation instead of individual confession. The one-year-
equivalent reward renders joint cooperation (remain silent, one year prison) into an 
attractive outcome in comparison to the option of unilateral confession (confess, set 
free).164 The criminals are making profit while serving a one year sentence for a minor crime 
(such as illegal possession of hand guns).165 
Besides the colliding interest trap, the PD Game is also marked by a distrust trap. As soon as 
both sides start to doubt the sincerity of their counterpart and begin to think in terms of 
the worst-case scenario, the PD Game will quickly slip into the deadlock situations of 
mutual defection (DD) since the two prisoners are likely to apply the Maximin solution (M) 
in order to “hedge their bets”. In such a situation, even a perfectly fitting reimbursement 
could not prevent the two prisoners from embarking on an uncooperative course. After all 
a 1-year reward is looking pale if one is weighing the scenario of a 10 year prison sentence – 
the outcome the individual prisoners could face if the worst case scenario materializes.  
                            
164
 However, the situation becomes more complicated if the reimbursement offer is insufficient and not 
equivalent to the losses of one year “robbery income”. In such a situation, the rewarding strategy would 
signify an underfit. The intervention would fail to achieve a major impact because it would be 
inappropriate in quantitative terms (Figure 13). 
165
 An information campaign highlighting to the two suspects that their high expectations of unilateral 
self-help are unlikely to materialize but instead lead to five years imprisonment would signify an 
alternative and less costly design element the local mafia boss could possibly apply to manipulate the 
interest of the two prisoners (Figure 13).  
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In order to avoid that both players recur to the Maximin Solution, “distrust reduction” 
represents another crucial part of the “optimal problem solution”. Systematically reviewing 
each other’s “trustworthiness” might be a suitable design element in light of this particular 
requirement. Given that the two prisoners had been criminal comrades before they were 
caught by the police, they could analyze their past cooperation for indicators of the other 
side’s (dis)honesty and (un)sincerity. However, such a review would only signify a fit 
suitable to avoid the Maximin strategy, if there is solid evidence of the other’s 
trustworthiness and if the analysis of the past experience provides sufficient confidence to 
stand up against the scenario of a 10 year prison sentence (Figure 13). 
(2) Reactive Situation: The “optimal problem solution” and the demand of diplomatic 
design elements are changing if we assume that the PD Game is moving from a preventive 
into a reactive situation. In that state the two prisoners have stepped either into the 
colliding interest or the distrust trap and have become entangled in the unpleasant 
deadlock situation (DD). Both prisoners have made the sour experience that unilateral self-
help has not lead to the desired outcome. As soon the traps have snapped shut and the two 
sides are confronted with the outlook of spending five years in prison, the option of joint 
cooperation (CC) and serving only a one-year sentence becomes attractive and desirable. 
Given this new strategic constellation, the demand for well matching design elements is 
changing too.  
In the reactive phase of the PD game, the need for interest manipulation is disappearing. 
“No interest manipulation” represents instead the “optimal solution strategy” (Figure 13). 
In such a situation, negative or positive sanctions would, for example, signify a partial fit. 
The attempt to drive the two prisoners towards joint cooperation – either by coercion or 
rewards – would represent an inefficient effort since both suspects are already inclined to 
choose joint cooperation. The real problem is instead constituted by the fact that both 
players hesitate to depart from the deadlock situation fearing that they would be worse off 
by this step and would face, in the end, a situation where they had to spend even 10 years 
in prison. Positive or negative sanctions press the two prisoners to take quick decisions and, 
therefore, are in actual bargaining dynamic of little practical help.  
Iteration of the game is in light of the preventive situation a less intrusive but in the end 
more promising approach. When the prisoners continue to experience the colliding interest 
trap, the desire for joint cooperation is likely to increase for both of them. This “wait and 
see strategy” is in particular attractive due to its low-cost nature (Figure 13). 
But the two suspects of the PD Game are unlikely to depart from the deadlock situation 
even if there is a well-matching solution for the colliding interest trap. What is required in 
addition is a resolution of the distrust trap. Unlike the colliding interest trap, the experience 
of the deadlock situation is, in terms of trust, not increasing the prisoners’ inclination for 
joint cooperation. Rather, by mutual defection, both suspects have experienced that the 
worst-case scenario is not just an abstract situation but an outcome that could easily 
become reality. While the requirement of interest manipulation is reducing when the PD 
Game is moving from the preventive into the reactive stage, the demand for distrust 
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reduction is rather increasing. Consequently, more intrusive and sophisticated diplomatic 
design is required to overcome suspicion and the embroilment in the Maximin strategy.  
A joint statement in front of the public investigator in which both prisoners annul their 
confession of the committed crime would, for example, signify a well-fitting design element 
in terms of distrust reduction (Figure 13). With such a joint statement, both suspects could 
be relatively certain that the other side is not cheating. Moreover, a joint statement would 
signify a very credible commitment for joint cooperation.  
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3.3 The Genesis of the Fit Taxonomy: An IBE 
Selection Process 
The fit taxonomy is the outcome of a strict application of an IBE selection process which we 
have described in general terms in the previous chapter (ch. 2.5.4; see in particular figure 
6). The starting point – the so-called “IBE-trigger” (E) – was the demand to develop an 
analytical scheme that allows to evaluate the “fit performance” of diplomatic design based 
on the assumption that negotiation problems are constituted by social traps (Figure 14). 
The search for the different components representing the “best contributions” to our fit 
taxonomy was divided in three consecutive steps. Each of these steps was bound to a set of 
premises (P1 - P3) which further specified the IBE-trigger and thereby signified the “starting 
fact” for each selection process. In each of these three selection steps, we identified a set 
of potential hypotheses (H1…Hn) from which we then selected the actual hypothesis (Hg) 
based on the three IBE quality criteria breadth, depth and coherence. In each of these three 
steps, the actual hypothesis (Hg) signified the “best contribution” to our fit taxonomy. In 
that sense, the fit taxonomy was step by step enriched by “ingredients” resulting from the 
different selection cycles (Figure 14). 
When we explained in the Setup chapter, the IBE in general terms, we made it clear that 
the handling of the background knowledge (W) is important for the proper application of 
this epistemological concept (Ch. 2.5.4). In order to assure that the IBE approach could fully 
unfold its analytical and innovative potentials, it is important, we said, to apply two criteria 
in parallel: relevance and exoticism. We explained that relevance without exoticism could 
give rise to boring repetition of past findings which are already regarded as conventional 
wisdom. Whereas exoticism without relevance might lead to conclusions that appear as 
innovative at first sight but signify in essence odd absurdities.  
We implemented the parallelism of relevance and exoticism in our IBE selection process. 
Apart from the conventional academic research on negotiation problems, we also took the 
non-scientific “practitioners’ literature” on bargaining dynamics into consideration – among 
them bestselling books such as Roger Fisher’s and William Ury’s “Getting to Yes” (2011) or 
David Lax’s and James Sebenius’s concept of “3-D Negotiation” (2006). By applying the 
criteria relevance and exorcism in parallel, we received a relatively broad and, at the same 
time, unconventional pool of background knowledge (W). The set of potential hypotheses 
(H1…Hn) we selected is therefore assumed to reflect a very reliable and sound 
representation of social reality.  
But despite these two criteria applied to systematize and streamline the selection process 
of the background knowledge (W), the development of the fit taxonomy was still an 
exhaustive endeavor. Since negotiations are a very common social practice in international 
affairs (and beyond), we encounter descriptions of bargaining problems in many disciplines 
and academic fields (e.g. history, economics, management, mathematics, social psychology, 
etc.; Jönsson 2002: 217). Tellingly, already in the late 1980s, bibliographies on international 
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negotiations contained more than 5,000 entries (Lakos 1989). Consequently, the amount of 
literature that had to be taken into consideration when applying IBE reasoning in 
negotiation research is extensive and amorphous. The effort to build a fit taxonomy in that 
particular field becomes even more complex given the fact that interdisciplinary discourse 
is rather infrequent in negotiation research. Despite several attempts to unify the different 
sub-disciplines,166 expert discussions and debates often take place in separated forums and 
circles. According to James Odell, the research on international negotiations is still divided 
“into vigorous networks that still operate largely independently of one another, like 
communities on different islands” (Odell 2013: 379).167  
In light of these challenges, we would have preferred “turn-key-ready” analytical templates 
on negotiation problems. At first sight, the chance to use pre-existing approaches looks 
good since we saw in recent years a growing interest in studying negotiation problems. 
While the negotiation problems were neglected by the literature in the past, the picture 
has changed during the last decade. Numerous scholars have addressed the scope and 
nature of problems in bargaining dynamics using different labels – such as “deadlocks” 
(Faure 2005; Narlikar 2010), “failures” (Faure 2012; Kleiboer 1996), “impasses” (Spector 
1995), “barriers” (Arrow et.al. 1995), “intractabilities” (Burgess & Burgess 2003; Crocker 
et.al. 2004; Lewicki, Gray & Elliott 2002), “stalemates” (Ekwuachi-Ford 2009; Zartman  
2000) or “escalations” (Kriesberg 2003; Zartman & Faure 2005).  
However, most of these approaches are, unfortunately, not relevant for our fit taxonomy. 
In the Setup chapter we said that fit taxonomies need to be exhaustive, detailed, and 
coherent at the same time in order to avoid falling prey to analytical pitfalls – such as false 
causality, multi-finality or equi-finality (ch. 2.4.3). Most of these past approaches, however, 
do not meet these requirements. Often they signify a series of individual studies on 
negotiation problems loosely bound together in collective volumes without a common 
analytical framework that would allow for higher levels of abstraction (e.g. Arrow et al. 
1995; Lewickie et al. 2002; Crocker et.al. 2004). Moreover, the focus of the past research 
was in most cases either limited to a particular sub-type of international negotiations (for 
example to environmental negotiation) or a specific class of negotiation problems (for 
example to deadlocks) (e.g. Narlikar 2010; Faure 2005). Consequently we had “to bite the 
bullet” and develop our fit taxonomy from scratch in three distinct selection cycles, which 
we will outline in detail in the following section.  
 
                            
166
 See for example the Harvard University based Program on Negotiation Studies (PONS) or the 
Laxenburg (outside of Vienna) based project on Processes on International Negotiation (PIN).  
167
 In addition, research on international negotiations is marked by a relatively strong taste for middle 
ground theories, case studies, experiments of micro-process (Odel 2013: 380). Larger theoretical debates 
and broader paradigms that were heavily discussed in IR in general (see “war on ism”) and which could 
have had a systematizing effects on the research on international negotiations, had only a minor impact 
on the field (e.g. Gilady & Russett 2002: 394).  
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3.3.1 A General Template to Negotiation Problems (P1): The 
Substantive and Procedural Problem Dimension 
 
We begin our IBE selection process by compiling a set of potential hypotheses for the 
starting fact P1. It is our intention to identify a general approach that allows exhaustive, 
coherent, and detailed coverage of negotiation problems. If we “rummage through” the 
relevant and exotic background knowledge on trans- and international negotiations (W), we 
encounter four general templates that allow a broad conceptualization of negotiation 
problems: the bargaining & problem solution approach (H1.1), the communicative 
approach (H1.2), the approach of value-claiming & value-creating bargaining (H1.3), and 
the concept of the substantial & procedural dimensions of negotiation problems (H1.4) 
(Figure 14). However, if we apply the IBE selection based on our three quality criteria 
(breath, depth, and coherence), we found that only the substantial & procedural problem 
dimensions signify the best contribution to our fit taxonomy (Hg). It is the approach that is 
the most relevant among the set of potential hypotheses.  
3.3.1.1 Set of Potential Hypotheses (H1.1 - H1.4)  
 
H1.1 Bargaining & Problem Solution: The first approach we take into consideration as a 
potential typology for a general conceptualization of negotiation problems is the distinction 
between “bargaining” and “problem solving”. According to Fritz Scharpf, “bargaining” is 
based on individual self-interest and regulates social behavior by resorting to incentives. 
“Problem solving” instead represents a regulation that is based on common or solidarity 
values and on the “collective sanctions” of ostracism and exclusion (Scharpf 1988: 258-9; 
see also Richardson 1982). Elgström and Jönsson second this view by saying that the 
difference between bargaining and problem solution signifies in essence the distinction 
between self-interest versus common interest (Elgström & Jönsson 2000: 685). According 
to Terrence Hopmann, the theory on international negotiations has developed for centuries 
around these two distinct paradigms (Hopmann 1995; Hopmann 1996: Ch. 6; see also 
Wagner 2008).168  
H1.2: The Communicative Approach: Another approach that likewise provides a general 
conceptualization of negotiation problems is the so called “communicative approach” (e.g. 
Hampson, Crocker & Pamela 2007: 40-2; Jönsson 1990; Putnam & Jones 1982). Language 
and communication is one of the most essential elements of negotiation. As Fisher and Ury 
have put it “without communication there is no negotiation” (Fisher & Ury 2011: 35). And, 
according to Janice Stein, negotiation is in essence synonymous with communication (Stein 
1988: 222). Consequently, the “communicative approach” provides a broad general 
concept for the analysis of negotiation problems. Some scholars have, for example, studied 
how diplomatic processes are affected by misunderstandings or how the desire to 
communicate in bargaining dynamics merely to impress the own constituency constitute 
negotiation problems (e.g. Fisher & Ury 2011: 35). Others have focused on the problematic 
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 For an exemplary application of this approach in the “practitioners’ knowledge” on international 
negotiation see Zartman & Berman 1982.  
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impact of conflict semantic understandings of negotiating parties. For example, in the 
literature we encounter studies that attribute deadlocks and impasses to contradictory 
definitions of basic diplomatic concepts such as “concession”, “trust”, or “peace”. These 
scholars say that successful bargaining solutions require in essence meta-negotiations in 
which parties jointly develop common understandings about these basic concepts (e.g 
Cohen 2000; Weinhard 2013). And again, other scholars have studied how the 
communicative framing of issues, actors, and strategies affect international negotiating 
process and outcomes (e.g. Carnevale 2008; Dewulf, et.al. 2009).169  
H1.3 Value-Claiming & Value-Creating Bargaining: Another concept, which is very similar 
to the approach of bargaining and problem solving, is the idea of value-claiming and value-
creating bargaining (also known as distributive and integrative bargaining). Originally 
introduced by the seminal work of Richard Walt and Robert McKersie on labor-
management negotiations (Walton & McKersie 1965), this analytical scheme was 
intensively used in the literature on international negotiations (e.g. Carnevale & Edward 
1986; Da Conceição-Heldt 2006; Kirkey 1995; Lax & Sebenius 1992; Odell 2013: 381). While 
value-claiming bargaining describes a zero-sum negotiation mode where the involved 
parties try to maximize their share of limited resources, value-creating bargaining signifies 
a win-win-situation where the gains for all negotiating parties are jointly increased 
(Spangler 2003).  
H1.4: Substantial & Procedural Problem Dimension: Another general concept to grasp the 
fundamental nature of negotiation problems is the distinction between the substantial and 
procedural problem dimension, which we have described in detail above (ch. 3.1.1). This 
concept lies at the very heart of negotiation and is closely intertwined with the general 
nature of bargaining dynamics. We encounter the distinction between the substantial and 
procedural problem dimension at numerous occasions in the background knowledge of 
trans- and international negotiations – both in the academic and in the practitioners’ 
sphere.170 The idea of substantial and procedural negotiation problems is for example 
central to Fred Iklé’s seminal book “How Nations Negotiate”. The major objective of his 
writing was to show how the process of negotiation (i.e. the procedural problems) related 
to the outcome of the negotiation process (i.e. the resolution of substantial negotiation 
problem) (Iklé 1964: 2). But the idea of substantial and procedural negotiation problem is 
also crucial to the study of Walton and McKerise (1965). Walt and McKersie emphasize that 
the various obstacles and stakes negotiating parties face in bargaining dynamics are best 
                            
169
 The “communicative action” and the logic of persuasion which we have discussed above in detail (Ch. 
2.5.1) could be also listed as a part of the broader “communicative approach”.  
170
 For a good example that the concept of substantial and procedural problem dimension played also an 
important role for the thinking of “negotiating practitioners” see David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius’ 
concept of 3-D negotiations (2006). But this idea is also central to Roger Fisher’s and William Ury’s classic 
book “Getting to Yes” (2011). Following the logic of this two-fold structure, Fisher and Ury have suggested 
that negotiation problems are best resolved when the conflicting parties manage to “disentangle the 
relationship from the substance” (Fisher & Ury 2011: 23-4).  
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conceptualized by distinguishing them into a substantive and behavioral dimension (Walton 
and McKerise 1965: 304).171  
Figure 14: the IBE Selection Process 
 
 
                            
171
 In addition, the concept of the substantive and procedural problem dimension is also expressed by the 
distinction between “first-order” and “second-order” problems, which was used for the analysis of 
international institutions (e.g. Keohane 1984: 83; Ostrom 1990: 42-4; Zangl 1994: 282-289; Zürn 1992: 
203, 207). 
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3.3.1.2 IBE Selection for H1.1 - H1.4 
With the help of our three quality criteria (coherence, breath, and death), we will now 
evaluate which of the just introduced potential hypotheses (H1.1 - H1.4) represents the 
“best contribution” (Hg1) to our fit taxonomy (Figure 14). 
(1) Depth: What has come clear already in the description of these approaches is that all 
concepts are bestowed with a sufficient depth. Numerous scholars have – either implicitly 
or explicitly – applied these concepts in the past to analyze problematic bargaining 
dynamics. Even the communicative approach (H1.2), which emerged in the research on 
international negotiations not before the early 1990s, is assumed to have acquired 
considerable depth. While the analysis of international negotiations had been for a long 
time “particularly insensitive to language and communication” (Bell 1988: 233), this field 
has been marked by fast growing literature for more than a decade. 
(2) Breadth: Apart from the communicative approach (H1.2), we come in terms of the 
breadth criterion also to a positive vote. The bargain & problem solution approach (H1.1), 
the concept of value-claiming & value-creating (H1.3), and the approach of substantial & 
procedural problem dimensions (H1.4) are all simple and at the same time unifying. They 
are all marked by a high analytical flexibility and allow studying bargaining dynamics from 
different angles – including their structure, their varying actors’ constellations, their 
behavioral patterns, and their strategic environments. The communicative approach, 
however, falls short in terms of the breadth criterion. While it has ample explanatory power 
for the various aspects for bargaining process, it is relatively weak in the analysis of actual 
outcomes of negotiation dynamics which often have a physical, non-communicative nature 
(e.g. negotiation agreements and the related distribution of losses and gains).  
(3) Coherence: While the communicative approach is insufficient for a general 
conceptualization of negotiation problems with regards to breadth, the bargaining & 
problem solution approach (H1.1) and the concept of value-claiming & value-creating (H1.3) 
fall short in terms of coherence. Both concepts are only partially consistent with the starting 
fact (P1) which requires a general approach that allows exhaustive, coherent, and detailed 
coverage of negotiation problems (Figure 14). The bargaining & problem solution approach 
and the concept of value-claiming & value-creating are suitable to analyze negotiation 
problems. But their major focus is not the problems themselves but their solution. Both 
concepts represent, in the end, resolution strategies that prescribe how to handle 
intractable situations in trans- and international bargaining dynamics. With that they go 
clearly beyond the scope of the fit taxonomy. 
3.3.2 Tangible Concepts of Negotiation Problems: Colliding Interests, 
Distrust, Injustice 
 
After we have revealed that the substantial and procedural dimension (H1.4; Figure 14) is 
the best general template for an exhaustive, coherent, and detailed analysis of negotiation 
problems, we move on to the second cycle of our IBE based selection process. Following 
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the logic of a step-by-step development of the fit taxonomy, what is now required is to 
identify tangible concepts that allow for an analysis of negation problems situated on these 
two dimensions (P2; Figure 14). When we again “rummaged through” the relevant and 
exotic background knowledge (W), we encountered six potential approaches: conflicting 
interests (H2.1), power struggles (H2.2), cultural clashes (H2.3), injustice (H2.4), distrust 
(H2.5), and inadequate or dysfunctional institutional negotiation environments (H2.6). 
While all six approaches had the potential to further specify substantial and procedural 
negotiation problems, we found that only three approaches (conflicting interests (H2.1), 
injustice (H2.4), and distrust (H2.5)) yielded sufficient results in light of the three IBE quality 
criteria we applied. The other approaches were found to be weaker in terms of breadth, 
coherence, and depth and were therefore not taken into consideration.  
3.3.2.1 Set of Potential Hypotheses (H2.1-H2.6) 
H2.1 Conflicting Interests: One of the most influential accounts for negotiation problems is 
certainly interest collision.172 While often not made explicit, the vast majority of scholars 
and practitioners who study bargaining dynamics analyze negotiation problems through the 
lens of interest collision. The idea of interest conflicts is, for example, central to the 
founding classics of negotiation research – such as Thomas Schelling’s “Strategy of Conflict” 
(1960), Anatol Rapoport’s “Fights, Games and Debates” (1960), or Fred C. Iklé’s “How 
Nation Negotiate” (1964). Likewise, many prominent definitions of international 
negotiations build on to the idea of colliding interests. For example, Andrew Moravcsik has 
referred to negotiation as “the process of collective choice through which conflicting 
interests are reconciled” (1993: 497). And according to William Zartman, negotiation is “the 
process of combining conflicting positions into a joint agreement” (Zartman 2009: 322). But 
the idea of interest conflicts is also central to the practitioners’ literature on bargaining 
dynamics (e.g. Malhorta & Bazerman 2007: 221-4). Putting colliding interest at a central 
stage, David Lax and James Sebenius (2006: 8) have, for example, explained that the 
practitioners’ literature on negotiation is in essence structured along a two-fold dimension 
with the novices of win-lose bargaining on the one side (e.g. Camp 2002; Ringer 1974) and 
the followers of the win-win strategy on the other side (e.g. Fisher & Ury 2011; Ury 1991).  
H.2.2 Power Struggles: Power is ubiquitous to the research on international relations 
(Baldwin 2013). It is therefore little astonishing that this category is also relevant for the 
analysis of negotiation problems. According to Wanis-St. John and Dupon, power struggles 
are seen by many as “one of the most ‘powerful’ explanatory variables for negotiations” 
(Wanis-St. John & Chirstophe 2012: 214). Correspondingly, a considerable proportion of the 
background knowledge (W) revolves around power (see in particular Zartman & Rubin 
2000a).173  
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 Interests are in general defined as the “pursuit of personal advantage, be it money, fame, power or 
salvation“(Elster 2007: 78)  
173
 For example, Steinberg (2002) has shown that biased outcomes in negotiations on multilateral trade 
agreements are attributed to power asymmetry. Rothstein (1979) has analyzed how power struggles 
materialize South-North negotiation on economic issues. Haskel (1974) and Dür & Mateo (2010) have 
studied how the power capacities available to negotiating parties affect their bargaining strategies. 
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H.2.3 Cultural Clash: Culture and cultural clashes is another potential hypothesis to further 
specify the procedural but also the substantial problem dimension in challenging bargaining 
dynamics. International negotiations often bring together parties from different cultural 
backgrounds. It is therefore little surprising that past scholars have intensively studied the 
role of culture in diplomatic processes (e.g. Bülow & Kumar 2011; Faure 2003; Faure 2009; 
Faure & Rubin 1993; Gelfand & Dyer 2000).174  
H.2.4 Injustice in the Sense of Distributive Inequality: Apart from power struggles, cultural 
clashes, and interest conflicts, injustice represents another candidate for a tangible concept 
to specify negotiation problems on the substantial and procedural dimension. While 
neglected for a long time (Welch 2014), we saw in recent years growing interest in 
exploring the role of (in)justice in bargaining dynamics (e.g. Albin 2001; Müller & Druckman 
2014; Zartman et.al. 1996; Zartman 1997). Although most scholars have focused on the 
positive contribution of justice to negotiation outcomes, there are also a series of studies 
that have analyzed the negative implications of injustice (e.g. Albin 2009: 583; Müller 2010; 
Odell 2000; Zartman 2009: 326). 
That we encounter in the literature a confusing variety of overlapping concepts is – in all 
probability – owing to the fact that (in)justice represents still a very young object in 
negotiation research. William Zartman and Victor Kremenyuk have, for example, introduced 
the distinction between “forward-looking” (e.g. shaping a future just order) and “backward-
looking justice” (e.g. compensation and restoring past injustice) (Zartman & Kremenyuk 
2005). Based on the approach of “securitization”, originally developed by the so-called 
Copenhagen School (e.g. Buzan, Ole & de Wilde 1998), Harald Müller has recently 
developed the concept of “justisication” in order to analyze discursive struggles on 
conflicting notion of justices in international negotiations (Müller 2011). Cecilia Albin and 
Daniel Druckman have differentiated between “procedural” and “distributive justice” and 
have introduced additional an sub-category to further specify these two dimensions.175  
However, in light of our specific research objective (the Libyan NRN), not all of these 
different concepts signify potential hypotheses. Rather, we claim that “distributive 
                                                                             
Moreover, power and power struggles is also a crucial aspect in the thinking of “practical negotiators”, 
(see e.g. Fisher & Ury 2011: Ch. 9; Malhotra & Bazerman 2007: ch. 11).  
174
 A classic study in that regard is, for example, the analysis by Sir Harold Nicolson who has distinguished 
two principal “negotiation ethics” – shopkeepers and warriors (Nicolson 1969; see also: Zartman & 
Berman 1982: 225). The Cold War gave birth to numerous studies that analyzed the role of cultural 
differences in the negotiation style and tactics between the United States and the Soviet Union or China 
(Dennett & Johnson 1951; Lall 1968; Pye 1992; Sloss & Davis 1986; Smith 1989; Whelan 1983; Young 
1968). Recently, the focus has shifted to the current opponents of the United States – such as Iran or 
North Korea (Bar 2004; Limbert 2009; Snyder 1999). But cultural differences as an obstacle to the 
bargaining process also plays a role in the background knowledge of “negotiation practitioners”. Fisher 
and Ury elaborate, for example, on that aspect in their chapter on “dirty tricks” (Fisher & Ury 2011: 131-
145).  
175
 Procedural justice: fair representation, fair treatment and play, voluntary agreement, and 
transparency. Distributive justice: equality, proportionality, and need (Albin & Druckman 2014; Druckman 
& Albin 2011; see als Deutsch 1975). 
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injustice” in the sense of inequality represents the best potential candidate for the 
selection process on our fit taxonomy.176 
H2.5 Distrust: Distrust is another crucial element of negotiation problems that is often 
discussed among scholars and foreign policy practitioners. As trust is depicted as “one of 
the cardinal underlying characteristics of fruitful negotiation” (Zartman & Berman 1982: 
27),177 it is relatively obvious to assume that distrust is a central hurdle to bargaining 
dynamics. Numerous scholars and practitioners have revealed that there is no negotiation 
process that is free of suspicion. Doubts in the counterpart’s reliability and honesty are 
deeply involved with diplomatic crises. Even negotiating parties who share in general 
friendly relations are at certain points of the bargaining dynamic fearful of cheating. Hence, 
when distrust becomes excessive, it could cause stalemates, deadlock and breakdowns of 
negotiation processes (e.g. Koeszegi 2009; Kydd 2005, Kydd 2012; Hoffmann 2002; 
Hoffmann 2005; Lewicki 2006). In their bestselling book “Negotiation Genius”, the two 
Harvard scholars Malhotra and Bazerman come, for example, to the conclusion that “trust 
is essential in relationships; hence, it is a critical ingredient in negotiation [and] distrust is 
considered to be a major obstacle to negotiation” (Malhotra & Bazerman 2007: 267). 178 
H2.6 Incomplete and Dysfunctional Institutional Environment: The institutionalist view on 
international relations allows another approach to conceptualize negotiation problems. 
Neglected for a long time, we saw, starting by the 1980s, a growing interest in exploring the 
linkage between international institutions and bargaining dynamics (e.g. Young 1989a; 
Young & Osherenko 1993). Negotiations in the context of the European Union were in that 
                            
176
 First, when we discuss injustice in NRN, we focus primarily on the allocation of gains and burdens of 
the involved negotiation parties. “Procedural justice” – the question of participation and recognition – 
plays an important role in multilateral negotiations where many and different negotiation parties take 
place (e.g. state actors, international organizations, and NGOs). But since NRN are first and foremost 
bilateral negotiations, the question of appropriated participation and recognition is, with regard to this 
particular type of bargaining process, by and large irrelevant. Second, among the different concepts of 
distributive justice (e.g. need, proportionality and equality), summarized by Cecilia Albin and Daniel 
Druckman, equality appears to be the most relevant for international bargaining situations – at least this 
finding is suggested by numerous psychological and experimental studies conducted in the past in order 
to explore the social settings that are most appropriated to these three principles of distributive justice 
(Deutsch 1975: 143-7; Mikula 1980: 152-153; Schwinger 1984; see also: Mayer 2006: 183). While need is 
regarded most relevant for “caring-oriented groups” (Deutsch 1975: 147) where the focus is on fostering 
welfare, development, and mutual responsibility, proportionality was found to be particularly relevant in 
social settings that are oriented on an economy productivity and that are associated with professional and 
work life. Obviously these social settings are very distant to the situations we encounter in bargaining 
dynamics on the illegal nuclear weapons programs. The principle of distributive justice that was, however, 
found most akin to the nature of NRN was equality since psychological and experimental studies have 
found that this concept is most relevant in constellations that are about the development and 
maintenance of social relations.  
177
 Jon Elster has described trust as the “lubricant of society“ (2007: 344) and has defined it as a social 
practice where actors “lower one’s guard to refrain from taking precautions against an interaction partner 
even when the other, because of opportunism or incompetence, could act in a way that might seem to 
justify precautions“ (Eslter 2007: 334).  
178
 For example, social psychologists have revealed that negotiation parties who are entangled in severe 
conflicts are particularly inclined to distrust and to biased information processing. In that sense, problem 
solving in negotiations is first and foremost about “freeing the minds” of the involved players and 
establishing open and trustworthy communication (Chaiken et.al. 2000; Ross & Stillinger 1991). Others 
have shown that prevailing distrust hampers the application of a problem-solving negotiation approach 
(Butler 1995, Ross 1996) or encourages the use of coercive tactics (Greenhalgh & Chapman 1998; see also 
Deutsch 1960).  
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regard at the center of attention (e.g. Bjurulf & Elgström 2004; Dür, Mateo & Thomas 2010; 
Jönsson et.al. 1998). Negotiation and international institutions are closely connected. 
Negotiations are crucial for the formation of international institutions. And many 
negotiations in international affairs take place within the context of international 
institutions. Against that background, it appears only logical that an incomplete and 
dysfunctional institutional setting could lead to diplomatic deadlocks and breakdowns. 
While most of the relevant literature is focusing on the positive relationship between 
institutions and negotiations, we find in the background knowledge (W) also reference for a 
problematic connection (e.g. Boyer 2012; Narlikar 2010).179  
3.3.2.2 IBE Selection for H2.1 - H2.6 
We will now assess which of the just introduced potential hypotheses (H2.1 - H2.6) 
represents the best contribution (Hg2) to our search for a tangible concept of negotiation 
problems. In this second cycle of the IBE selection process, interest conflicts (H2.1), 
distributive inequality (H2.4), and distrust (H2.5), achieved the highest scores when 
evaluated with the help of the three quality criteria (coherence, breadth, and depth) (Figure 
14). As we have already explained in chapter 3.1.2, these three “ingredients” have a 
common nature. All three tangible problem concepts signify social traps – a fact that results 
from the particularity of interdependent decision making in international negotiations.  
(1) Coherence: Interest collision (H2.1) and the inadequate institutional environment of 
negotiation dynamics (H2.6) were found to be in particular consistent with the starting fact 
(P2) (Figure 14). These two potential hypotheses have explanatory power and analytical 
relevance for both substantive and procedural negotiation problems. For example, in the 
background knowledge (W) interest collisions (H2.1) are usually described in a two-fold way 
– as an issue that is need to be resolved by the bargaining parties and as a challenge to the 
negotiation process itself (e.g. Zartman 2009). With these two dimensions the hypothesis of 
interest collision signifies a high degree of coherence with the two-dimensional logic of 
substantial and procedural negotiation problems. The same logic applies to potential 
hypothesis of inadequate institutional environments (H2.6). While dysfunctional institutions 
could hamper negotiation dynamics (e.g. Narlikar & Van Houten 2010; Stanford 1992), 
scholars appear to the very well aware that international institutions (or their absence) 
could become themselves a conflict-laden issue that need to be handled in bargaining 
dynamics  (e.g. Young 1989a; Young & Oshrenko 1993). Thus, the potential hypothesis of an 
incomplete and dysfunctional institutional environment is relevant both to the procedural 
and the substantial dimension of negotiation problems.  
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 For example, some scholars have studied the phenomenon of “institutional crowding” – contradicting 
negotiation dynamics caused by overlapping international regimes (Boyer 2012: 226-228; Zartman 2003: 
30). Others have analyzed how the linkage between negotiations on the international level and domestic 
politics could constrain bargaining dynamics (e.g. Evans et.al 1993; Winham 1977: 116-19; Zartman & 
Berman 1982: 207). But we encounter in the literature also studies that analyze how dysfunctional 
features of institutionalized negotiation processes – such as ineffective conference secretariats (Stanford 
1992), inadequate or absent institutional control mechanisms (Narlikar & Van Houten 2010), or unable 
chairpersons and presiding officers (Tallberg 2002; Sjöstedt, Spector & Zartman 1994; Zartman 2003) – 
could hamper the achievement of joint agreements.  
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Power struggle (H2.2), cultural differences (H2.3), and distributive inequality (H2.4) were 
found to be less coherent with the two dimensions of negotiation problems (Figure 14). For 
example, power struggle (H2.2) and cultural differences (H2.3) are described in the 
background knowledge (W) primarily as obstacles to the negotiation process. Although 
there are also studies that identify these two potential hypotheses as negotiation issues 
referring thereby to the substantial dimension,180 both are first and foremost 
conceptualized as hurdles to successful conflict management in bargaining dynamics and 
therefore signify procedural negotiation problems (e.g. Bülow & Kumar 2011; Zartman & 
Rubin 2000a).181  
In a mirror-inverted way, the same assessment applies to distributive inequality (H2.4). As 
we have already explained above, distributive justice is defined by the allocation of gains 
and losses (Druckman & Albin 2011: 1139). Consequently, this potential hypothesis is 
primarily of relevance for the substantial dimension of negotiation problems where the 
issues and the bargaining outcome are at the focus of attention.  
Finally, distrust (H2.5) is the approach that appears to be most biased in terms of two 
dimensions of negotiation problems. Distrust is first and foremost perceived as a feature of 
procedural negotiation problems. In the background knowledge, it is primarily described as 
an operational hurdle when addressing actual negotiation issues (e.g. Lewicki 2006; Chaiken 
et.al. 2000).  
(2) Depth: In the IBE selection process, we found that interest collision (H2.1) and distrust 
(H2.5) are in particular depth. Both potential hypotheses appear to be ubiquitous in the 
background knowledge on negotiation. Either implicitly or explicitly, the majority of 
scholars and practitioners refer to them when describing stalemates, deadlocks, and 
breakdowns in bargaining dynamics. The thinking of negotiation problems appears to 
revolve in many respects around these two essential concepts.  
Injustice in the sense of distributive inequality (H2.), power struggles (H2.2) and inadequate 
institutional settings (H2.6) represent instead potential hypotheses that have in terms of 
depth likewise a relatively good record – although these concepts score lower rates than 
the concepts distrust and the conflict of interests. While the role of (in)justice (H2.4) in 
international negotiations was for a long time neglected, we have seen growing attention in 
recent years (e.g. Albin 2001; Müller & Druckman 2014; Zartman et.al. 1996; Zartman 
1997). The research on power struggles (H2.2) as a barrier for successful negotiations has 
produced a solid stock of literature too (e.g. Fisher & Ury 2011: Ch. 9; Malhotra & Bazerman 
                            
180
 For example, Andrew Gamble has studied how the rise of emerging powers leads in general to 
negotiation deadlocks since the decision making process in international bargaining process becomes 
“crowded” by a larger number of new players who bring along new political views and strategic postures 
(Gamble 2010).  
181
 For example, the most comprehensive study about the role of power in negotiation – Zartman’s and 
Rubin’s “Power and Negotiation” (2000) – is almost exclusively about how power influences the 
bargaining behavior and diplomatic conduct of the parties. The same applies to the cultural-related 
problems to negotiation. The background knowledge on that particular hurdle to diplomatic encounter is 
likewise “operational biased” (e.g. Pye 1992; Sloss & Davis 1986; Smith 1989; Whelan 1983; Young 1968).  
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2007: ch. 11; Zartman & Rubin 2000a; Wanis-St. John & Chirstophe 2012).182 The depth of 
inadequate institutional negotiation environments (H2.6) is limited too.  While the number 
of scholars who focus on the role of institutions in negotiation problems has grown over the 
years (e.g. Boyer 2013; Spector & Zartman 2003), the attention on the problematic nature 
of institutional bargaining settings is still limited. The research is biased in the sense that it 
studies primarily the positive implications of international institutions in bargaining 
dynamics. Moreover, the research is strongly focused on negotiation in the context of the 
European Union which was described as a “multilateral inter-bureaucratic negotiation 
marathon” (Kohler-Koch 1996: 367) or as a “permanent negotiation institute” (Bal 1995: 1). 
Other institutional settings have instead gained far less attention.183 
Cultural conflict (H2.3) represents the potential hypothesis on negotiation problems that 
scores in terms of depth the lowest results (Figure 14). Although the literature on culture 
and cultural related barriers in negotiation process is “voluminous” (Jönsson 2002: 219), a 
more careful look reveals that the findings stemming from these studies is often 
contradictory.184 Moreover, studies on the role of culture and cultural conflict are often 
built on shaky empirical foundations. Comparative studies on the role of cultural conflicts in 
bargaining dynamics are rare (e.g. Binnedijk 1987; Weiss & Stripp 1985). Scholars have 
made little effort to explore alternative explanations (e.g. Mingst & Warkentin 1996). And 
many of the studies have more the nature of field reports than of sound scientific analysis 
(Jönsson 2002: 219). In addition, it was questioned by many whether the culture 
dimensions – which might be important for example in business relations – plays much of a 
role in international diplomacy. After all, it is the very nature of the diplomatic elite to have 
developed over centuries a set of common behavioral patterns and practices which levels 
national cultural differences (e.g. Lang 1993; Zartman & Berman 1982: 226).    
                            
182
 Nevertheless, the study of power and power struggles in diplomatic processes is also marked by some 
contradiction which limited the depth of this potential hypothesis. Take for example the discussion on the 
symmetry-asymmetry dichotomy in power-related negotiation research. While some scholars have 
pointed out that power symmetry between negotiating parties render bargaining processes more 
complicated (e.g. Faure 2005; Zartman & Rubin 2000b: 273-4), others have challenged this finding. Beriker 
and Druckman (1996) have, for example, revealed that power symmetry is irrelevant when parties are 
equally weak. And J.P. Sing (2008) has shown that the scope and nature of power distribution alone could 
not explain negotiation outcomes but only affects the bargaining dynamics in conjunction with several 
other explanatory factors.  
183
 Moreover, the research on negotiations in international institutions appears to be very 
compartmentalized with different schools and disciplines doing isolated research without little 
interdisciplinary exchange and interaction – a fact that Jon Odell has described by the metaphor of 
disconnected “island of knowledge” (Odell 2010a).  
184
 For example, Ramirez-Martin and Brett come to the conclusion the Latin-America negotiation culture is 
characterized by low initial demands and a tendency towards integrative deals (Ramirez-Marin & Brett 
2011). Ott comes to an opposite conclusion saying that negotiators with a Latin American background 
rather make inflated initial demands and ask for large concessions (Ott 2011). Others have revealed that 
Indian negotiators are thorough and make few concessions (Kumar 2004) – only to be challenged by 
colleagues who come to the opposite conclusion that the Indian negotiation style is marked by flexibility 
and readiness for large concessions (Requejo & Graham 2008). Similar contradicting findings are found in 
the background knowledge on the American negotiation style. While some point out that Americans are 
inclined to seek creative solutions in the negotiation process because they are often less bound by 
hierarchy than their negotiating parties and have in general a more egalitarian attitude (Tinsley et.al. 
2004), others say that US negotiators are focused on fixed-pie solutions because of the inherent search for 
fair solution (Leung & Tong 2004). 
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 (3) Breadth: Finally, the six potential hypotheses need to be evaluated against the IBE 
quality criterion of breadth. In our assessment we come to the conclusion that colliding 
interests (H2.1), distrust (H2.5) and distributive inequality (H2.4) yield the highest scores 
with regard to this particular criterion (Figure 14). All three approaches have strong 
explanatory power and a high unifying capacity explaining various features of negotiation 
problems regardless of the issue, the involved actors, or the actual negotiation setting. Due 
to the high level of abstraction, none of these three potential hypotheses could be 
absorbed by other approaches without losing much of their genuine explanatory power.  
In comparison to these three potential hypotheses, the breadth of power struggles (H2.2) 
and cultural clashes (H2.3) appear to be more limited. One the one hand, both concepts are 
to a considerable degree absorbed by other concepts. For example, while power struggles 
are often absorbed by the concept of colliding interest (H2.1),185 cultural clashes in 
bargaining dynamics are often operationalized by conflicts about different notions of 
fairness (e.g. Brockner et.al. 2000; Gelfand et.al. 2002) or as an expression of suspicion and 
misunderstanding (e.g. Elahee, Kirby & Nasif 2002; Gunia et.al. 2011; Rivers & Lytle 2007; 
Triandis 2001) and therefore become subordinated to the hypotheses of unequal 
distribution (H2.4) and distrust (H2.5). Losses of genuine explanatory power are the logical 
consequence. And apart from being absorbed by other, more unifying concepts, the 
breadth of the power struggle and cultural clash hypotheses are, on the other hand, limited 
by their inherent wooliness and imprecision. For example, the fact that IR lacks in general a 
clear understanding of the scope and nature of power (e.g. Baldwin 2013), is also affecting 
the research on international negotiations. Consequentially, it appears that the different 
studies of power in bargaining dynamics have talked past each other due to different 
operationalization of power.186 Imprecise conceptualization is also limiting the breadth of 
the cultural clashes. Apart from varying definitions of what exactly signifies culture and 
cultural conflicts in negotiations, we encounter in the literature numerous imprecise and 
overlapping concepts.187  
The potential hypothesis of inadequate institutional environment (H2.6) was found to have 
an even more limited breadth since this approach is subordinated in many respects to 
broader and more unifying analytical concepts. Scholars who have studied the nature of 
institutional settings in international negotiations have returned to either interest or power 
based explanations (e.g. Young 1989a; Habeeb 1988) or have attributed the (dys)function 
                            
185
 For example, the “power of the weak” (the ability of state actors with relatively limited power 
capacities to dominate bargaining process) is a phenomenon that was often studied in the past by 
scholars interested in the role of power in international negotiations (e.g. Hopmann 1996: 119; Snyder 
and Diesinger 1977: 1990). The most common explanation for this phenomenon – the higher commitment 
to “win” in bargaining process – builds, however, on the logic of colliding interests.  
186
 See, for example, scholars that have explained negotiation outcomes by the distribution of “power 
capacities” among state actors (e.g. Krasner 1991; Steinberg 2002; Telhami 1990). Others have instead 
operationalized “power” primarily as a function of strategic moves and the quality of relationships 
(Habeeb 1988; Odell 2010b).  
187
 For example, the dichotomy “collectivism-individualism”, which was often used to describe different 
cultural negotiation styles, is plagued by unclear definitions and ambiguous conceptualizations. While 
some scholars identify families and friends as an expression of a “collective”, others refer by this term to 
companies or even to nations (Brewer & Chen 2007; Bülow & Kumar 2011: 354).  
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of the institutional setting to (dis)trust or (in)transparency (e.g. Arrow 1995; Bjurulf & 
Elgström 2004).  
3.3.3 Analytical Operationalization: Game Theory & Public Bad 
Approach  
Now that we found that our fit taxonomy is – apart from the distinction of the substantive 
and procedural dimension – further specified by colliding interests, distrust, and injustice, 
we take the next step of model development and “sound the bell” for another round of IBE 
based reasoning. The mission is to identify approaches and concepts that provide further 
specification. What we are searching are analytical concepts that allow for a detailed 
operationalization of the three tangible concepts of negotiation problems we have revealed 
thus far. It will turn out that we identified five potential explanations from which we 
eventually chose two: dilemma games (H3.1) and the public bad approach (H3.4) (Figure 
14).   
3.3.3.1 Set of Potential Hypothesis (H3.1 - H3.5) 
 
H3.1 Dilemma Games: The research on negotiation and game theory is densely interwoven. 
On the one hand, systematic research on international negotiation emerged hand in hand 
with the application of the game theoretical approach. The founding fathers of modern 
research on international negotiations (e.g. Schelling (1960), Rapoport (1960)) based their 
analysis primarily on game theory. On the other hand, thinking about negotiation dynamics 
and the bargaining situation was also important for the evolution and maturing of game 
theory. It was for example, the reasoning about negotiation strategies and dynamics that 
helped John Nash develop his mathematical model for general bargaining solutions (Sally & 
Jones 2006: 87). Consequently, there is ample game theoretical research on international 
negotiations in general and on negotiation problems in particular. The literature stretches 
from military crisis bargaining (e.g. Fearon 1995) over mediation efforts (e.g. Rauchhaus 
2006; Kydd 2010) and the distribution of (mis)information (e.g. Leventoglu & Tarar 2008; 
Morrow 1994: Ch. 8; Walter 2009) to negotiations on contested water resources (e.g. 
Güner 1998).  
H3.2 GRIT (Gradual Reciprocation in Tension Reduction): GRIT is another central approach 
for the analysis of negotiation problems which was likewise relatively often used in the past 
by IR scholars (e.g. Collins 1997; Goldstein & Freeman 1990; Kelman 1985).188 Originally 
introduced by Charles Osgood (1962) as a general de-escalation mechanism during the Cold 
War, GRIT builds on a tit-for-tat strategy. What is at the very heart of GRIT is a multi-stage 
process of trust building. Conflict parties are asked to take unilateral steps of tension 
reduction, provide concessions, and thereby establish over time a “peace spiral” which is 
assumed to have the potential to resolve deadlock and stalemates in bargaining dynamics. 
Consequently, among the different cases studied by this approach, the President Anwar 
Sadat’s unilateral trip to Jerusalem in 1977, which marked the first step in the Egyptian-
                            
188 For a critical review on GRIT and its explanatory powers, see: Bitzinger 1994; Thränert 1991  
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Israeli rapprochement, is certainly the most often cited example of the GRIT logic (e.g. 
Kelman 1985; Kydd 2005: 184-185).  
H3.3 BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreements): The BATNA approach is another 
analytical concept to study problematic negotiation problems. The BATNA concept is based 
on the so called “no-deal option”. On the one hand, negotiations fail or become particularly 
difficult if at least one of the bargaining parties dispose a better alternative to the 
negotiated agreement (Raiffa 1982; Fisher & Ury 2011). On the other hand, successful 
negotiations are possible if the parties operate in a “zone of agreement” (also called 
“bargaining range”) where the outside option has less value than the expected agreement. 
The BATNA concept was used in the past by numerous IR scholars to study difficult 
diplomatic constellations – for example armistice negotiations (Pillar 1983), bargaining 
dynamics in the EU (Moravcsik 1998) or in the WTO context (Odell 2009).  
H3.4 The Public Bad Approach:  As we have explained above (ch. 3.1.3.1), the Theory of 
Collective Goods (TCG) – of which the public bad approach is part of – is widely used by IR 
scholars. Numerous studies have shown that all international and cross-border problems – 
such as environmental pollution or the provision of international peacekeeping missions – 
are in essence problems of public good provision and consumption (e.g. Holzinger 2008; 
Keohane & Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 1990; Rittberger 2008; Sandler 2004: 192-211). In many 
of these studies, bargaining dynamics and negotiations played a crucial role (e.g. Barrett 
2003). However, we have also explained above that the concept of public bad was – apart 
from some generic references –not yet systematically applied in negotiation research.189 
H3.5 The Ripeness Approach: The ripeness approach is a process oriented concept. It 
explores the conditions and circumstance required to conduct successful bargaining 
dynamics. According to William Zartman – who has developed this concept – “conflict 
resolution depends, above all, on the identification of the ripe moment” (Zartman 1989: 
263). The “ripe moment” is given if two conditions are met. First, the conflict parties find 
themselves entangled in a “mutual hurting stalemate” from which they cannot escape 
unilaterally and which signifies for all involved actors an unfavorable state. Second, conflict 
parties have to envision a “way out” representing a negotiated solution to the actual 
conflict situation (e.g. Zartman 2000; Zartman 2006).190 Like the other analytical concepts 
discussed above, the ripeness approach was used by numerous IR scholars for analyzing 
complicated bargaining dynamics – for example the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (e.g. 
Moorandian & Druckman 1999), the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations (e.g. Lieberfeld 
1999), or the Cambodian conflict (e.g. Amer 2007).  
3.3.3.2 IBE Selection for H3.1 - H3.5  
With the help of our three quality criteria (coherence, breadth, and depth), we will now 
evaluate which of the just introduced potential hypotheses (H3.1 – H3.5) represents the 
                            
189
 For studies in negotiation research that refer generically to public bads without providing further 
specification or a systematic concept of this approach, see e.g.: Drahos 2003; Croson, Marks & Snyder 
2008; Money & Allred 2009, Sutter 2002.  
190
 For a critical review of the ripeness approach, see for example: Ekwuachi-Ford (2009); Kleiboer (1994); 
Pruitt (2005).  
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best contribution (Hg4) to our effort to build a fit taxonomy for the analysis of NRN. We will 
show that dilemma games (H3.1) and the approach of public (H3.4) bad yield the best 
results (Figure 14). 
(1) Depth: In terms of depth, the concept of dilemma games (H3.1) achieves the highest 
score. As we have already explained above, game theory and negotiation research is 
densely interwoven. Consequently, we encounter in the literature numerous studies and 
research that explored diplomatic bargaining constellations through a game theoretical 
lens. And even though the game-theoretical heritage is today less obvious as scholars apply 
numerous other approaches, it remains, according to Christer Jönsson, “a benchmark of 
sorts, to which most analysts [in negotiation research] relate one way or another”(2008: 
218). GRIT (H3.2), BATNA (H3.3), and the ripeness approach (H3.5) are in the mid-table. All 
three approaches have been widely applied in the past. However, compared to the 
approach of dilemma games, the depth of all three concepts is nevertheless limited. The 
approach of public bads (H3.4) instead achieves in terms of depth the lowest scoring (Figure 
14). As we have already explained above, the public bad approach represents rather exotic 
concepts in negotiation research and was – apart from occasional generic references – 
never systematically applied in the field.   
(2) Breadth: Dilemma games (H3.1) and the public bad approach (H2.4) are assumed to 
have a relatively wide breadth (Figure 14). As we have already discussed above (ch. 3.1.3), 
both concepts have high explanatory power and allow scholars to study broad varieties of 
different problem constellations regardless of the issue area or the involved actors. While 
BATNA (H3.3) and the ripeness approach (H3.5) could be likewise applied to a broad variety 
of negotiation problems, they have nevertheless a relatively narrowed breadth since their 
explanatory power is absorbed by the concepts of dilemma games. In essence, the ripeness 
approach and BATNA are particular applications of game theory (Sally & Jones 2006). 
Tellingly, Zartman once said that when seen through the lens of game theory, the ripeness 
approach operationalizes the transformation from a PD Game into a Chicken Game 
(Zartman 2006). And the BATNA concept was in many respects developed as a part of 
Howard Raiffa’s (1982) more general approach to the analysis of negotiation dynamics 
which was based in many respects on game theoretical reasoning. The GRIT (H3.2) 
approach is not absorbed by a more unifying concept. However, its breadth is limited too 
since it applies only to a particular constellation of negotiation conflicts: trust-building and 
de-escalating bargaining processes that are marked by unilateral concession of the involved 
actors.   
(3) Coherence: None of the five approaches are fully coherent with the requirements 
specified in P3 (Figure 14). None of these concepts is able to study at that same time 
injustice, distrust, and colliding interest traps both on the substantive and procedural 
problem dimension. Rather, all five approaches have, for each part, limits. However, the 
limits of the GRIT (H3.2), the BATNA (H3.3), and the ripeness approach (H3.5) appear in 
particular strong. All three concepts have a clear bias for the procedural dimension and 
apply in addition to only one of the three basic social traps. While GRIT is in essence about 
the distrust trap, the BATNA and the ripeness approach relate exclusively to the colliding 
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interest trap. Against that background the coherence of the dilemma game (H3.1) and the 
public bad approach (H3.) appear relatively high. After all, both concepts allow us to study 
at least two social traps in parallel.  
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4. METHODS & CASE SELECTION  
As we have elaborated above in detail, our research project is inspired by Enlightened 
Rationalism. The major focus of the following chapter is to show the methodic implications 
of this meta-theoretical approach. Above we have explained that the assumption of 
endogenic motivational shifts is at the very heart of Enlightened Rationalism. It is the one of 
the decisive criteria to demarcate this approach from the conventional Orthodox 
Rationalism. Consequentially, the way we map endogenic motivations (ch. 4.2) and how 
those findings are translated into preferences by the so-called “re-enactment method” (ch. 
4.3) are central to our method chapter. In this section, we will explain in detail how we 
operationalize this task. Moreover, we will answer how the American-Libyan negotiation 
dynamics on the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapons program was selected as the “hard 
case” among the 14 historic examples of NRN (ch. 4.4). In addition, at the beginning of the 
chapter we will briefly elaborate on how we implement the qualitative research paradigm – 
the methodic principle which is guiding the analytical terms in our entire PhD project (ch. 
4.1).  
4.1 The Qualitative Research Paradigm  
In the introduction chapter, we already explained that our PhD project will follow the 
“qualitative research paradigm”. This choice was taken due to the limited number of NRN 
cases, the complex causal relations that need to be explored, and the numerous rival 
explanations that must be taken into account. While large-N quantitative studies have a 
well-defined structure with a clear distinction between analysis and conclusion, qualitative 
research is often more “disordered”. In qualitative research, the analysis of data and the 
findings that scholars draw from this process are often densely intertwined. However, that 
does not mean that qualitative research is lacking analytical excellence and is inferior to the 
“quantitative research paradigm”. Qualitative research is likewise bestowed with a set of 
distinct “quality criteria” – although they are very different from the benchmarks applied to 
evaluate quantitative research.  
The “quality criteria” for qualitative research listed in the relevant literature consist 
normally of four central aspects: (1) process documentation and rule-governed analysis, (2) 
triangulation, (3) interpretative validation and, (4) communicative validation (e.g. Cropley 
2002; Flick 2007; Flick 2008; Lamnek 2005). In the following section, we will discuss how 
and to which degree our PhD project fulfills these criteria. 
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(1) Process Documentation and Rule-Governed Analysis: Process documentation and rule-
governed analysis are primarily implemented in our PhD project by the method of “process 
tracing” which is the central analytical instrument in our study of the Libyan NRN. It is by 
using “process tracing” that we investigate the “fit performance” of the individual design 
elements.  
“Process tracing” is one of the primary methods in qualitative research to study causal 
relations (e.g. Bennett 2008; Schimmelfennig 2006). Scholars who apply this approach aim 
for a detailed and complete description of causal pathways. According to Alexander George 
and Andrew Bennet, “process-tracing is an operational procedure for attempting to identify 
and verify the observable within-case implications of causal mechanisms” (George & 
Bennett 2005: 138). Inspired by the conventional wisdom that correlation is not 
synonymous with causation, “process tracing” allows us to open the black-box of the causal 
process with the objective to “bring the mechanism back in” (Checkel 2005: 14). It 
therefore allows for detailed process documentation and provides a rule-governed analysis 
of causal relations.  
However, “process tracing” has short-comings too. First, it is a method that necessitates an 
enormous amount of information (see e.g. Gheciu 2005). In order to decipher causal 
relations, intensive data is required such as interviews, documents, historical memos or 
press accounts. Second, “process tracing” has an inherent tendency to relapse into mere 
“storytelling”. In such a situation, scholars do ex-post rationalizations of hypothetical cause-
effect-relations which do not necessarily reflect the social reality of the studied situation. 
Third, “process tracing” is endangered to fall prey to the “infinitive regress problem” where 
the causation for an observed effect is constantly traced back only to arrive at a chain of 
insufficient explanations which stretch over extended periods of time without providing 
definitive answers.  
Not all of these shortcomings could be resolved by a well-crafted research design. But their 
negative impact could be mitigated if the “process tracing” is embedded in a theoretical 
concept which specifies the cause-effect relations, narrows down the critical aspects for the 
causal process that needs to be studied in detail, and which lists the series of alternative 
explanations that could falsify the assumed causal relation. Only when the “process tracing” 
is embedded in a theoretical concept will this method be able to the quality criteria of 
process documentation and the rule-governed analysis. In our PhD project, the fit 
taxonomy, which we have outlined in the previous chapter, signifies the theoretical concept 
that is structuring the “process tracing”. 
(2) Triangulation: “Triangulation” is another central criterion indicating the quality of 
qualitative research (e.g. Cropley 2002; Flick 2007). “Triangulation” is a term resulting 
originally from geodetic measurement. The central idea of “triangulation” is to investigate 
the very same phenomenon from different perspectives. We apply “triangulation” 
throughout our doctoral thesis with regard to the studied data, the applied methods, and 
the theories we use. Consequentially, attentive readers will find evidence of “triangulation” 
on numerous occasions in our research projects. For example, our analysis on the Libyan 
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NRN is based on different types of sources – including historic documents, interviews with 
central participants, press releases, and memoirs of key decision makers. With the 
“operational code analysis” and the “interest profiling” we triangulate our survey of 
Tripoli’s and Washington’s motivations. And to build our fit taxonomy, we have likewise 
applied different perspectives. We have not only included academic knowledge but also 
insights provided by the practitioners of international bargaining dynamics. 
(3) Interpretative Validation: Interpretive validation is a quality criterion that is particularly 
relevant in terms of transparency. The central idea is to give readers of qualitative research 
projects the chance “to form their own impression” of the studied phenomenon by 
providing them with a brief description of the key facts. This is necessary since – as 
mentioned – analysis and conclusion are densely intertwined in qualitative research. 
Without sufficient knowledge about the field, readers have little chance to evaluate the 
quality of the research project. Instead they become hijacked by narratives the authors are 
presenting them.  
Interpretative validation will play an important role in our research project. This criterion is 
for example implemented by the chronological description about the evolution of the 
American-Libyan negotiation process and the nature of the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear 
weapons program. Both sections are situated at the beginning of our analysis of the Libyan 
NRN in order to provide readers with an objective, fact-based overview (ch. 5.1).  
(4) Communicative Validation: Communicative validation is achieved by giving the key 
actors of the studied phenomenon (in our case the major negotiators of the American-
Libyan bargaining process whom we interviewed, see Annex 16) the chance to comment, 
correct, and change the final research results. Unlike all other criteria, we have excluded 
“communicative validation” from our PhD project because we thought it would provide no 
value added in terms of analytical quality – given the hostile and antagonistic history of the 
American-Libyan negotiation process. It is very likely that this “quality criteria” would have 
simply forced us back to the conventional interpretations about Libya’s nuclear reversal 
which is in many respects influenced by the uneasy history of the U.S.-Libyan relationship. 
Applying the criterion of communicative validation would have – in all probability – 
distorted the interpretive power of our research project.  
4.2 Mapping Endogenic Motivations: Operational 
Codes & Interest Profiles 
 
In the Setup chapter, we explained that inferring actors’ motivation from their behavioral 
pattern is not a sound method because of the so-called “revealed preference problem” (ch. 
2.3.5.2). By the same token, the approach applied by Orthodox Rationalists who primarily 
use theories (e.g. neo-realism or market theories) to deduce the general interest of actors 
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(such as such as political power or economic well-being), is likewise not a viable option for a 
research project that endeavors to follow the principles of Enlightened Rationalism. 
Enlightened Rationalists reject both approaches claiming that motivations of actors are 
neither fixed nor given. That perspective, however, requires that we run case-specific 
surveys on actor’s desires and beliefs and show how these findings are translated into 
preferences (i.e. “re-enactment method”). Certainly, this approach bestows us with a 
broader and richer picture of social reality and allows for control alternative constructivist 
explanations which primarily build on the logic of ideational shifts. However, the price to 
pay is a very demanding empirical endeavor. Studying ideational facts such as desires and 
beliefs are not the “home turf” of rationalist scholars but rather the field of constructivist, 
post-positivist, and social-psychologist researchers. As a consequence, doing research on 
endogenic motivations propels Enlightened Rationalists into a schizophrenic situation. To a 
considerable extent, scholars have at first to carry out constructivist or social-psychologist 
research before they can proceed to the actual “rationalist core” of their project – the 
analysis of the “logic of consequence”.  
Doing a survey on actors’ motivations is not trivial. We said in the Setup chapter that it 
requires a “mapping-of-the-mapping” (ch. 2.5.3.2). Motivations are invisible and their 
degree of “unobservability” varies. We can only study them by proxies. In that sense, the 
question “how do we know a desire or belief when we see one?” is very much bound to the 
question “where do we look for it”. 
In IR literature, we encounter different approaches that allow us to survey actors’ 
motivations. The most common are: interest profiles, operational codes, cognitive maps, 
and interest indicators (e.g. Zürn 1997). Following the logic of triangulation, we will survey 
both desires and beliefs by applying the “operational code” approach and “interest profiles” 
in parallel. While “operational codes” were applied to decipher beliefs, we use the 
approach of the “interest profiling” method in order to identify the desires the United 
States and the Qaddafi regime had during the negotiation process. “Cognitive maps” and 
“interest indicators” were found to be less fruitful for the analysis of the Libyan NRN. Doing 
the “mapping-of-the-mapping”, we will briefly explain why: 
(1) Interest Indicators: “Interest indicators” is an approach that allows scholars to assess 
the benefits and costs of particular strategic outcomes. Unlike other concepts applied to 
study an actor’s endogenic motivation, “interest indicators” represent a relatively 
“objective” approach. The interpretative freedom of individual scholars is limited since the 
relevant preferences of the involved actors are not revealed by a retrospective analysis but 
by an ex-ante assessment based on general variables. For example, to assess the interest in 
Arctic oil and gas of the five central players in that region (Russia, the United States, 
Canada, Norway, and Denmark/Greenland), Kathrin Kreil used three interest indicators: (1) 
the overall standing of the Artic in the countries’ policies, especially concerning security 
considerations (2) the market relevance of Arctic oil and gas (3) identity, culture, and 
historic relevance of the Artic and its resources. Based on these indicators, Kreil was able to 
show that Russia has a very high interest in the Arctic region and its oil and gas ressources 
and is, consequentially, the most central player in this region (Kreil 2014).  
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OPERATIONAL CODES 
 
Philosophical Beliefs 
 
P1: What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the 
fundamental character of one’s political opponents?  
 
P2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be 
optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects are they one and/or the other? 
 
P3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? 
 
P4: How much control or mastery can one have over historical developments? What is one’s role in moving and shaping 
history in the desired direction?  
 
P5: What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?  
 
Instrumental Beliefs 
 
I1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?  
 
I2: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?  
 
I3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?  
 
I4: What is the best timing of action to advance one’s interest?  
 
I5: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interest?  
 
 
Source: George 1969 
 
“Interest indicators” are of partiuclar value in policy fields were general variables to assess 
preferences are already available or easy to build. In issue areas where social, economic, or 
trade related data are less relevant and difficult to obtain (such as in the nuclear policy 
field), “interest indictors” have obvious limits and represent a methodic tool that is difficult 
to use.  
Figure 15: Five Philosophical and Five Instrumental Operational Codes 
(2) Cognitive Maps: The “cognitive map” approach is a concept that was originally 
introduced into IR research by Robert Axelrod (1976). This approach involves a graphical 
analysis to visualize the cognitive values of statements given by policy makers from the 
field. It allows us to study desires, their ranking, and their causal relation. While this 
approach provides a rich picture of social reality, it has limits. First, “cognitive maps” are a 
very demanding method in technical terms and require considerable data and academic 
resources to be run properly. Second, “cognitive maps” were relatively seldom used in the 
past to assess actor’s motivation. This method was outpaced by the “operational code 
approach” as an alternative socio-psychological concept which has a similar focus as 
“cognitive maps”.191 
4.2.1 Revealing Beliefs: Operational Codes 
The “operational code” analysis is an approach to study the beliefs of foreign policy makers. 
First introduced by Nathan Leites in his seminal study on the Bolshevik world views (1951, 
1953), this method was made famous among IR scholars by Alexander George (1969) and 
Ole Holsti (1977) and witnessed growing popularity in recent years in particular in social-
                            
191
 Endogenic motivations could also be surveyed by questioning experts who are assumed to be 
knowledgeable about the desires and beliefs of the relevant actors in a given issue area (see e.g. Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 1985; Hart 1976; Zürn 1997). Although we have not applied standardized questionnaires, 
this aspect was to a certain degree covered in our PhD project by the interviews we conducted with 
decision makers and participants in the American-Libyan negotiation process (Annex 16).  
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psychological studies on international affairs (e.g. Walker & Schafer 2010; Schafer & Walker 
2006).  
In light of our research project, the most central advantage of “operational code” analysis is 
that it allows a direct translation of actors’ motivations into strategic constellations. 
According to Jack Levy, the fact that “operational code” analysis operates at the 
“intersection of political psychology and game theory” is one of the most interesting 
aspects of this method and an “important area for future research” (Levy 2003: 272-3). 
With the help of this method, it is possible to infer from an actor’s belief system directly to 
the related hiearchy of strategic preferences – a benefit numerous game theoretical studies 
have taken advantage of in recent years (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & McDermott 2004; 
Malici & Buckner 2008; Marfleet & Walker 2006).   
Figure 16: Four Ideal-Typical Operational Codes  
 
In its current form, the “operational code” analysis  is the outcome of an evolutionary 
process. The major contribution of Alexander George is that he modified the approach of 
Nathan Leites by introducing five philosophical and five instrumental beliefs and developed 
a scheme that allowed for systematic and comparative studies of different world views 
(Figure 15). Based on George’s contribution, Ole Holsti (1977) has further developed the 
“operational code analysis”. He has identified six ideal-typical operational codes (labeled 
with the letters A through F).  
Eventually Stephen Walker (1983) further systematized the approach and has condensed 
the six ideal-typical codes introduced by Holsti into four types of world views: A-type (the 
idealist), B-type (the revolutionary), C-type (the reformer), and DEF-type (the realist) (Figure 
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16). Each of these four ideal-typical world views is associated with a distinct strategic 
preference ordering which allows for a systematic application of the “operational code 
method” for game theoretical analysis (Figure 16). Walker’s modification builds on the 
argument that three beliefs of the different instrumental and philosophical convictions 
listed by Alexander George are particularly important and decisive (P1: What is the 
essential nature of political life? P4: How much control or mastery can one have over 
historical developments? I1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for 
political action?). He thereby recurs on assumptions that were previously stated by 
Alexander George (1969) and Ole Holsti (1977). Both postulated the hypothesis that there 
are “master codes” which are more important than other beliefs.  
In our PhD project, we applied the “operational code analysis” to study the belief system of 
Muammar al-Qaddafi. We studied the various speech acts and writings authored by the 
Libyan dictator and codified the arguments and statements he made along the three 
decisive beliefs: P1, P4, and I1. As we will explain later in more detail, we came by this 
approach to the conclusion that the world view of the Libyan leader was alternating 
between a (neo)realist (DEF-type) and a revolutionary (B-type) position (ch. 5.2.1.1, see 
Figure 3 and Figure 4).192 
4.2.2 Identifying Desires: “Interest Profiling Approach“  
“Interest profiles” are essentially nothing more than a systematized study of the available 
historic data. It is a structured approach to reveal information about what actors wanted in 
a given strategic situation from the relevant documents, interviews, speeches, biographies, 
and press releases. The “interest profiling” is based on several analytical steps. The central 
idea is that scholars who work in a step-by-step manner guided by a systematic scheme are 
able to focus more clearly on the nature of an actor’s desire and are less likely to become 
overwhelmed by extensive and often ambiguous data and by dominating explanations 
formulated by previous research studies. In that sense, the main purpose of “interest 
profiling” is to streamline the interpretative freedom of scholars and avoid false 
descriptions and misinterpretation. The “interest profiling” we applied in the study on the 
Libyan NRN is composed of three steps.  
First, we have to specify the “scope of desires”. Desires do not have a standard shape. On 
some occasions, they are very specific to the issue area while in other constellations they 
are primarily shaped by the nature of the relationship of the involved actors.193 Second, we 
have studied the “nature of the desires”. That is, what actors actually want in a given 
negotiation dynamic. The central question is: What is at the core of an actor’s motivation 
and how does it change over time? Third, scholars have to rank the different desires 
                            
192
 For a detailed discussion on the question of why we have only applied the “operational code analysis” 
to Libya and not to the United States, see ch. 5.2.1.  
193
 In the Libyan NRN, we found that the desires of the involved players were inseparably intertwined with 
the broader American-Libyan relationship. What both sides wanted in the negotiation on the Qaddafi 
regime’s nuclear weapons program could not be separated from other issue areas. WMD was an integral 
part of the general relationship between the two conflict parties.  
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according to the priority the actors ascribe to them. In that step, the analytical task is to 
reveal the strategic hiearchy of the involved actors’ intentions.  
4.3 The “Re-enactment Method”: Identifying 
Preferences 
Even the most comprehensive profiling of desires tells us little about preferences. As we 
have explained in detail in the Setup chapter (ch. 2.5.3.2), preferences are the most 
unobservable aspect of an actor’s motivation as they are specific to particular situations 
and interactions. Their actual appearance varies dependent on the actual set of 
opportunities available in a concrete strategic constellation. Nevertheless, preferences are 
essential for the application of many analytical concepts – including game theory. In the 
rationalist world view, preferences precede actions. Without a clear understanding of an 
actor’s preferences, we are unable to operationalize strategic constellations.  
In the Setup chapter, we have already introduced two theoretical concepts how desires 
(and beliefs) transform into preferences: “sequencing by translation” and “sequencing by 
weighting” (ch.2.5.3.4). We also said that when taken in parallel, both concepts are 
assumed to allow a detailed and relatively dynamic sequencing of changing strategic 
constellations. In this section, we introduce the “re-enactment method” which allows 
operation of both concepts of sequencing.194 
It is important to understand that the “re-enactment method” is not an abstract academic 
“finger exercise”. Rather, it is a replay of a procedure that real players in international 
affairs (and in other areas of social life) do all the time. When facing new strategic 
situations, real actors normally do not know their preferences by heart. They have to infer 
them in light of the situation’s specific set of opportunities with a translation and weighting 
procedure. In that sense, the “re-enactment method” merely makes a real-world practice 
transparent and helps to systematize its procedures.  
When scholars reconstruct strategic constellations and infer preferences from an actor’s 
intentions, they have considerable interpretative leeway. Consequentially, the risk of 
misinterpretation and the danger to jump to tempting, but false conclusions is high. In 
terms of strategic analysis, the best survey of an actor’s motivation is in danger of 
becoming futile if the transformation of these results into preferences is faulty. In essence, 
                            
194
 In principle, the “re-enactment method” applies to beliefs as much as it is relevant for desires. The 
mechanism of translation and weighting are the same for both motivational components. However, 
applying the “logic of triangulation”, we will limit the “re-enactment method” in our PhD project 
exclusively to the strategic desires mapped with the help of “interest profiling”. As we have outlined 
above, the “operational code method” has developed an independent procedure to identify how different 
world views (A, B, C, and DEF-type) translate into preferences (ch. 4.2.1). Thus, once we have mapped an 
actor’s beliefs with the “operational code method”, we are automatically bestowed with a hiearchy of 
preferences and have not necessarily applied the relatively demanding “re-enactment method”.  
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the problem of transforming survey motivation into strategic constellations was described 
already by Duncan Snidal in the mid-1980s. In his often-cited introduction to analytical 
game theory, he said that “[e]stablishing (…) correspondence between an issue area and its 
game model is the toughest problem confronting successful empirical application of game 
theory” (Snidal 1986: 40).195 Identifying preferences is therefore an important methodic 
Achilles’ heel of Enlightened Rationalism.196 
The “re-enactment method” is crucial since it provides guidance and helps to avoid scholars 
becoming “lost in translation” when they endeavor to infer preferences from surveyed 
actors’ motivations. It helps to mitigate the risk of misinterpretation, since it impels 
scholars to transform the mapped desires (and beliefs) carefully and systematically into 
preferences.  
When applying the “re-enactment method”, scholars have to “put themselves in the shoes” 
of the real-world actors they are analyzing. That is certainly a difficult and demanding task – 
particularly if asked to decipher the strategic thinking of actors (such as atomic renegade 
states) who are known to have deviating views from the mainstream perspective on world 
politics. However, since the intensive mapping of intentions is the necessary precondition 
for applying the “re-enactment method”, scholars are assumed to have gained sufficient 
insights into the mindset of the actors they are studying and are therefore are able to put 
themselves “in their shoes”. 
Covering both approaches of sequencing (“sequencing by translation” and “sequencing by 
weighting”), the “re-enactment method” is essentially a two-step approach. First, scholars 
have to replay the “translation process” and ask themselves how real-world players would 
have transformed their intentions into action-guiding preferences in a given strategic 
situations. Changes in the surveyed desires (and beliefs) are of particular interest since they 
are often likely to affect the translation process leading to new sets of preferences. Second, 
scholars also have to re-enact the “sequencing by weighting”. Apart from shifting desires 
(and beliefs), they also have to be sensitive to changes in the set of opportunities. As we 
have outlined in the Setup chapter in detail (ch. 2.5.3.3), decisive and profound shifts in the 
set of opportunities in given strategic situations are likely to affect the perception of desires 
(and beliefs) and make them appear “in a different light”.  
The translation and weighting of motivations into preferences based on the “re-enactment 
method” allows us to model strategic constellations that are realistic (since they reflect the 
endogenic nature of actors’ desires), dynamic (since they grasp motivational changes and 
shifts in detail), and immunized against the “revealed preference problem” (since they are 
                            
195
 Against that background, it is disturbing that, apart from some exceptions (e.g. Aggarwal 1996), many 
scholars have paid little attention to this particular methodic problem.  
196
 In the Libyan “hard case study”, we will show that the application of the “re-enactment method” 
preserved us from misinterpretation which we would have drawn on several occasion if we had not 
translated the mapped desires according to a strict guideline. For example, in the survey on U.S. 
motivation, we found that Washington’s strategic desires towards Libya were shifting in the early 1990s 
with the incoming Clinton administration. At first sight, it appears logical to infer a new strategic 
constellation from this “desire shift”. However, based on the “re-enactment method”, we come to the 
conclusion that this was not the case. The shift in Washington’s motivation was not decisive enough and 
was unlikely to translate into altering the hierarchy of preferences (for more details, see ch. 5.2.1.2). 
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exclusively based on a mapping of motivations and not on a tautology-prone analysis of 
actors’ strategic behaviors). The “single hard case” study on Libya’s NRN will show that the 
“re-enactment method” is keeping its promise. Applying this approach reveals that the 
Libyan-American negotiation process is, in essence, a five-stage strategic cascade built by 
four different game constellations (ch. 5.2.1.3).197 
4.4 The Least-Likely Case Selection 
As we have explained in the introduction chapter (ch. 1.1), the Libyan case was selected by 
a “least-likely approach”.198 Among the 14 examples of NRN, the bargaining process on the 
Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapons program signifies the “hard case” – as a brief look at 
figure 17 clearly reveals. Given the relatively challenging and difficult strategic 
constellations, diplomacy had – a priori – relatively little chance to result in successful 
nuclear reversal in the Libyan case. In comparison to all other examples of NRN, the 
conditions for successful negotiation were particularly challenging and adverse in the U.S.-
Libyan bargaining process. If we were unaware of the fact that the Libyan NRN was in the 
end a “diplomatic success story” and had to assess the likelihood of a positive negotiation 
outcome, we would have given the American-Libyan engagement the lowest chance.  
The least-likely case selection we applied was essentially a three-step approach. First, we 
decided to take only successful cases into consideration. Second, we used the “maturity” of 
the nuclear weapons program as the first indicator for the “hard case” selection. Third, we 
introduce an ordinal index to assess the varying degrees of a “challenging negotiation 
environment”. This index was used as the second indicator for the least-likely selection. The 
outcome of this three-step selection process is presented in figure 17.  
 
                            
197
 Having completed the “re-enactment method” and having modeled a strategic constellation, scholars 
will feel a strong desire to cross-check their findings by studying the behavior of the actors in a given 
situation. It is very understandable to ask “whether or not a modeled strategic constellation is really 
reflecting the actual interactions between the involved negotiation parties”. However, evaluating the “re-
enactment method” by studying behavioral patterns in a given strategic constellations is not a sound 
methodical approach. It leads us back to the “revealed preference problem” (ch. 2.5.3.2). Moreover, by 
analyzing the strategic behavioral patterns, we would only be able to identify cases of drastic errors. For 
example, studying the concrete actions of actors in a given strategic constellation would make it possible 
to tell the difference between a Deadlock Game and the Imposed Deadlock Game since these strategic 
constellations have a very similar pattern in behavioral terms (see also ch. 5.2.1.2). Since evaluating the 
performance of the “re-enactment method” by analyzing behavioral patterns is not possible, we have to 
apply a more subtle approach of cross-checking by a comparison with the “operational code analysis”. 
Since the “operational code analysis” provides us with an independent, non-behavioral procedure to 
identify preferences and strategic constellations (as we have explained above), it could be used as a 
control instrument to verify the “re-enactment method”. 
198
 Apart from its “hard case” status, choosing Libya also has another advantage. As Maria Rost Rublee has 
pointed out, Libya is particularly interesting among the different cases of successful nuclear reversal 
because it is the only example where “the same dictator who gave the decision to set up the program was 
convinced to disarm it” (Rublee 2009: 151).  
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Figure 17: Least-Likely Case Selection  
 
(1) Only Successful Cases of Nuclear Reversal: Negotiations aiming for a complete 
dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs were also conducted with atomic renegade 
states that continued their ambitions and crossed the nuclear threshold (India, North 
Korea, and Pakistan). Nevertheless, we decided to limit our case selection only to those 
cases where nuclear reversal was eventually successful.199 Since we want to investigate the 
performance of diplomatic design with a “single case study approach”, it is relatively 
obvious that successful cases provide us with more insights than failed cases. Studying a 
failed case would only lead to “negative explanations”. We would primarily reveal findings 
about situations where diplomatic design was not successful and failed in terms of 
promoting nuclear reversal. That is, of course, interesting too. However “positive 
explanations” are generally preferable since they have more analytical value in light of our 
central research question.  
                            
199
In our selection process, we included Iran and North Korea; two cases where the negotiations were still 
ongoing at the time of our analysis (2010-2015). Moreover, Spain and Algeria were also identified as 
examples of NRN. But since both cases are still heavily understudied (see Figure 2), we excluded them 
from our case selection.  
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(2) “Maturity” of the Nuclear Weapons Program: In the Setup chapter, we explained that 
nuclear weapons programs could be distinguished according to their “maturity” (ch. 2.2.1). 
We introduced three decisive stages of nuclear proliferation: “nuclear deliberation”, 
“nuclear pursuit”, and “nuclear possession”. Moreover, we said that there is the special 
case of “inherited nuclear weapons programs” which applied to the three post-Soviet Union 
states (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). These three states have not actively strived to 
create an atomic bomb. Instead, the nuclear weapons programs “fell into their laps” as a 
result of the chaotic demise of the USSR in the early 1990s.200 
We presume that with growing maturity, the willingness to abandon nuclear weapons 
programs is decreasing. The likelihood of nuclear reversal is higher when atomic renegade 
states are still in the phase of “nuclear deliberation” than when they have already managed 
to proceed to the stage of “nuclear pursuit” or “nuclear possession”. This assumption is 
supported by findings we revealed when elaborating on the general patterns of the nuclear 
policy field (ch. 2.2.1). In the history of the atomic bomb, there was only one state (South 
Africa) that abandoned its atomic weapons program after having crossed the “nuclear 
threshold”. In terms of nuclear reversal, achieving the stage of “nuclear possession” 
represents in most of the cases the “point of no return”.201 In addition to historic evidence, 
the assumption that nuclear “maturity” is a suitable indicator for “hard case” selection is 
also supported by the literature. We could identify three central arguments in that regard. 
First, it is irrational to dismantle a nuclear program which has already absorbed 
considerable resources and has a realistic chance of being realized (rationalist argument). 
Second, over time, nuclear weapons programs generate domestic pressure groups that 
support ongoing proliferation and oppose nuclear reversal (systemic-bureaucratic 
argument). In most cases, these pro-nuke veto players are constituted by an alliance of 
nuclear scientists, high-ranking military officers, and representatives of the national atomic 
industry (Cirincione 2005; Sagan 2000). Third, the quest of a nuclear weapons program is 
often likely to become a crucial element of national identity (constructivist argument). The 
strive for an atomic bomb and, even more, the possession of a nuclear arsenal is likely to 
become part of an atomic renegade’s national identity – a fact that makes nuclear reversal 
more difficult (Hymans 2006; Wisotzki 2002).  
(3) Index of a “Challenging Negotiation Environment”: Nuclear “maturity” alone is not 
sufficient to apply a “hard case” selection on NRN. Apart from the nature of the nuclear 
weapons program, there are several additional factors that are likely to render NRN into a 
challenging diplomatic struggle – for example previous conflicts between the negotiation 
parties. Consequentially, we have surveyed the available literature on international 
negotiations and have integrated the different factors that are likely to complicate the 
bargaining process into a single index indicating the “challenging negotiation environment” 
                            
200
 That is the reason why the three cases of “nuclear inheritance” were ranked in terms of “maturity” as 
the lowest category (Figure 17).   
201
 In their analysis of past cases of nuclear reversal, Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt made similar 
observations. They found that the duration of nuclear weapons programs is reducing the probability of 
nuclear reversal (Müller & Schmidt 2010: 149).   
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(Annex 2). This index was applied together with the “maturity” criterion in order to identify 
the least-likely case among the different NRN examples (Figure 17). 
Screening the negotiation literature on challenging contextual situations, we could list four 
crucial indicators: (a) experience of previous conflict between the negotiation parties, (b) a 
low degree of bilateral trade, (c) no or few overlapping memberships in alliances and 
international institutions (d) and conflicting national identities (see Annex 2). We have a 
challenging “negotiation environment” when conflict experience and the dissimilarity of 
“national identities” between the negotiation parties is high and when bilateral trade and 
overlapping membership is low. 
a) Bargaining dynamics are assumed to be more challenging if negotiation parties were 
embroiled in conflicts in the past – particularly if these struggles were violent. As a 
consequence, it is likely that their relationship is marked by grievance and distrust. In 
order to code past conflict experiences, we have recurred to the COSIMO data 
set/Conflict Barometer provided by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict 
Research (http://hiik.de/en/). This data set has the advantage that it goes beyond 
fully-fledge warfare and also grasps lower intensities of state conflicts.  
b) Evaluating the intensity of bilateral trade between the negotiation parties builds on 
the assumption of interdependence and assumes that the general socio-economic 
interactions between two countries is increasing mutual understanding and interest 
for joint cooperation (e.g. Spindler 2006). In order to evaluate the nature of bilateral 
trade, we have used the Correlates of War data set (version 3.0) on dyadic trade 
constellations (Barbieri, Keshk&Pollins 2009; http://correlatesofwar.org/data-
sets/bilateral-trade).  
c) Overlapping membership in alliance is another aspect that could ease bargaining 
dynamics. If negotiation parties are part of the same military alliance, they are 
assumed to share at least some security-related goals and objectives. None or only 
few overlapping memberships is instead a proxy indicating difficult negotiation 
constellations. In order to assess the degree of overlapping alliances, we used the 
data set on formal alliances provided by the Correlates of War Project (version 3.03) 
(Gibler & Sarkees 2004; http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances).  
d) Diverging “national identities” is also an aspect that is assumed to render diplomatic 
engagement more complicated (e.g. Faure 2003; Zick 2008). Since “national identity” 
is a relatively amorphous concept which is difficult to assess without detailed case-
specific analysis, we used three different proxy yardsticks (different languages, 
dissimilar civilizations, and divergent socio-economy systems; for more details see 
Annex 2).  
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5. THE SINGLE “HARD CASE”: THE LIBYAN 
NUCLEAR REVERSAL NEGOTIATIONS 
On December 19th 2003, the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya announced publically 
its decision to voluntarily reverse its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, limit its 
missile capacity to the regulations of the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime),202 
adhere to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to IAEA Additional Protocol, and 
to allow international inspectors to visit its hitherto clandestine WMD sites. This sharp turn 
in Libya’s foreign policy came as a surprise to most observers. Up to that point, Libya was 
the prototype of an atomic renegade state. The grim autocratic regime run by the eccentric 
dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi had a track record of supporting terrorist groups around the 
world, destabilized the North African region and pursued an illegal nuclear weapons 
program which was launched in the early 1970s.  
Likewise surprising was the progress the Qaddafi regime had achieved in its efforts to 
acquire a military nuclear capability. Libya’s atomic weapons program was in late 2003 still 
in an embryonic stage. When Tripoli abandoned its WMD ambitions, it was still years away 
from a military deployable atomic bomb. Libya had neither produced nor acquired any 
significant amounts of nuclear weapon-capable uranium or plutonium. Nevertheless, 
Western observers and intelligence analysts were still astonished. While the Qaddafi 
regime’s chemical weapons program has been the focus of attention for years, the 
achievement Libya had made in particular since late 1990 in the field of nuclear weapons 
acquisition went mostly unnoticed. Much of the scope of the Libya’s nuclear weapons 
program had been detected by U.S. and UK intelligence rather as a by-product of the effort 
to disclose the A.Q. Khan network – a transnational smuggle network for nuclear weapons-
related equipment and know-how which was led by the so-called “father” of Pakistan’s 
atomic bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, and which had acted as Tripoli’s major nuclear outfitter 
starting by the mid-1990s.   
In this chapter will shed light on the question why the Qaddafi-regime chose to “come in 
from the cold” (Suskind 2006) and reversed its WMD programs. A brief glance at Libya’s 
nuclear disarmament reveals that bargaining and negotiation played an important role in 
the Qaddafi regime’s decision. According to our analysis, the diplomatic process started 
already in late 1987, continued through the 1990s in a rather hostile and antagonistic mode 
and eventually peaked in 2003 with a series of intensive disarmament talks held in secrecy 
between Libyan, U.S., and British officials.  
With the help of our fit taxonomy, we can study the impact of 20 diplomatic design 
elements applied during the U.S.-Libyan negotiation process. We revealed that Libya was in 
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 Maximal range of missiles: 300 km; maximal payload of warheads: 500 kg. 
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the end “won” by diplomacy. The overall performance of diplomatic design is the most 
important explanation for Tripoli’s decision to abandon its WMD programs. Alternative 
explanations – non-diplomatic interventions or structural factors – played a certain role at 
some point in the American-Libyan diplomatic struggle. But, when taken in isolation, none 
of these rival factors could properly explain Libya’s disarmament. 
However, before we start analyzing the “fit performance” of the various design elements 
and its alternative explanations (ch. 5.3), we will give at first an historical overview of the 
diplomatic process and the evolution of the Libyan nuclear weapons program (ch. 5.1). 
Afterwards we will set the parameters for the fit taxonomy which requires the mapping of 
the negotiating parties’ motivation by the “operational code” method (ch. 5.2.1.1) and the 
“interest profile approach” (ch. 5.2.1.2 and ch. 5.2.1.3), the translation of their intentions 
with the help of the “reenactment method” (ch. 5.2.1.4), and the elaboration on Libya’s 
nuclear bad based on the public bad approach (ch. 5.2.2).  
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5.1 The Evolution of the Libyan NRN & Tripoli’s 
Nuclear Weapons Program   
In the method chapter, we explained that “interpretative validation” is an important quality 
criterion since it allows transparency and objectivity (ch. 4.1). The central idea is to give the 
readers of qualitative research projects a chance “to form their own impression” of the 
studied phenomenon by providing them with an objective, fact-based description of the 
research objective. This is necessary since analysis, description, and conclusion are densely 
intertwined in qualitative research.  
By providing an overview of the evolution of the U.S.-Libyan bargaining process with its 
different negotiation phases (ch. 5.1.1) and the genesis of the Libyan nuclear weapons 
program (ch. 5.1.2), we honor the criterion of “interpretative validation”. The purpose of 
the two following section is to give the readers a detailed description before we started the 
actual analytical part of our doctoral thesis.  
5.1.1 The Evolution of the Libyan NRN – A Four-Stage Bargaining 
Sequence 
 
On a late Sunday afternoon in March 2003, few days before the US lead Iraq invasion was 
launched on March 19, Muammar al-Qaddafi’s second-oldest son, Saif al-Islam, made his 
appearance in a luxury hotel in London’s chic Mayfair district. An elegantly dressed young 
man in his early 30s trained in western top-ranking university, Saif was regarded as his 
father most likely successor. Reportedly, Saif al-Islam was accompanied by Moussa Koussa, 
at that time head of the Qaddafi regime’s external secret service. Stylish in appearance and 
as a graduate in Sociology from Michigan State University a fluent English speaker, Koussa 
was the central figure on the Libyan side throughout the diplomatic process on Tripoli’s 
WMD programs. In the 1980s, Koussa had been one of the central protagonists of the 
Qaddafi regime’s training and sponsorship program for left-wing and nationalists terrorist 
and guerilla groups around the world – including the IRA, the PLO, and the German RAF. 
Apart from personal involvement in the planning of the 1986 bombing of the West Berlin 
discotheque, La Belle, and the downing of the French airplane, flight UTA 772, in 1989 over 
Niger, he is believed to be one of the key figures behind the bombing of Pan Am 103 on 21st 
December 1988, which marked before 9/11 the terrorist attack which caused the highest 
number of casualties among U.S. citizens.  
On that Sunday afternoon in March 2003, Saif and Koussa met with three senior British 
intelligence officers from MI6. Saif surprised his British interlocutors by offering a strategic 
dialogue with the West which should “clear the air about” WMD programs in Libya 
(Interview with R. Joseph 2011, Annex 16). It had not been two months ago, in January 
2013, that the Libyan Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, Hassouna al-Shawesh, had publically 
dismissed Western concerns that the Qaddafi regime was striving for nuclear weapons as 
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mere CIA propaganda. Reportedly, everyone in the room was immediately aware that this 
was a message that was sent directly from Muammar al-Qaddafi. At the end of the meeting 
when the MI6 officials prepared to debrief 10 Downing Street about the conversation, Saif 
and Koussa conveyed to them that Libya would like to see also the White House informed 
about their offer (e.g. Tobey 2014; Miller 2006; MacLeod 2006; Frantz & Meyer 2005; 
Joseph 2009; Frantz & Collins 2007: 304).  
On March 2003 the Qaddafi regime proposed WMD talks but it was neither offering to 
disarm its unconventional weapons program nor was it admitting its quest for atomic 
bombs. Tripoli’s nuclear reversal was instead the outcome of an intense diplomatic 
engagement achieved through a series of secret meetings and conversations which took 
place at various venues throughout the year 2003 and which involved Libya, on the one 
side, and the US and the UK on the other side. The breakthrough was eventually achieved in 
late December 2003.  
The disarmament agreement had been finalized in a negotiation session held in London on 
16th December 2003. The public announcement of the deal had been scheduled for 19th 
December. The West had put particular emphasis on the fact that Muammar al-Qaddafi 
himself would give publically his personal consent to the achieved agreement. As the 
evening growth later on 19th December, the US President George W. Bush in Washington 
and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in London were anxiously awaiting with their close 
entourages whether the Libyan dictator would keep his promise. The UK Ambassador to 
Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Anthony Layden, had to call in constantly 
and had to report on the current situation in Tripoli. The Libyan State TV was still showing a 
soccer match. No statement on WMD had been made so far. Eventually, in the late night 
news the Libyan foreign minister, Abdel Rahman Shalgham, announced the disarmament 
agreement. Immediately after his statement a brief sequence was slotted in showing the 
Brother Leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi, who was endorsing the agreement his Foreign 
Minister had just announced. Qaddafi called the decision to reverse the Libya’s nuclear 
weapons program a “wise and brave step that merits the support of the Libyan people.” 
Reportedly, relief was high at the White House and at 10 Downing Street (e.g. Beaumont, 
Kamal & Bright 2003; Joseph 2009). At the same evening shortly after 10 p.m. (London 
time), George W. Bush and Tony Blair both gave statements welcoming Libya’s nuclear 
reversal. The U.S. President made clear that Tripoli had now “begun the process of rejoining 
the community of nations” which would allow the North African state to “regain a secure 
and respected place among the nations, and over time, achieve far better relations with the 
United States” (Bush, Dec. 13, 2003). While Bush uttered caution in its statement by 
emphasizing that the US “will be vigilant in ensuring” that Libya “lives up to all its 
responsibilities”, Tony Blair was more welcoming to the Qaddafi regime’s decision. He 
expressed that “[t]his courageous decision by Colonel Gaddafi is an historic one” (Blair, 19. 
Dec. 2003).  
These two events – the conversation between MI6 officials with Saif al-Islam in London and 
the public announcement of the disarmament deal – mark the two most important 
milestones in the diplomatic engagement with the Qaddafi regime on its WMD program. It 
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is, therefore, little astonishing that these two crucial episodes were described in relative 
detail in the press and in the relevant literature (e.g. Beaumont, Kamal & Bright 2003; 
Frantz & Meyer 2005; Joseph 2009; Tobey 2014; MacLeod 2006). However, it shall not blur 
the fact that the U.S.-Libyan bargaining process on the Qaddafi regime’s WMD programs 
started already in the late 1980s. While, back then, chemical weapons were more at the 
focus of the American-Libyan diplomatic struggle, it is still crucial to take this early episode 
into account since it builds the fundaments for the late direct disarmament talks.  
Due to its obvious complexity and lengthiness, it appears pertinent to study the Libyan NRN 
in a “phased approach”. Taking the shifting behavioral pattern and changing actors’ 
constellation into account we suggest dividing the U.S.-Libyan into four distinct episodes:  
(1)  In the pre-negotiation phase (December 1987 - March 2003) the United States and 
the Qaddafi regime had almost no direct diplomatic intercourse concerning the WMD 
issue. Communication took place only indirectly through intermediaries and go-
betweens. By and large, this episode was marked by a confrontational behavioral 
pattern. Nevertheless, the question whether or not exploratory talks on Libya’s WMD 
should be started arose in the pre-negotiation phase already at a relatively early 
stage. Only when both sides finally made up their mind and gave “green light” to 
explorative talks by spring 2003, the bargaining process transformed into the pre-
agreement phase.  
(2) In the pre-agreement phase (March - December 2003) Washington and Tripoli 
established a direct back-channel talks which were staged primarily by intelligence 
officers. At that point, British representatives became involved in the process. The 
central challenge that characterized this diplomatic phase was the question whether 
the involved players could reach a common understanding which would allow the 
start of direct negotiations on a final disarmament agreement. When both sides came 
to “positive vote”, the diplomatic process moved forward from the pre-agreement 
phase into the agreement phase.  
(3) The agreement phase (December 2003) was marked by direct negotiations on the 
disarmament agreement. The United States and the Qaddafi regime were confronted 
with the decision whether or not to go the last step and give consent to such an 
accord which would initiate Libya’s nuclear reversal.  
(4) The public announcement of Libya’s nuclear reversal was the starting point of the 
post-agreement phase (2004 onwards). This diplomatic episode was marked by the 
implementation of the disarmament agreement. To abide by the negotiation accord 
or to return to unilateral actions was the central strategic question that Washington 
and Tripoli had to answer for themselves. 
In the following section, we will elaborate on these four phases in detail in order to provide 
an overview on the evolution of the Libyan NRN.  
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 5.1.1.1 Pre-Negotiation Phase (December 1987 - March 2003)  
On Christmas Eve 1987 a group of senior intelligence officials revealed to the New York 
Times under the veil of anonymity that Libya was searching a WMD capacity (Gordon 1987). 
The story disclosed the Qaddafi regime’s effort to build a plant for the production of 
chemical warfare agents.
203
 It is unlikely that the New York Times article was a smart plot of 
investigative journalism leaking intelligence information to the public (e.g. Terril 1994: 47-8; 
Wiegel 1992: 21). Given the number of involved senior officials, the detailed information 
that were disclosed, and the highly symbolic publishing date, this article was most likely an 
orchestrated initiative by the Reagan administration. In that sense, the New York Times 
article represents the first direct action undertaken by the U.S towards Qaddafi regime’s 
ambition for WMD. Christmas Eve 1987 was the starting point of the Libyan NRN. 
In the beginning, the Qaddafi regime reacted vigorously against the U.S. charge and 
rejected all accusations. In the early 1990s Libya, however, adjusted its approach (e.g. 
Terrill 1994; Wiegle 1992). Tripoli started to launch various back channel initiatives 
executed by different kinds of intermediaries with the objective to establish a direct 
channel of communication with the United States. The first initiative in that regard that we 
know of was undertaken in January 1992 when the Qaddafi regime approached William 
Rogers, former Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs under the Ford Administration 
(e.g. Bowen 2006: 90; Frantz & Collins 2007; Slavin 2004; St. John 2003: 464; Viorst 1999: 
73). One month later Tripoli made a similar approach searching the help of the former 
Senator Gary Hart (Hart 2004). According to Wayne White, who worked during that time at 
U.S. State Department Bureaus of Intelligence and Research Office, the Bush senior 
administration were at that time receiving a “stream of people” who all were acting as 
intermediaries for the Qaddafi regime. All of them were trying to establish a direct contact 
between Tripoli and Washington (Interview with W. White 2012; Annex 16).204 Martin 
Indyk, responsible for Middle East policy at the State Department during Clinton’s 
presidency, reported the same observation: “There were plenty of instances where he 
[Muammar al-Qaddafi] was trying all sorts of backdoor ways to try to get to the White 
House” (Interview with M. Indyk 2011; Annex 16). 
Certainly, not all of these offers had the WMD issue on the agenda. The central intention of 
the Qaddafi regime was a general improvement of the tense and hostile U.S.-Libyan ties. 
However, the historical evidence suggests that a fair amount of the Libyan back-channel 
approaches assigned WMD a special role for a future diplomatic encounter with the United 
States (e.g. Hart 2004).  Regardless of the question how sincere Tripoli’s proposals really 
                            
203
 Already in summer 1987 the U.S. media reported the alleged use of chemical weapons by Libyan forces 
against Chadian troops in the war on the Aouzou strip. In the wake of these reports the U.S. military 
provided Chadian troops with 2.000 gas masks (Sciolino 1987a). In addition, starting in September 1987 
alleged shipments of Iranian chemical weapons to Tripoli were also reported in the Western press 
(Ottaway 1987; Sciolino 1987b). In 2004 the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) revealed that Libya indeed produced from 1989 to the late 1990 approx. 25 tons blister warfare 
agent at a plant which later became known as the Rabta facility located about 95 km south of Tripoli 
(Tucker 2009).  
204
 The State Department received so numerous initiatives from the Qaddafi regime that a special file was 
set up which eventually became “about three or four inches thick” (Interview with W. White 2012; Annex 
16). Internally at that State Department this file was dubbed as the “wanna be file” since all the proposed 
initiatives were eventually rebuffed by the U.S. administration.  
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were, these initiatives put the option of explorative talks on Libya’s WMD programs at the 
table. The question whether such a diplomatic process should be started remained the 
central theme of the entire pre-negotiation phase. 
However, despite Libya’s diplomatic reach outs, the United States applied a non-
cooperative approach and refused to respond to the Qaddafi regime’s offers for explorative 
WMD talks. It took until May 1999 until Washington took the first step towards a 
diplomatic process with Libya. Since the rupture of its diplomatic ties with the North African 
country in the 1980s, the United States engaged for the first time in direct negotiations 
with representatives of the Qaddafi regime. The content of these talks was not WMD but 
Libya’s involvement in the bombing of flight Pan AM 103 in December 1988 over the 
Scottish town Lockerbie and the compensation of the victim families. However, at the 
sidelines of the first meeting which were held in utmost secrecy, Libya renewed its offer to 
dismantle its unconventional weapons program. Tripoli declared that it was willing to join 
the recently brokered Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and to open its facilities to 
international inspections. The Libyan repeated their WMD proposal in October 1999 when 
the “Lockerbie talks” continued. At these two occasions, the United States reacted for the 
first time to the Libyan offer. Instead of rejecting the proposal as it was done in the past, 
the US delegation – led by Martin Indyk – made clear to the Libyans  that WMD would be 
on the agenda of future U.S.-Libyan engagements but only after the Lockerbie issue was 
resolved (Bowen 2006: 59; Frantz & Meyer 2005; Indyk 2004; Interview with M. Indyk Nov. 
2011, Annex 16). 
In the end, it took both sides until March 2003 to give diplomacy on WMD a chance. When 
Saif al-Islam renewed again the Libyan offers for talks, the United States eventually gave 
“green light”. Reportedly, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair himself lobbied for that step 
when he met Georg W. Bush in late March 2003 at Camp David. At the sidelines of this 
meeting, which was primarily focused on Second Iraq War, the two leaders together with 
their foreign policy advisor – Sir David Manning and Condoleezza Rice – discussed the 
Libyan proposal (e.g. Tobey 2014; Suskind 2006). However the actual decision to get 
involved with Libya on WMD was presumably taken in mid-April 2003 in an Oval Office 
meeting which were attended beside the US President George W. Bush and the Vice 
President Dick Cheney by George Tenet (CIA Director) and Stephen Kappes (Deputy Director 
of Operations at CIA) (e.g. Suskind 2007: 222-3; Frantz & Collins 2007: 306; Tenet 2007: 
288-9; Tobey 2014; Tucker 2009: 364).  
5.1.1.2. Pre-Agreement Phase (March – December 2003)   
With the positive veto of George W. Bush given in April 2003, the pre-negotiation phase 
came to an end, and the diplomatic process entered into the pre-agreement. In the 
following months Libya and the United States – supported by officials from the U.K. – hold a 
series of secret meetings at various venues across Europe. On the U.S. side, Stephen Kappes 
was chosen to handle the initial rounds of talks with the Libyans. His British counterpart in 
these conspiratorial meetings was Sir Mark Allen, chief of the counterterrorism unit at MI6. 
On the Libyan side, Moussa Koussa was the key player. He was accompanied by 
Mohammed Azwai, the Libyan ambassador to the United Kingdom, and Abdellati Obaid, the 
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Qaddafi regime’s ambassador to Italy (e.g. Interview with T. Dowse Jan. 2012; Interview 
with R. Joseph 2011; Annex 16).  
Starting from the very first meeting, which took place already in April 2003 in Geneva, the 
central theme of these secret tripartite meetings was to sound out ways and means for 
direct negotiations on a disarmament agreement. Both sides – the members of Qaddafi 
regime and the UK-US team – pondered each for their part the question whether or not to 
start negotiations for a disarmament agreement. Thus, preparing for final negotiations was 
the major focus of this period.  
Throughout spring and early summer 2003, the talks revolved about the possible content 
and structure of such a future negotiation process (e.g. Tenet 2007: 289-90; Tobey 2014; 
Suskind 2006). However, by summer 2003 the pre-agreement phase turned into an 
impasse. Little progress was made. Important aspects that were necessary to prepare for a 
final negotiation process were still unsettled (e.g. Evans 2004; Suskind 2007: 266). 
According to Ambassador Robert Joseph, Director for Counter-Proliferation at the National 
Security Council, the diplomatic process with Libya was at that time still “very amorphous” 
(Interview with R. Joseph 2011, Annex 16).205 Moussa Koussa continued to reiterate the 
offer that had already been made in March 2003 – “to clear the air about WMD Libya.” No 
efforts were made to specify this proposal (Interview with R. Joseph 2011; Interview with T. 
Dowse 2012, Annex 16). Even when Kappes and Allen had the chance to talk directly to 
Muammar al-Qaddafi in August 2003 the pre-agreement phase was – apart from 
atmospheric improvements – not gaining momentum (e.g. Joseph 2009: 6-7; Frantz & 
Meyer 2005; Tenet 2007: 292). At the second meeting held in September 2003, the Libyan 
dictator agreed at least “in principle” to the U.S. request for technical visits to the Libya’s 
clandestine WMD sites – Washington’s precondition for direct NRN with Tripoli. But the 
conditions and details of such a fact-finding missions to Libya including a concrete date 
remained unsettled (e.g. Joseph 2009: 7). Reportedly, Tripoli’s continuing maneuvering led 
to increasing concerns in Washington and London. Doubts were rising whether the Libyans 
were sincerely willing to engage in a diplomatic process (e.g. Tennet 2007: 292).  
The pre-agreement phase, however, gained new momentum when cargo vessel owned by a 
German logistic company, the BBC China, was intercepted on its way from Dubai to Tripoli 
on a joint U.S.-UK intelligence operation and was ordered into the Southern Italian harbor, 
Taranto. Having been tipped off by an informant who had acquired an important position 
within the A.Q. Khan network, the U.S. and UK intelligence officers knew what they 
searched for when they inspected the ship on October 4. In five standard 40-foot shipping 
containers the BBC China had loaded a delivery for the Qaddafi regime: components of 
centrifuges determined for the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium, worth of tens of 
millions of US dollars, manufactured by the A.Q. Khan network at a secret plant in Malaysia 
(Frantz & Collins 2007: 309; Evans 2004; Bowen 2006: 66; Wright 2004).  
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 In similar veins, a US senior official who had been interviewed by the Los Angeles Times in preservation 
of anonymity made clear that “the Libyans were” by summer 2003 “not admitting they had a nuclear 
program (…) they were being coy” (Frantz & Meyer 2005).  
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The BBC China incident changed the character of the pre-agreement phase. At their next 
meeting with Muammar al-Qaddafi, which was already arranged at October 7, four days 
after the interception of BBC China, Steven Kappes and Sir Mark Allen received permission 
by the Libyan leader to conduct a fact-finding mission to the clandestine sites of the Libyan 
WMD program. That Muammar al-Qaddafi had personally given “green light” to technical 
visits increase confidence in London and Washington – although skeptic was still very 
present (e.g. Joseph 2009: 7; Suskind 2006).  
In October (19 - 29 October 2003) a joint team of CIA and MI6 WMD experts visit several 
places in Libya. At the second visit, which took place in early December (1 - 12 December 
2003), Libya were even more open. The 15 members of the British-American team were 
granted with wide access and were permitted to obtain detail information about Libya’s 
WMD programs (e.g. Interview with Tim Dowse 2012, Annex 16). Towards the end of the 
second visit, Libya clearly signaled its willingness to disarm its WMD programs and agreed 
in principle to allow OPCW and IAEA inspections. This crucial decision paved the way for 
direct negotiations on a final disarmament agreement and brought the pre-agreement 
phase to an end. A negotiation session was scheduled for the 16th December 2003.  
 5.1.1.3 Agreement Phase (December 2003)  
Although Tripoli and Washington had already weathered several challenges in the previous 
episodes of the negotiation process, the agreement phase was still demanding. The United 
States and the Qaddafi regime were confronted with the decision whether or not to go the 
last step and give consent to a final disarmament agreement which would not only initiate 
Libya’s nuclear reversal but would also lift the cloak of secrecy and present the outcome of 
the U.S.-Libyan diplomatic engagement to the global public. It took substantial effort to 
eventually arrive at a joint consensus.   
Since the stakes were rising in the agreement phase, the diplomatic process was elevated 
on the Western side to the political level. While the intelligence officers, who had run the 
pre-agreement phase, were still involved, the White House was now in the driver seat. The 
Bush administration designated Robert Joseph, senior director for nonproliferation at the 
National Security Council, as head of the U.S. delegation and similar happened in the UK. 
London was now represented by Sir William Ehrman, a senior career diplomat with thirty 
years’ experience in foreign affairs.  
The decisive meeting was held on December 16 in London. The intense negotiations, which 
went on the entire day, focused on the text of the public statement that would announce 
Libya’s nuclear reversal. After hours of back and forth, both sides eventually arrived at a 
consensus. It was agreed that Libya would publically announce the destruction of its 
nuclear and chemical weapons program, put the dismantlement effort under the 
supervision of the IAEA and the OPCW, eliminate its ballistic missiles with a range beyond 
300 km range and a payload of 500 kg, sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, accede to the 
CWC and the MTCR, and allow immediate inspections to verify these actions. Moreover, all 
three sides agreed that the most sensitive parts of the Libyan WMD programs shall be 
removed from Libya for destruction – namely all uranium enrichment centrifuges and 
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associated equipment, all weapons-capable materials, and all documents and records 
related to the production of atomic bombs and their delivery systems. That the United 
States and also the UK agreed to welcome Libya's decision publically was the essential 
takeaway point for Moussa Koussa and his team. Likewise important for the 
representatives of the Qaddafi regime was the promise that Libya’s disarmament would 
depict Libya’s nuclear reversal as a voluntary decision taken by free will (e.g. Joseph 2009: 
127).  
When the meeting ended in the late evening hours, the Western representatives were 
uncertain if Moussa Koussa and his team would be able to convince Muammar al-Qaddafi 
of the just negotiated deal. It was obvious that the Libyans could hardly “go back to 
normal” and continue their nuclear program after they had allowed Western experts visit 
its clandestine WMD facilities. However, Washington and London had concerns that Tripoli 
could nevertheless back off the achieved agreement. However, the Libyans were concerned 
too. In light of the Second Iraq War, Tripoli still had not got over the fear that Washington 
would, in the end, turn its back on the diplomatic engagement and use Libya’s public 
acknowledgment of WMD as a justification for military actions.  
In the following days until 19th December 2003 – the date that had been scheduled for the 
public announcement – intensive haggling over the wording of the actual statements took 
place. After some back and forth, which also involved a direct phone call between Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and Muammar al-Qaddafi, the script for the public announcement was 
eventually agreed. The Libyan foreign minister, Abdel Rahman Shalgham, would read the 
disarmament statement on the Libyan State TV followed by Muammar al-Qaddafi’s public 
endorsement of the decision. Afterward, Tony Blair and George W. Bush would give 
statements in their capitals welcoming Libya’s nuclear reversal.  
5.1.4. Post-Agreement Phase (2004 - 2011)  
With Libya’s announcement to reverse its WMD programs the diplomatic process entered 
into the post-agreement phase. The central task was to implement the disarmament 
agreement. The diplomatic engagement continued – although it was limited to occasional 
meetings set up to address remaining diplomatic problems.  
The post-agreement phase was marked by the dismantling and the removal of the most 
sensitive parts of Libya’s WMD program – a process which started already on 18th January 
2004. On that day, a joint team of 15 British and US experts was dispatched to Tripoli with 
the mission to assemble the most dangerous components of the Qaddafi regime’s WMD 
program and remove them from Libya by plane (Frantz & Meyer 2005; Mahley 2004). Apart 
from enriched uranium, L-2 centrifuges, and guidance kits for Scud-C missiles, the most 
sensitive that the US-UK team amassed in January 2004 was a plastic bag filled with 60 to 
70 sheets of nuclear weapons design – an item Libya had received from their supplier in 
Pakistan, the A.Q. Khan network. On 28th January 2004 a US Air Force cargo plane whose 
markings had been painted over landed at a military airport outside of Tripoli and loaded all 
the items the expert team had assembled on board and shipped them in a direct flight to 
the National Laboratory at Oak Ridge (Tennessee).  
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This airlift was the first part of the removal efforts and the second act began in early spring 
2004. This time, the residual elements of the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear and chemical 
program as well as its longer range ballistic missiles material were shipped to the US. In 
March 2004, the Industrial Challenger, a cargo vessel was cast off the harbor of Tripoli with 
more than 1.000 tons of equipment from the Libyan WMD program including five long-
range Scud missiles the Qaddafi regime had once bought from North Korea (Frantz & Meyer 
2005). With these two shipments, most of the Libyan WMD program was eliminated. The 
remaining elements of the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear and chemical weapons program had 
minor priority and were later destroyed on Libyan soil under the supervision of the OPCW 
and the IAEA.206 
A fact that made the post-agreement phase distinct apart from the central focus on the 
implementation of the negotiated disarmament accord was the changing constellation of 
actors. The process was handed over from the high ranking political and diplomatic sphere 
to practical operators and experts.207 Moreover, the spectrum of players was extended by 
spring 2004 when the IAEA and the OPCW became actively involved in this process (Bowen 
2006: 75ff; Boureston & Feldman 2004).208  
It is difficult to name the exact ending of the post-agreement phase. The year 2008 marked 
certainly an important historic threshold. The American-Libyan relations had by that time 
achieved a state one would describe as “normal” – although it would be an exaggeration to 
call them “amicable.” The rapprochement Washington and Tripoli had achieved was 
underpinned by a visit Condoleezza Rice (at that time Secretary of State) paid in September 
2008 to Libya – an “historic moment” as it was the first stopover of a high-ranking U.S. 
politician since John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under at the Eisenhower 
administration, had traveled to Libya in 1953. However, since the WMD issue was even 
after 2008 lingering on (in particular if we take the unfinished destruction of Libya’s 
chemical weapons arsenal into account and occasional setbacks in the removal of nuclear 
weapons-related materials) it makes more sense to take summer 2011 as the end of the 
post-agreement phase when rebel forces toppled the Qaddafi regime.  
                            
206
 After the fall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011 it was disclosed that a certain amount of chemical weapons 
– mainly artillery shells filled with the blister warfare agent Sulfur Mustard – had remained at a store in a 
remote area in the Libyan Desert. Tripoli had never indicated neither to the US and the UK nor to the 
OPCW the existence of this arsenal.  
207
 In the United States the Libya’s nuclear disarmament was by that time run by an interagency unit, the 
so-called “Proliferation Strategic Policy Coordination Committee” (Wing & Simpson 2013).  
208
 Moreover, the post-agreement phase was also the time where the Qaddafi regime undertook several 
steps to re-integrate into the institutional architecture of the global nuclear order. Already in January 
Libya had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and thereby underscored its willingness to 
remain from now on a nuclear weapons free state. In March 2004 Libya signed the IAEA Additional 
Protocol and thereby formally gave the Vienna based nuclear watchdog organization extended rights to 
oversight its nuclear related activities. One year late, in March 2005, Libya also jointed the African Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone by ratifying the Treaty of Pelindaba (Cirincione, Wolfsthal & Rajkumar 2005).  Already 
in February 2004 Libya became an official party to the CWC. 
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 5.1.2 Libya’s Nuclear Weapons Program  
When Muammar al-Qaddafi seized power in September 1969 the decision to “go nuclear” 
was quickly taken. The new leadership in Tripoli had apparently little concern to act against 
the international norm of nuclear restraint prescribed by the NPT – a treaty King Idriss had 
signed in 1968. Above in the Setup Chapter, we have explained that the period of “nuclear 
deliberation” was in many historic cases of nuclear proliferation relatively long (Figure 2).  
The Qaddafi regime, however, passed through this stage swiftly. Already in the 1970s the 
new leadership in Tripoli entered into the phase of “nuclear pursuit” and took concrete 
action to build up a nuclear weapons program.  
Despite a clear intention to acquire atomic bombs and sufficient oil money to put this 
desire into practice, the history of Libya’s nuclear weapons program is – by and large – a 
history of failures and setbacks. Hampered primarily by the lack of the necessary domestic 
technological and scientific capabilities as well as the necessary management competence, 
Libya’s nuclear efforts made little progress in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Braut-Hegghammer 
2006: 60; Bowen 2006: 25; Jasper 2014: 125).209 The picture started only to change by 1990 
when Libya intensified its cooperation with the A.Q. Khan network (Corera 2006; Frantz & 
Collins 2007; Fitzpatrick 2007). Libya was still years away from a deployable atomic bomb 
when the final decision for nuclear reversal was taken in December 2003. When 
Mohammed el-Baradei – at that time General Director of the IAEA – visited Libya’s nuclear 
sites in late December 2003 he estimated that it would have taken three to seven 
additional years until Libya had gained an operational nuclear weapon (Cirincione et.al. 
2005: 320; Tyler 2003). Tripoli had neither enriched any weapon-grade uranium nor had it 
designed a nuclear explosive device (IAEA 2004b: 2; Mahley 2004: 2). Furthermore, Libya 
had no aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons and possessed only very few Scud-C 
missiles which could reach parts of Southern Europe.210  
However, although standstill and setbacks were the major characteristics of the Libyan 
nuclear program, we could nevertheless distinguish three distinct phases of the Qaddafi 
regime’s atomic ambition: (1) the Qaddafi regime arduous search for external nuclear 
suppliers in the 1970s (2) the period of stagnation from the 1980s to the mid-1990s (3) the 
revival of Tripoli’s nuclear weapons program due to the cooperation with the A.Q. Khan 
network starting by the late 1990s.  
5.1.2.1 The Qaddafi Regime’s Arduous Search for External Nuclear Suppliers  
The Qaddafi regime’s first reported attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon was already in 
1970 when Muammar al-Qaddafi’s confident, Major Abdul Salam Jalloud, traveled to China 
in order to convince Beijing to sell Libya a turn-key read atomic bomb (e.g. Richelson 2006: 
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 According to Dany Shoham Libya was “technologically, in terms of genuine domestic capabilities (…) 
the most backward state in the Middle East” (Shoham 2004).  
210
 The linear distance between Tripoli and Palermo/Sicily is for example around 450 kilometer. This range 
was only doable by the few Scud-C missiles (600 kilometers range, 700-kilogram payload). The other 
missiles Libya had in its arsenals had a far lower range (several Soviet Scud-B missiles (300-kilometer 
range, 700-kilogram payload) dating from the 1970s and the indigenously developed Al-Fatah missile (200 
kilometer range).  
   
162 
 
325; Spector & Smith 1990: 367). China turned down the naïve Libyan request and the 
Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai reportedly said to the Major Jalloud: “Sorry (...) but 
China obtained the bomb through its own efforts. We believe in self-help” (cited at Cooley 
1982: 230).  
Jalloud’s visit to China marked the prelude of an arduous decade-long search for external 
nuclear suppliers. While only limited efforts were undertaken to develop a domestic 
nuclear infrastructure, Libya’s focus was clearly on buying critical technology and know-
how from abroad. But despite all its oil money, the North African country was not able to 
establish an enduring and reliable relationship with potential nuclear outfitters. Tripoli’s 
nuclear shopping tours to Argentina, China, France, India, Yugoslavia, and the United States 
all remained futile (Bowen 2006: 27-8 and 33; Hymans 2012: 241).211 Concerning Egypt, 
Pakistan, and the Soviet Union, the Qaddafi regime had more luck. But these cooperations 
too remained limited either because changes in the political landscape of the supplier 
states and deteriorating ties with Libya (i.e. the case of Pakistan and Egypt) or because the 
suppliers remained cautious and were not ready to relent to Tripoli’s demand (i.e. the case 
of the Soviet Union).  
In the early 1970s, Libya was able to recruit a fair number of Egyptian nuclear experts and 
scientists – among them Eizzat Abdel Aziz and Salah Hedyat, who had acted previously as a 
nuclear advisor for the Egyptian President Nasser (Bhatia 1988: 66-7). Direct transfer of 
sensitive technology from Egypt to Libya was less important than the input of know-how 
and manpower. Generous salaries, free housings, and convenient working conditions were 
a crucial factor in Libya’s recruitment efforts (Cooley 1982: 231; Wing & Simpson 2013: 
103). The Egyptian connection, however, lost relevance when Anwar as-Sadat took over the 
power in Cairo after Gamal Abdel Nasser’s died in September 1970. In the light of growing 
rivalry between the neighboring countries, the nuclear cooperation became more and more 
hampered. Although individual Egyptian scientists and engineers played an important role 
throughout the history of the Libyan nuclear weapons program, the Egyptian connection 
was terminated in 1974 when it was revealed that Libya had backed an assassination plot 
against Sadat (Bhatia 1988: 66). 
The Libyan-Pakistani nuclear cooperation took a similar development. Bolstered by the 
good personal relationship between Muammar al-Qaddafi and the Pakistani Prime Minister 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Tripoli and Islamabad reportedly signed in February 1974 a secret 
nuclear agreement (e.g. Cooley 1982: 232; Jones 1981: 48-9). It is assumed that Libya 
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 For example, in 1973 Tripoli tried to purchase enrichment technology from a French company, only to 
be down turned by the French Government (Bhatia 1988: 67; Wing & Simpson 2013: 103). The Libyan 
request to acquire a complete nuclear reactor system and highly enriched fuel rods from the U.S. 
Company “Gulf and General Atomics Corporation” was blocked by the State Department and the 
Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Cooley 1982: 230-1; Spector 1984: 151). The attempt to 
win Argentina as supplier for nuclear equipment and training in 1974 remained fruitless as well as another 
request to China for critical technology (Litwak 2007: 189; Bowen 2006: 27-8 and 33). A preliminary 
agreement with France achieved in 1976 on the provision of a 600-megawatt power reactor was 
eventually called off due to increased proliferation concerns (Wing & Simpson 2013: 104). And the 
“Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy” signed between Libya and India in July 1978 came to 
an abrupt end when Tripoli insisted on direct support for the development of a nuclear bomb (Bhatia 
1988: 68; Cordesman 1991: 152; Office of Technology Assessment 1984: 397; Spector & Smith 1990: 1975-
88; Cooley 1982: 232-3).  
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invested as much as US $500 Million into Pakistan’s efforts to build a nuclear weapon in 
exchange for gaining later full access to the achievements of the program (e.g. Koppe & 
Koch 1990: 45; Spector & Smith 19990: 176; Weissman & Krosney 1981: 60). Furthermore, 
it was reported that around 450 tons of yellowcake – powdered uranium ore and the 
precursory product for enriched uranium – coming from Niger had been shipped to 
Pakistan via Libya (Sidhu 1996: 279).212 However, the relatively high amount that Libya 
invested into the Pakistani nuclear program was not paying off in the end.213 The Pakistani-
Libyan friendship cooled quickly when President Bhutto was overthrown by a military 
putsch in 1977 and later executed. The relationship between the new Pakistani President 
General Zia-ul-Haq and al-Qaddafi was tense from the start. Correspondingly, the nuclear 
cooperation between Pakistan and Libya quickly came to an end. All attempts to revive the 
Libyan-Pakistani nuclear relationship failed (e.g. Jones 1981: 48-49; Wright 1981: 41).214 
As all other potential nuclear suppliers eventually refused to cooperate, the Qaddafi-regime 
finally turned to the Soviet Union. Although Muammar al-Qaddafi disdained Moscow 
because of its “imperialistic attitude” and its anti-religious stance (Ronen 2008: ch. 4; St. 
John 2003: 472), the Soviet Union became the most important external actor in Libya’s 
nuclear policy in the following years until the A.Q. Khan network took over this position by 
the mid-1990s (Wing & Simpson 2013: 105).215 Moscow shipped a 10-megawatt-research-
reactor (IRT-1) which was installed at the nuclear research center in Tajoura near Tripoli 
and put into operation in August 1981 (Office of Technology Assessment 1984: 395). 
However, as with other atomic outfitters, Moscow was cautious due to Libya’s nuclear 
ambitious. The Soviet Union provided exclusively civil nuclear technology, set up additional 
security measures at the Tajoura research site, and insisted on a safeguard agreement with 
the IAEA, which ensured close monitoring of the IRT-1 reactor by the Vienna-based 
watchdog organization (e.g. Bowen 2006: 28-9).216 As a result of Moscow’s caution, the 
research reactor in Tajoura played only a minor role in Libyan nuclear ambitions. It was only 
used several times for experiments on plutonium production (e.g. Litwak 2007: 189).  
5.1.2.2 Period of Stagnation  
While some efforts to gain external support were more promising than others, it 
nevertheless dawned on Tripoli starting by the late 1970s that the entire strategy to 
assemble nuclear weapons-related technology and know-how from foreign outfitters was 
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 The steady increase of Pakistani scientists that visited Libya since the mid-1970s is another indicator of 
the flourishing Libyan-Pakistani connection (Bhatia 1988: 67). 
213
 Harald Müller has pointed out that the only positive impact of the “Pakistani connection” was that it 
laid the foundation for the later cooperation with the A.Q.-Khan network (Müller 2006: 7)  
214
 Muammar al-Qaddafi demanded that Pakistan should quit the pro-Western “Central Treaty 
Organization” (CENTO) and join instead the “Non-Aligned Movement” (NAM). Furthermore, the Qaddafi 
regime wanted more effort from Pakistan in the support of the anti-Shah protests in Iran. When Zia 
refused to fulfil the Libyan demands, Qaddafi started to attach conditions to the financial investments that 
Libya provided (Cooley 1982: 232). 
215 The Soviet Union was also Libya’s major supplier in terms of conventional military equipment. In the 
light of the “ideological antipathy”, (St. John 2003: 472) the main impetus the Libyan-Soviet cooperation 
was Tripoli’s need for modern armament (Bowen 2006: 15).  
216
 Moreover, the proliferation risk of the Tajoura research site was minimized by its size. The light-water-
reactor was too small to produce a sufficient quantity of plutonium for an atomic bomb (Pajak 1976: 86). 
The 11.5 Kg enriched uranium needed to fuel the reactor was produced in the Soviet Union and then 
shipped to Libya (e.g. Müller 2006: 8; Wright 1981/2: 38-41).  
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not a viable approach to an atomic bomb. By the early 1980s, the Libyan nuclear weapons 
program was still in an embryonic stage. Moreover, in the 1980s, it became more difficult 
to win support by external suppliers since potential cooperation partners became more and 
more reluctant to assist Libya due to Tripoli’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy (e.g. 
Albright 2010: 116-7).217  
Haven been thrown back on its underdeveloped indigenous scientific and technology 
capabilities due to unwilling suppliers, the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear build-up entered into a 
period of stagnation by the early 1980s. Libya’s nuclear efforts came at that time almost to 
a standstill. In the 1980s, Libya conducted several hapless experiments at the Tajoura site in 
order to explore ways to separate and produce weapon-grade plutonium (e.g. IAEA 2004b; 
Bowen 2006: 32). During the same time, Tripoli tried unsuccessfully to produce 
domestically gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment (IAEA 2004a: Annex 1, p. 5; Wing & 
Simpson 2013: 109). Also, the most spectacular project of the Libyan nuclear weapons 
program – the attempt to enrich uranium between 1982 and 1992 in Tajoura with the help 
of a foreign expert (allegedly a German flight engineer) – finally failed (Douglas & Meyer 
2004; IAEA 2004a: Annex 1, p. 5). Although the Qaddafi continued during the 1980s 
attempts to gain assistance from abroad, these efforts were as little destined to succeed as 
in the previous decade.218 The indigenous efforts dogged by insufficient technological and 
scientific capabilities as well as the lack of coherent planning, became even more problem-
ridden by the 1990s when Libya faced intrusive UN sanctions which thwarted any 
cooperation with potential external suppliers.219 
5.1.2.3 The A.Q. Khan Network and the Revival of Tripoli’s Nuclear Weapons 
Program 
Libya’s nuclear efforts, however, regained impetus when the A.Q. Khan-network became 
involved in the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear ambitions by 1995.220 Analyzing the Libyan nuclear 
weapons program after its destruction in 2004, the IAEA came to the conclusion that Tripoli 
took by the mid-1990s “a strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities” (IAEA 
2004a: 5).  
                            
217
 Although Libya’s nuclear shopping trip’s might appear naïve and illusory when viewed in retrospect, 
one have to bear in mind that extensive support by external outfitter was the “standard procedure” in 
Libya’s military policy. As many oil-producing countries, the Qaddafi regime, imported military equipment 
and know-how in large scale, made little effort to build indigenous capabilities, and therefore became 
relatively dependent from external suppliers (e.g. Senn 2009: 111-2; Director of National Intelligence 
1983). We observe this particular pattern not only in nuclear and conventional armament policy, but also 
with regard to Libya’s chemical weapons program (Terrill 1994: 47; Tucker 2009: 365-66). 
218
 For example, efforts to establish in the early 1980s a cooperation with the Belgian companies 
Belgatom and Belgonucléaire remained fruitless (e.g. Wing & Simpson 2013: 107; Solingen 2007: 213).  
219
 There is considerable ground to believe that the stagnation of Libya’s nuclear efforts eventually made 
Tripoli launch its chemical weapons program – a category of WMD that is easier to develop and produce 
than nuclear weapons. The quest for chemical weapons which started around the year 1984 was in that 
sense a makeshift solution for the little progress in the nuclear field (Tucker 2009).  
220
 Apart from Libya the A.Q. Khan-network provided also Iran and North Korea with nuclear weapons 
related equipment and know-how. It is also believed that Syria belonged to its clients. Although it was a 
relatively loosely organized, most analysts agree that the Pakistani government must have had some 
influence on the network (Heupel 2008: 12; Corera 2006; Harnisch 2006; Kampani 2004). 
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Tripoli reached out to A.Q. Khan already in January 1984 and later in 1989 and 1991 (Wing 
& Simpson 2013: 111). However, the cooperation became non-active before June 1995 
(Corera 2006: 107-8). At first, Tripoli bought twenty P-1 gas centrifuges221 and components 
for 2.000 further enrichment processors from the network. In the early 2000s, the Qaddafi 
regime acquired a small amount of enriched uranium and two more sophisticated P-2-type 
centrifuges. Tripoli then placed an order for 10.000 additional P-2-type centrifuges which 
were successively shipped to Libya through clandestine channels (Müller 2006: 8; IAEA 
February 2004: 5). Furthermore, the Libyans bought from the Khan network a blueprint for 
a nuclear warhead for the price of $20 to $50 million. This 10-kilo-tonne implosive device 
was based on a model China had used in the 1960s. Based on the delivery of the A.Q. Khan 
network, Libya had installed three uranium enrichment cascades with 9, 19, and 65 P1 type 
centrifuges starting by October 2000. The advanced P2 type centrifuges, which Libya had 
ordered at the A.Q. Khan network had never been assembled and was mainly in their 
original packing when Libya reversed its nuclear weapons program (IAEA 2004b: 5; Bowen 
2006: 43; Cirincione et.al. 2005: 323; Kerr 2004).  
Unlike all other external outfitters the Qaddafi regime had worked with, the smuggling ring 
was willing to sell sensitive nuclear technology and know-how and was not scared neither 
by ideological antipathy nor by Libya’s pariah status. In that sense the A.Q. Khan network 
was the nuclear supplier Tripoli had always waited for. Although the equipment sold by 
A.Q. Khan network was limited in quality, overpriced, and occasionally incomplete (e.g. 
Wing & Simpson 2013: 114; Hyman 2012: 242-3), the late 1990s and early 2000s were the 
most productive years in the entire lifespan of Libyan nuclear weapons program (e.g. Corea 
2006; Bowen 2006: 26, 36). With the help of the A.Q. Khan network Libya had never been 
closer to the bomb than in late 2003. At no time, the future looked brighter in nuclear 
terms for Libya than in the early 2000s. Tellingly, Ambassador Donald Mahley – a key figure 
on the U.S. side in the destruction of the Libyan WMD programs – has pointed out that the 
Libyan nuclear weapons program would have been hindered “if not thwarted altogether” 
without the support of this transnational smuggling ring (Mahley 2004: 5).   
5.2 Fit Taxonomy on the Libyan Nuclear Reversal 
Negotiations   
In this section, we build the fit taxonomy for the Libyan NRN. The major focus is to gather 
all the relevant data to describe comprehensively the procedural and substantive 
negotiation problems Washington and Libya faced during the bargaining process.  
To identify the procedural negotiations problems, we will at first survey the motivations of 
the two players with the help of the “interest profile” and the “operational code method” 
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 “P“ stands for “Pakistan“ and indicates a particular design of uranium enrichment centrifuges 
developed for the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. P-2 is the more sophisticated off-shoot of the P-1 
model.  
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(ch. 5.2.1.1 and ch. 5.2.1.2). Based on these results we will apply the “reenactment 
method” we introduced above in order to infer the payoff structure Libya and the United 
States had followed during the bargaining process (ch. 5.2.1.3). Our central finding is the 
disclosure of a “five-stage strategic cascade” of dilemma games which operationalize the 
different shades of the colliding interest, and the distrust trap Washington and Tripoli were 
entangled during the diplomatic struggle on Libya’s nuclear reversal: Deadlock Game (1987-
1989), Imposed Deadlock Dame (1990 - March 2003), Alibi Game (March - December 2003), 
again an Alibi Game (December 2003), Biased Stag Hunt Game (2004 - 2011). This “strategic 
cascade” signifies in our fit taxonomy the most comprehensive “diagnosis” of the 
procedural problem dimension in the Libyan NRN. It is a crucial analytical tool to study the 
“fit performance” of the applied diplomatic design elements (see ch. 5.3).  
In order to grasp the substantial problem dimension, we analyze the nature and scope of 
Libya’s nuclear weapons program through the lens of the public bad approach (ch. 5.2.2). 
Apart from specifying the “negative externalities” of the Libyan nuclear bad (ch. 5.2.2.1), 
we will elaborate as well on its “supply” and its “demand side” in order to provide a 
detailed description of the “negotiation issue” which underlay the U.S.-Libyan bargaining 
process (ch. 5.2.2.2 and ch. 5.2.2.3). We will reveal that the Libyan nuclear weapons 
program was, in essence, a “threshold bad” aggregated by the “best-shot logic” and 
embedded in a larger “fabrication chain” which was oriented towards the realization of two 
“final goods”: security and prestige. Together with the “five-stage strategic cascade” this 
very structure of the Libyan nuclear bad is likewise essential for the later analysis of the “fit 
performance” of the diplomatic design.  
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5.2.1 The Procedural Problem Dimension: A Five-Stage Cascade of 
Social Traps 
The “reenactment method” is essential to identify the “strategic cascade” of social traps 
operationalized in our fit taxonomy by five consecutive dilemma games. Particularly, in the 
pre-agreement phase, it prevented us from misinterpretation and false inference regarding 
Washington’s and Tripoli’s preferences. For example, if we had not applied the 
“reenactment method” but instead had tried to deduce the Libya’s and the United States’ 
payoff structure directly from their surveyed desires, we would have – in all probability – 
not disclosed that both players were entangled during spring and summer 2003 in a so-
called Alibi Game – a strategic constellation widely neglected in IR research.  
However, the “reenactment method” is heavily dependent on the survey of the involved 
actors’ motivations. The mapping of their intentions is the essential precondition for 
applying the “reenactment method”. In the case of the United States, we were fortunate to 
encounter solid data which allowed the disclosure a relatively comprehensive and complete 
picture about the desires Washington held during the Libyan NRN. In press releases, 
interviews, Congressional Hearings, and memoirs of former decision makers, we found 
ample evidence of the United States intentions. Applying the method of “interest profiling” 
provided us therefore with comprehensive insights and allowed a straightforward 
application of the “reenactment method.”  
However, with regard to Libya, the situation was different. Here the data was thin, and the 
quality of the available documents and sources was more limited. Consequentially, we were 
uncertain whether the “interest profiling” would lead to a coherent and reliable description 
of the Qaddafi regime’s desires. A distorted picture of the Libya’s motivation would have 
also led to misinterpretation and false conclusion in the “reenactment method”. To reduce 
this risk, we crosschecked – following the logic of triangulation (ch. 4.1) – the findings 
stemming from the “interest profile” with the help of the “operational code analysis.” 
Unlike the mapping of Washington’s motivation, the specific data situation of the Libyan 
case requires that we established a “second bottom line” and applied these two survey 
methods in parallel. Since the “interest profiling” and the “operational code analysis” 
follows distinct logics and build on different types of data, the triangulation between these 
two approaches is relatively unproblematic.  
5.2.1.1 Operational Code Analysis: A Survey on Muammar al-Qaddafi’s Beliefs  
In the methodic chapter we have already introduced the three decisive categories that are 
crucial for the “operational code analysis” in order to determine the worldviews of foreign 
policy leaders: (a) “the nature of the political universe”(P1), (b) “control over history” (P4), 
(c) and “best strategic direction for action” (I1). Based on these criteria, scholars have 
developed four principle types of foreign policy belief systems and each characterized by 
particular strategic posture: the type A, B, C and DEF worldview (Figure 16). In our survey of 
Muammar al-Qaddafi’s operational codes, we will follow the same structure. As we will 
show in detail in the following section, Muammar al-Qaddafi’s operational code was 
alternating between a B- and a DEF-type belief system. During the first years of his rule, the 
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Libyan dictator had a relatively positive and benign worldview. By the mid-1970s, his belief 
system, however, shifted into a more confrontational mode only to return by the late 1980s 
to the original DEF-type foreign policy (see Figure).222  
Figure 18: Chronology of Muammar al-Qaddafi's Worldviews  
 
 
 
However, there is one important precondition to the “operational code” analysis. It is 
crucial that the decision maker who is studied by this method has the capability to shape 
foreign policy. Obviously, the belief system of actors who have little concrete influence 
regarding decision making is of little relevance for the analysis of practical politics. 
In the Libyan case, this particular requirement was undoubtedly met given that Muammar 
al-Qaddafi was the uncontested and most central player in Libya’s foreign policy. Libya’s 
external affairs were shaped to a considerable extent by Muammar al-Qaddafi’s personality 
and his individual world view (see e.g. Brill 1988: 11; Niblock 2002: 219; Ronen 2008: 201; 
Solomon & Swart 2005: 470; Zartman & Kluge 1991: 245). Libya was in essence run like a 
“private fiefdom” (Mark 2002: 14). Muammar al-Qaddafi did determine not only the goals 
of Tripoli's foreign policy by his personal mindset and ideological framework but also 
influenced the operational style of Libya’s external relations. While the Qaddafi regime’s 
external relations were also influenced by bureaucratic players – such as the “Liaison 
Committee of the Revolutionary Committees” (i.e. the central authority of the 
revolutionary committees) and the “Secretariat for Foreign Liaison” (i.e. the Libyan foreign 
ministry) – the clout of these actors depended to a large extent on their personal loyalty to 
Muammar al-Qaddafi. Only those who belonged to Qaddafi’s handpicked private entourage 
(known in Libya as the rijal al-khaimah) – mainly recruited from the “Free Officers’ 
Movement” and the “Revolutionary Youth” – had a say in Tripoli’s foreign policy (Niblock 
2002: 220-1).223 
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 It is important to note that our findings about Muammar al-Qaddafi’s belief system were recently 
supported by the analysis conducted by Kelly O’Reilly. Although O’Reilly used the quantitative VBIS-
approach to study the Libyan leader’s worldview, he revealed by and large the same results we achieved 
in our qualitative analysis (O’Reilly 2015). 
223
 Moreover, the large majority of the scholars is united in their rejection of the picture that describes 
Muammar al-Qaddafi as a crazy and erratic personality as he was often depicted by politicians and 
journalists from around the world (see e.g. Niblock 2002: 231; St. John 1987: 143; Solomon & Swart 2005: 
470). Qaddafi was for example dubbed a „rogue criminal” (Henry Kissinger), “the mad dog of the Middle 
East” (Ronald Reagan), “reckless adventurer” (Fidel Castro) and as “a split personality – both evil” (the 
Sudanese President Nimeiry) (Lemarchand 1988b: 1-15). While Muammar al-Qaddafi was certainly an 
eccentric personality and often showed tactical flexibly when confronted with foreign policy problems, 
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To analyze the worldview of Muammar al-Qaddafi, we selected 83 documents out of a 
collection of a total of 273 documents.224 The selection was driven by the criterion whether 
the documents contained speech acts by Muammar al-Qaddafi in which he described his 
general view on the nature of politics, strategy, and the international system. These 
documents were analyzed and coded with the help of MaxQda (see Annex 3). The sample 
period (1970-2010) goes beyond the period of the Libya NRN. However, we decided to code 
also the 1970s and 1980s in order to gain a full picture of the historical trajectory of 
Muammar al-Qaddafi’s belief system. The expression made by the Libyan leader in the 
three decisive categories (“nature of the political universe” (P1), “control over history” (P4) 
and “best strategic direction for action” (I1)) were evaluated along a continuum containing 
four positive and for negative categories. We thereby follow the four-field typology of 
“operational codes” originally introduced by Stephen Walker (see ch. 4.2.2). As shown in 
Figure, most of the expression Muammar al-Qaddafi made regarding his beliefs had a 
clearly negative connotation.  
In the following section, we will give a brief overview of the three decisive categories (P1, 
P4, and I1) we applied in the mapping of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s operational codes.  
A) The Nature of Politics is Hostile and Confrontational (P1)  
Throughout the four decades of his autocratic reign, Muammar al-Qaddafi indulged the 
belief that the political sphere is inherently hostile and inevitable prone to conflict and 
confrontation. Speaking in terms of IR theories one could say that Muammar al-Qaddafi 
was with every fiber of his being a realist. His political thinking was strongly influenced by 
the concepts of sovereignty and national self-determination. In his youth, he was socialized 
with the ideas of the anti-colonialist liberation movements and in particular with the 
thoughts of his political idol the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (Brill 1988: 25-9; 
Ronen 2008: 82; Vandewalle 2006: 131). Consequentially, the nature of politics was in 
Qaddafi’s eyes the ongoing struggle between suppressed nations and (neo-colonialist 
forces) – which were in his view primarily personalized by the United States and Israel. In 
the “Green Book” – a pamphlet containing the major political thoughts of the Libyan 
leaders – he explains, for example, that:  
[The] existence of a national identity is the basis for the survival of nations (…) [N]ational 
struggle (…) is the primary driving force in the movement of history; it is the essential 
factor, the fundamental factor, and therefore the strongest of all other factors. [It] (…) 
will not cease to occur until every group is liberated from the domination or another” 
(Qaddafi [1972] 2005: 54).  
 
The fight between (neo-) colonialist and anti-colonialist forces was in Muammar al-
Qaddafi’s view, not a modern phenomenon but signified a centuries-long struggle. In an 
                                                                             
basically all scholars knowledgeable of Libya’s politics have nevertheless described his harsh rule over 
Libya as coherent and rational since it was stringently shaped by his ideological tenet mainly composed of 
Pan-Arabism, Islamic renewal, and anti-imperialism.  
224
 This mentioned collection of documents contained (1) sources stemming from the CIA run Foreign 
Broad Cast Information System (FBIS), (2) interviews the Libyan leader had given to various newspapers, 
(3) writings Muammar al-Qaddafi had published (such as his famous “Green Book”), and (4) collections of 
his speeches and essays (Annex 3).  
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interview given in the early 1990s, he said for example that “[w]estern tyranny against the 
Arab world is nothing new (…) The West has always belittled Arab civilization and ravished 
the Arab lands” (Interview with Budapest Reform, FBIS-NES-92-084, April 1992, Annex 3). 
And at another occasion he explained that the “Arab nation is in a state of confrontation 
against colonialism (…) we passed through many stages of colonialism, beginning with the 
Crusaders” (Interview, Dubayy Space Channel TV, FBIS-NES-96-061, March 1996, Annex 3).  
But not only Qaddafi’s reading of the past, but also his prospect of the future was gloomy 
and pessimistic. When the Cold War came to an end, the Libyan leader was not expecting 
the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992). He was not envisioning a new peaceful era of 
international affairs. In consistent with what he believed to be the very nature of the 
political universe, al-Qaddafi rather expected that “the North will throw itself into a new 
colonization campaign, which will result in sharp competition among the countries of the 
Northern hemisphere (…) just like in World War I, and subsequently in World War II”. 
South-North cooperation was in his view “nothing but fairy tales. The North wants to 
colonize and exploit the South and not offer effective assistance” (Interview with Vienna 
Domestic Service, August 1990, see Annex 3).225 
It is in particular noteworthy that Muammar al-Qaddafi was upholding his belief of the 
inherent hostile and confrontation-prone nature of politics even in the late 2000s when 
most of the conflicts with the West had been removed, and the Libyan-American 
rapprochement had been initiated. For example, in a speech al-Qaddafi delivered to 
students at Oxford University in May 2007, he made, for example, clear that in his view 
“colonialism” remained the major source of conflict:  “There is a colonialism that imposes 
itself by force and another that uses gentler methods. There is a soft and a harsh 
colonialism. But in the final analysis, colonialism is one and the same” (Qaddafi: Oxford 
University, May 2007, Annex 3).  
B) Control over History: From Pessimism to Optimism and Back (P-4) 
While the Libyan dictator’s belief in the hostility of the political universe remained by and 
large stable throughout the entire sampling period (1970-2010), his view on the ability to 
influence historical trends and events was subjected to change and alternations. In essence, 
it is owing to the shift within this particular operational code (P4) that we saw the back-
and-forth swinging between the DEF-type and the B-type belief system (Figure). 
                            
225
 In hindsight it appears that the ethnic-political conflicts that raged in the 1990s on the Balkans, Africa 
and the former USSR have even further strengthen al-Qaddafi’s belief in roots and causes of inevitable 
struggle for national liberation and self-determination. Already in his Green Book, al-Qaddafi explained 
that political structures which are “comprised by more than one nation” will be “(…) ripped apart as each 
nation obtains its separate national independence” (Qaddafi [1972] 2005: 62). Consequentially, he 
expected that the United States which he depicted first and foremost as a multi-ethnical entity would slip 
one day into an ethnic-political warfare. For example, in an interview given in Vienna al-Qaddafi said that 
all “regimes that are based on ideology, religion, or the military will fall apart – under the pressure of 
nationalist conflicts (…) What is currently taking place in the USSR will be repeated in the United States. 
There the Blacks, the Indians, the Whites, and the American Jews will struggle for their independence. 
This is why it is possible that a civil war will break out in the United States, because of the nationalist 
tendencies” (Qaddafi interviewed in Vienna, FBIS-NES-90-157, August 1990; see Annex 3). 
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The young Qaddafi had a relatively pessimistic view of the ability to alter the general 
historic trend. In all probability, this view had deeply rooted ideological causes. First, he 
strongly believed that in light of general trends and processes – such as the inevitable 
struggle for national liberation – active and purposeful actions with the aim to shape 
history were futile. Second, Muammar al-Qaddafi ascribed at that time to Libya only a 
minor role in world politics. In the view of the young Libyan dictator, the North African 
country was not a meaningful player. Instead, he perceived Egypt – ruled at that time 
Qaddafi’s political idol Gamal Abdel Nasser – as the uncontested Arab lead nation. In 
essence, Qaddafi was an ardent Nasserist.226 He saw the Egyptian president as the rightful 
Arab leader (Burgat 1988: 21-22; El-Kikhia 1997: 112-124; Ronen 2008: 105-106; Zartman & 
Kluge 1991: 238). According to Qaddafi’s perspective, it was not Libya but Egypt that was 
regarded as the “essential nucleus of an Arab union” (St. John 1987: 50). Tellingly, the first 
verbal note Qaddafi conveyed to President Nasser immediately after the successful coup in 
September 1969 via Nasser’s close confident, Mohammed Heikal, is illustratively expressing 
Libya’s self-chosen submission to Egypt:  
“We [the Libyans] have hundreds of miles of Mediterranean coastline; we have the 
airfields; we have money; we have everything! Tell President Nasser we made this 
revolution for him. He can take everything of ours and add it to the rest of the Arab 
world’s resources to be used for the battle” (Heikal 1975: 70).227 
 
By the mid-1970s, it appears that the Libyan leader, however, started more and more to 
abandon his pessimistic view on his ability to control history. Instead, Muammar al-Qaddafi 
adopted a more confident and optimistic perspective. For nearly one decade until the late 
1980s, al-Qaddafi was indulging the conviction that he indeed could change the course of 
history and that it was Libya’s destiny to act as the vanguard for the liberation of the 
suppressed masses of the Third World in general and the Arab countries in particular. The 
Libyan leader had the ambition to play in the same league as the big powers and portrayed 
himself as the “defender of the Arab homeland” (St. John 1987: 26). An important 
explanation for that shift in al-Qaddafi’s operational code which in effect lead to a more 
aggressive and adventurous B-type foreign policy was the death of the Egyptian President 
Nasser and evolving friction with Anwar as-Sadat – the new leader in Cairo. Cultivating a 
deeply rooted dislike for Sadat, the Libyan dictator came to the conclusion that he was the 
true successor of Nasser’s and that it was upon him to fulfill the heritage of his political idol 
(El-Kikhia 1997: 112; Zartman& Kluge 1991: 238; Wright 1981: 156-159; St. John 1987: 26). 
                            
226
 Qaddafi was already during his schooldays inspired by the writings and speeches of Nasser and his idea 
of Pan-Arabism. It is assume that the 1969 coup against the King Idris was to a certain extent motivated by 
the frustration that the Libyan monarch was not strictly following Nasser’s example. Tellingly, after having 
seized control over Libya, Qaddafi used to literally repeat Nasser’s speeches– a habit that caused 
amusement among other Arab leaders (St. John 1987: 153). 
227
 In the following years we encounter numerous similar references by the young Libyan dictator. In 1974 
he expressed, for example the admiration for his neighboring country in the following words: “Egypt 
always offers numerous sacrifices without getting exhausted, and its people still offer thousands in the 
struggle for the sake of the Arab nation. I have already said that Egypt was the first citadel of 
confrontation” (“The Ramadan War” in Qaddafi 1976). And in the same year he said in an interview given 
a Yugoslavian Newspaper: “In the opinion of all Arab youth, Abdul Nasser is the only man in modern Arab 
history that was able to embody the hopes and aspirations of the Arab nation for a better, stronger and 
unified life” (Interview with Daran Janikovic, Zagreb, Qaddafi 1976).  
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At that time, we encounter in Qaddafi’s speech acts numerous reference expressing the 
belief of Libya’s decisive role in world politics. In an interview given with the Arab 
newspaper Al-Watan he said, for example: “For the sake of achieving Arab unity, Libya is 
shouldering its responsibilities in this direction and will play a practical role in this regard” 
(Al-Watan, FBIS-MEA-82-221, Nov. 1982, Annex 3). At that time, Muammar al-Qaddafi 
constantly called on Libya’s neighboring Arab countries to unite with Libya for a more active 
role in world politics. On the occasion of the Libyan national holiday, he said for example in 
September 1982:  “Brothers, we are capable of changing the norms. We are capable of 
turning the tables on them. We are capable of creating grave changes in this region” 
(Speech, Anniversary Jamahiriyan, FBIS-MEA-82-043, Annex 3).  
Tellingly, the Qaddafi regime pursued at that time a very active foreign policy and became 
aggressively involved in many conflict scenarios – both on the regional but also on the 
global level. Bruce St. John said for example: “No state in the Arab world since Egypt under 
Nasser has attempted such a multifarious regional and global policy” (St. John 1987: 143). 
Tim Niblock second this assessment by stressing that “Libya has pursued one of the most 
engaged and outgoing foreign policies of the Arab World (…) and has sought actively to 
reshape the dimensions of international politics that affected the countries of the Arab and 
Islamic worlds and of Africa” (2002: 213). Boosted by oil wealth Tripoli started several 
military intervention in Chad (1978 to 1987) and Uganda (1972 and again 1977-8),228 began 
to confront the United States at every possible occasion,229 and became the world most 
active  sponsor of guerilla and terrorist groups – among them the PLO, the Japanese Red 
Army, the German RAF, or the IRA.230 However, the most prominent expression for shaping 
the geopolitical map of the Middle East was certainly al-Qaddafi’s continued efforts for 
pan-Arabic unification – an initiative that the Libyan leaders regarded as the legacy of 
President Nasser. Altogether the North African country undertook six unsuccessful 
attempts to unify with other Arab states in order to achieve the ideal of Pan-Arabism (El-
Kikhia 1997: 118; Brill 1988; St. John 2011: 115).231 
However, in the late 1980s Muammar al-Qaddafi’s returned to the pessimistic view he had 
indulged in the early 1970s. He retrieved the assumption held at the beginning of this rule 
that it was, in the end, broader trends and major political events that shaped history 
(Figure). At that time, we encounter more and more references in the Libyan leader’s 
speech acts indicating that he had little hope to shape or even control historic dynamics. In 
an interview with given in 1989, Muammar al-Qaddafi said, for example: “We are not the 
                            
228
 For a detailed description of the Libya’s support for the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin see: Foltz 1988; 
Ronen 2006: 145-56.  
229
 Since Tripoli claimed sovereign rights far beyond the national waters, it came to numerous skirmish 
between Libyan forces and U.S. navy in the Gulf of Sirte in 1982, 1985, and 1986 (Ronen 2008: 157). 
230
 What initially started as a support for anti-colonial and liberation movements, turned quickly into a 
confusing financing and training machinery for hundreds of violent guerilla and terrorist groups (Collins 
2004; Vandewalle 2006: 132; Prunckun & Mohr 1997). According to Brain Davis, Libya trained in the 1980s 
7.000 to 8.000 terrorists and guerillas per year in special camps at the Libyan Sahara (Davis 1990: 10-11). 
Between 1979 and 1993 around 30 states were affected by terrorist acts which directly or indirectly were 
linked to Libya (Martinez 2007: 56). 
231
 (1) “Tripoli Charter” 1969 (with Egypt and Sudan)  (2) “Benghazi Treaty” 1971 (with Egypt and Syria) (3) 
“Hassi Messoud Accords” 1973 (with Egypt and Syria) (4) “Djebar Treaty” 1974 (with Tunisia) (5)  “Tripoli 
Communique” 1981 (with Chad) (6) “Oujda Treaty” 1984 (with Morocco)   
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ones who have made the world the way it is. The dialectics of the conflict will produce the 
result” (Interview with Al-Hawadith, FBIS-NES-89-124, Annex 3). Libya was not anymore 
portrayed as the Arab lead nation. Instead, Muammar al-Qaddafi became more self-critical 
regarding his previous claims. In a speech delivered in 2004, he said for example: “Libya 
must be a model. However, it seems that we Libyans find it difficult to be a model (…) I do 
not know exactly why but if we analyze the question the reasons maybe because the 
(Libyan) people were educated only recently and were illiterate not so long ago or maybe 
because we are Bedouin people (…)” (Tripoli TV, FBIS-Nes-2004-0901).  
Qaddafi’s retrieved humility is also indicated by the fact that the Libyan dictator attached at 
that time growing importance to not be regarded as a leader or a political figure. He rather 
preferred to portray himself as an “intellectual” or a “spin doctor” of the future Libyan 
society. In 1992 he said for example: “I am not a head of state. I am reading a lot. I am a 
member of the Academy of Social Sciences” (Interview with Budapest REFORM, FBIS-NES-
92-084, April 1992, Annex 3). And in 2007 he clarified that he saw himself neither as “a 
politician nor a diplomat [but as] (…) the leader of a revolution and a social reformer” 
(Qaddafi, May 2007, Annex 3).  Qaddafi’s self-restraint could be seen as another discursive 
indication that the Libyan leader had abandoned the hubris of Libya as an emerging Arab 
power he had indulged in the 1970s and early 1980s.  
C) A Fraying Priority for Confrontation (I-1) 
The general “direction of strategic actions” (I-1) is the third central component that is 
regularly used to determine the belief system of foreign policy leaders. If we analyze the 
speeches, interviews, and writings of the Libyan dictator along this line, we find that 
Muammar al-Qaddafi showed almost the entire sampling period a priority for conflict. Only 
towards the end of the 1990s his preference for confrontation started to fray. However, 
this improvement was too little to initiate any major shift regarding the Libyan leader’s 
world view (Figure). 
For long stretches of his reign over the North African country, al-Qaddafi saw confrontation 
and not cooperation as the best strategy to handle political problems. Perceiving himself 
first and foremost as a revolutionary, it was little astonishing that he regarded military force 
as a crucial tool of foreign policy (Solomon & Swarte 2005: 472). Moreover, since al-Qaddafi 
and most of his entourage had a military background, it is little astonishing that the 
“political and the military realms were intimately intertwined” (Foltz 1988: 52). Since 
conflict and violence were central elements in al-Qaddafi’s belief, we find numerous 
references to this view in his speech acts. In an interview with the Arabic newspaper al 
Hayah, the Libyan leaders said, for example, “Frankly, as a revolutionary, I am against sick 
stability (…) Instability is better than having an Arab state that is subservient to the West 
and Israel” (Interviewed al-Hayah, FBIS-NES-94-102, 26th May 1994). By the same token, it 
appears that al-Qaddafi firmly believed that much of the recent foreign policy failures of 
the Arab nations were rooted in the fact that violence had been applied too cautiously. In 
the late 1970s, he said that the general:  
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“[P]roblem of the Arabs is that they want again and again to enter into a quarter of a 
battle, half a battle, and two-thirds of a battle. Of course, this is unacceptable in the 
concept of war aimed at a complete victory (…) Real meaning of war [is that there is] 
no reconciliation, no peace, no mercy, no understanding and no civility (“The 
Ramadan War, Qaddafi (1976), Annex 3).232    
 
It seems that in al-Qaddafi’s mindset the unrestricted recur to violence was legitimized as a 
means of self-defense for those acting from a position of weakness. In the early 1980s, the 
Libyan dictator made in that regards a revealing statement depicting violent resistance as a 
means without alternative: “What more can happen to us if we fought America, and what 
other sort of disaster can hit us if we antagonize America or the devil? We are defeated, 
torn apart, expelled, our land is occupied, our honor is tread upon, or dignity is injured” 
(Speech before Opposition movement, FBIS-MEA-83-024, 3rd Feb. 1983, Annex 3).233 
It is little astonishing that Muammar al-Qaddafi’s esteem for violence found reflection in 
Libya’s aggressive foreign policy. Not only in the intensifying struggle with the United States 
but almost in all other geopolitical theater, Tripoli showed little restraint and recurred 
swiftly to military means.234 Libya made numerous efforts to destabilize several countries in 
Sub-Sahara Africa,235 intensified by the early 1980s its intervention in Chad, augmented 
significantly its military spending,236 became more blatant in claiming territorial rights in the 
Southern Mediterranean,237 and entered into a four-day border war with Egypt in July 1977 
                            
232
 It is little astonishing that the Middle East conflict signified a central theme for al-Qaddafi’s I-1 related 
speech acts. We encounter throughout the 1970s and 1980s numerous calls for a violent Palestinian 
insurgence against Israel. In the late 1976 the Libyan dictator was reported to have said the following 
quote: “cease-fire, peace, negotiations, withdrawals, the Security Council, America, Russia – all that, I 
believe, are not means to an end; they are temporary solution and sedatives; the clash [between Israelis 
and Palestinians] remains inevitable (“The Ramadan War, Qaddafi (1976), Annex 3). A decade later he had 
obviously not changed his view since he said: “There is no solution. The only solution would be to have all 
Jews who were not born in Palestine return to where they came from.” (Interview with Der Kurier, FBIS-
MEA-86-016, Jan. 1986, Annex 3).  
233
 Against that background it is little astonishing that al-Qaddafi used the same argumentation to 
legitimize the use to terrorism: it was the weapon of the weak that had no other mean to defend 
themselves. In the mid-1980s he said for example during an interview with ABC “we [the Libyans] 
denounce terrorism as an act of aggression against the innocent, but we differentiate between terrorism 
and legitimate struggle for freedom” (Interviewed by ABC, FBIS-MEA-84-230, 28th Nov. 1984).   
234
 At that point we have to mention that Tim Niblock and Mary-Jane Deep have come to the opposite 
conclusion that the aggression in Libya’s foreign policy was not augmenting but decreasing by the late 
1970s (Niblock 2002: 225; Deeb 1991:117-120). We admit that Libya indeed lowered its confrontational 
profile in the inter-Arab relation by the late 1970s. However, the conclusion that Libya reduced its violent 
stance in general and vis-à-vis the United States in particular is simply not supported by the historic facts.  
235
 By the late 1970s and early 1980s Libya extended its military training and support for opposition 
groups in numerous African states: Burkina Faso (1982-3), Gambia (1981), Niger (1976), Mali (1982), 
Tunisia (1980-4), Somalia (1978-85), Sudan (1975-85), Western Sahara (1976-84), and Zaire (1976-86) (see 
Lemarcharnd 1988; Solomon & Swart 2005: 472). Libya was involved in at least two attempted coups 
d’états against Sudanese President Nimeiry (in fall 1975 and summer 1976). Moreover, the Qaddafi 
regime tried at that time to interfere – mainly through development aid attached to political conditions 
(such as the Jihad Fund)
 
– into the internal affairs of numerous political weak and impoverished sub-
Saharan states, primarily those with Muslim proportion in their national population (Ronen 2006: 145-56; 
El-Kikhia 1997; St. John 1988; Lemarchand 1988a).  
236
 Libya raised its military expenditure from $709 Million in 1982 to $1,149 Million in 1984 – i.e. from 
16.7% to 23.6% of the Libyan state budget (Vandewalle 2006: 131).  
237
 In blatant contradiction with international treaties and conventions, the Qaddafi regime declared a 100 
mile air radius around Tripoli as restricted area and claimed that Libyan territorial waters in the Gulf of 
Sirte would stretch until the 32°30’ latitude (Brill 1988: 59-64; Davis 1990: 14; Ronen 2008: 12). In similar 
vein, Libya picked a quarrel with Malta by 1973 upon the demarcation of the two countries continental 
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(Davis 1990: 10-11; El-Kikhia 1997: 121; Lemarchand 1988b; Pienaar 2008; Ronen 2008: 
166-170; Vandewalle 2006: 131).  
Growing hostility in the external affairs was also mirrored by increasing revolutionary zeal 
in domestic politics starting by the late 1970s. Particularly in the year 1977s, the Qaddafi 
regime undertook substantial efforts to achieve the ideological aim of the Jamahiriya (i.e. a 
state of the masses) which would – in the view of Muammar al-Qaddafi and the power elite 
in Tripoli – substitute the antiquated system of conventional government. By the 
Declaration of People’s Authority in January 1977 the transfer of all power to People’s 
Committees was decided. A system of Revolutionary Committees was established in the 
same year (Niblock 2002: 225). By the late 1970s and 1980s, Tripoli intensified the pressure 
on Libyan opposition groups formed among exile Libyans living abroad. In the so-called 
“stray dog” campaign the critics of the Qaddafi regime – many of them in Western 
countries – were threatened with execution (St. John 2011: 126, St. John 1987: 81).  
By the mid-1990s, we, however, saw that al-Qaddafi’s preference for confrontation was 
slowly losing importance. Around that time, the Libyan dictator appeared to have 
developed more esteem for non-violent instruments of problem solution such as 
negotiation, diplomacy, and mediation (Figure). 
This shift, which was however not strong enough to cause a substantial change in the 
Libyan dictator’s belief system, also found resonance in his speech acts. In a statement 
aired on Tripoli TV, Muammar al-Qaddafi said for example: “We must try to maintain our 
relations with others, and not turn back the page again. Nations must understand the other 
side. There is a lack of mutual trust for historical reasons, but this must be overcome” 
(Speech delivered on Tripoli TV, FBIS-Nes-2004-0901, August 2004). Talking about the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Qaddafi started by the late 1990s to plea for a peaceful solution 
of a joint nation state which he called “Isratine” – a proposal that stood in stark contrast to 
harsh anti-Israel rhetoric he had used in the decades before. In that regard, he said in 2007: 
“The solution is an establishment of a single state for both groups. We must rid ourselves of 
the culture of religious, linguistic, and ethnic racism. This is the culture of the old guard. But 
the youth in Israel and Palestine want peace, want a single state, want to travel and trade 
and have a normal life” (Qaddafi, 16th May 2007, Annex 3). 
Muammar al-Qaddafi’s more benign worldview appears to have had also resonance in 
Libya’s foreign policy. In the 1990s, Tripoli “tried its hand” at several negotiation and 
mediation initiatives. Particularly, concerning the Lockerbie conflict and the UN sanctions 
imposed on Libya, Tripoli learned that cooperation and diplomacy could shift international 
community’s opinion in favor of the Qaddafi regime. Libya’s rehabilitation in the late 1990s 
was in many respects the result of a successful “charm offensive” Tripoli. Shortly after the 
UN sanctions were imposed on Libya, the Qaddafi regime reached out globally to sway 
opinions and was eventually able to forge a broad coalition of supporter that requested to 
undo the multilateral pressure (e.g. Matar & Khalil 2004: 128, 160; St. John 2003: 264-5; 
                                                                             
terrace. The quarrel which was fueled by Malta’s plans for offshore oil drilling was not settled before 1985 
when the International Court of Justice in Den Haag decided a solution (Brill 1988: 64-69). 
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Niblock 2001: 43-49; Reynolds & Wan 2012). But Tripoli’s new preference for cooperation, 
mediation, and diplomacy also materialized in other fields. Starting by the mid-1990s, the 
Qaddafi regime undertook numerous mediation and conflict resolution efforts – primarily 
on the African continent. For instance, in 1998 Libya made an attempt to solve the conflict 
between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo and in the same year it mediated 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 1999 Libya hosted a five-nation peace conference to find 
the solution to the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and made mediation efforts in 
the civil war in Sierra Leone. Moreover, in 2000 Tripoli played an active role in the hostage 
negotiation with the Philippine fundamentalist terror organization, Abu Sayyaf, which had 
kidnaped several Western tourists (Ronen 2008: 187-188; St. John 2002: 177). 
5.2.1.2 Interest Profiling 
Now that we have completed the “operational code analysis” we turn to the “interest 
profiling” to reveal the strategic desires both players – the United States and Libya – held 
during the bargaining process.  
A) Washington’s Strategic Desire towards the Qaddafi Regime  
The strategic desires Washington’s pursued in its policy towards the Qaddafi regime were 
not specific to the WMD issue. Rather, they signified an integral part of the general 
American-Libyan relationship which was throughout the time of the diplomatic 
engagement on Libya’s WMD programs primarily marked by hostility, confrontation, and 
antagonism. With the method of “interest profiling,” we revealed not only the substance of 
what Washington had wanted to achieve in the diplomatic struggle with Tripoli but also 
how its strategic desires changed over time. It is noteworthy that the “rhythm” of strategic 
shifts were not following the frequency of newly incoming presidencies. Desires that span 
across two or more presidency where more common that strategic shifts triggered by new 
incoming administrations (see Figure 19).   
(i) From the September Revolution 1969 to Ronald Reagan  
When Muammar al-Qaddafi and his comrades dethroned King Idriss of Libya in the 
bloodless putsch in September 1969, Washington was at first inclined to show goodwill and 
trust to the new Libyan leadership despite its revolutionary zeal. The U.S. pursued at that 
time a Middle East policy that was focused on containing the spread of communism. The 
aim was to curb the Soviet influence without entering into direct confrontation with 
Moscow (e.g. Reich 1979: 6-8; Tillman 1982: 123-274). Since the Nixon administration 
correctly interpreted the new power circle in Tripoli as a band of young anti-communist 
nationalists that were primarily inspired by the ideas of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Washington 
reacted rather calm and unexcited upon the events in the North African petro-state (e.g. 
Cooley 1982: 13-14; Miller 1996: 215; Haley 1984: 24; Arnold 1996: 89; El-Warfally 1988: 
76-77).238 In light of that general geopolitical climate, Washington initially established with 
                            
238
 Muammar al-Qaddafi had indeed an anti-communist inclination. Since he rejected all interference into 
regional and domestic politics by all superpowers, he was not only critical to the U.S. but also with the 
Soviet Union. In addition, his strong Islamic background brought him into opposition to the atheistic and 
anti-clerical communist ideology (e.g. Ronen 2008:81-104). The alignment with the USSR started not 
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the Qaddafi regime a pragmatic working relation and was willing to benevolent overlook 
the growing radicalization of Tripoli’s foreign policy.239 For the first years, the Qaddafi 
regime’s anti-communism functioned as a pillar of stability in the American-Libyan 
relationship.  
Figure 19: U.S. Strategic Desires towards the Qaddafi Regime 
 
 
 
 
 
While the Nixon administration’s “detached objectivity” (St. John 2002: 104) towards the 
Qaddafi regime became more and more porous,240 the crucial turning point in Washington’s 
Libya policy was not reach before mid-1973 when Tripoli had eventually exhausted its 
credit of trust and goodwill initially granted by the United States (St. John 2002: 5, 106). At 
that point, Washington started to admit that the Qaddafi regime poses a security threat. 
The objective to establish a pragmatic working relation with Tripoli was abandoned, and a 
new strategic desire emerged on the U.S. agenda which remained present until early 2004: 
Preventing and contain Libya’s aggression (Figure 19).  
Correspondingly, the U.S. pressure on Libya was constantly ratcheted up by mid-1973 to 
curb the Qaddafi regime's influence in the region and to induce a more moderate foreign 
policy behavior in Tripoli.241 In mid-1976 the Ford administration for the first time publically 
accused Libya of its support and financing of international terrorism. In early 1977 the 
Pentagon listed Libya together with other states such as Cuba and North Korea as a 
potential enemy of the United States (Cooley 1982: 37-8; Wright 1981: 215). Reflecting the 
constantly deteriorating American-Libyan relationship, President Carter eventually said at a 
                                                                             
before the 1980s and had a purely pragmatic nature. When the relation with the West became tense, 
Libya was on the search for a reliable arms supplier. However, the Qaddafi regime was at no time a 
“Soviet puppet regime” as it was later claimed by the Ronald Reagan administration. Correspondingly, 
Moscow never intervened in support for the Qaddafi regime when direct confrontation between 
Washington and Tripoli loomed ahead.  
239
 The push for a more confrontational stance towards Libya by the National Security Henry Kissinger was 
rejected by the majority of the Nixon administration with the argument that such a strategy would drive 
the Tripoli into the arms of the Soviets (Kissinger 1982: 859-60).  
240
 Exemplary for this shift towards a more realistic view on Tripoli was, for example, the statement issued 
by Assistant Secretary David D. Newsom in July 1972 in a hearing before the House Subcommittees on 
African and Near East Relations, saying: [A]lthough strongly anti-Communist, the regime is at the same 
time cool to the United States” (U.S. Congress 1972). 
241
 The down-grading of U.S. diplomatic representation to Libya from the ambassador level to the rank of 
a chargé d’affair in early 1973 was the first direct signal of disapproval sent by Washington. In the same 
year the delivery of eight C-130 aircrafts to Libya were blocked although Tripoli had already paid for these 
plans. And in January 1975 Washington stopped the sale of an air defense system to Libya and refused the 
entry of Libyan trainees into the US aircraft maintenance training (St. John 2002: 108).  
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press conference in August 1980 that “[t]here are few governments in the world with which 
we have more sharp and frequent policy differences” (U.S. National Archives 1982: 1477).  
It is important to note, however, that the U.S.-Libyan confrontation was clearly focused on 
security related issues – such as the struggle about geopolitical spheres of influence or the 
support of international terrorism and liberation movements. The U.S.-Libyan economic 
and social relations remained for a relatively long time unaffected.  Before the Washington 
imposed unilateral sanctions in the late 1980s, U.S. oil companies enjoyed relatively normal 
business ties with Libya. Tripoli was buying to large amounts of know-how and 
technological products at the U.S. market and a comparable high number of Libyan 
students were enrolled in U.S. universities (Niblock 2002: 226; Vandewlle 2006: 131).  
(ii) From Ronald Reagan to Bush Senior  
When Ronald Reagan became U.S. President in January 1981, the U.S.-Libyan relation took 
a dramatic shift (Haley 1984: 247; St. John 2011: 127). In the eyes of Ronald Reagan and his 
conservative entourage, the out-going Carter-Administration had pursued an overcautious 
foreign policy that had been too soft on the enemies of the United States. Ronald Regan’s 
stated goal to restore U.S. resolve in the world in general and in the Middle East particularly 
affected immediately the ties with the Qaddafi regime (Davis 1990: 38-41; El-Warfally 1988: 
154-5) immediately. Starting by the early 1980s, the coercive policy applied towards Tripoli 
was considerably intensified and was extended by a military dimension.  
The U.S. increased the economic and military support for Libya’s opponents in the region 
(namely Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia), terminated official diplomatic relations with 
Tripoli, engaged more directly in the Chad conflict, and set up in the early 1980s an 
embargo on Libyan oil and on US exports to the North African country (St. John 2011: 127; 
Ronen 2008: 23-25). Moreover, in August 1981 the United States and Libya became for the 
first time embroiled in a brief military confrontation. At the margin of a U.S. Navy exercise 
held in the southern Mediterranean, a skirmish evolved between Libyan and U.S. forces 
which lead to the downing of two Libyan combat aircraft (Litwak 2007: 175; Stanik 2003: 
51-6). This incidence marked the prelude to a series of military clashes between Libya and 
the US in the following years which reach its peak with the “El Dorado Canyon” operation in 
April 1986. In a reaction to the death of two GI who died in the bombing of the Berlin night 
club “La Belle”, prepared and organized by Libyan secret service men, U.S. Navy combat 
aircraft and F-111 bomber launched air raids against several facilities in Tripoli and 
Benghazi (Stanik 2003: 176-205). Apart from a few parked Libyan aircraft, the “El Dorado 
Canyon” operation caused limited military damage to the Qaddafi regime. However, it is 
assumed that in the course of the air raids around one hundred Libyans were wounded or 
killed (St. John 2002: 137, 151; Vandewalle 2006: 142).  
Like the three U.S. administration before, Roland Reagan’s policy towards Libya was 
primarily inspired by the desire to prevent and contain Libya’s aggressive foreign policy. The 
goal to curb the Qaddafi regime’s involvement in terrorism and its subversive foreign policy 
in the North African region remained unchanged – although the measures to achieve this 
objective intensified (Litwak 2007: 174; St. John 2002: 122).  
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However, the Ronald Reagan administration pursued additional desires (Figure 19). First, 
Washington tried to orchestrate a regime in Tripoli. It was reported that already at the first 
days of his presidency Ronald Reagan and his advisors weighed different options to 
dethrone Muammar al-Qaddafi,  who Reagan described as the “mad dog of the Middle 
East” (Davis 1990: 39; Niblock 2002: 227).242 In the early 1980s, the CIA was authorized for 
covered operations that aimed to destabilize the Libyan regime (El-Warfally 1988: 175-8; 
Tyler 1987; Woodward 1985). These clandestine actions included the spread of 
disinformation and propaganda, sabotage commandos, and support for various dissident 
groups.  In 1984, an internal CIA report, which was leaked to the press, drew the conclusion 
that “no course of action short of stimulating Qaddafi’s fall will bring any significant and 
enduring change in Libyan policies” (Woodward 1985).243 When the United States launched 
in April 1986 the operation “El Dorado Canyon”, the U.S. attacks were also delivered with 
the objective to yield a “decapitation strike” against Muammar al-Qaddafi (Litwak 2007: 
176; Vandewalle 2006: 142). While the air raids in April 1986 were in general planned as a 
punitive military operation to deter future terrorist acts, killing Muammar al-Qaddafi en 
passant was also part of this logic. Apart from numerous military facilities, the U.S. combat 
aircraft were also bombing the Bab al-Aziaziya compound at Tripoli where the Libyan leader 
and his entourage used to reside. While the Brother Leader narrowly escaped the attack, 
his two years old adoptive daughter died.244   
Second, the Reagan administration was driven – in all probability – by a third desire: using 
Libya as a showcase for U.S. anti-terror policy (Figure 19). The 40th U.S. President and his 
advisors were very well aware of the fact that apart from Libya also Iran and Syria were 
involved in the support of terrorist groups. Like Libya, both countries actively searched to 
undermine the U.S. stance in the region. However, small in demographic size, relatively 
isolated in the Arab world, bestowed with little political support by Moscow, and situated in 
a vulnerable strategic location with a long stretched shore at the Mediterranean, Libya 
represented in comparison to Iran and Syria a relatively “easy catch”. Against that 
background, the Reagan administration chose Libya as the ideal candidate to demonstrate 
the renewed American resolve and to apply the so-called Reagan Doctrine, which 
emphasizes the need to roll back the influence of regimes that were hostile to the U.S. (e.g. 
Davis 1990: 39; Ronen 2008: 29; George 1991: 53).  
When George H.W. Bush became U.S. President in 1989, he continued the coercive 
diplomacy towards the Qaddafi regime he inherited by his predecessor (Figure 19). While a 
mounting number of analysts and experts voiced at their time that doubts that continued 
pressure on Libya could induce Muammar al-Qaddafi to change his course but instead 
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 Correspondingly, there are numerous statements from members of the Regan administration which 
also speak the “regime change” language. For example, it was reported that Secretary of State, Alexander 
Haig, regarded the Qaddafi regime as “a cancer that had to be removed”. And already in early 1980s a 
White House spokesperson publicly said that “overthrowing Col. Qaddafi would be the world’s most 
popular crusade” (El-Warfally 1988: 166). 
243
 In addition, numerous reports surfaced during the 1980s that the Reagan administration where even 
pondering upon plans to assassinate Muammar al-Qaddafi (e.g. Wright 1981: 16; Woodward 1985; Zoubir 
2006: 49). 
244 Apart from target killing of Muammar al-Qaddafi the strategic planners in Washington also envisioned 
that the “El Dorado Canyon” operation would spark an uprising by the Libyan people which might likewise 
lead to the dethroning of the Brothers Leader (Byman & Waxman 2002: 94; Litwak 2007: 173).  
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entailed the risk to destabilize the entire region (e.g. Hunter 1992: 19; Miller 1996: 232-33; 
Murphy 1992), the Bush senior administration was eager to justified its unrevised sanction 
politics by pointing out that the Qaddafi regime still represented an unchanged threat to 
the United States and its allies.245 Consequentially, orchestrating a regime change in Tripoli 
remained on the agenda of the Bush administration. For example, in the last months of his 
term in office Ronald Reagan had launched a clandestine military training program in Chad 
supporting several hundreds of exiled Libyans with the objection to destabilizing the 
Qaddafi regime. The Bush administration continued this covered operations until a pro-
Libyan rebel group took over power in Chad and the Libyan volunteers were forced to leave 
the country without having ever been involved in combat with the Libyan army (St. John 
2002: 154, 164-5). However, towards the end of Bush senior’s presidency, the desire to 
topple Muammar al-Qaddafi was slowly phasing out and the covered military projects were 
one after another suspended. It was reported that the Bush administration finally reached 
the conclusion that it “cannot remove the man [Muammar al-Qaddafi] from the outside by 
military means” (e.g. Gideon 1998: 134; Litwak 2007: 177).246  
Apart from slowly abandoning the intention of regime change, the Bush presidency differed 
also from the Reagan administration in the sense that Libya was no longer regarded as the 
ideal showcase for new anti-terrorist policy (see Figure 19). There is no convincing evidence 
available that would suggest that George H.W. Bush picked on the Qaddafi regime to test 
foreign policy strategies and show the world Washington's reawakened assertiveness.  
(iii) Clinton & Bush Junior I: No Regime Change anymore & the Fear to Be too Soft on 
Qaddafi 
While the desire for regime change has lost importance towards the end of the Bush senior 
administration, it was only with the incoming Clinton administration that this strategic 
desire was completely abandoned (Figure 19). In the following years, it was made clear by 
several members of the new administration that Washington had no intention to 
orchestrate Muammar al-Qaddafi’s downfall (e.g. Neumann 2000; St. John 2002: 182). 
But while Bill Clinton had once and for all abandoned the plan of a forced regime change, 
the new presidential administration continued to pursue the goal to curb Libya’s aggressive 
policy – an element of continuity in the U.S. policy towards the Qaddafi regime. Libya was 
still regarded as a serious security risk that needed to be addressed by coercive diplomacy 
(Interview with Indyk, Nov. 2011, Annex 16). As Bruce St. John – one of the most knowledge 
experts on Washington’s policy towards Libya – concluded: “[I]n a virtually seamless 
transition, the Clinton administration from the beginning articulated a policy toward Libya 
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 This perspective was, for example, clearly expressed when a spokesman of the State Department in 
December 1990 who underscored that “Libya’s support for terrorism is nothing new. Libya has been on 
the U.S. Government’s list of state-sponsors of terrorism since 70s. Libya continues to offer extensive 
support to notorious international terrorist groups (…) Just to reiterate our policy, we continue to hold 
terrorists and their state sponsors responsible for acts of terrorism” (U.S. Department of State. 1990). 
246
 As Robert Litwak has pointed out, among other things, Washington was compelled to de-emphasis its 
regime change objective in order to win wide support for the multilateral sanctions against Libya 
established by the UN in the wake of the Lockerbie bombing. Because the U.S. attempt to actively 
destabilize the Qaddafi regime was inconsistent with the policy of almost all UN member states, the Bush 
administration had to lower its profile in that respect (Litwak 2007: 178-9). 
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that was difficult to distinguish in tone or content from that of its predecessor” (St. John 
2002b).  
However, the Clinton administration could not shut its eyes from the fact that the Qaddafi 
regime was slowly changing course during the 1990s.247 Libya was at that time abandoning 
much of the aggressive foreign policy it had pursued beforehand and was sending signals to 
Washington that in favor for a rapprochement with the United States. These changes 
troubled the U.S. policy towards Libya. One the one hand, the Clinton administration had to 
acknowledge the positive steps that Libya was making and had to encourage Tripoli to 
pursue this track further. Despite the prevailing coercive diplomacy towards Libya, the 
Clinton administration was therefore towards the late 1990s cautiously test-driving more 
conciliatory noises towards the Qaddafi regime. In parallel to its harsh pressure on the 
North African country, the Clinton administration was, for example, not voting against 
Libya’s first participation at an UN mission (to the Democratic Republic of Congo), 
dispatched for the first time a mission of consular officials to Libya in order to evaluate the 
travel security for U.S. citizens, and allowed in the February 2000 for the first time four U.S. 
oil companies (i.e. Conoco, Occidental, Marathon and Amerada Hess) to send a fact-finding 
mission to Libya in order to inspect the oil fields in the North African country they had still 
under concession (e.g. St. John 2002: 183; Zoubir 2006: 53). On the other hand, the Clinton 
administration was not ready for a rapprochement with Libya. Distrust and the view that 
Libya was still a state of concern clearly dominated the Washington’s policy towards the 
North African country (e.g. Ronen 2008: 56; St. John 2002: 181; Neumann 2000: 142-5; 
Zoubir 2006: 54).248 While many European countries were preparing to normalize their 
relations with Tripoli after the UN sanctions had been lifted in 1999, the United States 
continued its course towards the North African state. Thus, lowering the harsh stance 
towards the Qaddafi regime was not an objective in itself but was rather regarded by the 
Clinton administration as an additional instrument beside the conventional sanction politics 
(Interview with Martin Indyk, Nov. 2011, Annex 16).249 
But despite the fact that the United States continued an antagonistic course towards the 
Qaddafi regime, the fear that the domestic audience could gain the impression that the 
Clinton administration would be too gentle on Qaddafi started to haunt policy makers in 
Washington. In particular in light of the cautious diplomatic engagement with Tripoli which 
was started in the late 1990s regarding the remaining issue of the Lockerbie bombing, the 
White House was significantly concerned to be “caught in bed with Qaddafi” (Interview 
with Paul Pillar 7th Dec. 2011; Zoubir 2006: 54).  
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 In spring 2000, Ambassador Sheehan, the coordinator for counter-terrorism under the Clinton 
administration, said for example that the picture in Libya was still mixed and that the Qaddafi regime had 
neither cooperated sufficiently with regard to the Lockerbie trail nor has it compensated the families of 
the Lockerbie victims. However, Sheehan made clear that the “links to terrorism have dramatically 
declined since the 1980s” (U.S. Department of State. 2000).  
248
 For example, one argument for the launch of the National Missile Defense system, the United States 
began at that time, was that Libya and other “rogues states” would soon acquire intercontinental missiles 
that could at some point threaten U.S. security (Zoubir 2006: 54).  
249 In light of the emerging new conciliatory steps towards Libya some scholars had made the argument 
that the United States had changed its Libyan policy already during the 1990s in gradual steps (e.g. 
Hoagland 2000). In hindsight this argument appears however exaggerated.  
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Since the Lockerbie bombing, the Qaddafi regime was perceived by the American public as 
an incarnation of cruelty and viciousness. Media coverage on Libya and its aggressive policy 
were relatively high at that time. In particular, the families of the Lockerbie victims had 
formed an influential pressure group which was well connected with important Congress 
members and was successfully lobbying for a harsh pressure on Tripoli.250 
Against that background, we observe in the mid-1990s the emerging of a new strategic 
desire in the U.S. policy towards Libya: the attempt to avoid the impression of being too 
soft on Qaddafi (Figure 19). 
When George W. Bush became the 43rd U.S. President in January 2001, he and his neo-
conservative advisors were eager to clearly demarcate his policy from the preceding Clinton 
administration. But with regard to Washington’s Libya policy, the new chief at the Oval 
Office continued without significant changes the course of his predecessor (Figure 19).251 
Improving the U.S. security in light of a still threatening Qaddafi regime was the central 
objectives.252 The Bush junior administration continued the cautious diplomacy which the 
Clinton administration has started in the late 1990s (Interview with Robert Joseph 3rd 
November 2011; see also: Leverett 2004). The cautious cooperation in the field of anti-
terror policy established under Clinton’s presidency went on and began to accelerate after 
the 9/11 attacks (Zoubir 2006: 59). And similar to his predecessor, George W. Bush, and his 
entourage were also driven by the fear to appear as too patient and soft towards the 
Qaddafi regime (Interview with Robert Joseph 3rd November 2011; see also: Litwak 2007; 
185; Slavin 2004).  
(iv) Bush Junior II: Linking the Diplomatic Engagement with Tripoli to the Iraq War  
While continuity marked the Bush Junior administration’s Libya policy, we see in spring 
2003 a new and quickly emerging desire in Washington’s posture towards the Qaddafi 
regime (Figure 19). While the other objectives remained unchanged, there is solid ground 
to believe that George W. Bush and his advisors undertook in light of the U.S. lead 
intervention to Iraq a strategic readjustment. It appears that Bush junior administration 
was eager to yield the political profit from a future engagement with Libya on WMD for the 
broader Bush Doctrine. The nascent bargaining process with Tripoli became in that sense 
subordinated to the Washington “grand strategy” for the Middle East and was linked to the 
outcomes of the Second Iraq War.  
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 Supplied with high media coverage and support by the U.S. Congress, the victim families influenced at 
several occasions the American-Libyan relations. Namely the intensification of the sanction package 
against Libya – the Iran-Libya-Sanction Act (ILSA) – imposed in 1996 and the delay of the ease of the travel 
restriction were to a considerable extent the outcome of successful lobbying by the victim families and 
their supporters at Capitol Hill (e.g. Litwak 2007: 179,
 
St. John 2002: 183).  
251
 Although the strategy of regime change played a prominent role within George W. Bush’s first 
presidential term – namely expressed by the Iraq intervention in spring 2003 – this element was missing in 
Washington’s Libya policy. While the Bush Junior often referred to Ronald Reagan as a political idol, 
Reagan’s policy towards Libya was not regarded as a script for future action.   
252
 For example, even when on the 31st January 2001 – after 12 years of investigation and 84 days of 
hearing – the three Scottish judges in the Netherlands (at Camp Zeist) found Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi 
guilty for committing the Pan Am 103 bombing and the majority of Europe states welcomed this outcome, 
George W. Bush made clear in a joint statement with Tony Blair that the UN sanctions would not be lifted 
before Libya was completely fulfilling all demands of the UN Security Council resolution – mainly the 
compensation for the families of the Lockerbie victims (Bush & Blair 23rd Feb. 2001).  
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The decisive meeting in which the Washington’s policy towards Libya was turned into a 
vehicle severing the broader Bush Doctrine took place in April 2003. President George W. 
Bush was discussing with CIA Director George Tenet, Vice President Cheney, and the 
Deputy Director for CIA Operations, Steven Kappes, the pros and cons of a diplomatic 
engagement with the Qaddafi regime on WMD (Suskind 2006, Suskind 2007: 222-3; Franz & 
Collins 2007: 306). President Bush eventually took the decision to give the Libyan offer for 
explorative WMD talks a try. But by referring to the ongoing Iraq War and the broader plans 
to establish a “Pax Americana” in the Middle East, he issued the instruction that the 
bargaining process with Tripoli should be pursued in a way that is outcome would “send a 
signal to the world.” According to Ron Suskind, an investigative journalist, the U.S. 
President admonished to the attendees of this secret White House meeting: “make sure we 
get some deliverable from this process” (Suskind 2006; see also: Frantz & Collins 2007).  
In the light of the presidential decision, it is not astonishing that the key U.S. players who 
were involved in the bargaining process with Libya often uttered the idea that the 
diplomatic engagement with Tripoli was a “showcase”, an “alternative model”, or a 
“vehicle” that was, in the end, serving higher U.S. objectives. Reflecting on the negotiation 
process with the representatives of the Qaddafi regime in late 2003 Ambassador Robert 
Joseph (at that time Director for WMD issues at the National Security Council) said:  “it was 
very conscious on our part to try to establish a model different from Iraq (…) We wanted to 
have a different model (…) So you [future atomic renegade states] could choose. You could 
choose Iraq, or you could choose an alternative model” (Interview with R. Joseph, Nov. 
2011; see also: interview with D. Jody, Dec. 2011, Annex 16). Paula DeSutter, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, expressed the very same idea that Libya 
represented “a model for other proliferators to mend their ways and help restore 
themselves to international legitimacy” (U.S. Congress, 26th February 2004). By the same 
token, in 2005 Ambassador Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State 
Department, said that “Libya is portably the best model for how a country can renounce 
the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and take important steps to rejoin the 
international community (U.S. Congress, 16th March 2005: 16).253    
(v) Bush Junior III after December 2004: Priority on Cautious Rapprochement  
After the Qaddafi regime publically announced its decision to dismantle all its WMD 
programs, “cautious rapprochement” with Tripoli became the main objective of the Bush 
Junior’s policy towards Libya (Figure 19). Although skeptics and distrust were still high in 
Washington, the Bush administration realized that the Qaddafi regime represented no 
direct security threat to the United States anymore. In the light that many European 
countries had already re-established its commercial ties with oil-rich Libya, the will to “reap 
the fruits” the diplomatic and political effort was mounting in Washington. Particularly, the 
U.S. oil companies were actively lobbying for a fast normalization with Tripoli (e.g. Zoubir 
2006).  
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 Interestingly, the objective to link Libya to broader strategic setting was also shared by the United 
Kingdom. Tim Dowse, a British diplomat who was involved in the U.S.-Libyan negotiation process said for 
example: “We were very keen to demonstrate internationally that (…) there was more than one way to 
deal with WMD disarmament (Interview with Tim Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex 16).  
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That the United States was ready in late 2003 to pursue the desire of a “cautious 
rapprochement” is already evident in the statement U.S. President George W. Bush 
delivered in the evening hours on 19th December 2003. Besides welcoming Libya’s nuclear 
reversal, the President said that: “Libya can regain a secure and respected place among the 
nations, and over time, achieve far better relations with the United States” (Bush, 19th 
December 2003). In the similar vein, Ambassador Burns said in March 2005 at a hearing 
before Congress Committee on International Relations that “Libya’s actions to abandon 
weapons of mass destruction and meet its Pan Am 203 obligations have significantly 
advanced American as well as Libyan interests” (U.S. Congress, 16th March 2005: 3). 
Although there were several members of the Bush Junior administration who were 
demanding for  a tougher stance towards the Qaddafi regime given its negative track record 
in human rights abuse and its non-democratic political system, the Bush junior 
administration resisted to these calls (St. John 2008: 136; interview with R. Joseph, 
November 2011, Annex 16).  
B) Interest Profile: Tripoli’s Desire towards the United States  
The Libyan desires vis-à-vis the United States, we revealed with the help of the “interest 
profiling” method, were less complex than those we disclosed for the successive U.S. 
presidency. However, we observe here too several shift and a trend from confrontation to 
more benign posture (Figure 20). 
(i) From Positive Neutrality over Arab Lead Nation Respect to Confrontation 
The ties between Washington and the Qaddafi regime had never been good. However, 
while the Libyan-American relationship became starting by the late 1970s constantly more 
hostile and antagonistic, the early and mid-1970s were marked by relative calamity and by 
a conciliatory undertone. Tripoli’s foreign policy towards Washington was determined in 
the 1970s by two desires: the implementation of the “Positive Neutrality” doctrine and the 
attempt to be recognized by the United States as an Arab lead nation (Figure 20).  
Figure 20: The Qaddafi Regime's Strategic Desires towards the U.S. 
 
 
“Positive Neutrality” was a doctrine Tripoli had adapted from the thoughts of the Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In the words of the charismatic Egyptian President, “Positive 
Neutrality” represented a particular non-alignment posture during the Cold War. In order 
to balance the influence from the Eastern and the Western bloc, enlarge its own room for 
political maneuvering, and to reap the greatest benefit from both Cold War camps, 
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“Positive Neutrality” searched to apply non-alignment not by isolation but through peaceful 
coexistence and the parallel search form assistance Washington and Moscow (e.g. Binder 
1964: 240-8; Dekmejian 1971: 109-118).  
In the first years after the bloodless putsch against King Idris, “Positive Neutrality” was the 
central reference point in Tripoli’s policy towards the United States (St. John 1987: 71-2; St. 
John 1983: 478-80).254 From 1969 until early the 1970s we encounter numerous statements 
where the Qaddafi regime made clear that “Positive Neutrality”, which prescribed a 
cautious and pragmatic relation with Washington, was a central guiding principle of its 
foreign policy towards the super powers. For example, when Muammar al-Qaddafi gave 
during an interview with the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram in October 1969 a summary of 
the core elements of Libya’s future foreign policy, he, tellingly, mentioned “Positive 
Neutrality, non-alignment, and support for all liberation causes and freedom in the whole 
world” as central components (Middle East Institute 1970: 212). One month later, the 
Libyan leader clarified in an interview with a Polish Radio station that the application of this 
foreign policy doctrine meant that Libya would “not differentiate between East and West, 
except on the basis of the unconditional help each state offers and of mutual respect and 
relations of equality” (Middle East Institute 1970: 212).255  
In line with “Positive Neutrality”, there is ample evidence that during this period, 
pragmatism and avoidance of confrontation were central to Libya’s policy towards the 
United States. For example, when Muammar al-Qaddafi and his comrades seized power, 
they were eager to communicate towards Washington as quickly as possible that they had 
no intention to nationalize the oil industry and that U.S. companies could continue their 
business without alternation (St. John 2002: 104). Moreover, when the Qaddafi regime 
announced that it was not extending the leasing contract for the Wheelus Airbase – a large 
military component a few kilometers east of Tripoli which U.S. Air Force had rented from 
1954 to 1971 – Tripoli attached great importance to frame the evacuation as a stringent 
deduction of its taste for neutrality and was keen to dispel any concerns of an anti-U.S. 
course (Gera 1980: 199). 
Starting around the year 1973 the Qaddafi regime appeared to have changed more and 
more its foreign policy – a fact that also affected its relation with the United States (Figure 
20). Recognition for the self-chosen role as an Arab lead nation became now the dominant 
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 Neutrality and peaceful coexistence in external relations were also in line with the Qaddafi regime’s 
effort to consolidate its power in internal affairs after the putsch. A more confrontational conduct 
towards the United States might have undermined the revolutionary rearrangement of Libya’s social and 
political system (Ronen 2008: 11). In that sense, the application of the “Positive Neutrality” in the 
American-Libyan relationship could be interpreted as an expression of a general trend in post-
revolutionary Libya. According to Dirk Vandewall the years between 1969 and 1973 marked an interlude, 
a period of political transformation from the conservative monarchy “to an increasingly activist military 
regime” (Vandewalle 2006: 94). 
255
 The distant but not hostile position towards the United States, which was buttressed by a dense web of 
economic and commercial ties – in particular in the energy sector (Vandewalle 2006: 131; St. John 1987: 
72-3, 79-80) – was defended by Qaddafi even against actors who were more critical against the United 
States. In a debate held in spring 1972 with Egyptian intellectuals the young Libyan dictator rejected harsh 
critique towards Washington by clarifying that the United States had never pursued a neo-colonial politics 
towards Libya but rather has provided aid and financial assistance to the North African country (Davis 
1990: 34; First 1974: 242). 
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theme. Bolstered by a steep increase in oil revenues, the early 1970s marked an important 
turning point in Libya’s foreign policy.256 Libya tried to ascend itself to the level of a regional 
powers and shifted towards a more active foreign policy (Niblock 2002:  223-225; 
Vandewalle 2006 Deeb 1991).257 For example, the Qaddafi regime started to formulate 
around the year 1973 the vision of Libya as the defender of the suppressed masses that 
were perceived to be exposed to imperialist and neo-colonial forces (Arnold 1996: 79; St. 
John 2001: 116-7).258  
The attempt to emerge as a new Arab lead nation was – similar to the Positive Neutrality 
doctrine – a foreign policy approach that was not exclusively tailored to the United States 
but marked the general thrust of Libya’s foreign policy. However, the Libyan-American 
relationship was clearly affected by the reorientation of Qaddafi regime’s foreign policy. To 
be recognized by the United States as emerging power was an essential ingredient in the 
Qaddafi regime’s policy towards Washington. Although Tripoli was – like many other 
nationalist and anti-colonial governments of the southern hemisphere at that time – in 
general, critical of the United States and its role as a superpower, Washington’s 
acknowledgment was regarded as a crucial proof of its own significance. Correspondingly, it 
was reported that Tripoli was yearning to be treated by the United States as a respected 
Arab leader and demanded to be regarded by Washington as a player situated on the same 
eye level with other big powers in world politics (Vandewall 2006: 131; Arnold 1996: 79). 
Consequentially, the Qaddafi regime tried at that time to avoid a direct confrontation with 
the United States – although it embraced more and more an anti-American rhetoric and 
maneuvered itself more and more into a confrontational situation with Washington due to 
the fact that Libya’s active and growingly aggressive foreign policy started to undermining 
Washington’s interests in the Middle East and North Africa at numerous occasions 
(Vandewalle 2006: 131; Gera 1980).259  
(ii) Zigzagging between Resistance and Recognition  
Libya’s active foreign policy steered Tripoli more and more towards a maelstrom of 
confrontation with the United States – neither planned nor wanted from both side (Ronen 
                            
256 For a more detailed description how the oil market affects Libya’s foreign policy see e.g. Lemarcharnd 
1988: 10; Vandewalle 2006: 94-6. 
257
 Significantly, this reorientation in external relations coincides with a period of drastic changes in Libya’s 
domestic politics. Starting by 1973 the North African country entered into a revolutionary phase – the so 
called “Popular Revolution” – which altered Libya’s state structure by removing numerous of the 
conventional and administration and legal institutions dated from the monarchy era (Vandewalle 2006: 
84; Lemarchand 1988b: 7).  
258
 In general one can say that the Qaddafi regime’s effort to comply with the vision of an Arab lead nation 
was a task that remained always a size too large for Libya – despite of all its oil wealth. In a way Tripoli was 
constantly trying to catch up with the self-imposed standards and aspirations (Lemarchand 1988b: 10-13; 
Ronen 2008: 153). Many curiosities of Libya’s politics and Muammar al-Qaddafi particular habits could be 
ascribed to attempt to put in practices the self-chosen but overcharging vision to convert a desert North 
African country with around three million inhabitants which before the oil boom have been one of the 
poorest places on earth into an active player in world politics.  
259
 Tripoli’s cautious pragmatism towards the United States was for example expressed by the fact that 
Libya violated the joint Arab oil embargo in the early 1970s and clandestinely delivered oil to the West. By 
the same token members of Black September – a Palestinian terror group which was in general regarded 
by the Qaddafi regime as comrades and were granted with financial and logistic support – were 
imprisoned when it occurred to Tripoli that they were planning to attack American-owned oil depots in 
Libya (Davis 1990: 35). 
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2008: 11-12; St. John 1987: 80-1). Around the year 1977, Tripoli appeared to adapt its 
foreign policy to this undeniable reality. Until that point, Tripoli had had no precise U.S. 
policy but had subjected its affairs with the Western superpower along general principles 
such as neutrality, non-alignment, and recognition. Around the year 1977, however, the 
United States became more and more the central focus of the Qaddafi regime’s foreign 
policy. Pragmatism and restraint, which had beforehand marked the American-Libyan 
relationship, were falling apart and were giving room to a more confrontational course.260 
Still inspired by the self-chosen role as Arab lead nation the Qaddafi regime entered into a 
decade that was marked by a zigzag between two objectives: resistance against U.S. policy 
and the continued effort to be recognized on the same eye level as an emerging power 
(Figure 20). 
There is ample evidence that Tripoli became starting by the late 1970s more and more 
fixated to offer resistance against what was perceived as U.S. patronage and unjustified 
inference into Libya’s “regional backyard”. As Yehudit Ronen has pointed out Libya was in 
essence “endangered all of Washington’s objectives in the region: combating terrorism 
across the Middle East, minimizing Moscow’s influence while maximizing its own, 
consolidating stability against radical forces to safeguard pro-US Arab regimes, advancing 
the Arab-Israeli peace process, and ensuring the supply of oil at reasonable prices” (Ronen 
2008: 29). It became more visible that Libya’s effort to mingle into the big power business 
and maintain at the same time neutral ties with Washington was untenable and inherently 
contradictory. While the power elite in Tripoli were apparently taking the growing hostility 
with Washington as proof that countermeasures against U.S. dominance were needed and 
legitimated, they turned a blind eye to the fact that the quickly deteriorating ties with 
Washington was triggered in this first place by Libya’s ambitious and aggressive foreign 
policy. The starting point of the intensified confrontation was certainly the Qaddafi 
regime’s attempt to assassinate the U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Herman Frederich Eilts, in 
fall 1977 – a U.S. diplomat that was perceived by Tripoli as one of the driving forces behind 
the disliked Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement (Blundy & Lycett 1987: 152-3; St. John 2001: 
110). The attempted murder which was discovered and thwarted marked a watershed in 
the American-Libyan relationship.  
However, resistance against the United States was not the only desire the Qaddafi regime 
pursued at that time. In parallel, we also observe at that time evidence that Tripoli was 
eager to be respected by Washington as a key Arab power. Confrontation with Washington 
and yearning for recognition were in Tripoli’s view not mutually exclusive. There are 
numerous incidences were Libya interrupted its confrontation course and undertook 
conciliatory steps towards the United States in the hope to be rewarded in exchange for 
recognition for its self-chosen role as an Arab lead nation. For instance, the Qaddafi regime 
called President Carter to improve diplomatic relations, launched a charm offensive aiming 
to win over famous and influential U.S. citizens (such as such as Muhammad Ali and Senator 
William Fulbright), and initiated a People-to-People Dialogue Conference where US and 
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At that point it is important to note that this shift in Libya’s desires appear to coincide with Muammar 
al-Qaddafi’s changing belief system which grow around that time from a DEF-type operational code into a 
B-type world view (see ch. 5.2.1.1).   
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Libyan citizens were supposed to meet with the aim spark a transnational dialogue and 
overcome misunderstanding (Ronen 2008: 19; Lennon 1978: 4; St. John 2002: 109-110, 
Wright 1981/2). The most important initiative in that regard was, however, when the 
Qaddafi regime successful invited Billy Carter, the President’s brother, twice to Libya in the 
late 1970s and convinced him to give several Libyan friendly statements (St. John 2002: 
111).261 Even when Ronald Reagan – who had already during the election campaign made 
anti-Libyan remarks – became the new chief at the Oval Office, the Qaddafi regime 
presented a proposal for the normalization of the American-Libyan relationship (Ronen 
2008: 35).262  
(iii) Rapprochement and Non-Military Resistance  
In the late 1980s, we encounter another shift in Libya’s interest profile. Resistance against 
U.S. policy remained important although the means applied were less violent. At that time, 
we saw a certain “demilitarization” of the Tripoli’s policy towards the Washington. Starting 
by the 1990s, the Qaddafi regime dissociated itself more and more from asymmetric 
warfare and the “instruments” of terrorism. Resistance was instead implemented by 
diplomatic and political tools. That becomes, in particular, visible in the struggle with the 
United States and the United Kingdom on the resolution of the Lockerbie case – a 
diplomatic tug-of-war which became the dominant theme during the 1990s in the 
American-Libyan relationship (see also ch. 5.3.2.2). Yehudit Ronen has described this shift 
as a “diplomatic turn” in Libya’s foreign policy (Ronen 2008: 6).  
What was in that period, however, particularly outstanding was the transformation of the 
desire for “recognition” into the strategic objective of “rapprochement” (Figure 20).263 
Starting by the early 1990s, we encountered significant evidence that Libya was sincerely 
interested in overcoming the confrontation and normalize its relationship with the United 
States. The first step Libya undertook in that direction was returning the remains of a U.S. 
combat pilot to the United States who had downed during “Operational El Dorado Canyon” 
by Libyan air defense. The hand-over, which was implemented via contacts at the Vatican, 
were accompanied by an appeal to the new incoming Bush senior administration to 
normalize the American-Libyan relations (Niblock 2002: 228; St. John 2002: 154). Starting 
from the early 1990s, we saw a constant stream of these initiatives – including numerous 
proposal for bilateral dialogue proposed through intermediaries and diplomatic backdoor 
channel.  
When the Clinton administration entered into office, Tripoli appeared to have considerably 
intensified its activities in that regard – falsely believing the new president would mark a 
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 This particular episode – duped “Billygate” by the press and later led to an investigation by the U.S. 
Congress – made certainly an important contribution to the fact that Libya’s charm offensive rather 
lowered than increased the Qaddafi regime’s standing in the general U.S. public. 
262
 For example, in September 1981 Muammar al-Qaddafi said in an interview with the German weekly 
“Der Spiegel” that he would prefer Reagan to Carter who he described as naïve and ignorant. Reagan, on 
the other hand, would be “more serious” and the republican program would be more appropriate to 
Libya’s policy, Qaddafi said (Interviewed by Der Spiegel, FBIS-MEA-81-183, Sept. 1981, Annex 3). 
263
 This shift we detected with the help of the “interest profile method” coincided again with the 
alternation in Muammar al-Qaddafi’s worldview (i.e. the transformation from the B- to the DEF-type belief 
system in the late 1980s) we have identified in “operational code analysis”.   
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window of opportunities (St. John 2002: 168, 193). Muammar al-Qaddafi was for example 
reported to have said that “Clinton’s election (…) is like a star shining in the dark” (Alterman 
2006: 173). According to Ambassador Martin Indyk, responsible for Middle East policy at 
the State Department during Clinton’s presidency “Qaddafi had wanted to normalize his 
relationship with the West but with the United States in particular for a very long time” 
(Interview with M. Indyk, Nov. 2011, Annex 16). Interviewed by in the late 1990s the Libyan 
Undersecretary for European Affairs, Abdulati Alobidi said: “What we want is to get the 
Lockerbie problem behind us. It is the wish of the Leader and the people of Libya to 
normalize relations with the United States” (Viorst 1999: 74). 
The desires of “resistance” and “rapprochement” made the Libya’s policy towards the 
United States starting by the early 1990s in many respects ambiguous and difficult to 
decipher from the outside. Form Tripoli’s perspective however this posture were inherently 
logic and consistent. It reflected in essence the love-hate relationship that characterized 
Tripoli’s policy towards the United States until the Qaddafi regime was swept aside by the 
Arab Spring in 2011 (Figure 20).  
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5.2.1.3 The Re-enactment Method: Building the Five-Stage Cascade of Social Traps  
 
After having surveyed the motivation of the Qaddafi regime and the United States, building 
a cascade of social traps is the final step of our effort to develop the fit taxonomy for the 
dimension of procedural negotiation problems. Applying the “reenactment method” 
introduced in the method chapter (ch. 4.3), we come to the conclusion that the American-
Libyan negotiation process is best understood as a five-stage cascade of strategic traps built 
by four different types of 2x2 dilemma games:  
(1) Deadlock Game (first part of the pre-negotiation phase, 1987 - 1990) 
(2) Imposed Deadlock Game (second part of the pre-negotiation phase, 1990 - 2003) 
(3) Alibi Game (pre-agreement phase, March - December 2003) 
(4) again an Alibi Game (agreement phase, December 2003) 
(5) Biased Stag Hunt Game (post-agreement phase, 2004 - 2011)  
 
As we have explained above, the survey of Tripoli’s and Washington’s motivation was 
biased. Only Muammar al-Qaddafi’s worldviews were mapped but not those of the 
successive U.S. presidencies – a fact owed to the varying availabilities of relevant data. 
Therefore, the “reenactment method” builds exclusively on a survey of the actors’ strategic 
desires.  
But that does not mean that the investigation of the Libyan leader’s belief and worldviews 
was inutile. While the revealed results from the “operational code analysis” are not directly 
used to build the cascade of strategic cascade, it plays – in an expression of the 
triangulation logic (ch. 4.1) – a crucial function in verifying the “reenactment method”. As 
we have outlined in the method chapter, the method of “operational codes” has develop 
an independent procedure to translate different world views into preferences (ch. 4.2.1). 
Consequentially, we could use the findings stemming from the “operational code” analyze 
to cross-check the outcomes of the “re-enactment method”.264 The central question is: do 
both methods arrive at the same conclusion about the strategic constellations in the Libyan 
NRN? As we will show in this section: they do most of the time. The congruence in the 
findings is convincing evidence of the significant and reliability of these two approaches.  
A) Pre-Negotiation Phase: From a Pure Deadlock to Imposed Deadlock Game  
Applying the “reenactment method” it becomes clear that the pre-negotiation phase – the 
longest episode in the American-Libyan negotiation process which span from the late 1980s 
to March 2003 – was split in two distinct strategic sequences. The first part of this 
diplomatic episode – from December 1987 to the late 1980s – was structured by a Deadlock 
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 Since the “interest profiling” of the U.S. desires was based on sound and expressive data, the cross-
checking between the two methods is in particular relevant for the Libyan case. As we explained at the 
beginning of this section, the relevant data on the Qaddafi regime’s desires are murky, little in number, 
and often difficult to decipher. Therefore, it is reasonable that we do only a biased verification of the two 
methods.  
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Game.265 During the second part – from the early 1990s to March 2003 – the diplomatic 
struggle on Libya’s WMD programs was instead shaped by an Imposed Deadlock Game.  
(i) Deadlock Game (December 1987 – late 1980s)  
In the first year, from late 1987 to early 1990s, the diplomatic process on Libya’s WMD 
programs was marked by a confrontational and antagonistic pattern. If we apply the 
“reenactment method”, we come to the conclusion that Libya and the United States were 
entangled in a Deadlock Game (Figure). Both players had a payoff structure that is typical 
for Deadlock Games where unilateral defection is preferred over mutual defection, mutual 
defection over joint cooperation, and joint cooperation over unilateral cooperation (DC > 
DD > CC > CD).266  
Figure 9: The Deadlock Game (Dec. 1987 -  late 1980s)  
 
If we replay the strategic situation based on the desires we have surveyed and the 
bargaining phases with its specific tasks we have identified in the historic analysis of the 
Libyan NRN (ch. 5.1.1), we come to the conclusion that unilateral defection (DC) must have 
been for Libya as well as for the United States the most attractive outcome in the first part 
of the pre-negotiation phase (see also Annex 4 and Annex 5). For example, remaining idle to 
a U.S. diplomatic offer to start explorative talks on WMD would have fulfilled the two 
desires Libya held at that time. First, such a step would have shown Libya’s resolve to resist 
against U.S. power politics. Tripoli would have been able to foil a US initiative. The Qaddafi 
regime could have portrayed itself in its favorite role: as the ringleader against the alleged 
U.S. neo-colonialist policy aiming to subject underdeveloped countries in general and the 
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 Unfortunately, our survey of strategic desires (the interest profiling) is not detailed enough determine 
the exact date when the Deadlock Game was transformed into an Imposed Deadlock Game. Our closet 
assessment is that it must be at the end of the 1980s – presumably in early 1989. It is also at that time 
when Muammar al-Qaddafi’s world view shifted from a B-type to a DEF-type operational code (cf. Figure 
18).  
266
 Deadlock Games (game no. 9 according to the game theoretical taxonomy of Anatol Rapoport and 
Melvin Guyer (1966)) were often neglected by game theoretical analysts with the argument that this 
particular constellation is rather seldom and occurs in real-world politics only in extreme cases (e.g. Zürn 
1992: 153). The Libyan case is in that sense a good example for those who argue that the Deadlock Games 
(and its sub-categories, such as the Imposed Deadlock Game) are more common in international affairs 
and that this particular strategic constellation is likely to occur also in not so extreme and more ordinary 
situations. In an historic analysis of strategic constellations between rivalrous actors (i.e. Egypt-Israel, 
Israel-Syria, Chile-Argentina, France-Prussia, Greece-Turkey, India-China), Maoz and Mor found, for 
example, that the Deadlock Game was the most common constellation occurring in 41 % of the 
interactions (Maoz & Mor 1996: 154). Moreover, if we give past case studies on negotiation dynamics 
between two or more players a more careful look we found that Deadlock Games were relatively common 
in diplomatic history (e.g. Aggarwal 1996: 142-157 and 287-307; Beck 1997; Conybeare 1985; Downs, 
Rocke & Siverson 1985: 122; Snyder & Diesing 1977: 124-9; Downs & Rocke 1987: 302; Oye 1986b).  
start explorative talks  [C] no explorative talks [D]
start explorative talks  [C] 2,2 1,4
no explorative talks [D] 4,1 3,3 M,N,P+
USA
Libya
The players' preference hierarchy:      DC > DD > CC > CD
C =  Cooperation  D = Defection  M = MaxiMin Solution  N = Nash Equilibirum  P+ = Qualified 
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Arab nations in particular. Second, if the United States had reached out for a diplomatic 
process in the late 1980s, that would have meant – in the perspective of the Qaddafi 
regime – that Washington was recognizing Libya as a crucial regional player and was ready 
to meet with North African country “on the same eye level” – another strategic desire 
Tripoli was pursuing at that time (Figure 20). Libya could have indulged the feeling of 
superiority if it had turned down a US plea for dialogue.267  
Further applying the “reenactment method”, we also reveal that in all likelihood mutual 
defection (DD) – the so-called deadlock situation – was ranked by the two sides as the 
second best outcome. While both sides would have preferred unilateral defection (DC), 
mutual defection (DD) was still a relatively attractive situation from which both sides – the 
United States and Libya – would not have departed unilaterally. For example, the situation 
where neither of the two sides was talking to each other was conducive to the strategic 
goals Washington was pursuing at that time in its policy towards the North African country 
(see Annex 5 for further discussion). Avoiding any diplomatic exchange with Libya would 
have been in line with the Reagan’s administration objective to orchestrate a regime 
change in Tripoli. The same applies to Washington’s desire to render Libya into a showcase 
for successful U.S. anti-terror policy. And while mutual defection (DD) would have had no 
tangible impact in terms of improving the United States’ security vis-à-vis the Qaddafi 
regime’s hostile foreign policy (the third of Regan administration’s strategic objectives), 
stoic refusal of any bargaining process with Tripoli could have been interpreted as a sign of 
Washington’s resolve towards the North African dictator. Mutual defection (DD) had not 
meaningfully improved U.S. national security. However, it would not have imposed any 
harm to this strategic goal either (Annex 5).  
With the help of the “reenactment method,” it becomes clear that both players – the 
United States and Libya – must have ranked joint cooperation (CC) in a relatively low 
position in their hierarchy of preferences. For the Qaddafi regime, holding unanimously 
explorative WMD talks would have contradicted the objective to “resist against U.S. power 
politics”. For the United States, the same would have applied to the regime change 
objective as well as to the goal of rendering Libya into a testing ground for anti-terrorism 
policy (Annex 4 and 5).  
The result we have revealed for the first part of the pre-negotiation phase with the 
“reenactment method” is corresponding with the findings of the “operational code 
analysis” on Muammar al-Qaddafi’s belief system. As we have outlined above, the Libyan 
leader was until the late 1980s indulging a worldview which had been labeled by the 
literature as a B-type belief system. Foreign policy leaders, who are found to follow this 
world view, are assumed to have a preference order which is identical with the strategic 
hierarchy of the Deadlock Game (DC > DD > CC > CD) (Figure 16 and Figure 9). Thus, 
“operational code method” is supporting the accuracy of the “reenactment method”.  
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 For more details see the complete discussion of the “reenactment method” for the pre-negotiation 
phase in Annex 4 and 5.  
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(ii) Imposed Deadlock Game (late 1980s – March 2003)  
The Deadlock Game prevailed only for a short time. With the help of the “reenactment 
method,” we were able to show that the pre-negotiation phase was shifted in the early 
1990s into a slightly more benign strategic constellation: the so-called Imposed Deadlock 
Game.268 
Figure 21: Imposed Deadlock Game  
 
In the survey of the Qaddafi regime’s desires we have identified in the early 1990s the rise 
of a new objective: the search for a rapprochement with Washington (ch. 5.2.1.1). If we put 
ourselves “into the shoes” of the power elite in Tripoli, we come to the conclusion that this 
change Libya’s “interest profile” must have translated – in all likelihood – into a new 
strategic disposition. Tripoli took on the preference order which is normally held by the 
players of the PD game (DC > CC > DD > CD).  
We assume that mutual cooperation (CC) gained importance for Libya at that time. After 
all, the Qaddafi regime’s new intention to conciliate with Washington would have been 
substantially promoted if both sides had started exploratory talks on the WMD issues. In a 
similar vein, the option of mutual defection (DD) is assumed to have lost relevance for Libya 
in light of the desired rapprochement with the United States. Applying the “reenactment 
method” we come to the conclusion that mutual defection (DD) was ranked by Libya only 
on the third place at that time. Although Tripoli would have been ready to choose that 
option if the United States had moved likewise into that direction, mutual defection lost 
much of its attraction as it clearly contradicted Libya’s newly emerged desire for 
rapprochement with Washington (Annex 6).  
The findings provided by the “reenactment method” are again supported by our 
“operational code analysis”. Mapping Muammar al-Qaddafi’s worldview, we detected a 
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 The Imposed Deadlock Game is a less malign sub-type of the pure Deadlock Game. It is synonymous 
with situation no. 11 in Anatol Rapoport’s and Melvin T. Guyer‘s taxonomy on 2x2 games (Rapoport & 
Guyer 1966). The expression “Imposed Deadlock Game” was coined by Marc A. Levy in his study on the 
U.S. effort to mediate the Namibia conflict during the Carter and Reagan administration (Levy 1985). It is 
the major characteristic of this game constellation that one of the players continues to “dwell” in a pure 
Deadlock Game and is imposing this confrontational strategic logic to its counterpart who is in general 
more in favor for cooperation expressed by a hierarchy of preferences we normally encounter in PD 
games. Imposed Deadlock Games were rarely studied in IR research. Using a different label, Langlois & 
Langlois (1996) come, for example, to the conclusion that the U.S.-China relation is in many respect 
structure by an Imposed Deadlock Game. And by referring to the historian Fritz Fischer (1964) – a scholar 
who’s research was in recent years heavily contested by Christopher Clark (2013) – Snyder and Diesinger 
came, for example, to the conclusion that the July Crisis in 1914 signified also an Imposed Deadlock Game 
(Snyder & Diesinger 1977: 94; see also: Levy 1985).  
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US preference hierarchy:              DC > DD > CC > CD
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Libya's preference hierarchy:      DC > CC > DD > CD
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shift in the late 1980s (presumably starting by in late 1988 or early 1989; Figure). 
Abandoning the previous B-type foreign policy mode, the Libyan leader was adopting a 
more cooperative DEF-type worldview. According to the operational code literature the 
DEF-type belief system is associated with the same payoff structure we revealed for Libya 
by applying the “reenactment method” (cf. also Figure 18). Again, the relevance of the 
“interest profiling” and the “reenactment method” is supported by the findings stemming 
from the “operational code analysis”.  
As we have explained above (ch. 5.2.1.1) Washington’s strategic desires towards Libya were 
changing too during the second part of the pre-negotiation phase (1990 - March 2003). 
While regime change was no longer an objective, a new strategic goal emerged at that time 
which was primarily inspired by domestic politics. The Clinton administration and later the 
Bush junior administration were eager to avoid the impression of being “too soft” on the 
Qaddafi regime (Annex 7). But despite these ideational shifts, Washington was – in all 
probability – not changing its strategic position towards the North African country. With the 
help of the “reenactment method” we are able to show that the shifting desires were not 
translating into a new hierarchy of preferences. Until March 2003 the United States 
maintained the confrontational deadlock disposition (DC > DD > CC > CD). In all likelihood, 
when confronted with the question to start a diplomatic engagement with Libya, the 
United States would still have given relatively high value to the option of mutual defection 
(DD) and continued to assign a relatively low preference to the choice of joint cooperation 
(CC). The security related concerns the Regan and Bush senior administration would have 
had vis-à-vis a diplomatic engagement with Libya remained also relevant for the Clinton and 
Bush junior administration. Moreover, explorative WMD talks would have been also 
inconsistent with Washington’s objective to avoid the impression of being “too soft” on the 
Qaddafi regime (Annex 7). Thus, one would be trapped into a false interpretation of the 
American-Libyan negotiation process if one had simply equated the shift in the U.S. desires 
with a strategic change in Washington’s stance towards the Qaddafi regime.  If we had not 
applied the “reenactment method” we would have – in all probability – misinterpreted the 
strategic preferences the United States was pursued towards Libya in the 1990s.  
B) Pre-Agreement Phase: The Alibi Game  
By March 2003 the diplomatic process between the United States and the Qaddafi regime 
entered into the pre-agreement phase (ch. 5.1.2). With the help of the “reenactment 
method” we are able to reveal that both sides were entangled during this period in a so-
called Alibi Game (Figure 22).  
Alibi Games are a type of strategic constellation that has been widely neglected by IR 
scholars although they are assumed to occur in real world situation way more often than 
the frequently cited PD Game.269 Alibi Games, which are characterized by a biased 
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 The term “Alibi Game” was coined by Robinson and Gofort in order to describe a set “degenerated” PD 
Games (Robinson & Gofort 2005: 83-91; Robinson & Gofort 2004). Alibi Games are in essence asymmetric 
PD Games. But while the classical PD was intensively studied by IR scholars, Alibi Games received almost 
no attention (for a rare exception see: DeCanio & Fremstad 2013; Maoz & Felsenthal 1987) – although 
these authors have studied the Alibi Game under a different label (see also 6.1.1.4).  
   
195 
 
structure, signify relatively challenging strategic constellations. Nevertheless, this type of 
social traps is more benign in terms of joint cooperation (CC) than the two previous 2x2 
dilemma games – the Deadlock Game and the Imposed Deadlock Game.270 
Figure 22: Alibi Game  
 
The shift from the Imposed Deadlock Game to the Alibi Game is in methodic terms of 
particular interest. The two principles mode of endogenic change we have discussed in our 
introduction on Enlightened Rationalism – “sequencing by translation” and “sequencing by 
weighting” (ch. 2.5.3.4) – were at play at the outset of the pre-agreement phase. Applying 
the “reenactment method,” we disclose that this shift was – unlike the two previous 
strategic transformations of the pre-negotiation phase (i.e. the Deadlock and the Imposed 
Deadlock Game) – not only caused by a translation of the players’ altering desires. Rather, 
we see that motivational weighting, initiated by a changing set of opportunities, also played 
an important role.  
By spring 2003 the United States was eventually abandoning the deadlock payoff structure 
it had maintained throughout the entire 16 years of the pre-negotiation phase. In its policy 
towards the Qaddafi regime, Washington was now shifting to more cooperative and less 
confrontational stance. Like Tripoli did already in the early 1990s, the United States took on 
a strategic posture we normally associate with the PD Game (DC > CC > DD > CD). While the 
choice for unilateral utility maximization (DC) was still ranked at the first place, joint 
cooperation (CC) was – in comparison to the hitherto deadlock playoff structure – moved 
forward to the second position in the U.S. hierarchy of preferences. 
Washington’s new strategic orientation was caused a new emerging desire. In the survey 
on the U.S. “interest profile,” we have detected that the Bush junior administration 
introduced by spring 2003 a new strategic goal (ch. 5.2.1.1). Washington aimed to establish 
a linkage between the nascent efforts to reverse Libya’s WMD programs and the Second 
Iraq War – back then the central power project of George W. Bush’s foreign policy (ch. 
5.3.2.2). The portfolio of Washington’s strategic goals towards the Qaddafi regime was 
altered several times during the 16 years of the pre-negotiation phase without a decisive 
impact on the U.S. payoff structure. This time, however, the “desire shift” was translated 
into a new strategic constellation.  
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 The Alibi Game we faced during the nuclear reversal negotiations with Libya would signify in the 
taxonomy of 2x2 strategic games developed by Rapoport and Guyer the game no. 47 (Rapoport & Guyer 
1966).  
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Based on the “reenacting method”, it is reasonable to assume that the objective to draw a 
linkage to the Iraq War led the Bush junior administration to accredit higher value to the 
strategic choice of joint cooperation (CC) and lowered at the same time Washington’s 
confrontational stance pursued beforehand towards the Qaddafi regime (Annex 9). Starting 
explorative talks on Libya’s WMD programs appeared now in a more favorable light. Seen 
from the perspective of the Bush junior administration, successful disarmament 
negotiations with Tripoli would have been crucial evidence that the U.S. led intervention to 
topple Saddam Hussein had positive implications for the entire Middle East region and also 
affected the course of Libya’s foreign policy. By the same token, the choice of mutual 
defection (DD) presumably lost attractiveness to the Bush administration during pre-
agreement phase since this outcome had no use for the objective to establish a positive 
political connection between the Second Iraq War and the effort to disarm Muammar al-
Qaddafi with diplomatic instruments (for more detail discussion see Annex 9).  
However, not only the United States was changing its strategic disposition. Libya’s stance 
was shifting too. As the diplomatic process entered into the pre-agreement phase, the 
Qaddafi regime pursued a payoff structure that is normally associated with the Stag Hunt 
Game (CC > DD > DC > CD). Most noteworthy in comparison to the previous Imposed 
Deadlock constellations was Tripoli’s rising esteem for joint cooperation (CC). Starting by 
spring 2003 this outcome was ranked at first place in Libya’s payoff structure.  
Also noteworthy is the fact that the shift in Libya’s strategic stance was, according to our 
“reenactment method”, not the result of the conventional “sequencing by translation” but 
– in all probability – the outcome of the more rare “sequencing by weighting”. When the 
diplomatic process on the reversal of Libya’s WMD programs entered into the pre-
agreement phase, the strategic options available for the two sides were changing (see ch. 
5.1.1). It was not anymore the question whether or not to hold exploratory talks. Rather, 
the choice given to the two players was whether or not they were willing to start direct 
negotiations on a final disarmament agreement. Applying the “reenactment method” we 
come to the conclusion that this changing set of opportunities let appear Libya’s desires in 
“different light” to an extent that Tripoli’s preference structure was affected causing a new 
strategic constellation (Annex 8).271 
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 For example, according to our survey on Tripoli’s “interest profile”, the desire to resist against U.S. 
power politics was of high relevance for the Qaddafi regime throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. During 
the preceding pre-negotiation phase, this desire was – in all probability – an important reason for the 
Qaddafi regime’s relatively high inclination for defection. Refraining from any diplomatic engagement 
with the United States was until spring 2003 the primary vehicle to implement the resistance against 
Washington’s Middle East policy. However, when the diplomatic process moved into the pre-agreement 
phase Libya starting by spring 2003 and the United States established a diplomatic channel and held series 
of secret talks, the objective of “resistance” appeared in a “different light”. While this desire remained 
unabated, executing this objective by uncooperative behavior become more and more inappropriate in 
light of the set of opportunities that was now available to Tripoli. It is rather unlikely that Washington’s 
active involvement in the nascent NRN was perceived by the members of the Qaddafi regime as an 
expression of U.S. power politics. Assuming a minimum of rationality, resisting against this diplomatic 
process by defection must have appeared misplaced and inappropriate in the Libyan perspective. Thus, 
the strategic goal to oppose the United States remained important. However, due to the changing set of 
opportunities triggered by the advance of the diplomatic process, the translation of this particular desire 
into action-guiding preferences was “weighted” into a more cooperation oriented payoff structure (see 
also Annex 10).  
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In the pre-agreement phase, the findings of the “reenactment method” and the 
“operational code” approach are inconsistent. As it was revealed by the survey of 
Muammar al-Qaddafi’s belief system, the Libyan leader continued in the early 2000s to see 
the world through the lens of a DEF-type perspective (Figure). This belief system is 
associated with a payoff structure we normally encounter in PD Game constellations (i.e. 
DC > CC > DD > CD). However, if we give the actual “position” of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s 
worldview a more careful look (Figure 23), we find that he was very close to an A-type 
belief system – an operational code that characterized by the Stag Hunt payoff structure 
(Figure 23). When we position the worldview the Libyan dictator held in the year 2003 on 
the four-field matrix of operational codes, we find that Qaddafi was at that time almost on 
the verge of transforming from a “realist” (DEF-type worldview) into an “idealist” (A-type 
belief system). Thus, there was an inconsistency between the “reenactment method” and 
the “operational code method” in the pre-agreement phase (and also in the following 
agreement phase which was likewise marked by an Alibi Game) – but the actual deviation 
were relatively little in absolute terms (see Figure 23).  
Figure 23: Shifts in Muammar al-Qaddafi's Worldview 
 
C) Agreement Phase:  The Alibi Game Continues  
When the negotiation process entered into the agreement phase, the Alibi Game continued 
– despite a changing set of opportunities. Applying the “reenactment method,” we found 
that the Washington’s hierarchy of strategic preferences remained stable throughout this 
diplomatic episode (Annex 11). The altered bargaining environment was not changing the 
U.S. strategic stance towards Libya.  
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The very same applies to Libya. While we encountered with the help of the “reenactment 
method” some changes in how the Qaddafi regime must have translated its desires during 
the agreement phase, these modifications were, however, too minor to provoke a new 
strategic constellation.272 Like in the previous pre-agreement phase, the Qaddafi regime 
continued to act as an alibi player (Annex 10).  
D) Post-Agreement Phase: Biased Stag Hunt Game   
In the post-agreement phase, which started in early 2004, Libya and the United States were 
entangled in a so-called Biased Stag Hunt Game – a relatively benign 2x2 game 
constellation (figure 24).  
Figure24: Biased Stag Hunt Game 
 
This time it was not a shift in Libya’s motivation that initiated this new strategic 
constellation. In the post-agreement phase Tripoli’s desires as well as Muammar al-
Qaddafi’s belief system remained relatively stable (Annex 12). What was however different 
was that the United States abandoned in early 2004 its confrontational stance towards the 
Qaddafi regime and started to pursue a relatively cooperation posture (CC > DC > DD > CD). 
Again this strategic shift is the result of newly emerging desire. In the survey on 
Washington’s strategic goals we revealed that by January 2004 – as an immediate result of 
the disarmament breakthrough – the Bush junior administration adopted the strategic 
desire to implement a “cautious rapprochement” with Tripoli (Figure 19). According to our 
“reenactment method” the rise of this objective made the United States more open and 
more inclined for cooperation with the Qaddafi regime. By the same token, it is only logical 
that Washington’s aversion of unilateral defection (DC) or of a deadlock scenario (DD) was 
growing at that time (Annex 13).  
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 For example, the progress made in the negotiation process with the United States continued – in all 
likelihood – to affect the implementation of Tripoli’s strategic goal to resist against U.S. power politics – an 
objective that became more and more misplaced when the a rapprochement with the United States came 
into close reach during the agreement phase.   
Implement the Agreement  [C] Defect from Implementation [D]
Implement the Agreement  [C] 4,4 N,P+ 1,3
Defect from Implementation [D] 2,1 3,2 M,N
USA
Libya
US preference hierarchy:              CC > DC > DD > CD    
C =  Cooperation  D = Defection  M = MaxiMin Solution  N = Nash Equilibirum  P+ = Qualified Pareto Optimum 
Libya's preference hierarchy:      CC > DD > DC > CD 
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5.2.2 The Substantial Problem Dimension: A Nuclear Bad in the 
Making 
In this section we will analyze Libya’s nuclear weapons program through the prism of the 
public bad approach. We will apply all the relevant categories we have outlined above (ch. 
3.1.3) in order to grasp the substantive negotiation problem the United States and Libya 
was facing during the bargaining process on Tripoli’s nuclear weapons program.  
Libya’s nuclear weapons program was a public bad “in the making”. When Tripoli eventually 
decided in favor for nuclear reversal, it had only a relatively small and badly managed 
nuclear weapons program. Since it was still under production, it is only logical that we focus 
primarily on the “supply side” of the Libyan nuclear bad. The Libyan nuclear weapons 
program is – in our opinion – best understood as a “threshold bad” which was aggregated 
by the “best-shot technology” (ch. 5.2.2.2). In the following section we will show that this 
“aggregation technology” helps to understand the distinct particularities of Tripoli’s nuclear 
weapons program. In addition, we will show that the “supply side” of the Libyan nuclear 
bad was determined by two “final goods” – national prestige and national security – which 
shifted in terms of significance over time.  
But while the Libyan nuclear bad were still in the making, it already imposed “negative 
externalities” to the outside world. Despite its crudity, Tripoli’s nuclear weapons program 
had already several typical features of a full-blown public bad. As we will explain in the 
following section, the two state actors that suffered the most negative consequences were 
the United States and its close ally the UK (ch. 5.2.2.1).  
Moreover, we will also analyze the “demand side” of the Libyan nuclear bad (ch. 5.2.2.3). 
We will disclose that Tripoli’s nuclear efforts had in essence a “private nature”. In terms of 
the “good foundation”, the Libyan nuclear weapons program was in essence a “private 
good”. Libya’s nuclear bad was inseparably linked to Muammar al-Qaddafi and his close 
entourage. The historic evidence suggests that the benefits the Qaddafi regime envisioned 
to “consume” after the completion of its nuclear weapons program were rivalrous and 
excludable.  
5.2.2.1 Negative Externalities in the Sense of Threat Perceptions 
That the Qaddafi regime was in search for nuclear weapons was widely known since the 
1970s. Tripoli’s shopping tours for a turnkey-ready atomic bomb and its efforts to woo 
external supplies had not gone unnoticed. Already from the 1980s onward CIA reports were 
expressing rising concern of Libya’s nuclear ambitions (e.g. Commission on Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States 2005: 253).273  
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 For example in an unclassified response to the U.S. Congress Committee on Banking, the U.S. 
intelligence community answered the chairman’s question whether there is any evidence indicating that 
“Arab countries have a clandestine nuclear weapons program?” as follows: “We believe that (…) Libya are 
pursuing nuclear weapons development although Libya claims that its nuclear program is only for peaceful 
purposes” (U.S. Congress 1992: 170).  
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Correspondingly, worries vis-à-vis the Qaddafi regime as a potential nuclear aspirant states 
were widely spread (e.g. Bhatia 1988; Cooley 1980; Spector 1988; Waller 1996). But since 
the assessment that Tripoli’s strive for atomic bombs was primarily marked by standstill 
was widely shared among proliferation experts, the scenario that Libya could cross the 
“nuclear threshold” and obtain a deployable nuclear device was regarded as a rather 
remote threat. In that sense, Libya was certainly different from other atomic renegade 
states – such as Iran, India, Pakistan, or North Korea – where the detected nuclear 
ambitions sent shock waves through to neighboring countries (and still does) and always 
implied the danger of regional arms races (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2016; Hobbs & Moran 2013). 
Although the Qaddafi regime’s unfailing nuclear ambitions was clearly visible, the Qaddafi 
regime’s effort has – in all probability – cast no “nuclear shadow” (Fitzpatrick 2008) on the 
region or provoked its neighboring countries to take any tangible contingency measures.274 
Thus, when applying the public bad approach, one can say that Libya’s nuclear weapons 
program was imposing only modest “negative externalities” to the international 
community. The negative consequences of Tripoli’s uncompleted atomic efforts had cross-
territorial but no cross-sectorial impact. Apart from the security sector there is no evidence 
that the Qaddafi regimes strive for atomic bombs were affecting the economic, 
environmental, or social sphere of its neighboring countries.  
The bad-sufferers that were most affected by the “negative externalities” of Libya’s nuclear 
weapons program were certainly the United States and – to a lesser extent – also the 
United Kingdom.275 Certainly, if the Qaddafi regime had ever managed to cross the “nuclear 
threshold” both states would be far out of the range of Libya’s atomic arms given the North 
African countries limited capacity in terms of strategic delivery systems (i.e. ballistic missiles 
and long-range-bomber). While the danger of a physical nuclear threat was a relatively 
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 One could, of course, claim that Algeria’s attempt to secretly build a nuclear reactor in the 1980s was – 
at least to some extent – a reaction to the nuclear efforts in neighboring Libya (Albright & Hinderstein 
2001). However, our knowledge about the Algerian case is still very limited. It is, for example, unclear 
whether Algeria was really trying to reach out for an atomic bomb. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
this secret plan were in anyway related to Libya’s nuclear ambitions.  
275
 By the late 1990s London and Tripoli could look back on a troublesome history that was almost as 
hostile and antagonistic as the American-Libyan past. The friction between North African country and 
Great Britain started already in the 1970s – almost a decade before the bombing of the Pan Am flight 103 
which made British nationals the second largest group of victims after US citizens. London was in 
particular disturbed by the Qaddafi regime’s support for the IRA and Tripoli’s violent campaigns against 
expatriate Libyan opponents living in the UK (Ronen 2006: 271-4). In April 1984 the Libyan-British 
relationship reached its nadir when the policewoman Yvonne Fletcher was shot on duty at the margin of 
an anti-Qaddafi demonstration in the front of the Libyan embassy in London. Since the rounds were fired 
from inside of the Libyan embassy, allegedly by Tripoli’s secret service agents, London expelled Qaddafi 
regime’s diplomats and served its diplomatic relations with Tripoli (Ronen 2006).  But the dislike was 
mutual. Tripoli perceived the UK as an opponent and London experienced in every respect the same 
treatment the Qaddafi regime normally showered on the United States. Throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s the U.K. was subjected to a torrent of harsh rhetoric which was occasionally interrupted by Tripoli’s 
attempt to mitigate London’s position through demonstrative charm offensive (e.g. JANA, 3 December 
1993; Ronen 2006: 279). However, despite is troublesome nature; the ties between Tripoli and London 
were never as hostile and antagonistic as the Libyan-American relationship. The UK had taken not part in 
the US air raids in April 1986 and only provided logistic and political support to this operation. The 
unilateral sanctions that London imposed on Libya in the late 1980s were – in particular in comparison to 
the U.S. coercion – far from intrusive (In the wake of the US operation “El Dorado Canyon” the UK 
expelled around 300 Libyan pilots and aviation engineers who were receiving training in UK at that time 
(Ronen 2006: 276)). 
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remote scenario, both Washington and London were – due to their tense relationship with 
the North African country – nevertheless very sensitive to all security-related developments 
in Libya.276 Consequentially, the Qaddafi regimes unbridled strive for unconventional 
weapons caused concerns in Washington and also in London.277  
For instance, a scenario which was at that time haunting U.S. and British security experts 
was that Libya would one day be in the position to hold Southern Europe as a “nuclear 
hostage” and thereby would exert pressure far beyond the regional theater. Libyan Scud 
missiles mounted with atomic warheads capable of hitting parts of Southern Italy or 
Southern France would have certainly changed the entire strategic landscape of Europe and 
the Middle East (Black 2000; Litwak 2007: 190; Waller 1996).278 In combination with the 
strategic missile arsenal that Libya was working to build in parallel to its nuclear efforts, 
even a relatively small nuclear capacity would have had a considerable strategic impact 
(Albright 2010: 122). This particular concern was for example reflected in a 2004 report to 
the British House of Commons. Reviewing the role of the UK’s secret service in past efforts 
to disclose WMD, the report said, for example, that Libya’s nuclear weapons program was 
“disturbing enough in itself, but was even more so when combined with the knowledge of 
Libya’s long-range ballistic missile aspirations” (U.K. House of Commons 2004).279    
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 One can assume that Israel were probably also well informed of the Libyan nuclear weapons program. 
After all, Israel had concerns regarding the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear ambitions since the 1970s (Abadi 
2000:91; Bowen 2006: 20). The power circle in Tripoli had always legitimized Libya’s quest for the atomic 
bomb by Israel’s nuclear capacities. In September 1973 the Knesset Member Ariel Sharon warned 
Muammar al-Qaddafi publically that Israel as able to hit “any target in the Arab world including Libya” 
(Ha’aretz 20 September 1973). In the early 1980s Muammar al-Qaddafi directly called for the destruction 
of Israel’s nuclear research reactor Dimona (cf. FBIS-MEA-83-061 on 1983-03-29; see Annex 3). In 
addition, there were even reports that the Libyan secret service conducted in the early 19980s a covered 
operation and tried to shell Dimona with a rocket smuggled in to the Negev desert via Jordan (Bhatia 
1988: 64). Moreover, according to Ostrovsky and Hoy, Israel’s foreign intelligence service had even 
pondered in the 1980s to destroy a Pakistani nuclear research reactor which was regarded as a source in 
terms of know-how and technology for the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear efforts (Ostrovsky & Hoy 1991: 127). 
However, for the late 1990s and 2000s we have no evidence that Israel continued to see the Qaddafi as a 
threat at all. Thus, it is simply uncertain whether the Libyan nuclear bad still imposed any “negative 
externalities” on Israel at that time. Moreover, the Israeli-Libyan confrontation took place primarily on the 
field of rhetoric and symbolic and had in general an “intangible” nature – as we will discuss in detail in 
footnote 280).  
277
 France would have been another likely candidate and a potential bad sufferer of the Libyan nuclear 
weapons program. After all, la grande nation played a very vital role in supporting anti-Qaddafi rebels 
during the Chad War. Moreover, the Qaddafi regime’s aggressive policy towards many North African and 
Sub-Saharan states was a direct interference of what France perceived as its zone of influence. In addition, 
Libya was involved in the bombing of the UTA flight 772 on 19th September 1989 above a remote desert 
area in Niger. That attack caused the death of all 170 passengers including 54 French citizens. However, it 
appears that Paris went different paths in its Libyan policy. It supported the U.S. and U.K. efforts for harsh 
UN sanctions against Tripoli in the early 1990s. But shortly thereafter, France started to pursue an 
independent policy towards Libya. The UTA incidence was handled directly with Libya and was kept 
separate from the UK-US efforts on the Lockerbie bombing. In general France appeared to have not 
“suffered” from the “negative externalities” emitted from the Libyan nuclear bad.  
278
 This scenario ventilated by Western security experts was not just plucked out of the air but had some 
historic reference. As an immediate retaliation against the US air raids in April 1986, Libya had fired two 
Scud-B missiles at a US military base situated on Italian island Lampedusa. Although the missiles missed 
their target and fell into the Mediterranean, the memory of this attempted attack remained vivid in the 
Western security community (Black 2000; Litwak 2007: 190; Waller 1996).  
279
 Another threat scenario that was reportedly weighted by security analysts in London and Washington 
during the 1990s was the possibility of an unconventional arms race in the Middle East if Tripoli would 
come one day into the reach of a nuclear capability (Waller 1996). In addition to that, in the 1980s there 
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But despite all these concerns and risk scenarios, Libya’s nuclear weapons program was 
nevertheless a “public bad in the making”. The “negative externalities” the United States 
and the UK were suffering remained in the realm of perceptions. Tripoli’s nuclear bad was 
not inflicting actual costs to Washington and London. Apart from intensified intelligence 
surveillance and contingency planning, neither Washington nor London had not taken 
costly measures to defend against or to deter a future Libyan nuclear capacity. It was 
primarily the prospect of a future security threat and related proliferation risk that 
constituted the “negative externalities” of Libya’s unfinished nuclear weapons program.  
5.2.2.2 Supply Side: The “Fabrication Chain” of Libya’s Nuclear Bad  
Above in the chapter on the “fit taxonomy” we explained that the concept of the 
“fabrication chain” is crucial for operationalizing the colliding interest and the distrust trap 
on the substantial dimension (ch. 3.1.3). Consequentially, having a detailed and 
comprehensive understanding of “fabrication chain” that stood behind the Libyan nuclear 
bad is essential. Otherwise we would not be able to evaluate and explore the (mis)fit of the 
diplomatic design applied to resolve the substantial negotiation problem. In this chapter we 
will, at first, explore the “up-stream side” of the “fabrication chain” focusing on the 
“aggregation technology” applied to build the Libyan nuclear bad (section A). Afterwards, 
we will study the “down-stream” production and survey what “final goods” the Qaddafi 
regime’s nuclear ambition was oriented at (section B).  
A) Up Stream: A Threshold Bad Aggregated by the Best-Shot Technology  
When we apply the concept of “aggregation technology” to the “up-stream side” of the 
Libyan nuclear bad, we arrive relatively quickly at the conclusion that Tripoli’s nuclear 
weapons program were following the “threshold logic.” As we explained above (see ch. 
3.1.3.1) threshold bads are only supplied if the bad doers manage to transgress a certain 
level. If this threshold is not cross, the public bad remains in an unfinished production stage 
and unfolds no or only limited “negative externalities”.  
That the “threshold logic” applies to the Libyan nuclear weapons program is little 
astonishing since there is ample ground to believe that nuclear proliferation is always 
following this particular “aggregation technology.” Tellingly, the notion “threshold” itself is 
widely used in the literature on nuclear proliferation. IR scholars on nuclear proliferation 
have in the past invested considerable effort to estimate what exactly it takes for an atomic 
renegade state to take this decisive step (e.g. Rublee 2010). In military, strategic, and 
political terms it makes a huge difference whether an atomic renegade state is close to the 
“nuclear threshold” or whether it had taken the final step and has acquired an atomic 
bomb.  
However, while Libya’s nuclear bad was produced – like all other nuclear weapons 
programs – according to the threshold aggregation technology, the historic evidence 
                                                                             
was also the concern that Libya would hand over nuclear and chemical weapons to the various terrorists 
groups that enjoyed closed ties with Tripoli. However, that risk assessment was slowly losing relevance 
when the Qaddafi regime withdrew from the terror business during the 1990s (Waller 1996).  
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suggest that the mode Tripoli applied to reached the desired threshold signified a best-shot 
approach. It is widely known in the literature that threshold bads (and goods) could be 
further distinguished regarding the actual mode of aggregation. According to Todd Sandler, 
the threshold technology “involves an ‘aggregator’ – for example, summation or weakest-
link” (Sandler 2004: 64). Presumably in most of the historical cases of nuclear proliferation 
– except the examples of “nuclear inheritance” (see ch. 2.2.1) – nuclear bads were built 
according to the summation logic. Different steps, each for its own part necessary and 
indispensable, were taken in order to move closer to a deployable nuclear capacity. 
Tellingly, the summation logic with its characteristic step-by-step pathway lies at the very 
heart of almost all research projects that have tried to discern the different building blocks 
– such acquisition of sensitive scientific and technological know-how, uranium enrichment, 
warhead development, etc. – necessary to cross eventually the “nuclear threshold” (e.g. 
Meyer 1984; Stroll 1996; Wohlstetter 1977). 
However, the historic evidence suggests that the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapons 
acquisition was not following a step-by-step scheme where sensitive capacity is gradually 
amassed and where one technical stage is mastered after the other. When Libya 
abandoned its nuclear weapons program in late 2003, the North African state had obtained 
little sensitive know-how and technology – despite 33 years of nuclear proliferation effort. 
The acquired material and technology was in many respect disconnected and partially even 
mismatching (e.g. Albright 2010; Craword 2004).280 Unlike, for example, the Iraq nuclear 
weapons program in the 1980s, Libya had not built a domestic nuclear infrastructure. Little 
to no efforts was made to require the necessary scientific foundation for a self-reliable 
quest for nuclear weapons (Bowen 2006: 44; Hymans 2012: 242). Consequentially, the 
manpower that was employed in the Libya’s nuclear effort was strikingly little. Although 
around 800 employees worked at the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapons program, only 140 
of them appeared to have advanced training and university degrees (Interview with M. 
Mininni December 2011; see also Stone 2005: 186; Wing & Simpson 2013: 118). According 
to an IAEA investigation, it was less than 30 people who were actually crucial for the 
nuclear weapons program (Crawrofd 2004).281 Compared to the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program pursued under Saddam Hussein, which employed around 7.000 scientists, 
engineers, and technician, the Libyan nuclear effort was in every respect understaffed 
(Hymans 2012: 23).282 
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 For example, the Director General of IAEA, Mohammed El-Baradei, who pay a visit to Tripoli’s WMD 
sites in late December 2003, was reported to have said that the Libyan nuclear weapons program was 
“quite dismantled in fact. It’s all in boxes” (CNN “What is Being Found in Libya?” Dec. 29, 2003).   
281
 This assessment was confirmed by the U.S. Department of Energy. After Libya’s disarmament the 
ministry conducted an assessment of the employees in the former Libyan WMD programs in order to start 
a “redirection initiative” of the relevant scientists to avoid further proliferation risk. According to Margot 
Mininni, who was involved in this effort, only 40 persons were of real proliferation concern (Interview 
with M. Mininni, Dec. 2011).  
282
 Donald Mahely, U.S. State Department, who lead by early 2004 the effort to dismantle Libya’s WMD 
programs, reported that he was in essence dealing most of the time with the same people who were only 
a handful und who were responsible for all main aspects of the Libyan WMD programs (Mahely 2004). 
This assessment was later seconded by Harry L. Heintzelman, a senior scientific advisor for the U.S. State 
Department. Heintzelman said that “the same six people – most of them American-educated – did almost 
everything” (Tobey 2014). 
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But while the logic of summation appears not to apply, the historic evidence suggests 
instead that Libya tried to acquire nuclear weapons by the best-shot logic.  
As we explained above (ch. 3.1.3.1, see also no. 9 Table 5), in the best-shot aggregation 
public bads are supplied by the “single best effort” (Barrett 2007: 199). Best-shot bads, 
which often signify a technical or scientific breakthrough, are provided by the single most 
potent bad doer. It is the provision of the single most potent bad doer that is, in the end, 
decisive whether or not the public bad is supplied.  
Tripoli’s preferred to acquire – if possible – a ready to use nuclear weapons program or 
even a nuclear bomb and its flagrant neglected to build a domestic capability appears to 
follow the logic of a best-shot aggregation. Muammar al-Qaddafi and his close entourage 
were always inspired by the idea to buy a ready to use atomic bomb or a turnkey-ready 
nuclear weapons program “off the shelf”. As we have outlined above, Tripoli was in fact 
constantly on nuclear shopping tour (ch. 5.1.1). Fueled by its oil money, the Qaddafi regime 
was reaching out to all actors they deemed promising to buy nuclear weapons program.283 
Tripoli was clearly in favor of having its desired nuclear bad supplied in a “single act of 
creation.” And searching support from capable foreign outfitters was the logical 
consequence of this acquisition strategy.284  
The best-shot logic becomes clear particularly in Tripoli’s cooperation with the A.Q. Khan 
network. The smuggle ring was the nuclear supporter Libya always had longed for. Until the 
1990s the Qaddafi regime’s best shot approach always failed because the North African 
country never received the external supply it desired. This time, it was different. 
Reportedly, when the initial contacts between the Qaddafi regime and the nuclear smuggle 
ring was established, Abdul Kadir Khan and his team envisioned to handle business with 
Libya the same way he had cooperated with his previous clients – Iran and North Korea. 
Teheran and Pyongyang had mainly demanded supply of certain sensitive technology and 
selective support with know-how which Mr. Khan and his employees could relatively easily 
set aside from the Pakistani nuclear program without causing too much noise. Libya’s 
demand, however, propelled the A.Q. Khan network into another sphere. Tripoli was ready 
to buy a full nuclear weapons program with all the different component and intermediary 
steps it takes. The A.Q. Khan network had to change its business model completely to meet 
Libya’s demands. It went from consultancy into the production business. According David 
Albright – an outspoken scientific expert on nuclear weapons proliferation – “[n]ot since 
the mid-1960s, when the Soviet Union offered to help its communist ally China to build 
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  It is difficult to assess the overall investment the Qaddafi regime made during the thirty years long trial 
to acquire a nuclear weapons capacity. However, we know that Tripoli spend around US $200 million for 
the support provided by the A.Q. Khan network (Albright 2010: 122). Although it is believed that the A.Q. 
Khan clearly overpriced the equipment it delivered, this investment was still well spent given the 
considerable amount of technology and know-how provided. It was, for example, reported that in the late 
1980s the Qaddafi regime paid out approx. US $500 million to the Pakistani nuclear weapons program 
without receiving any useful return from Islamabad (Albright 2010: 112; Hymans 2012: 241).  
284
 In all probability, we could identify Libya’s preference for best-shot aggregation also in the field of 
conventional military armament. Here as well, Libya was not acquiring domestic capabilities but was 
importing arms and military supply in enormous amounts (Martinez 2007: 55).  
   
205 
 
nuclear weapons, had a country received a proposition for such a massive infusion of 
nuclear weapon technology and know-how“ (Albright 2010: 122).285 
Since the Qaddafi regime was by the cooperation with the A.Q., Khan network for the first 
time able to implement its preferred best shot logic, the Libyan nuclear weapons program 
was considerably accelerated in the early 2000s. By late 2003 it was for example assumed 
that Tripoli could have crossed the “nuclear threshold” within three to six years, if the 
cooperation with the A.Q. Khan network had developed linearly (e.g. El Baradei 2011: ch. 
6). If the Qaddafi regime would have eventually succeeded – with intensified help of the 
network –  to assemble the 10.000 P2 centrifuges it had order together with 20 tons of 
uranium hexafluoride, it would be able to produce four nuclear weapons per year –  
according to David Albright “a small but formidable nuclear arsenal” (Albright 2010: 124; 
Frantz & Collins 2007: 301).286 
Consequentially, Tripoli saw at that time a fairly good chance that it eventually could 
jumpstart its nuclear ambition and that the nuclear proliferation strategy it had followed 
since almost 30 years (i.e. the best shot aggregation) would finally bear fruits. For example 
after Libya’s nuclear reversal the former head of the nuclear program, Maqtoub 
Mohammed Maqtub, was, reportedly, very convinced that Libya “definitely would have 
done it" and could have produced a sufficient amount of nuclear weapons graded material. 
Interviewed in the in the mid-2000s he said that the Qaddafi regime’s “original goal was” to 
cross the nuclear threshold “between 2006 and 2008” (Miller 2006).  
B) Down Stream: The Final Goods of Security & Prestige 
The Libyan nuclear bad was not an end in itself. Rather it signified an intermediary bad that 
was oriented towards the realization of two “final goods” – regime security and prestige. 
Together with other instruments of the Qaddafi regime’s foreign policy, the nuclear bad 
was planned and envisioned to contribute – once the nuclear threshold was crossed – to 
the realization of these two general objectives. These “final goods” – unlike the 
intermediate nuclear bad – were largely unproblematic. The quest for prestige and security 
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 The network had built, for example, a production site in Malaysia – the so-called Scomi Precision 
Engineering (SCOPE) – where the components for the centrifuges were fabricated that Libya had ordered. 
Additional productions sights were build up in Turkey and South Africa. And by the early 2000, the 
network organized workshops in Spain, Dubai and other places to train Libyan engineers, technicians, and 
scientist (Bowen 2006: 37, 39; Corera 2006:109; Frantz & Collins 2007: 272-3, 301; Royal Malaysia Police 
2004). Tellingly, that Western intelligence were able to track down the network in the end was owed to a 
considerable degree to the fact that the high-flying Libyan demand led to an “overstretch” of the A.Q. 
Khan network. It was the network’s increased activities that – in all probability – spark suspicion at MI6 
and CIA (Corera 2006:136). 
286
 Of course not all deliveries that the Qaddafi regime received from the A.Q. Khan network were perfect 
and state of the art (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 69; Craword 2004). There were cases were Libya received 
old or inappropriate materials. For example, the plan the A.Q. Khan network provided for the 
development of miniaturized nuclear warheads were not fitting with the Libya’s missiles (Craword 2004). 
To some extent important elements Libya had order at the A.Q. Khan network – namely rotation parts for 
the enrichment centrifuges – were missing (Albright & Hinderstein 2004; Bowen 2006: 41). And the 
deliveries of the A.Q. Khan were in general overpriced. According to Douglas Franz and Catherine Collins 
the smuggle ring “charged double” for what it delivered to Tripoli (Frantz & Collins 2007: 302). However, 
such problems are typical feature of black market deals. And it appears that the Libyans were not 
disturbed by these difficulties.  
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was not immediately imposing “negative externalities” to the outside world. In that sense, 
the nuclear bad was a problematic element in a rather normal and largely unproblematic 
“fabrication chain”. 
While the two “final goods” were both of relevance throughout the entire period of Libya’s 
nuclear ambition, we nevertheless observe different constellations within the historic 
process. In the following sections, we will elaborate on the shifts within the “final goods” in 
detail.287 
(i) Priority for Prestige (the early 1970s – mid-1980s)  
Numerous knowledgeable scholars have emphasized that “prestige” – understood as the 
“desire for public recognition of eminence as an end in itself” (Markey 1999: 126; see also: 
Sagan 1997/8: 73-85) – played in general a crucial role in the Qaddafi regime’s foreign 
policy (e.g. Bhatia 1988: 64; Litwak 2007: 189). We have already outlined when elaborating 
on the Qaddafi regime’s desires in the interaction with the United States that Muammar al-
Qaddafi was yearning throughout his entire reign to be respected as an outstanding leader. 
Being “on the same eye level “with great powers was an important element we encounter 
at different angles of the Libyan foreign affairs. While the geographic focus of the regions 
where Libya tried to establish a leadership role varied over time – the Arab world, the 
Muslim countries, the Third World, and African continent – the motive for “prestige” 
remained unchanged. In that sense, it is not astonishing that the “prestige motive” appears 
to have played also an important role in the Libya’s nuclear efforts (e.g. Bowen 2006: 22; 
Solingen 2007: 215). However, we come to the conclusion that this “final good” “was of 
particular importance from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s.  
First, Libya was during this period simply not confronted by any meaningful security threat 
(e.g. Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 72; Jasper 2014: 128).288 Given that national security – the 
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 The operationalization of “final goods” is complicated and challenging. Within this dissertation project 
we primarily relied on the method of qualitative content analysis to explore the “final goods”. With the 
help of MAXQDA we have coded and analyzed speeches, memoirs, and interviews of the Qaddafi regime’s 
inner circle for the time period from September 1969 to December 2003. However, comparable to other 
abstract concepts – such as norms, power, or interest – “prestige” and “security” are rarely observable 
directly. Although policy makers sometimes refer explicitly to “prestige” or “security” as guiding 
principles, such clear evidence cannot taken for granted within the analytical process. To overcome this 
obstacle it is inevitable to explore concepts within the speech acts of the relevant actors that can serve as 
proxies for the relevant “final goods”. With the help of these auxiliary constructions it is possible to 
analyze the underlying “final goods”. Within the Libyan case the “prestige motive” for nuclear weapons 
can, for example, be grasped by the role of the “Arab homeland’s defender” that the Qaddafi regime has 
chosen as a guiding principle for its foreign policy.  
288
 Even Israel – the other nuclear power in the region – is assumed to have not signified a security threat 
for the Qaddafi regime at that time (Abadi 2000; Tremlett 1993: 200; Niblock 2002: 220). While Tripoli 
tried to drive back Jerusalem’s diplomatic influence in Sub-Sahara Africa and supported radical Palestinian 
terrorist groups, the Qaddafi regime never – unlike many other Arab states – waged war against Israel and 
apart from harsh rhetoric outbursts (see below), the actual relation between the two countries were in 
practice less hostile. Behind the scene Libya took even a pragmatic stance towards Israel such as selling oil 
to the Jewish State and maintaining other forms of commercial relations (Tremlett 1993: 16). Moreover, 
Etel Solingen has put forward a causal argument underlying that Israel’s nuclear weapons capacity played 
presumably no substantial role for the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear ambition. Solingen has highlighted that 
Libya was reinvigorating its nuclear weapons program in the mid-1990s at a time when the Middle East 
conflict appeared to shift towards a peace solution. Moreover, the Qaddafi regime was reversing its WMD 
programs in the early 2000s at the heydays of the second Intifada. Thus, “the links between the vagaries 
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Libya’s nuclear decisions seemed spurious” (Solingen 2007: 215). 
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most classical explanation for nuclear proliferation – was at that time irrelevant for Libya, 
Etel Solingen has pointed out that “of all Middle East nuclear aspirants, Libya arguably 
provides the least support” for a neo-realist explanation. Instead, she concludes that 
Muammar al-Qaddafi was rather on a “symbolic quest for nuclear weapons” which he 
regarded as a “currency to enhance his regime at home and abroad” (Solingen 2007: 
215).289  
Second, we encounter “prestige elements” during that period also in the conventional, non-
nuclear armament policy of the Qaddafi regime. For example, while Libya was investing 
during the 1970s and 1980s enormous sums in conventional weapons, Malfrid Braut-
Hegghammer comes to the conclusion that “much of this equipment appears to have been 
acquired to increase the country’s prestige as opposed to being used for (or tailored to) the 
arms forces” (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 61).  
Third, we encounter in the speech acts given by Muammar al-Qaddafi and other high-
ranking figures of the Qaddafi regime numerous references suggesting that “prestige” had 
priority in Libya’s nuclear efforts from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. In particular there 
are three nuclear weapons-related “discursive themes” that clearly speak the “language” of 
“prestige”: (a) the nuclear bomb as a joint Arab project under Libyan leadership (b) nuclear 
proliferation as a symbolic-ideological confrontation with Israel, and (c) nuclear weapons as 
a symbol of technology mastery.  
(a) The Qaddafi regime styled itself as the “Arab homeland defender” (Chubin 1994: 54). 
Achieving Arab unity was an important element in Libya’s foreign policy at that time. 
Against that background, it is little astonishing that Libya’s Pan-Arabism also had a 
“nuclear dimension”. At numerous occasion, al-Qaddafi and other high-ranking 
members of his regime had depicted the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a “joint 
venture” of all Arab nations implying the chance to achieve more Arab unity. Perceiving 
itself as the Arab lead nation, Tripoli is assumed to have inferred from that view the 
responsibility to go ahead and provide the nuclear infrastructure to require an “Arab 
atomic bomb” (St. John 2002: 148).290  
(b) The symbolic-ideological confrontation with Israel and constant rhetoric clashes with 
the Jewish State were another arena from which Libya aimed to receive prestige and 
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 Tellingly, Soling’s assessment is seconded by a statement Muammar al-Qaddafi himself gave during an 
interview in early 2004. The Libyan leader said that “in early the 1970s we did not reflect on where or 
against whom we could use the nuclear bomb. Such issues were not considered. All that was important 
was to build the bomb” (Al-Qaddafi addresses General People’s Congress Tripoli, Great Jamahiriy TV, 
March 2, 2004; see Annex 3). Another noteworthy statement by Muammar al-Qaddafi which likewise 
underscores the “prestige motivation” dates from the mid-1980s where the Libyan leader said during a 
statement delivered to University students in Tripoli: “We should be like the Chinese – poor and riding 
donkey, but respected and possessing an atomic bomb” (Qaddafi: Address to University Students, July 
1987; see Annex 3).  
290
 This thinking found expression in numerous speech acts given at that time. For example, in 1985 
Muammar al-Qaddafi said in an Interview broadcasted at the Japan TV station “a small country, cannot 
manufacture this nuclear weapon. But I spoke about and speak about all the Arab countries to do 
together to face this situation” (Qaddafi interviewed by NHK Television, NeFBIS-MEA-85-109, June 1985, 
Annex 3; see also: Qaddafi: Press Conference, Arab Summit in Amman, November 1987, FBIS-NES-90-102, 
Annex 3). 
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respect (Abadi 2000; Tremlett 1993; see also:  Blundy & Lycett 1987: 69-83; Cooley 
1982: 159-186; Kleiman 1996: 26). Since Israel had crossed the “nuclear threshold” in 
the late 1960s, Libya’s rhetoric hostility also had a nuclear side. For example, the Libyan 
foreign minister Muhammad al-Muntasir said in the mid-1987 that “Arab states are 
entitled to possess all weapons which are available in the world” given that Israel is in 
possession of an atomic bomb (cited at Jasper 2013: 162).291 
(c) Another framing that would likewise fall into the “prestige category” is the reference to 
the “mastery of nuclear technology”. Since the nuclear technology was regarded in the 
1970s as cutting-edge technology, its mastery would have elevated Libya’s position and 
would have allowed meeting with the Western States “on the same eye level.” 
Correspondingly Braut-Hegghammer, as well as Jasper, have pointed out that this 
aspect played a certain role for the Qaddafi regime’s proliferation ambitions and found 
expression in numerous speech acts (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 61; Jaspar 2014; see 
also Bowen 2006: 12). 
(ii) The Shift Towards Security (the mid-1980s to early 1990s)  
While the “prestige motivation” never lost relevance for Tripoli’s nuclear ambition, it 
appears that starting by the mid-1980s, the “final good” of “regime security”, which was 
beforehand a rather peripheral rationale, emerge as the primary driving force behind the 
Qaddafi regime’s nuclear effort (Bowen 2006: 11; Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 64; Solingen 
2007: 214-5). Mainly as a consequence of its aggressive foreign policy, Libya was facing 
more and more external threats including military pressure by the United States. Reflecting 
on the history of the Libyan nuclear weapons program and the role of external threats 
Azwai Mohamed, Libya’s Ambassador to London said for example: “We came to the 
conclusion that – in the end – a military confrontation will be imposed on us. So from then, 
we started looking to obtain weaponry that could protect us from that attack. When 
Lockerbie came, it had us convinced that this decision was right” (cited at Corera 2006: 
178).   
Although Libya was in the late 1980s still far away from a militarily deployable atomic 
bomb, it appears that at that time, the power elite in Tripoli started to think nuclear 
weapons strategically. The members of the Qaddafi regime began to frame nuclear 
weapons in more concrete security terms. Senior figures of the regime made more and 
more reference to conventional strategic concepts such as deterrence, the zone of 
influence, and nuclear retaliation. According to Braut-Hegghammer, Tripoli was at that time 
“securitizing” its nuclear weapons program (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 65). Moreover, we 
found evidence in various speech acts that Muammar al-Qaddafi and his entourage 
indicating that Tripoli started by the late 1980s to think about a future nuclear doctrine. 
Although its atomic weapons program was at that time still very rudimentary, it appears 
that Libya envisioned to apply – once it had a nuclear weapons capability – a “defensive 
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 Moreover, Muammar al-Qaddafi was reported to have said: “Now that the Israelis possess the atomic 
weapon, the Arabs have nothing before them except to work day and night to possess the atomic weapon 
in order to defend their existence” (Reuters: Gaddafi Urges Arabs to Develop Nuclear Weapons, 
September, 1987, see Annex 3; see also: Qaddafi interviewed by NHK Television NeFBIS-MEA-85-109; 
Qaddafi interviewed by Neue Kronen-Zeitung, FBIS-NES-88-040, Annex 3).  
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nuclear posture.” In a case of a massive conventional attack against Libyan territory, Tripoli 
would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons. For example, in 1987 Muammar al-Qaddafi 
explained in a speech delivered to students of the Tripoli University: “We undertake not to 
drop the atomic bomb on anyone around us, but we must possess it (…) however if 
someone is going to threaten our existence and independence even without the use of 
atomic weapons, then we should drop it on them. This is an essentially defensive weapon” 
(Qaddafi: Address to University Students, July 1987; see Annex 3).292  
Moreover, the shift from the “prestige” to the “security motivation” is also indicated by the 
way how Tripoli ran its nuclear weapons program starting by the mid-1980s. In the 1970s, 
Libya had pursued its nuclear ambition comparably openly and took little precaution to 
hide its intention (Bowen 2006: 22).293 That is little astonishing given that a nuclear 
weapons program could only unfold a positive impact in terms of “prestige” if the 
addressed audience is aware of the nuclear efforts and if the progress made in that field are 
made public. By the mid-1980s Libya’s nuclear pursuit, however, became more opaque. 
Potential suppliers were chosen more carefully and were addressed more discreetly. And 
for the sake of concealment, Libya was now even willing to accept delays and slowdown in 
its nuclear program. For example, by 1986 the Qaddafi regime started to store the different 
modules of a uranium conversion facilities, it had purchased from an external supplier, at 
various locations around Tripoli – presumably in order to secure them against intelligence 
detection and a potential US-air strike (IAEA, May 2004, Annex I, p. 4-5). And in early 2000 
Libya removed its entire pilot uranium enrichment plant it had built at al-Hashan – located 
on the outskirts of Tripoli – to the more hidden and concealed al-Fallah site (Bowen 2006: 
40).  
(iii) A More Pragmatic View on Nukes   
Beginning with the mid-1990s the Qaddafi regime appeared to have occupied a more 
pragmatic view on its nuclear weapons programs. The nuclear enthusiasm the members of 
the Qaddafi regime had indulged in the past vanished during the 1990s and te early 2000s. 
While “security” as a “final good” remained of importance for Tripoli’s WMD efforts until 
late 2003, it has lost the relevance it had during the 1980s.  
At that time, senior members of the Qaddafi regime express the sober view that nuclear 
weapons are not necessarily a remedy for all power and security problems Libya was 
facing.294 This little counter-intuitive strategic finding appears to have disappointed the 
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 In August 1990 the Libyan dictator further elaborated this thought: “[I]n my opinion one only has the 
right to use such weapons in the case of threat against one’s own territory, and only when an enemy 
enters one’s country” (Qaddafi: Interviewed in Vienna, FBIS-NES-90-157; see Annex 3). 
293
 For example in 1978 Libya made a shopping tour for nuclear weapons related technology to the United 
States – for atomic renegade state certainly a venture into the lion’s den. Even more astonishing: this 
initiative was barely concealed. In effect Ahmed El Shahati – the head of the Libyan Foreign Liaison Office 
in Washington – bluntly told the Director of the Federation of American Scientists, Dr. Jeremy Stone, that 
his government was interested in nuclear weapons (Bhatia 1988: 69).   
294
 It was, for example, reported that the Qaddafi regime had carefully analyzed the Falkland War (1982) 
and Israel’s intervention in Lebanon (1982-1985) – two military conflicts where a nuclear powers fought 
against non-nuclear actors. The major finding was that in many conflict situations nuclear weapons alone 
are not a useful tool. The Qaddafi regime came to the obvious conclusion that to succeed in a military 
standoff, substantial conventional capacities are necessary as well (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 66). 
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members of Tripoli’s power elite who apparently had more high-flying hopes regarding 
nuclear weapons. Interviewed in 2004 the Libyan Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem expressed 
this sober view as follows: “Then you find out you can’t use these weapons. Even the US 
used them only once (…) It gives you a false sense of power” (Fidler, Huband & Khalaf 
2004).  
However, the more pragmatic stance on nuclear weapons meant in no way that Libya was 
relaxing its nuclear efforts. Rather, the 1990s and early 2000s were the time where Libya’s 
nuclear weapons program was quickly accelerating due to the cooperation with the A.Q. 
Khan network. “Security” – although less prominent as in the past – remained the “final 
good” that guided Tripoli’s nuclear efforts. Correspondingly, a senior member of the 
Qaddafi regime, who had been interviewed under the veil of anonymity, describes that the 
Libyan nuclear ambition was since the 1990s a sort of “insurance policy” which were 
embedded in a two-track approach. If the desired rapprochement with the United States 
had failed, the nuclear weapons program would have been a fallback option as Muammar 
al al-Qaddafi was at that time still distrustful that the West might one day apply military 
force to topple his regime (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 67). Pragmatism was in that sense the 
overarching theme in Libya’s nuclear effort starting by the mid-1990s.295  
5.2.2.3 Demand Side:  A Bad for Private Use   
Apart from the “supply side”, the Libyan nuclear bad had also a “demand side”. Like all 
human-made public bads the Libyan nuclear weapons program also bestowed benefits to a 
certain group of profiteer. If we analyze the positive utilizes of the Libyan nuclear weapons 
program by applying the categories of “rivalry” and “excludability”, we come to the 
conclusion that it was a “private bad”. The historic evidence suggests that the Qaddafi 
regime envisioned consuming the benefits of nuclear weapons program after its 
completion in a rivalrous and excludable way. Libya’s nuclear bad was inseparably linked to 
Muammar al-Qaddafi and his close entourage. It was not meant to serve the Libyan people 
at large but was exclusively oriented to the strategic benefits of the regime. At its core the 
Libyan nuclear bad had a profound private nature and as such were first and foremost the 
toy of the Brother Leader’s and the Libyan power elite.  
In other historic cases the build-up of a nuclear weapons capacity is often a multiplayer 
endeavor. Different bureaucratic actors – such as professional military, scientists, and the 
nuclear energy sector – play a vital role (e.g. Evangelista 1988; Sagan 1996/7: 63-73; Flank 
1993/1994). The situation in Libya was different. Here nuclear proliferation was not a 
collective and multi-player process. Rather, it appears that the program was run and 
oversaw exclusively by the inner circle of the Qaddafi regime. Other bureaucratic actors – 
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 Certainly, after Libya abandoned its nuclear weapons program, senior members of the Qaddafi regime 
tried to float the narrative that Libya had wanted to revert its nuclear weapons program already in the 
1990s and had just waited for the right opportunity. A senior official of the Libyan Foreign Office said for 
example that Libya had wanted to abandon its nuclear weapons for a long time and was searching for the 
“exit strategy” and a “suitable time for the announcement of [this] decision” (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 
67; Dejevsky 2004; Miller 2006). But this argument is inconsistent with the quickly developing Libyan 
program in the 1990s and with the relatively difficult and demanding negotiation process in the year 2003.  
Rather, these statements appear as an attempt to interpret history in its own favor. 
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such as the Libyan military – played no meaningful role in the Libyan effort. The daily work 
at Libya’s WMD programs was starting by the mid-1990s managed by the Libyan National 
Board of Scientific Research (LNBSR) (Albright 2010: ch. 5; Bowen 2006: 154; IAEA 28th May 
2004: 7).The LNBSR was led by Matuq Mohammad Matuq – a senior figure of the Libyan 
regime who reportedly “tapped” his position as the day-to-day decision maker in Libya’s 
nuclear effort from his close personal relation to Muammar al-Qaddafi and other key 
figures of Tripoli’s coterie.296 Consequentially, the nuclear decision making was directly 
under the control of the Libyan leader (Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 58; U.S. Embassy Tripoli 
20 Jan. 2010). This pattern prevailed even during the dismantlement of the Libyan nuclear 
bad starting in early 2004. Reportedly, all important decision had to be taken by the Libyan 
leader himself and the operational responsibility for this process was only partly delegated 
to bureaucratic underlings (Interview with Ken Ward 2012, Interview with Jody Daniel 
2011). 
But the Libyan nuclear weapons program was not only exclusively under the control of the 
senior members of Tripoli’s power elite, but it was also in terms of strategic benefits 
exclusive tailored to the inner core of the Qaddafi regime. As we have discussed above the 
“final goods”, the Libyan nuclear effort was first and foremost oriented at the purpose of 
the regime. It was not the security and prestige of Libya at large but the security and 
prestige of the Qaddafi regime the nuclear program aimed at. The nuclear effort was 
closely bonded to Muammar al-Qaddafi’s ideological and political mindset. In all 
probability, the Libyan people played in the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear ambitions no 
meaningful role. Consequentially, the delegation of the program to more subordinated 
players in the Qaddafi regime – such as the Libyan military and its different branches for the 
sake of national defense – would have undermined these overarching objectives of regime 
survival and regime prestige.   
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 Tellingly, when in April 2012 the UN Security Council imposed travel bans and asset freeze on 16 key 
figures of the Qaddafi regime as a reaction to the bloody revolution, Matuq’s name was on the list (see 
UN Security Council Resolution No. 1970 (2011)).  
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5.3 Analysing the (Mis)Fit of Diplomatic Design in 
the Libyan Nuclear Reversal Negotiations   
In the following section, we will study the “fit performance” of diplomatic design applied 
during the Libyan NRN. Our analysis is organized along the four decisive negotiation phases 
we identified above (pre-negotiation, pre-agreement, agreement, and post-agreement 
phase). With the help of our fit taxonomy, we will identify the substantial and procedural 
negotiation problems the United States and Libya faced in each of these phases. Whether 
and to which degree the diplomatic design elements (and their alternative explanations) 
contribute to the resolution of these negotiations is the crucial benchmark for the 
evaluation of their performance.  
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5.3.1 First Part of the Pre-Negotiation Phase (December 1987 - late 
1980s) 
The U.S. engagement on the Qaddafi regime’s WMD programs started in late December 
1987 when senior U.S. intelligence officers revealed to New York Times that Libya was 
pursuing a secret chemical weapons program. As we have shown above (ch. 5.1.1.1), this 
event marked the beginning of the so-called pre-negotiation phase. The pre-negotiation 
phase clearly differs from other phases of the US-Libyan bargain process. It was by far the 
most lasting episode in the entire process. Altogether it took 16 years until the two sides 
started for the first time direct talks on the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapon program in 
spring 2003. Moreover, unlike other phases of the NRN process, the pre-negotiation phase 
is sub-divided into two parts. The first part, which ran until the late 1980s, was dominated 
by fierce confrontation. The diplomatic struggle on the WMD issue fell into a relatively 
tense and hostile episode of the U.S.-Libyan relation. Although the second part of the pre-
negotiation phase which started in the early 1990s was more benign than the first years, it 
was still relatively challenging and came to an end, not before March 2003. What links 
these two parts together was the overarching strategic question the two conflict parties 
pondered upon throughout the pre-negotiation stage: Whether or not direct diplomacy 
shall be given a chance and explorative talks on the WMD shall be held? 
5.3.1.1 Procedural & Substantial Negotiation Problems  
Based on our survey of Libya’s and the United States’ motivation, we have in the previous 
chapter applied the “reenactment method” and thereby revealed that both players were at 
the very beginning of the diplomatic process entangled in a Deadlock Game. The procedural 
negotiation problem Tripoli and Washington faced until the early 1990s was dominated by a 
confrontational and antagonistic game constellation. That this challenging situation was 
overcome in relatively short time allowing the bargaining process to move on to less hostile 
realms, is primarily owed to structural changes in Libya’s foreign policy. Diplomatic design 
was for the resolution of the Deadlock Game almost irrelevant. Rather, it was already a 
“success” if the applied design elements were not further complicating the procedural 
negotiation problem in the sense of negative fits (Figure 25). 
The substantial negotiation problem – Libya’s nuclear bad – played during the pre-
negotiation phase at best a minor role. Given the tense U.S.-Libyan relationship, a 
reasonable diplomatic solution of the Qaddafi regime’s WMD programs was at that time 
simply not feasible. The nascent bargaining process had not yet developed the necessary 
maturity that would have allowed a diplomatic engagement on the substantial dimension. 
What had priority instead was to move the Libya-American relationship into a state that 
would make cooperation on “negotiation issue” possible.  
Nevertheless, we will not exclude Libya’s nuclear bad from our analysis of the pre-
negotiation phase. After all at least some of the design elements applied during this 
bargaining episode had at least some implications for the substantial negotiation problem 
(for example the U.S. military threat) (Figure 25).  
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A) Deadlock Game: “Splendid Confrontation” 
Deadlock Games are characterized by strong disincentive to negotiation. It is a particular 
malign game constellation in terms of joint problem resolution. Defection represents for 
both sides the dominant strategy. The deadlock situation – mutual defection (DD) – is the 
most likely outcome of this constellation. Therefore, the Deadlock Game is distinct from all 
other procedural negotiation problems we will discuss within the Libyan-American 
diplomatic engagement. In the perception of the players, mutual defection is not 
problematic at all. Rather, it is the outstanding characteristic of this strategic situation that 
actors who are entangled in a Deadlock Game clearly prefer the antagonistic and 
confrontational interaction over a possible cooperative outcome (CC). In that sense, it is 
“splendid confrontation” that makes Deadlock Game distinct from other procedural 
negotiation problems. Of course, since unreciprocated defection (DC) signifies for both 
players the individual optimum, they both rather prefer unconditional surrender of their 
opponent. But once the interaction result of mutual defection is achieved (DD), they both 
quickly arrange themselves with this outcome which coincides with the Nash Equilibrium 
(N) from which the players cannot depart unilaterally without rendering themselves worse 
off (Figure 9). 
Figure 9: The Deadlock Game (Dec. 1987 -  late 1980s)  
 
 
But the deadlock situation (DD) is not only a relatively attractive outcome, it is also a 
relatively safe option. In Deadlock Games, mutual defection coincides with the Maximin 
solution (M) – the strategic choice which provides in a situation of distrust and suspicion of 
the players the best precaution against the worst case scenario of unreciprocated 
cooperation (CD). Even if joint cooperation would emerge unexpectedly as a very attractive 
choice – for example due to an external intervention which is providing an appreciable 
incentive for this option – the deadlock players would still stick to the mutual defection 
(DD) and would only depart from that situation when mutual distrust is resolved (Figure 9). 
Thus, Deadlock Games are marked by a double trap: a colliding interest and a distrust 
trap.297 
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 Nevertheless, when we define social traps narrowly and look from that perspective upon the Deadlock 
Game in isolation this particular strategic constellation would not meet the decisive criteria. Deadlock 
Games have not the characteristic bifurcation between collective and individual rationality. Rather, 
mutual defection (DD) is the logical outcome if both players act according to the prism of individual 
rationality. But it is also the outcome that is collectively the best option and therefore coincides with the 
Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+).  Seen from that perspective, the Deadlock Game is comparable to full 
harmony (i.e. Pure Coordination Game) where both players have an upmost interest in cooperation. In 
start explorative talks  [C] no explorative talks [D]
start explorative talks  [C] 2,2 1,4
no explorative talks [D] 4,1 3,3 M,N,P+
USA
Libya
The players' preference hierarchy:      DC > DD > CC > CD
C =  Cooperation  D = Defection  M = MaxiMin Solution  N = Nash Equilibirum  P+ = Qualified 
   
215 
 
While the Deadlock Game is a relatively demanding situation, we are still convinced that it 
is not necessarily a “losing game” for diplomacy.  With the help of our fit taxonomy, we 
could identify ways and means on how to overcome this challenging constellation. 
Although the investment of governance resources  required s relatively high in Deadlock 
Games, we are nevertheless able to identify an “optimal problem solution” for a diplomatic 
intervention. Two aspects are in that regard of importance: (a) massive and lasting 
preference manipulation and (b) fast and unbiased confidence building (Figure 9).  
First, in order to overcome the “splendid confrontation” (DD) and move the two players 
into joint cooperation (CC), a “massive and lasting preference manipulation” is required. 
Since cooperation is under the condition of the Deadlock Game an unfavorable situation, 
considerable governance resources must be invested to influence the players’ motivation in 
favor of joint problem resolution. That requires that either the attractiveness of joint 
cooperation (CC) is sharply increasing, or the outcome of mutual defection (DD) is rendered 
into an unpleasant choice.  
Beyond individual cases, it is difficult to quantify the investment required to achieve a 
successful manipulation of the actors’ strategic calculation. However, in general, one can 
say that the “preference manipulation” must be equivalent to two ranks of the deadlock 
players’ payoff structure.  
In order to make the players depart from the deadlock constellation, the diplomatic 
intervention must make up for the difference of one payoff point in the players’ hierarchy 
of preferences. In the players’ rating of the available opportunities, the scenario of mutual 
defection (DD) has to swap its position with the choice of joint cooperation (CC).298 Without 
this intervention the players are unlikely to abandon the behavioral pattern of “splendid 
confrontation”. Yet, departing towards joint cooperation (CC) is only one side of the coin. In 
terms of a successful “preference manipulation”, it is also required that the players stick to 
cooperative course and do not relapse into unilateral defection (DC) – a practice that is 
under the circumstance of the Deadlock Game very likely to occur since mutual defection 
(DD) has no “catalyzing effect” in favor of joint cooperation (unlike in many other dilemma 
                                                                             
both situations – in the case of full harmony (e.g. the Pure Coordination Game) and in the case of a full-
fledged confrontation (e.g. the Deadlock Game) – there is no social trap (as long as we apply a narrow 
definition of this concept). Consequentially, in both situations there is no room for negotiation – either 
because it is not necessary (full harmony) or because it is not possible (full confrontation). 
However, in the chapter on our fit taxonomy (ch. 3.1.3.2) we explained that our concept of social traps 
takes into account the two principal dimensions of negotiation problems (the procedural and substantial 
dimension) and therefore goes beyond the conventional definitions of social dilemmas  which build 
primarily on the disjunction of the Nash Equilibrium (N) and the Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+). When 
thought as a procedural negotiation problem, the Deadlock Game is problematic since the involved 
players are unable to work jointly towards a diplomatic solution of the substantial negotiation problems. 
The central “negotiation issue”, operationalized in our case as a nuclear bad, which is itself a social trap 
remains unresolved and continues to linger on as long as the conflict parties remain under the conditions 
of the Deadlock Game in the state of mutual defection. As long as procedural negotiation problem is 
dominated by a Deadlock Game, there will be no diplomatic solution for the nuclear bad. In that sense, 
the Deadlock Game and its resolution is the indispensable prelude for longer, two-dimensional bargaining 
process. Since the Deadlock Game is an integral part of the larger substantial social trap, it would be odd 
not to describe it as a dilemma constellation.  
298
 Swap between DD and CC:      
DC > DD > CC > CD
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games (such as the PD or the Chicken game)).299 To make the players maintain cooperation, 
it requires an intervention on an even higher magnitude than to make them embark this 
course. A preference manipulation equivalent to two ranks in the deadlock players’ payoff 
structure is needed in which the third best scenario (CC) has to be swapped with the most 
preferred outcome (DC).300  
However, in addition to the relatively high investment of governance resources, successful 
“preference manipulation” under the condition of Deadlock Games has to be lasting. Unlike 
many other game constellations, cooperation (CC) is within Deadlock Games under no 
circumstances self-sufficient. As long as a diplomatic intervention is showing signs of wear, 
the centrifugal forces inherent in this strategic constellation will make the players return to 
unilateral defection with the result that they end up again in the situation of mutual 
defection (DD). It is therefore, essential that the preference manipulation continues even if 
the players have chosen joint problem resolution.  
The second essential “fit demand” required to assure cooperation in Deadlock Games is the 
resolution of the distrust trap signified by the coincidence between the Maximin solution 
(M) and the state of mutual defection (DD). If the “massive and lasting preference 
manipulation” is not seconded by efforts of confidence building, the chance is high that the 
entire initiative will fall apart despite all the governance resources that have been invested. 
“Confidence building” is absolutely imperative in order to arrive at a cooperative resolution 
of Deadlock Games. However, this “fit demand” is relatively challenging too. Since 
defection and confrontation are the “natural pattern” of this strategic situation, distrust is 
assumed to be high among the involved actors.  
To yield meaningful results under the condition of Deadlock Games, “confidence building” 
interventions have to fulfill two conditions: First, it is crucial that the players move 
simultaneously into cooperation. Diplomatic interventions to reduce distrust must, 
therefore, have an unbiased nature. In a case where the actors take this step separately, 
the “first mover” will quickly grow doubts about the cooperative attitude of its counterpart. 
The fear to be deceived will rise quickly and reemerging suspicion could easily wreck the 
entire diplomatic initiative, causing a relapse into mutual defection. Second, it is important 
that the confidence building is established quickly. There is the danger that mutual 
defection becomes rooted in the players’ general behavior pattern with the consequences 
that they make themselves comfortable with confrontation and regard it as the “normal 
form of living”.  The antagonistic and confrontational pattern of the deadlock situation 
becomes more deeply engrained, the longer the players remain in this situation. Unlike, for 
example, in the PD game, iteration under the condition of a Deadlock Game is not paying 
off in terms of joint cooperation.  
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 The experience of mutual defection (DD) is in Deadlock Games not increasing the player’s inclination 
for joint cooperation (CC).  
300
 Swap between DC and CC:  
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B) Libya’s Nuclear Bad 
Under the condition of a Deadlock Game, even simple and ordinary problems could turn 
into insurmountable obstacles. Consequentially, the diplomatic efforts to resolve the 
substantial negotiation problem – Libya’s nuclear bad – was unthinkable during the first 
part of the pre-negotiation phase. Cooperation in that field was highly unlikely in the light 
of the hostile U.S.-Libyan relations in the late 1980s. The substantial negotiation problem 
moved into the center of attention of the negotiation parties not before spring 2003 – the 
starting point of the pre-agreement phase (ch. 5.3.3. Moreover, in the 1980s the United 
States was simply not aware of the later development the Libya nuclear bad would take. 
While it was known for a long time that Tripoli desired to acquire nuclear weapons, the 
focus of Washington’s WMD policy was in the late 1980s primarily oriented at the Qaddafi 
regime’s chemical weapons program – which was started in the early 1980s and which was 
discovered by the U.S. intelligence around the year 1984 (e.g. Terril 1994: 48; Tucker 2009: 
372).  
Nevertheless, we still deem it important to include the substantial negotiation problem in 
our analysis of the first part of the pre-negotiation phase. Since a resolution of the nuclear 
bad is under the condition of the Deadlock Game not possible, it is still of interest to reveal 
whether and how diplomatic design elements have affected the substantial negotiation 
problem. Since the concrete scope and nature of Libya’s nuclear weapons program was in 
terms of a diplomatic resolution strategy a “non-issue” in the pre-negotiation phase, the fit 
demand that is in light of this particular constellation most relevant are precaution and 
preparatory measures capable of paving the way for a future diplomatic resolution. Against 
that background, we could infer from our fit taxonomy two requirements (Figure 25):  
First, as we have explained above, the Qaddafi’s regime nuclear effort was during the 1980s 
clearly oriented towards the “final good” of “regime security” (ch. 5.2.2.2). Seen through 
the prism of the public bad approach, the nascent nuclear weapons program functioned as 
an “intermediary step” in larger “fabrication chain” which was tailored to this particular 
“final good”. In order to avoid a further exacerbation of the substantial negotiation 
problem, which would later render diplomatic resolution efforts more demanding, the 
crucial “fit demand” we infer from our fit taxonomy is the avoidance of all actions that 
would increase Libya’s “nuclear appetite”. Regardless of whether it is a structural factor, a 
non-diplomatic intervention, or a design element – all aspects that had the potential to 
undermine and belittle the Qaddafi regime’s “final good” of “regime security” increase the 
relevance of Libya’s nuclear weapons program in its function as an “intermediate bad” 
(Figure 25). It is a principal logic we infer from the public bad approach that when the 
realization of “final goods” becomes more distant, bad doers are likely to become more 
eager and determined to increase the impact and the performance of the intermediate 
fabrication steps (i.e. in our case Libya’s nuclear weapons program) in order to realize the 
desired “final goods”.  
Second, Libya’s nuclear efforts had entered in the 1980s into a phase of stagnation (see ch. 
5.1.2.2 and ch. 5.2.2.2). At that time Tripoli’s nuclear weapons program was characterized 
setbacks and standstill. The desired “best shot aggregation” Libya tried to apply was not 
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yielding results given that the North African country had little to no success in winning 
external suppliers. Presumably as a makeshift solution, Libya turned to chemical weapons 
instead. Consequentially, as long as Libya was not able to gain support from nuclear 
outfitters from abroad, Tripoli was not moving closer to the “nuclear threshold” – given its 
low management skills and its backward domestic scientific-technological capabilities. 
Unlike nuclear weapons programs that are built by the “summation technology” where 
every technological step and atomic renegade state takes on its way towards a nuclear 
capability is adding up to the nuclear bad, the “best shot logic” of nuclear proliferation 
follows an “all-or-nothing-principle”. If a nuclear bad is not provided by the single most 
potent manufacturer which crosses the nuclear threshold by a “single act of creation”, 
proliferation efforts that follow the “best shot logic” are unlikely to succeed.  
The “optimal problem solution” we could deduce from this constellation, is the 
requirement to prevent any external influx to Libya’s WMD programs provided by nuclear 
outfitters. As long as the Qaddafi’s regime was unable to operate the “best shot 
aggregation”, the Libyan nuclear weapons program remained in a stage that was close to 
inexistence (Figure 25).  
5.3.1.2 Analyzing the Varieties of (Mis)Fit in the First Part of the Pre-Negotiation 
Phase 
While the Deadlock Game is a rather unlikely situation for diplomacy, we nevertheless 
encounter five diplomatic design elements during the first years of the pre-negotiation 
phase: Military threats, economic sanctions, a naming-and-blaming campaign, Arab 
mediation efforts, and a Libyan charm offensive. Alternative explanations were, on the 
other hand, instead little in number (Figure 25). 
Among the different strategic constellations the United States and Libya encountered 
during the entire NRN process, the first part of the pre-negotiation phase was the most 
difficult. Therefore, it is little astonishing that all diplomatic design elements failed to 
achieve a meaningful impact. Diplomacy was not a game changer. There was not a single 
design element that fit with the procedural or the substantial negotiation problem. Rather 
misfits, underfits, and occasionally even negative fits dominated the Libyan-American 
interaction on WMD in the late 1980s (Figure 25). The gap between the actual performance 
of diplomatic design and the “fit demand”, we identified with the help of our fit taxonomy, 
was striking during the first years of the Libyan NRN.  
We are likewise not astonished that “coercion” was the dominant nature of the hapless 
design elements applied during the first part of the pre-negotiation phase. Efforts to 
actively overcome the distrust among the conflict parties were instead inexistence.301 
However, this particular structure of diplomatic design is only logical. For a deadlock player, 
it would be simply irrational to choose rewarding or trust building strategies in order to 
affect the behavioral pattern of its opponent. A leopard can’t change its spots. Libya and 
the United States were simply too much entangled in the logic of “splendid confrontation” 
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 When diplomatic design elements affected the distrust trap, they only deteriorated the situation (i.e. 
Libya’s charm offensive or U.S. military threats).   
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and were unable to escape from this particular pattern. When nevertheless cooperative 
strategies were applied – as Libya did with its “charm offensive” – it was for the sake of 
setting up a diplomatic smokescreen. Even more important, however, is the fact that any 
conciliatory step or rewarding strategy applied by one deadlock player to its counterpart 
would be anyway unlikely to achieve the desired results. Under the circumstance of the 
Deadlock Game, the receiver of such an approach would simply reap in the positive 
incentive without reciprocating this step.   
Figure 25: Varieties of (Mis)Fit in the First Part of the Pre-Negotiation Phase 
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The Deadlock Game was in the end resolved by structural change. In the late 1980s, the 
Qaddafi regime was confronted with numerous setbacks and failures both in its foreign and 
its domestic politics and underwent a strategic readjustment. This general shift in the 
Qaddafi regime’s policy is known as the “Libyan perestroika”. If there had been no “Libyan 
perestroika”, the Deadlock Game would have prevailed. In all probability, the Qaddafi 
regime’s nuclear reversal, achieved in December 2003, would not have not been possible in 
such a scenario.  
In the following section, we will analyze the performance of the diplomatic design elements 
and its alternative explanations.  
A) U.S. Military Threats  
While the U.S. air raids on Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 took place before the first part 
of the pre-negotiation phase started, military threat played an important role during the 
prelude of the Libyan NRN. Although the option to use force against the Qaddafi regime’s 
WMD programs was never executed, military threats was always present.  
The scenario of U.S. raids against the North African country was, in particular, tangible in 
late 1988 and early 1989. At that time, military actions as a tool of U.S. counter-
proliferation was widely discussed in Washington. For example, in late December 1988, 
President Ronald Reagan said publicly in a TV interview that a military strike against the 
Rabta plant – the major site of Libya’s clandestine chemical weapons program – was in the 
realm of possibility (Cannon & Ottaway 1988: A1; Terrill 1994: 50). This view was in late 
1988 also endorsed by the elected presidential candidate, George H.W. Bush. Other key 
figures of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, such as William F. Burns, director US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, likewise proposed military strikes against the Rabta plant 
as a possible option. Moreover, the U.S. sabre rattling was further intensified in January 
1989 when U.S. Navy aircrafts downed two Libyan MIG 23 bombers in a skirmish over the 
Gulf of Sirte (Cannon & Ottaway 1988: A1; Terrill 1994: 50; Wiegele 1992: 46 & 115). 302  
Reportedly, Tripoli noted with growing concerns the public discussion in Washington about 
military force. In light of the “Operation El Dorado Canyon” (April 1986), the members of 
the Qaddafi’s regime took this threat serious (e.g. Apple 1986; O’Sullivan 2003: 176; Ronen 
2008: 35; St. John 2002: 148-9). Consequentially, immediately after Ronald Reagan’s 
statement during the TV interview, the Qaddafi regime took hectic measures to prepare for 
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 The US-Libyan military confrontation in the Gulf of Sirte started already in the early 1981. At the side-
lines of an U.S. manoeuvre in the southern Mediterranean in August 1981, Libyan combat aircrafts and 
forces of the U.S. Sixth Fleet skirmished in the Golf of Sirte (Vandewalle 2006: 133). Further clashes 
between Libyan air force and the U.S. Sixth Fleet occurred again in February 1983. During the year 1983 
Washington stationed nuclear headed cruise missiles on a U.S. air base in Sicily – an act that was 
perceived by Tripoli as a concrete threat (Cremasco 1987: 274; Ronen 2008: 24, 32-34). In early 1986 U.S. 
military coercion against Libya eventually climaxed. In late March 1986 the U.S. Sixth Fleet conducted a 
naval maneuver in the contested waters of the Golf of Sirte and thereby triggered a brief but hefty 
exchange of military blows which sank a Libyan patrol boat, downed several Libyan combat airplanes, and 
caused damage at a long-range SA-5 missile battery at the Ghardabiyya air base which had been recently 
delivered by the USSR to Libya (Shipler 1986; St. John 2002: 136). The peak of military violence, however, 
was reach a few weeks later when the Reagan administration launched Operation El Dorado Canyon on 
April 15, 1986 (see ch. 5.2.1.2).   
   
221 
 
a possible U.S. air attack. The military reserve was mobilized, additional anti-aircraft guns 
were deployed to protect government facilities, and larger numbers of civilians were 
ordered to camp at the vicinity of the Libyan chemical weapons production site in Rabta in 
order to drive up collateral damage in the case of a U.S. bombardment with the intention to 
inflict negative publicity on the Reagan administration (Terrill 1994: 52; Wiegele 1992: 34; 
Ross 1989).  
Nevertheless, we come to the conclusion that the design element of military threat was 
neither moving the Qaddafi regime towards cooperation nor made Tripoli change its WMD 
efforts. Libya remained in the deadlock situation (DD) and was continuing its 
confrontational stance towards the United States. The overall evaluation of this design 
element is therefore negative. In all probability, military threats represented in terms of the 
required “massive preference manipulation” an underfit, signified a misfit with regard to 
the “confidence building”, and had for the substantial negotiation problem even negative 
consequences in the sense of negative fit since the scenario of U.S. air raids made nuclear 
weapons as a mean of national security even more valuable for the Qaddafi regime (Figure 
25).  
Since Washington’s military threat towards Libya was maintained throughout the Reagan’s 
and Bush senior’s presidency, this diplomatic design element was certainly meeting the 
criterion of a lasting intervention – a factor we have identified above as crucial for 
successful “preference manipulation”.303 Moreover, among the other coercive instruments 
that Washington applied during the first part of the pre-negotiation phase, military threat 
was the only design element that was “clearly heard” by Tripoli. The military threats were 
perceived as something different than the “daily rudeness” that shaped the U.S.-Libyan 
relation at that time. It was not for nothing that the Qaddafi regime undertook contingency 
measures against an expected U.S. air strike. Neither was it a mere coincidence that Tripoli 
launched by early 1989 a “charm offensive” towards to pacifying the United States (see 
section B). Although this outreach initiative was first and foremost a “diplomatic 
smokescreen” and not a sincere offer for American-Libyan reconciliation, it nevertheless 
showed that this coercive diplomatic tool had – unlike all other diplomatic tools – caused 
immediate reaction by the Qaddafi regime. 
However, all that cannot make up for the lacking massiveness of the military threats. In all 
probability, the magnitude in which this coercive design element was delivered was simply 
too small to yielding meaningful impact under the condition of the Deadlock Game. Rather, 
the “best explanation” we could draw from the historic evidence is that the U.S. military 
threats signified an underfit in terms of the “preference manipulation”.  
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 For example, in the late 1980s the United States was increasing its support for the Chadian 
government in the war against Libya and delivered modern military equipment such as shoulder fired anti-
aircraft missiles. The military training Washington provided for Libyan exile opposition groups was 
intensified at the same time. In the 1980s media reports surfaced about commando operations executed 
by U.S. special forces on Libyan territory including nightly raids to destroy telecommunication 
infrastructure (e.g. Davis 1990: 161; O’Sullivan 2003: 176; Ronen 2008: 34; St. John 2002: 135). And when 
Libya build a second secrete chemical weapons plant at Tarhunah, 65 km southeast of Tripoli in the early 
1990s, Washington put military strikes again on the agenda (Prados 2005; Tucker 2009; 373; Shenon 1996; 
Waller 1996).  
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Despite all the precaution measures Libya undertook in late 1988 and early 1989, the 
Qaddafi regime must have been aware that Washington’s sabre rattling was first and 
foremost a threating gesture. We found no indication that the United States would have 
significantly increased its military presence in the Gulf of Sirte at that time. No additional 
military hardware was deployed in the region. In late 1988 and early 1989, there were no 
signs of tangible preparation for military actions from the U.S. side. In addition, the threat 
of military strikes against Tripoli and its WMD programs was relative vague. Washington 
had not drawn red lines that would – once crossed – trigger military actions. For example, 
when Ronald Reagan was asked by the TV interviewer whether he could elaborate in more 
detail what he meant by the threat he just sent to Tripoli, the U.S. President became 
cautious and said “that a decision has not been made yet, we’re in communication with our 
allies and with NATO forces and all, and we’re watching very closely that situation” 
(Wiegele 1992: 31). Several days after Ronald Reagan’s TV interview, U.S. senior officials 
were quoted by the press saying that “no active consideration” had been taken so far and 
that military actions were only one option of several possible tools discussed by the 
administration (Cannon & Ottawa 1988). 
Moreover, Libya must have noticed that U.S. allies in West European were critical to the 
use of force. Critique regarding this particular design element was voiced already in April 
1986 during the unilateral air raid on Tripoli and Benghazi.304 In late 1988 Washington’s 
allies were apparently even more opposed to military actions. According to Bruce St. John, 
there was a widespread feeling in European capitals that “the Reagan administration (…) 
continued to overestimate the Libyan threat” (St. John 2002: 143).  
However, the most important indicator for the lacking massiveness of military coercion is 
the fact that this very tool had already failed to achieve an impact on Tripoli when 
Washington applied it during the “Operation El Dorado Canyon”.  Even though the U.S. air 
raids in April 1986 were not just threats but concrete military actions, they did not force 
Libya into a more conciliatory and less hostile course. While it is undisputable that the 
bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 shocked Muammar al-Qaddafi and the power 
elite in Tripoli (e.g. Ronen 2008: 32, St. John 2002: 15), the historic evidence suggest that 
Libya was not decreasing but instead intensifying its confrontation with the United States in 
response to coercive diplomacy (e.g. George 1991: 57; Bowen 2006: 11; Braut-
Hegghammer 2008: 64; Newnham 2009: 78). The Qaddafi regime stepped up its terrorist 
activities and initiated an asymmetric retaliation campaign which climaxed in the bombing 
of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988 (e.g. Apple 1986; Collins 2004: 1; Exenberger 2002: 
70; Pienaar 2008; Jakobsen 2011).305 Since far more intrusive military coercion failed in April 
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 In particular Italy, Spain, and Greece had expressed in April 1986 concerns that the unilateral U.S. 
attacks on Libya would further deteriorate the security situation in the Mediterranean. During “Operation 
El-Dorado Canyon” U.S. bombers were not allowed to cross French airspace.  Even the UK – the special 
ally to the United States and by that time governed by Premier Minister Margaret Thatcher who fostered 
a close friendship with Ronald Reagan – had not taken part in this operation and provided only minor 
support in the sense that U.S. F-111 aircrafts were allowed to use air bases in the UK to fly their mission in 
Libya (e.g. Davis 1990: 145, 151-7; Ronen 2008: 31; Phillips 1986; St. John 2002: 132-3). 
305
 While the Reagan administration has claimed that Operation El-Dorado Canyon was a major success 
and a big blow to terrorism, an internal report of U.S. Department of Defense issued in October 1997 and 
declassified in 2000 evaluates the events in retrospective and comes to the conclusion that the Qaddafi 
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1986, it is likely to assume that it did even more so in December 1988 and January 1989. 
Tellingly, in early 1989 the Los Angeles Times interviewed a European diplomat stationed in 
Tripoli who reported that the U.S. military threats had certainly provoked an “underlying 
tension” in Libya “but it’s nothing like it was in ‘86 [the year of Operation El Dorado 
Canyon]” (Ross 1989).  
While military threat was in terms of “preference manipulation” insufficient, this design 
element had with regard to the substantial negotiation problem even negative implications. 
In all probability, it signified a negative fit. From our fit taxonomy, we have inferred the 
requirement to avoid actions that render nuclear weapons even more relevant for the 
Qaddafi regime in terms of national security. With Washington bringing air strikes up on the 
agenda, it is only logical that Tripoli’s demand for a nuclear weapons program, functioning 
as an intermediate good to achieve the desired “final good” of national security, was 
fostered and was given an additional boost (e.g. Braut-Hegghammer 2008). Coercive 
diplomacy was therefore even increasing the substantial negotiation problem. After all, 
military deployable atomic weapons would have been a reliable protection against external 
aggression (Figure 25).  
B) Libya’s Charm Offensive   
As an immediate reaction to the military threat, the Qaddafi regime launched a “charm 
offensive” towards the United States. According to our evaluation this design element 
signified a misfit with regard to “preference manipulation” and even a negative fit in terms 
of confidence building (Figure 25).  
In order to soften the Reagan administration stance, Libya sent conciliatory signals to 
Washington in late 1988 via the Italian foreign minister Giulio Andreotti. Tripoli voiced its 
willingness to allow international inspectors to visit its chemical weapons production site at 
Rabta (Wiegele 1992: 31). A similar initiative was made by Muammar al-Qaddafi in January 
1989 at a press conference in Tripoli arranged to welcome the incoming 41st U.S. President, 
Georg H.W. Bush. At that occasion, the Libyan leader aired his readiness to engage in 
“disarmament negotiations” with the United States as long as both sides would treat each 
other with respect and would “meet at eye level” (St. John 2002: 154). In the same month, 
Tripoli invited a group of international journalists to Libya for a “visit” to the Rabta site 
(Parmelee 1989). 
                                                                             
regime started to retaliate by a series of terror attacks which were launched already three days after the 
U.S. air raids and which were either conducted directly by Libya’s secret service or by various terrorist 
groups Tripoli financed and supported at that time (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 1997). 
Immediate reprisals included the killing of three kidnapped British and U.S. citizens in Beirut as well as 
ambushing of two U.S. embassy communication officers in Khartoum (St. John 2002: 143; Davis 1990: 157-
8). More sophisticated attacks needed planning and were therefore launched in the following year. In 
April 1988 U.S. Information Agency building was attack in Latin America and a USO club (United Service 
Organization) was bombed in Italy. In May 1988 a Citibank office in New Delhi were ragged by an 
explosion (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 1997: 15-6; St. John 2002: 148). One of the most 
spectacular retaliation effort Libya made was the failed attempt to hire “a Chicago street gang to attack 
US airliners with shoulder-fired weapons” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 1997: 16).  
   
224 
 
Tripoli’s diplomatic outreach to Washington should not be confused with the surge of 
Libyan backchannel approaches started by Spring 1992.306 Instead, in late 1988 and early 
1989 Libya intended – in all probability – not to sound out ways for a diplomatic 
rapprochement with the United States – a step that would be irrational in the logic of the 
Deadlock Game. Rather, it is most likely that the objective of this initiative was to pacify 
Washington, win international support from the international community, and gain – if the 
United States would really launch a strike – more time for contingency measures. 
It is little astonishing that the “charm offensive” was insufficient to manipulate the 
preference of the United States in terms of joint cooperation. Alone the fact that the 
Qaddafi regime framed its offer for direct talks on its WMD program in the logic of arms 
control negotiation – a type of bargaining which is in practice reserved to the bilateral 
agreements achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War 
– unmasked Libya’s charm offensive as a “diplomatic smoke screen” (e.g. New York Times, 
6th July 1989: p. 1.). Libya’s call for a WMD dialogue “on the same eye level” did not only 
imply that the United States should tread a small North African country the same way as it 
handled its relation with the Soviet superpower, the logic of “arms control talks” implied 
also the scenario that not only Libya but also the United States would disarm parts of its 
WMD programs.  
Moreover, it is relatively easy to decipher Libya’s offer for transparency on its chemical 
weapons program as a dummy maneuver. Tripoli’s invitation of international journalists to 
visit the Rabta site is in that regard in particular illustrative. The journalists – among several 
reporters from U.S. journals – were only admitted to watch Rabta in the gathering dark 
through the windows of a coacher driving by the site in a distance of several hundred 
meters. A stop-over at the facility – let alone a walk-through over its interior – was not 
allowed. It is, therefore, little astonishing that this failed Libyan PR coup caused negative 
echoes in almost all leading Western newspapers  (e.g. Parmelee 1989; St. John 2002: 146-
7; Wiegele 1992: 49-50).307 
Although Libya’s charm offensive was not further increasing the colliding interest trap, this 
design element nevertheless failed to manipulate Washington’s preference. We, therefore, 
evaluate it as a misfit. However, with regard to the require confidence building, Tripoli’s 
approach signified – in all probability – a negative fit. Washington correctly read Tripoli’s 
initiative as a deceptive measurement. The offer for talks and dialogue was in that sense 
another proof that Libya was – as the Reagan administration was anyway expecting – 
playing with marked cards (Figure 25).  
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 Consequentially, the „charm offensive“ differs clearly from Libya’s latter diplomatic backchannel 
initiatives which were held in utmost secrecy and were designed to avoid any media coverage.  
307
 A similar effort to disguise the Rabta facility were taken by the Qaddafi regime in March 1990 when  
Tripoli was feigning a fire at the plant by burning tires in the front and painting the buildings with faked 
burn marks. The aim of the hoax fire was to suggest that the plant was severely damaged. Moreover, the 
Libyans used this incidence to accuse the United State, Israel, and Germany for having launched a secrete 
operation to destroy Rabta. Meanwhile the work at the facility continued. Libya produced in Rabta a 
considerable quantity of mustard gas before it was closed down in the late 1990s (e.g. Tucker 2009: 372).  
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C) Unilateral U.S. Sanctions 
Economic sanctions were another coercive tool the United States applied against the 
Qaddafi regime. Unlike the multilateral UN sanctions which were imposed in April 1992, 
this diplomatic design element had a unilateral character. None of Washington’s allies co-
sponsored the U.S. economic coercion.  
While Washington started to apply coercive economic measurements against Libya already 
in the early 1970s,308 the economic coercion was substantially intensified under the Reagan 
administration. In March 1982, the United States banned all imports of Libyan crude oil. All 
US exports to Libya – except food, medical, and agricultural products – were submitted to a 
special licensing procedure. And trade with strategic goods such as military or oil drilling 
products was outlawed. In January 1986 Washington further ratcheted up its economic 
pressure on Libya. Almost the entire US-Libyan trade including financial transactions was 
banned, U.S. citizens were no longer allowed to work in Libyan, and all Libyan assets in U.S. 
banks were frozen (e.g. Niblock 2001: 29-30; O’Sullivan 2003: 187-88, 205; Vandewalle 
2006: 153 - 155).309 
Certainly, the unilateral U.S. sanctions signified a lasting instrument. In the late 1980s, 
Tripoli could not expect that Washington would lift its coercive economic measures in 
foreseeable future. Moreover, the U.S. sanctions were – in all probability –  not provoking 
any meaningful collateral damage. Unlike the Reagan administration’s military threats, it 
neither inflamed Libya’s desire for nuclear weapons nor made the Qaddafi regime 
significantly more distrustful of the United States. But while this diplomatic design element 
was not counterproductive in the sense of a negative fit, it nevertheless did not contribute 
to “massive preference manipulation” either. According to our evaluation the unilateral 
U.S. sanctions signified a misfit – at least this is “best explanation” we can derive from the 
available historical data (Figure 25).  
First, the U.S. sanctions were not massive enough. They were unlikely to yield a meaningful 
impact on Tripoli’s decision making under the condition of the Deadlock Game. The 
literature is relatively united in its conclusion that the unilateral economic sanctions the 
Reagan Administration imposed on the Qaddafi regime during the 1980s were relatively 
small and had rather a symbolic nature (e.g. St. John 2002: 130; O’Sullivan 2003: 187-88, 
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 In 1973 Washington blocked the sale of certain military goods to Libya including eight Lockheed C-130 
Hercules airplanes for which Tripoli had already paid for. In 1975 the U.S. government canceled the sale of 
an air-defense system to Libya, worth around $200 million. And in 1981 all U.S. passports were invalidated 
for travels to Libya – a measure which curtailed the business of U.S. oil companies that were operating in 
the North African country at that time (Niblock 2001: 27). 
309
 The U.S. sanctions did not focus specifically on the WMD issue but rather expressed Washington’s 
dislike with the Qaddafi regime’s foreign policy in general. Certainly, it is believed that the members of the 
Qaddafi regime understood at a very early point that they would never escape from Washington’s 
economic pressure if they would continue to strive for unconventional weapons. And the Reagan 
administration left in the late 1980s no doubts that the applied sanctions had – apart from anti-terrorism 
and the effort to tame Libya’s aggressive foreign policy in the North African region – also a non-
proliferation dimension (e.g. U.S. 1989: 21-22). Nevertheless, none of the sanctions Libya was facing by 
the late 1980s put the WMD issue at the center. And none of the U.S. economic pressure tools had been 
applied as a consequences of Washington’s effort to reverse Tripoli’s WMD program which started by late 
December 1987.  
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205; Vandewalle 2006: 153, 155).310 The actual effects of the U.S. sanctions on Libya’s 
socio-economic system remained limited. For example, the freeze of Libyan assets had only 
a small impact on Libya’s economic wellbeing as it affected only 2 % of entire Libyan 
financial properties held aboard (Economist Intelligence Unit 1984: 13). And until the U.S. 
sanctions were imposed in April 1992, Libya met the oil export benchmark set by the OPEC 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) (Vandewalle 2008: 155).311  
Of course, there is little doubt that the U.S. coercion against Libya had tremendous impact 
on the American-Libyan business ties. It interrupted almost the entire economic and 
commercial relationship between the two countries. However, since even close U.S. allies – 
such as the United Kingdom – were not ready to second Washington’s sanction policy, Libya 
had ample room to circumvent the applied coercive economic measures. Consequentially, 
we witness a sharp diversification of Libya’s commercial relations during the 1980s.312 In 
Asia and Europe, the Qaddafi regime found new trading partners (O’Sullivan 2003: 188-9, 
191). 
Second, since the U.S. sanctions were slowly ratcheted up starting by 1970s, it is likely that 
Tripoli regarded this diplomatic design element first and foremost as a normal feature of 
the hostile American-Libyan relationship. In all probability, the U.S. sanctions were 
perceived by Libya as “coercive background noise” and therefore remained below the 
relatively high set benchmark need to force a deadlock player onto a cooperative course. 
D) Naming-and-Shaming Campaign  
The US-Libyan diplomatic encounter on WMD was kicked-off by the disclosure of the 
Qaddafi regime’s attempts to build up a clandestine chemical weapons factory in Rabta. 
The New York Times article published at Christmas Eve in 1987 remained not a single event. 
Rather, we saw in a following two years an active “naming-and-blaming campaign” by the 
Reagan administration accompanied with repeated disclosures of U.S. intelligence on 
Libya’s WMD efforts. 
For example, in September 1988 further information originating from the U.S. intelligence 
community were revealed in the press saying that Libya was about to step across the 
threshold of “full scale production” of chemical warfare agents at its facility in Rabta (New 
York Time, 15th and 18th September 1988; see also: Wiegele 1992: 26). In October 1988, 
William Webster, at that time CIA director, made clear to journalists that the Libyan CW 
production plant at Rabta was the largest site “the CIA has yet detected anywhere” and 
would, therefore, represent “one of the most serious threats to world peace” (Ottaway 
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 The only scholar who seems to ascribe a positive impact to the unilateral U.S. sanction is Randall 
Newnham. In his view the economic crisis Libya faced in the 1980s was “sharply increased” by the U.S. 
sanctions which were by that time “gradually beginning to bite” (Newnham 2009: 84).  
311
 The only fields were the U.S. sanctions had a certain significance was on the oil drilling infrastructure, 
which were heavily depended on U.S. suppliers (O’Sullivan 2003: 188, 193; St. John 2002: 141-2; Senn 
2009: 113; Vandewalle 2006: 153-5). 
312
 For example, in the first 13 months after the Reagan administration imposed its economic sanctions 
against Libya, the United Kingdom increased its imports from Libya by 350 % (O’Sullivan 2003: 189; 
Vandewalle 2006: 153-4; Economist Intelligence Unit 1984: 15).   
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1988: A2; St. John 2002: 146). Moreover, the Reagan administration accused the Qaddafi 
regime of not only having started the production of chemical weapons but also having used 
mustard agents against Chadian troops in the Aouzou strip in Northern Chad – a clear break 
against the 1925 Geneva Protocol which Libya had acceded in 1971 and which 
internationally outlawed the use of chemical agent during war. Washington bolstered this 
accusation by sending Chad 2,000 chemical protection mask as a precaution measure 
against further Libyan attacks (e.g. Sciolino 1987a; Terrill 1994: 55).  
The Qaddafi regime reacted vigorously at the U.S campaign. For example, by claiming that 
Rabta was a plant to produce pharmaceutical goods and accusing the Reagan 
administration of banning the trade of medical supply to Libya, a spokesperson of the 
Qaddafi regime declared on 27th January 1988 that the US charge against Tripoli was “both 
uncivilized and inhumane, a part showing prejudice and racism (…) This ban represents a 
declaration of hostile war waged by a state like the U.S. against small nations that reject its 
hegemony” (cited at Wiegele 1992: 24).   
However, despite rhetoric skirmishes, there is no evidence that the U.S. “naming-and-
shaming campaign” had any major impact on Libya. Given that military threats and 
unilateral economic sanctions – two way more intrusive coercive tools – had remained 
below the level needed to achieve “preference manipulation” under the condition of the 
Deadlock Game, it is unlikely that the relatively weak naming-and-shaming strategy had 
been more successful in that regard. This coercive diplomatic tool, therefore, signifies a 
misfit (Figure 25).  
E) Arab Mediation Attempts  
Apart from the United States and Libya – the two major conflict parties of the Deadlock 
Game – there was during the first part of the pre-negotiation phase almost no involvement 
of other actors. A mediation effort undertaken in the late 1980s by four Arab states – 
namely Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia – was the only exception of bilateral interaction 
that shaped the first diplomatic episode of the Libyan NRN.  
In the light of growing tension between Libya and the United States, these four Arab states 
made individual efforts to mediate between Washington and Tripoli in order to avoid 
another military confrontation (Wiegele 1992: 47). For example, the message Prince 
Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, sent in early 1989 to Washington was: 
“Don’t shoot. Talk. See if you can work it out diplomatically, not militarily” (Sciolino 1989).  
However, this mediation effort signified a misfit (Figure 25). It was a diplomatic design 
element that was insufficient to yield under the condition of the Deadlock Game a 
meaningful result. The intervention of the four Arab countries was primarily a diplomatic 
emergency measure tailored to prevent new escalation and not designed to resolve the 
deeply rooted confrontation between Libya and the United States. Manipulation of 
Washington’s and Tripoli’s preferences in favor of joint cooperation (CC) was not on the 
agenda of these mediation interventions. In the light of the high investments necessary to 
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make deadlock players depart from the outcome of mutual defection (DD), well-spoken 
words alone are unlikely to have any meaningful impact.313  
Consequentially, all Arab mediation efforts were rejected by the Reagan administration. For 
example, reflecting the antagonistic and hostile mode that is characteristic of Deadlock 
Games, the U.S. State Department, reportedly, responded to the Saudi initiative with the 
words: “there is nothing for anyone to mediate. What we need is a change in Libyan 
behavior” (Sciolino 1989; Wiegele 1992: 47). 314  
F) Export Controls  
As we have outlined above, resolution attempts for the substantive negotiation problem 
are rather unlikely under the condition of the Deadlock Game. Consequentially, we are little 
astonished that all diplomatic design elements we encounter within the first part of the 
pre-negotiation phase – exception of the negative side effect caused by the U.S. military 
threats – were exclusively oriented at the procedural negotiation problem (Figure 25). 
However, the picture would be incomplete if we would not discuss the non-diplomatic 
intervention of international export controls.315  
There is ground to assume that the international export control helped to slow the Qaddafi 
regime’s nuclear buildup. In particular since the export control regimes – namely the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) – began by the 1980s to exert growing impact in the nuclear 
policy field. In the “phase of stagnation”, in which the Libyan nuclear weapons program 
witnessed standstill and setbacks (ch. 5.1.2.2), export control was likely to have contributed 
in preventing the Qaddafi regime from applying the desired “best shot aggregation 
technology”. However, according to our evaluation this non-diplomatic intervention 
represented only an underfit. Although export control was a non-diplomatic instrument 
that was appropriate to adress Libya’s nuclear bad, its impact was too little to cause 
meaningful consequences (Figure 25).  
First, in the late 1980s international export control was still in the making. While there was 
already some regulation in place, the decisive boost for cross-border control on the transfer 
of sensitive, nuclear weapons-related technology, know-how, and materials came not 
before the early 1990s. It was, in particular, the Iraq War and the disclosure of Saddam 
Hussein’s WMD programs that lead to accelerated international efforts in that field (Krause 
1998: 154; Cirincione, Wolfstahl & Rajkumar 2005: 34). 
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 Moreover, this diplomatic design element not only lacked the required massiveness, it also fell short in 
terms of the lasting requirement. The initiatives of the four Arab countries signified not enduring efforts 
but a limited event. 
314
 It was reported that these Arab states had also approach Tripoli with similar arguments (Gelb 1986; 
Ottaway 1986: A1; St. John 2002: 136).  
315
 Export controls signify a non-diplomatic tool. Their aim is to physically avoid the buildup of nuclear 
weapons programs or at least to drive up the costs for such an effort. The primary purpose of export 
controls is not an instrument to change the calculation of atomic renegade states. The primary export 
control regime in the nuclear field is the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG was established in 
January 1976. Within the framework of the NSG the major supplier countries of nuclear weapons capable 
technologies, material, and know-how coordinate and harmonize their coordinate their export policy (e.g. 
Cirincione, Wolfstahl & Rajkumar 2005: 34).  
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Second, the implementation of export control regulations was in the late 1980s still 
underdeveloped. Many Western countries had rather lax national legislation and little will 
to interfere with their export industry. The insufficient implementation became in 
particular obvious with regard to the Qaddafi regime’s chemical weapons program. 
Companies from several European countries – first and foremost from Germany – had 
played a crucial part in the Qaddafi regime’s WMD efforts (e.g. Terrill 1994: 47-8; Tucker 
2009: 372; Wiegel 1992). In that sense, the just discussed U.S. “naming and shaming 
campaign” was also tailored to send signals to Washington’s allies.  
Third, it is true that Libya’s nuclear bad was entangled during the first part of the pre-
negotiation phase in a “period of stagnation”. Tripoli had in the 1980s considerable 
problems to win support from external suppliers. But the Qaddafi regime’s difficulties in 
establishing sustainable relations with external outfitters were only partly the consequence 
of international export control. Rather, Libya’s difficulties were primarily owed to the high 
caution that Libya’s trading partners had when Tripoli was demanding for nuclear weapons-
capable technology and know-how (Bowen 2006: 29-33; Micallef 1981: 14; Kapur 1993: 
148; Solingen 2007: 217).  
G) Strategic Adjustment: The “Libyan Perestroika”   
Since none of the diplomatic design elements applied in the first part of the pre-negotiation 
phase provided a meaningful contribution to the resolution of the Deadlock Game, there 
must be another factor that could explain why this particular demanding procedural 
negotiation problem was already by the late 1980s transformed into a more benign and 
cooperative Imposed Deadlock Game. In survey of the actors’ preferences (ch. 5.2.1), we 
have revealed that Muammar al-Qaddafi’s world view (i.e. the transformation from the B-
type to the DEF-type belief system) but also Libya’s “interest profile” (i.e. the rise of the 
desire for a rapprochement with the United States) changed by the late 1980s. Libya’s 
strategic shift, its growing inclination for cooperation, was endogenic and structural. The 
Deadlock Game was not resolved by diplomatic design but by the “Libyan perestroika” 
(Figure 25).  
Several knowledgeable experts on Libyan history had pointed out that the Qaddafi regime 
underwent a profound policy reorientation by the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. Deeb 
1990: 149; Deeb 1991; St. John 2002: 138; St. John 2003; Vandewalle 1991; Viorst 1999). 
The revolutionary zeal and political adventurism Tripoli had pursued beforehand was put 
into question in the late 1980s. In terms of foreign policy – but as well as in domestic 
politics – Libya was implementing a course correction. It appears that the power circle in 
Tripoli was at that time ready to allow more freedom and cooperation across numerous 
policy fields.  
For example, starting by the late 1980s Libya has tamed the aggressive and subversive 
foreign policy it had pursued in the past towards its neighboring countries in the North 
African region. That new posture is in particular reflected by the Chadian-Libyan 
rapprochement which let in August 1989 to a peace agreement between the two countries 
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– after nearly two decades of hostile confrontation and warfare (e.g. Foltz 1988: 61-8; Joffé 
2004: 221). In addition, after having pursued for more than two decades a Pan-Arab 
orientation in its foreign policy, the Qaddafi regime started by the early 1990s to shift its 
focus towards the African continent (e.g. Niblock 2001: 46; St. John 2003: 464-5; Solomon & 
Swart 2005).316 One important byproduct of this “geopolitical swing” was that its 
fundamental opposition towards Israel – an element that had been densely intertwined 
with the Qaddafi regime’s strive to act as the Arab lead nation – lost importance (e.g. 
O’Sullivan 2003: 211; Takeyh 2001). Moreover, the orientation towards Sub-Sahara Africa 
appears to have de-radicalized the Qaddafi regime’s policy in general. Underpinning Libya’s 
growing “appetite” for cooperation, the new geopolitical orientation had an important 
“institutional dimension” since Tripoli’s effort to become more engaged in Sub-Sahara 
Africa led to relatively strong commitments for the OAU (Organization of African Unity) and 
later for the AU (African Union) (e.g. Werenfels 2008).317  
The historic evidence suggests that the “Libyan perestroika” was the outcome of an 
“evolutionary learning process”. In light of a series set-backs and failures – namely an 
economic downturn, growing domestic pressure including the rise of militant Islamic 
groups, and a flagrant failure of its military intervention into neighboring Chad – the 
Qaddafi regime realized that its adventurous foreign policy had not yielded the desired 
objectives but had caught Tripoli in a series of quagmires.318 
One of the most important setbacks Libya faced was the economic crisis which became by 
the late 1980s in particular painful for the Qaddafi regime. The plunge in the global oil price 
during the first half of the 1980s set an economic downtrend into motion from which Libya 
had considerable problems to recover. As the North African country was highly depended 
on the oil business – a sector that was responsible for 95 % of its entire foreign exchange – 
one can hardly overestimate the economic shock waves triggered when Libya’s oil 
production dropped around 70 % in the early 1980s (e.g. St. John 2002: 128; O’Sullivan 
2003: 187).319 This sharp downward trend of prices, which all oil producing countries faced 
at that time, further inflamed the problems stemming from Libya’s internal 
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 As we have explained above (ch. 5.2.1.1), Libya had undertaken numerous attempts to unite with 
neighboring Arab states. But all these efforts failed in the end. The late 1980s and the early 1990s were 
therefore the time of Libya’s „Pan Arab heartbreak“ (Ronen 2008: 181-183).   
317
 But the “Libyan perestroika” found also resonance in domestic affairs. In the late 1980s Tripoli was 
relaxing its revolutionary radicalism to a certain extent and launched a series of reforms in order to allow 
greater openness. In March 1988 the Qaddafi regime set free approximately 400 political prisoners in a 
symbolic act. The power of the Revolutionary Courts, which had played an important role in suppressing 
the political opposition in Libya, was curtailed in May 1988. In June 1988 Muammar al-Qaddafi announced 
the “Great Green Charter” which promised more freedom and rights to the Libyan people. Around the 
same time exile opposition groups were invited to return to Libyan and to receive their confiscated 
property (Deeb 1991: 173; Vandewalle 2006: 143-4; Zoubir 2006: 50). Moreover, Tripoli made at that time 
also an effort to liberalize its economic. In late 1980s so called economic infitah was launched – a bundle 
of economic reforms to encourage private initiatives, allow for more market-mechanism in particular with 
regard to small and medium size companies, and even initiate privatization of some state owned 
corporations (Deeb 1991: 173; Solingen 2007: 222; O’Sullivan 2003: 187; Vandewalle 2006: 164-9).  
318
 It is important to bear in mind that none of these failures and set-back was triggered by one of the 
design elements we have discussed thus far. The coercive tools applied by the United States (i.e. the 
military threat, the unilateral sanctions, and the naming-and-shaming campaign) were minuscule in 
comparison to the “homemade” problems Libya faced in the late 1980s.   
319
 As a consequence, the Libyan revenues shrunk from $21 billion in 1980 to $6,5 billion in 1986 (Palkki & 
Smith 2012: 269).  
   
231 
 
mismanagement.320 Consequentially, the decline in the living standard of the Libyan 
population which started already in the mid-1970s was sharply accelerated. Inflation was 
high, corruption was rampant, and unemployment – a phenomenon that was unknown 
previously to the Libyan population – was emerging in particular among younger people 
(e.g. Solingen 2007: 222; Vandewalle 2006: 164). In addition, towards the late 1980s, the 
Qaddafi regime became more and more under pressure by domestic opposition groups. 
The most important threat in the perception of the power circle in Tripoli was certainly the 
rise of fundamentalist Islamists – groups such as the al-Takfir wal Hijra, al-Dawa wa al-Jihad, 
and Tabligh (Deep 1990: 149; Mattes 1995: 31). 
The Chad War debacle was another large scale failure of Libyan power politics that, 
reportedly, caused the Qaddafi regime to rethink its foreign policy course. Tripoli’s military 
engagement in Chad started in 1973 when Libyan troops occupied the Aouzou strip. This 
swathe of desert land south of the Libyan border was regarded by the Qaddafi regime as a 
historic and inherently part of Libya and was therefore unilaterally annexed in 1975 (e.g. 
Brill 1988: 53). Starting at first as low-intensity warfare, the military confrontation with 
N’Djamena eventually climaxed in 1987. The approx. 15,000 Libyan troops stationed in 
Chad were heavily defeated in a quick series of dessert battles. Reportedly, 3,600 Libyan 
soldiers died during this military confrontation and 1,165 were taken war prisoners 
(Lemarchand 1988: 106; Ronen 2008: 169).321 In a chaotic withdraw, Libyan troops left the 
Aouzou strip leaving behind a large amount of military equipment. As Chad had been a 
focal point in Libya’s regional politics, this devastating defeat sent heavy shock waves to 
Tripoli. What followed was a more conciliatory approach towards Chad. Libya switched to 
diplomacy and started peace negotiation with N’Djamena (Foltz 1988: 61-8; Joffé 2004: 
221).   
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 In the 1970s and 1980s the Qaddafi regime had tried to establish with revolutionary zeal an Arab-
Islamic brand of socialism – an experiment which eventually lead to weak bureaucracy, excessive 
dirigisme, an overwhelmingly large public sector which employed approx. 75 % of the working Libyan 
population, and an opaque jumble of political responsibilities which stretches from various revolutionary 
committees and central state institutions to pre-modern entities likes clans and tribes (e.g. Vandewalle 
2006: 162-4). 
321
 The United States as well as France was actively supporting Chad. Together both western countries 
delivered by the end of 1986 military equipment worth $15 million (Ronen 2008: 168). However, it would 
be exaggerated to attribute the Qaddafi regime’s defeat to the U.S. involvement. The hard work was done 
by the Chadians themselves who, on the one hand, achieved to overcome internal political differences 
and united against the external aggressor (e.g. the agreement between Habre and Goukouni) and who, on 
the other side, adopted modern military equipment to traditional warfare tactics and thereby launched a 
“brilliant desert blitzkrieg” (Lemarcharnd 1988: 121) against a superior enemy (also known as the “Toyota 
War”). Consequentially, it would be misleading to describe the Chad War as a proxy war between Libya on 
the one and France and the United States on the other side. 
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5.3.2 Second Part of the Pre-Negotiation Phase (late 1980s – March 
2003) 
With the Qaddafi regime having undergone a strategic shift and having adopted a more 
cooperative stance towards the United States, the nascent diplomatic process on Libya’s 
WMD programs entered by the early 1990s into the second part of the pre-negotiation 
phase. While Libya had changed, the United States had not. Washington continued until 
March 2003 the same strategic orientation towards the Qaddafi regime it had adopted 
when the NRN were kicked off in December 1987. Intuitively one would have assumed that 
Tripoli – the textbook atomic renegade state – had spoiled the chance for cooperation 
during the pre-negotiation phase. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the major stumbling 
block for nuclear reversal was for a long time not Libya’s obstruction but Washington’s 
reluctance to engage in cooperation with Tripoli.  
5.3.2.1 Procedural & Substantial Negotiation Problems 
If we look at the second part of the pre-negotiation phase through the prism of the 
dilemma game approach, it turns out that the United States and Libya were entangled in a 
so-called Imposed Deadlock Game. The Imposed Deadlock Game is a slightly more benign 
variation of the pure Deadlock Game we got to know in the previous chapter. But although 
it is less hostile and antagonistic than the previous Deadlock Game, it is still relatively 
challenging. It was not without a reason that it took Tripoli and Washington altogether 13 
years to eventually depart from this constellation and start exploratory talks on Libya’s 
WMD programs.  
With regard Tripoli’s nuclear bad, which signified according to our fit taxonomy the 
substantial negotiation problem, the situation remained in comparison to the first part of 
the pre-negotiation phase by and large the same. Like in the first part of the pre-negotiation 
phase, the bargaining process had still not developed the necessary maturity that would 
have allowed a diplomatic engagement on the substantial problem dimension. Since the 
procedural problem both conflict parties faced was still massive, there was still no room to 
address the actual “negotiation issue”. Consequentially, the optimal fit demand we have 
identified in the first part of the pre-negotiation phase with regard to the substantial 
negotiation problem remained relevant in the second part of this diplomatic episode. Not 
resolution of Libya’s nuclear bad but prevention of a further aggravation was the primary 
benchmark we evaluated the design elements against.  
A) Imposed Deadlock Game 
While in classical Deadlock Games both sides share a strong disincentive to cooperate, this 
symmetry in the players’ payoffs is missing in Imposed Deadlock Games. Rather, a dissimilar 
preference structure is the outstanding characteristic of this dilemma game. The Imposed 
Deadlock Game occurs when a player with a confrontational preference order (i.e. the 
deadlock player; in our case the United States) encounters an actor that has a strategic 
orientation which is normally associated with PD games (i.e. the non-deadlock player; in 
our case the Libya). While this non-deadlock player is already in favor for unreciprocated 
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cooperation (DC), its inclination for joint cooperation (CC) is relatively high and is rated as 
the second best outcome (Figure 21).  
Although mutual defection (DD) is in the Imposed Deadlock Game an attractive (P+), safe 
(M), and stable (N) situation, the logic of “splendid confrontation”, which has characterized 
the previous Deadlock Game, is no longer unconditionally applicable. Since the non-
deadlock player is inclined to overcome the outcome of mutual defection (DD), the “seed” 
for a diplomatic resolution is implanted in the structure of the Imposed Deadlock Game. 
Thus, when a Deadlock Game transforms into an Imposed Deadlock Game, the chance of 
cooperation is increasing. Once achieved, joint cooperation (CC) provides benefits for both 
sides. Although the non-deadlock player is individually rendered better off, the players are 
nevertheless gaining collectively if they chose joint cooperation. Consequentially, joint 
cooperation (CC) signifies the second Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+) within the Imposed 
Deadlock Game (Figure 21).   
Figure 21: Imposed Deadlock Game  
 
However, the legacy of the classic Deadlock Game lingers on. The Imposed Deadlock Game 
is marked by a double trap – a colliding interest trap and a distrust trap. If both players 
strive to realize their individual interests they end up in a situation of mutual defection 
(DD). The deadlock constellation (DD) is, ceteris paribus, the most likely outcome. And since 
it is expressing individual rationality, mutual defection coincides with the Nash Equilibrium 
(N).  
But mutual defection is not only the likely result if the actors strive to realize their egoist 
desires. The very same scenario occurs when the players operate under the assumption 
that their counterpart is not trustworthy. The Imposed Deadlock Game is marked by a 
distrust trap since the Maximin Solution (M), which best protects against the worst case 
scenario of unreciprocated cooperation (CD) coincides with the deadlock scenario (DD). To 
make things worse, mutual defection (DD) is under the Imposed Deadlock Game – similar to 
the situation in the Deadlock Game – a situation that is in general very comfortable for both 
players. While the non-deadlock player does not gain as much as its counterpart, mutual 
defection is still an outcome where the players profit collectively. It, therefore, represents 
the second Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+) of this game constellation. 
Due to this double trap, Imposed Deadlock Games signify a veritable procedural negotiation 
problem. Although they are – in principle – less antagonistic and confrontational than 
start explorative talks  [C] no explorative talks [D]
start explorative talks  [C] 3,2 P+ 1,4
no explorative talks [D] 4,1 2,3 M,N,P+
USA
Libya
US preference hierarchy:              DC > DD > CC > CD
C =  Cooperation  D = Defection  M = MaxiMin Solution  N = Nash Equilibirum  P+ = Qualified 
Libya's preference hierarchy:      DC > CC > DD > CD
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classic Deadlock Game, they lead in most of the case – in effect – to the very behavioral 
pattern: entrapment into a diplomatic impasse.  
What is required to resolve the Imposed Deadlock Game? What is the “optimal problem 
solution” diplomatic design elements are required to meet in order to resolve this 
procedural negotiation problem? It is obvious that the biased nature of this game 
constellation must have implications for the performance of diplomatic design. Moreover, 
in Imposed Deadlock Games the demand for well-fitting diplomatic interventions is not as 
intensive in quantitative terms as in classic Deadlock Games. But it is certainly more multi-
faceted.  
In the Imposed Deadlock Games, the resolution of the colliding interest trap requires a 
manipulation of the deadlock player’s preference (i.e. the United States). Without 
increasing the attractiveness of joint cooperation (CC) and/or decreasing the value of 
mutual defection (DD), this player, who acts in essence as a spoiler for joint problem 
resolution, will not abandon its uncooperative pattern. But unlike the situation in the 
previous pure Deadlock Game, “preference manipulation” is less demanding in terms of 
invested governance resource – although it is also required that diplomatic interventions 
are lasting. A “preference manipulation” equivalent to one payoff point in the deadlock 
player’s payoff structure is already sufficient to make this actor depart from mutual 
defection. A diplomatic intervention fits to the resolution of the colliding interest trap if it 
manages to swap the deadlock player’s second best option (DD) with its third best option 
(CC) (Figure 21). As long as the intervention continues, the cooperative outcome is stable. 
None of the players has an immediate interest to depart from this situation since such a 
step would cause a relapse into mutual defection (DD).  
While crucial for the deadlock player, “preference manipulation” is not required for the 
non-deadlock player (i.e. Libya). Joint cooperation has for this actor sufficient 
attractiveness. No additional intervention is needed. Providing rewards or coercion to the 
non-deadlock player is superfluous and signifies an inefficient investment of governance 
resources (Figure 26).  
But the Imposed Deadlock Game is not only biased in terms of “preference manipulation”. 
A well-fitting diplomatic intervention capable of resolving this game constellation has to be 
also biased in terms of timing. Rationality assumed, the non-deadlock player (i.e. Libya) has 
a “first mover inclination”. As soon as the chance for joint cooperation becomes at sight, 
this actor is likely to embark a cooperative pathway.  That however, increases the risk that 
the deadlock player might exploit the non-deadlock player’s step towards cooperation and 
unilaterally reaps in all benefits. The unfavorable situation of unreciprocated cooperation 
(DC) would be the likely outcome. Thus, one of the various challenges that need to be 
weathered in the resolution of Imposed Deadlock Games is to make the deadlock player, 
who is little interested in cooperation, move first in that direction. At the same time, it is 
necessary to bridle the non-deadlock player’s first mover inclination. 
In that sense, the conventional wisdom which suggests to start resolving problems 
addressing first the “low hanging fruits” and to work from there towards the more 
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challenging parts is put upside down in Imposed Deadlock Games. For this particular 
procedural negotiation problem, it is crucial to begin the problem resolution with the most 
demanding aspect – the deadlock player.  
However, even if the colliding interest trap is resolved by a “first moving inducing 
preference manipulation” applied to the deadlock player (Figue 26), cooperation is still 
unlikely. It is impossible to overcome Imposed Deadlock Games without resolving in parallel 
the distrust trap. What is required in addition is a meaningful diplomatic intervention that is 
capable of reducing the players’ worst case thinking. Without resolving the distrust trap, 
both actors are unlikely to depart from the deadlock situation since they stick to the 
Maximin solution (M).  
The asymmetric nature of the Imposed Deadlock Game is also affecting the distrust trap 
and its diplomatic resolution.322 The inclination to choose the Maximin Strategy (M) and 
accept the relapse into the outcome of mutual defection (DD) varies between the two 
players. After all, it signifies its second best choice. For the deadlock player (i.e. the United 
States), the Maximin Solution (M) is relatively attractive. For the non-deadlock player (i.e. 
Libya) it is instead more regrettable if emerging distrust requires to stay or to return to the 
Maximin Solution (M) which coincides with the deadlock situation (DD) (Figure 21). Facing 
more disfavored consequences than the deadlock player, the non-deadlock player is 
therefore assumed to have a higher tolerance regarding distrust and is prepared to give 
cooperation a chance even when the worst-case scenario is within the realm of possibility.  
The varying tolerance in terms of worst-case scenario has consequences for the “fit 
demand”. Under the condition of Imposed Deadlock Games, the optimal diplomatic 
resolution of distrust traps requires that the effort to build confidence is more intensive 
and focused on the deadlock player than on the non-deadlock player. Again the biased 
nature of the Imposed Deadlock Game is affecting the resolution strategy. And again it is 
the deadlock player who is acting as a spoiler for joint cooperation (Figure 26).  
B) The Revitalization of the Nuclear Bad  
Like in the first years of the nascent diplomatic struggle between the United States and the 
Qaddafi regime, the Libyan nuclear bad played a subordinated role. Similar to the first part 
of the pre-negotiation phase, the diplomatic process was in the 1990s and early 2000s 
likewise still far away from a situation that would have allowed a cooperative resolution of 
the Libyan nuclear bad. At that time, the maximum that could be achieved by diplomatic 
design was the prevention of a further deterioration of the situation. However, in 
comparison to the first part of the pre-negotiation phase, the substantial negotiation 
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 Note that the actors’ symmetric dislike for unreciprocated cooperation (CD) and their favor for 
unilateral defection (DC) is the only unbiased aspect of Imposed Deadlock Game (Figure 21). Unlike other 
game constellation (see for example the Alibi Games in the pre-agreement and the agreement phase) the 
Imposed Deadlock Game requires therefore no extra precaution against “cooperation exploitation”. Once 
cooperation is achieved and one of the players nevertheless decides to free-ride, its counterpart has 
always the chance to retaliate by taking the same step without rendering itself worse-off than the player 
who embarked the non-cooperative pathway first.  
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problem was evolving in the 1990s and the early 2000s with the consequence that the 
optimal fit demand was changing too during this period.  
Starting from the 1990s we see that the Qaddafi regime developed a more sober and 
pragmatic view on its nuclear weapons program (ch. 5.2.2.2). While “regime security” was 
still the decisive “final good” for Tripoli’s nuclear ambitions, the high-flying hopes and the 
nuclear enthusiasm that dominated the 1980s were cooling down. During the first part of 
the pre-negotiation phase, there was a considerable danger that non-diplomatic 
intervention, structural factors, or unintended side-effects of diplomatic tools would 
further inflame Libya’s “appetite for nukes” (as the U.S. military threats in the end did, ch. 
5.3.1.2). However, beginning with the 1990s this danger was decreasing. Due to the more 
sober view, we assume that Tripoli was less sensitive in its nuclear effort to external factors. 
Given that Libya’s nuclear weapons program was – most likely – an “intermediate bad” 
serving higher objectives, it was in the 1990s and early 2000s still important to avoid 
actions that would indirectly increase Libya’s esteem for atomic bombs. 
But while the handling of nuclear bad’s “demand side” became less challenging, the “supply 
side” took an opposite development starting from the mid-1990s. As we have outlined 
above, the Qaddafi regime made at that time considerable progress in terms of its “best-
shot aggregation approach” because of the cooperation with the A.Q. Khan network. The 
build-up of Libya’s nuclear bad was revitalized and underwent an unprecedented dynamic 
after having been embroiled in a period of stagnation during the 1980s. With the A.Q. Khan 
network Libya had found its “best shot provider”.  
In the late 1980s, it was sufficient to prevent external influx to Libya’s WMD programs 
provided by “conventional” nuclear outfitters. In the second part of the pre-negotiation 
phase, more investments were required to address the “supply side” of Libya’s nuclear bad. 
What was now necessary in order to avoid an accelerated nuclear build-up was to cut off 
the business relation between the Qaddafi regime and the A.Q. Khan network. This “fit 
demand” was crucial to avoid that Libya would come in the position to cross the “nuclear 
threshold” by applying the “best-shot aggregation technology” (Figure 26).  
Since the pre-negotiation phase is also the time where the preparation for the actual 
negotiation process takes place, addressing the question of the optimal participation 
marked another “fit demand”. As we have outlined above (ch. 5.2.2.1, see also Table 5), the 
scope of a public bad’s “negative externalities” are crucial to identifying the group of “bad 
sufferer”. Those actors who do suffer from a public bad’s “negative externalities” shall be 
included in a negotiation process. We said that “no participation without affection” is the 
crucial criterion for the optimal representation of actors in bargaining dynamics.  
The UK was, apart from the United States, the second player that was most exposed to the 
negative consequences of Libya’s nuclear bad. The requirement to bring the UK into the 
emerging diplomatic struggle over the Libyan WMD programs is, therefore, the logical “fit 
demand” we infer from this situation (Figure 26).  
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5.3.2.2 Analyzing the Varieties of (Mis)Fit in the 2
nd
 Part of the Pre-Negotiation 
Phase 
Similar to the preceding Deadlock Game, diplomacy alone would not have resolved the 
Imposed Deadlock Game. Non-diplomatic intervention and structural factors played again 
an important part in overcoming this particular dilemma game constellation. Similar to 
previous Deadlock Game, the important impetus for the resolution of the procedural 
negotiation problem was again provided by a strategic readjustment. The Second Iraq War 
– the mega project during the Bush Junior’s first presidency – lead to the emergence of a 
new desire in the United States’ Libya policy and thereby propelled Washington onto a 
cooperative course. However unlike the first part of the pre-negotiation phase, the 
contribution of diplomatic design elements to the procedural negotiation problem was in 
the 1990s and early 2000s far more meaningful and intrusive than they had been during the 
late 1980s. This holds, in particular, true with regard to distrust trap. Here diplomacy design 
– most noteworthy the UK’s “biased mediation” efforts – had a high performance and 
helped both players to reduce their suspicion and their worst case thinking (Figure 26).  
With regard to the players’ preference manipulation and the resolution of the colliding 
interest trap, the situation was however, less favorable. The only diplomatic tool that had a 
direct effect in terms of preference manipulation – multilateral UN sanctions – turned out 
to signified a misfit. That the colliding interest trap was in the end resolved at all must be 
attributed to the impact alternative explanations – the disclosure of the A.Q. network and 
the Iraq War linkage. Without the positive impact of these two alternative explanations, the 
pre-negotiation phase would – in all probability – have continued beyond the year 2003. 
And it is questionable whether Libya would have been at all a successful case of NRN.  
The failure to properly resolve the colliding interest trap by diplomatic design is also the 
major explanation why the second part of the pre-negotiation phase was so prolonged and 
long-lasting. It was primarily the misfitting UN sanctions in the early 1990s that prematurely 
pushed Libya onto a cooperative course. Starting from spring 1992, the Qaddafi regime 
repeatedly tried to establish a diplomatic dialogue with the United States only to be 
constantly rebuffed by Washington. That the United States stayed instead in the state of 
unreciprocated defection (DC) was due to lacking preference manipulation.  
In light of Libya’s diplomatic activities in the early 1990s, it was often voiced that the United 
States could have disarmed the Qaddafi regime 10 years earlier if it had only responded 
positively to Tripoli’s offers for a WMD diplomacy (Müller 2006; Hart 2004; Indyk 2004; 
Leverett 2004). While this view appears at first sight tempting, it nevertheless misreads the 
history of the pre-negotiation phase and ignores the underlying structure of the Imposed 
Deadlock Game. Being the deadlock player of this game constellation, Washington was 
deeply entrapped in a confrontational and antagonistic logic at that time. While it is true 
that the United States and not Libya was the principal spoiler of the bargaining process in 
the 1990s, it is nevertheless illusory to assume that Washington could have been able to 
start direct talks with Tripoli at any time before 2003. Due to the limited “fit performance” 
of the applied diplomatic design elements, the situation was simply not ripe for such a step. 
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The crucial ingredients of a diplomatic encounter under the condition of Imposed Deadlock 
Games – trust and interest – were simply missing.  
Figure 26: (Mis)Fit in the 2
nd
 Part of the Pre-Negotiation Phase  
 
 
A) Multilateral Sanction – A Partial Fit  
After having focusing at first on radical Palestinian groups with links to Syria and Iran, the 
investigation of the Lockerbie bombing revealed by the late 1980s more and more evidence 
that pointed in the direction of the Qaddafi regime. The scenario that it might have been 
the Libyan secret service that has planted a bomb on board of Pan Am flight 103 was for the 
first time made public in early October 1990 (e.g. Wines 1990). When the allegation of 
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Libya’s responsibility became more and more consolidated and was corroborated by new 
evidence, the United States – together with the UK and France –brought the Lockerbie case 
before the UN Security Council (UNSC) by January 1992. After winning support from Russia, 
the UNSC Resolution 731 was unanimously adopted on 21 January 1992 urging Libya to 
“cooperated fully in establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts”. As the Qaddafi regime 
was reluctant to comply, a multilateral sanction regime was imposed by March 1992 (UNSC 
Resolution 748) and further intensified in November 1993 (UNSC Resolution 883). Libya, 
confronted with travel and petroleum-sector related restrictions, witnessed a further 
downsizing of in its diplomatic relations, a freeze of Libyan financial assets and funds held in 
banking accounts abroad, an arms embargo, and a ban on direct air flights to Libya.  
While the UN sanctions were primarily tailored to Libya’s involvement in international 
terrorism, the WMD dimension played de facto an important role from the very beginning. 
In essence, it was clear to all sides that the multilateral sanctions were aiming at Libya’s 
foreign policy in general – including Tripoli’s aspiration for nuclear and chemical 
weapons.323  
In the literature, we encounter by and large a positive evaluation of this design element. 
Highlighting several conducive domestic and international factors that increased the impact 
of the UN sanctions’ impact, almost all scholars who have studied the subject came to the 
conclusion that multilateral coercion had a positive impact on changing Tripoli’s behavioral 
pattern (e.g. Cortright & Lopez 2004: 23; Newnham 2009: 93 O’Sullivan 2003: 210; Palkki & 
Smith 2012: 263; Jentleson & Whytock 2006; Jakobsen 2012).324 The finding we revealed, 
however, is different. Certainly, we have not evaluated the impact of the UN sanctions on 
the American-Libyan rapprochement at large. But at least with regard to the American-
Libyan NRN, our conclusion is clearly distinct from the mainstream view.  
In the Imposed Deadlock Game which constituted the procedural problem of the second 
pre-negotiation phase, Libya was the non-deadlock player. In that sense, the multilateral 
coercion policy was a design element that was unnecessarily manipulating Tripoli’s 
preference in favor for cooperation. It did not bridle Libya’s “first mover” inclination but 
instead was pushing the Qaddafi regime in premature cooperation. The UN sanctions 
thereby fostered Washington’s conviction that the disturbing features of Libya’s foreign 
policy – such as the North African countries involvement in international terrorism or its 
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 Little after the UN sanctions had been imposed on Libya, Washington emphasized that this coercive 
diplomatic design element would function also as a non-proliferation tool. For example, in September 
1993 at a Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives the CIA director, James Woolsey, underscored 
that “[f]ortunately, the UN sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the Pan Am 103 incident are assisting 
non-proliferation efforts” (U.S. Congress 1993b). Already in February 1993 in a written response to a 
questionnaire presented at a Hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the U.S. 
Government made clear that the imposed UN sanctions on Libya had also the effect to deter the 
proliferation of unconventional weapons programs (U.S. Congress 1993a). Even more important: the 
Qaddafi regime understood from the very beginning that the UN sanctions were at least implicitly 
addressing the WMD issue. Correspondingly, Libya’s unconventional weapons program played always a 
crucial role in Libya’s backchannel initiatives towards Washington. This thinking was also expressed by 
Mohammed Bukhres, a Libyan-American with close ties to the Qaddafi family, who interviewed in 2004 
reported that in 1992 “Gadhafi [sic] felt that the Americans wanted some more to get them interested, so 
he put some more [i.e. Libya’s WMD programs] on the table” (see Slavin 2004).  
324
 For a rather critical review of the UN sanctions on Libya see Niblock 2001.   
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strive for WMD – could be resolved without direct diplomatic engagement. Under the 
condition of Imposed Deadlock Game, the multilateral coercion signified, therefore, a misfit 
and a negative fit (Figure 26).  
First, the UN sanctions accelerated the Qaddafi’s “fist mover inclination” and pushed Libya 
into premature cooperation. Based on the motivation survey, we assume that the Qaddafi 
regime – being the non-deadlock player in the Imposed Deadlock Game – was already at 
the beginning of the second part of the pre-negotiation phase in favor of joint cooperation. 
Nevertheless, it appears that Tripoli was in the first years of this diplomatic episode not 
following this logic. Its behavioral pattern was instead dominated by defection – in an 
expression of the inherent nature of the Imposed Deadlock Game. The picture changed 
however rapidly in early 1992. The obvious coincidence with the imposition of the UN 
sanctions suggests that it was primarily the multilateral coercion policy that made Tripoli 
launch its hapless and repeatedly rebuffed back-channel initiatives which proposed 
Washington a diplomatic dialogue to repair the U.S.-Libyan relation. It appears that already 
the preparation for the UN sanctions in January 1992 was sufficient to move the Qaddafi 
regime on a cooperative course.  
Apart from the numerous diplomatic backdoor initiatives we described above (ch. 5.1.1), 
we can identify Libya’s eagerness for joint cooperation also in the actions Tripoli undertook 
at the UN. Already in February 1992 UN Secretary General, Boutros Bourtos-Ghali, noted in 
his report to the members of the UNSC that “there has been a certain evolution in the 
position of the Libyan authorities” (UN Secretary General 1992). In order to find 
reconciliation on the Lockerbie case, Libya showed considerable flexibility and made 
already in spring 1992 a far-reaching proposal (an international trial to be held in a third 
country) which was in many respect similar to the agreement that the United States and 
the UK eventually accepted six years later in June 1998.  
Second, since Libya was actively searching for cooperation, Washington indulge the hope 
that all the issues it had with Tripoli could be resolved without direct diplomatic 
engagement with the disliked Qaddafi regime. Libya’s willingness for cooperation was 
primarily attributed to the impact of the UN sanctions, and it was assumed that Tripoli 
would in the end, bend down and reverse its foreign policy course if only the applied 
coercion were intrusive enough. It went unnoticed that Libya had a more profound interest 
in cooperation beyond the narrow setting of the UN sanctions. While hoping to make Libya 
“surrender” in the sense of unreciprocated cooperation (CD), Washington was critical to 
any effort of direct engagement with the Qaddafi regime. For example, when the ex-
Senator Gary Hart and later the former U.S. diplomat Herman Cohn were approach by the 
Tripoli to act as intermediates for direct communication with the United States, they were 
later scolded by the State Department for having met at all with the Libyans given that such 
activities were unwise as long the Qaddafi regime was still under sanctions (Interview with 
W. White, June 2012, Annex 16; Hart 2004). According to Gary Hart, senior officials in 
Washington clearly conveyed to him that the United States was not prepared to respond to 
Libya’s diplomatic backchannel initiatives until all requirements of the UN sanctions were 
   
241 
 
met: “We will have no discussions with the Libyans (…) until they turn over the Pan Am 
bombers" (Hart 2004).325 
Third, the UN sanctions were way too massive. Since Libya was any way inclined for 
cooperation, active “preference manipulation” was unnecessary. Against that background, 
it is revealing that Libya already showed a cooperative pattern on various fronts in January 
1992 – at a time where it was still unclear whether the UNSC would in the end vote in favor 
for embargo politics. Even more revealing is however that Libya continued its cooperative 
course towards the United States after the UN sanctions were suspended. In April 1999 the 
UN halted its coercive policy against Libya after Tripoli had extradited the two suspected 
Libyan secret service officers – Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamin Khalifah Fhimah – to 
stand trial at a special court in the Netherlands. Despite having escaped from economic 
coercion, Libya was still eager to achieve cooperation with the United States – a behavioral 
pattern characteristic for a non-deadlock player in the Imposed Deadlock Game. 
Finally, the unnecessary “preference manipulation” by multilateral sanctions signified a 
waste of governance resources and caused negative social and humanitarian side-effects.  
Although Tripoli was not facing a complete oil embargo as it had been enforced in the early 
1990s upon Iraq, the impact of the UN sanction had nevertheless a twofold “magnifying 
effect” (O’Sullivan 2003: 218). On the one hand, multilateral coercion accelerated the 
downturn of the Libyan economy which had started in the 1980s. On the other hand, they 
indirectly tightened the unilateral U.S. sanctions since Libya was now not able anymore to 
compensate U.S. technology (which was, in particular, important for the oil drilling and 
airline industry) through alternative trading partners (Newnham 2009: 87; Palkii & Smith 
2012: 267; Vandewalle 2008: 156).326 The damage the UN sanctions inflicted on Libya’s 
economic affected the life of the Libyan population.327 The number of families directly 
dependent on food ration increased, corruption was growing, the health and education 
systems were suffering from financial cutbacks, and the rate of unemployment was further 
rising in particular among younger Libyans – the fastest growing proportion of the Libyan 
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 Indulging the hope that Libya would in the end bend down and change its course because of coercion, 
the United States further intensified its unilateral sanctions during the 1990s. Already in April 1992 
Washington issued the Executive Order 12801 which „prohibiting access to US airspace to any flights 
bound to or flying from Libya”. In 1996 the Iran-Libya Sanction Act (ISLA) was adopted which punished 
foreign firms with signification investment in Libya’s (or Iran’s) petroleum sector. In the same year the U.S. 
Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) which included a mechanism 
that would ban U.S. aid and financial assistance if a third country would provide military assistance to 
Libya (Reynolds & Wan 2012: 64-5; Cirincione, Wolfsthal & Rajkumar 2005: 318-9).   
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 While the exact link between the UN sanctions and Libya’s economic and social performance is difficult 
to draw and to quantify, the coincidence and magnitude is still considerable. Between 1992 and 1999 
Libya’s economic growth came practically to a standstill and was during that time never above 0.8 %. 
Meanwhile the per capita GDP decreased from $7,311 (1992) to $5,896 (1999). In 1998 the export 
revenues dropped to a volume of approx. $7 billons. As direct air traffic to Libya came to a halt due to the 
sanctions, the North African country’s airline industry suffered a damage of around $ 900 million during 
the period of the multilateral sanctions. Moreover, the purchase of conventional arms for which Libya has 
spent in the early 1980s in average $3 billion a year grinded to a complete halt despite some smaller 
acquisition via the international black market. Inflation was sharply rising and reached between 1993 and 
1997 an average rate around 35 %. (Newnham 2009; Niblock 2001: 60-73; O’Sullivan 2003: 195-202; 
Palikki & Smith 2012: 267-9; Vandewalle 2008: 156-60; Werenfels 2008: 8).  
327
 Although this figure appears exaggerated, Tripoli later claimed that it had suffered a lost in national 
wealth of approx. $26.5 billion due to the UN sanctions regimes (Hochman 2006: 68; Palkki & Smith 2012: 
269).
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population (Niblock 2001: 74-80; O’Sullivan 2003: 212; Palkki & Smith 2012: 267-8; 
Werenfels 2008: 8).328 
B) The Pre-Dating Lockerbie Talks – A Testing Ground for the Latter NRN 
Direct diplomacy on Libya’s WMD programs was not a premier, but rather a replay of a 
negotiation dynamic Libya and the United States (supported by the UK) had already 
practice with regard Libya’s involvement in the Lockerbie bombing. It appears that these 
talks, which started in May 1999, were important to reduce distrust for both sides and 
helped to overcome their worst case thinking. For the NRN the pre-dating “Lockerbie talks” 
function as a sort of “diplomatic testing ground” where both sides had the opportunity to 
probe their opponent’s honesty and trustworthiness. Consequentially, we arrive at a 
positive evaluation of the “Lockerbie talks” and rate this diplomatic design element in 
terms of distrust reduction for the Qaddafi regime as a fit. For the United States, the 
Lockerbie talks represented – in all probability – a partial fit. In essence, the Lockerbie talks 
had on the United States the same positive implications as it had on the Libya. But since 
Washington was the deadlock player during the Imposed Deadlock Game, it had simply a 
higher demand for confidence building than the Qaddafi regime – a fact that limit the 
actual performance of the “Lockerbie talks” in light of this particular “fit demand” (Figure 
26).   
In April 1999 the UN suspended the multilateral sanctions against Tripoli. Libya started to 
reintegrate into the international economy. However, in light of dwindling support for 
further coercion, the United States – and to a lesser extent the UK – made clear that it 
would veto a complete lifting of the UN sanctions at the UNSC until the Libya had fulfilled 
all obligations demanded in resolution 731 (Jan. 1992) and 748 (March 1993). The most 
important issue for Washington which was still pending in the late 1990s was the 
appropriate compensation for the families of the victims of Pan Am flight 103.329  
It was under these particular conditions that the Clinton administration decided to respond 
for the first time to the repeated offers for a diplomatic dialogue Libya proposed since the 
early 1990s. Starting from May 1999, Libya and Washington held series of secret meetings 
in several places in Europe to sound out the way forward on the Pan Am 103 issue (e.g. St. 
John 2008: 134-6; Suskind 2006; Indyk 2004). Briefly interrupted during the U.S. 
Presidential campaign in 2000 in order to avoid political backlashes if the dialogue with the 
Qaddafi regime would surface in public, the “Lockerbie talks” were resumed by the Bush 
Junior administration in January 2001 when Libyan and U.S. officials (who were supported 
by the UK) meet on the sidelines of UN meetings in New York (Leverett 2004; St. John 2004: 
393, Slavin 2004). Presumably, the Bush Junior administration continued the diplomatic 
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 While the multilateral sanctions affected the life of the ordinary Libyans, it did however not lead to a 
humanitarian crisis like it was the case in 1990s in Iraq (O’Sullivan 2003: 211-2; Reynolds & Wan 2012). In 
addition, the Qaddafi regime was still able to continue its expensive prestige projects such as the Man-
Made River – a large and very costly irrigation system which were planned to pump water from remote 
desert aquifers into Libya’s dry coastal lowlands. It was assumed that the Man-Made River projected has 
swallowed around 15 % of the entire Libyan government expenditures in the 1990s (Niblock 2001: 64-70). 
329
 “The payment of appropriate compensation” was requirement listed in UNSC resolution 731 (1992). 
See paragraph 3 of the resolution text.   
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engagement with the Qaddafi regime because of the same motivation that had already 
driven the Clinton administration into secret talks with Libya: the fear that the support by 
the international community for continued pressure on Tripoli could further erode without 
having resolved all pending issues of the Lockerbie bombing. 
In August 2003, the Lockerbie talks finally reached a solution when Libya agreed to pay in a 
sequential procedure $2.7 billion compensation to the families of the 270 victims killed in 
the Pan Am 103 bombing (St. John 2008: 136; Bowen 2006: 61, 65). After Libya had 
transferred the first tranche of $4 million to the victim families, the UNSC decided to 
permanently lift the sanctions in September 2003 – a rather symbolic gesture since the 
multilateral coercion was after its suspension in April 1999 exerting no practical impact on 
Libya anymore.  
Although Tripoli had issued since the early 1990s repeated offers for a U.S.-Libyan dialogue, 
there is solid ground to assume that the Qaddafi had made these proposals despite having 
little trust in the United States’ sincerity. Interviewed by Milton Virost in 1990s, Abdulati 
Alobidi, the responsible Libyan diplomat for the day-to-day policy towards the United 
States, said for example: “Frankly, we don’t trust the Americans (…) Libya is still on the 
State Department list of terrorist sponsors, though Washington acknowledges that we have 
not been involved in terrorism for three or four years” (Virost 1999: 74).330 As we have 
explained above, it was the UN coercion that propelled Libya into premature cooperation. 
Without the multilateral sanctions, the spreading distrust and lacking reciprocation by the 
United States would have swiftly corrected the cooperative course the Qaddafi regime 
hasty embarked in the early 1990s. The discrete modus of quiet diplomacy mitigated the 
negative consequences of unreciprocated cooperation but it was not reducing Libya’s 
distrust. According to our analysis, this picture was only changed by the “Lockerbie talks”. 
Now the Qaddafi regime experience for the first time that the United States were indeed a 
potential negotiation partner – a discovery that must have come for the power elite in 
Tripoli as a relief. The “Lockerbie talks” were in that sense adjusting the odd situation of 
distrustful cooperation initiatives Libya had applied since the early 1990s.  
The nature and scope of the pre-dating Lockerbie talks provided Libya with a solid 
fundament to build confidence in the United States. First, the similarities with the later NRN 
were relatively high. Both bargaining dynamics had a tripartite nature and included not only 
the United States and Libya but also the UK. Both negotiation dynamics were held under 
the cloak of secrecy at different venues mainly in Western Europe. And both diplomatic 
episodes were facilitated by Prince Bandar bin-Sultan, the influential ambassador of Saudi 
Arabia to the United States who hosted several of the secret meetings (Interview with M. 
Indyk 2011, Nov. 2011, Annex 16; Interview with P. Pillar, Dec. 2011, Annex 16). Second, the 
Lockerbie talks and the Libyan NRN were marked by a high degree of personal continuity. 
The Libyan negotiation team remained in both bargaining dynamics by and large 
unchanged. Both processes were steered by Moussa Koussa, who was in the Lockerbie talks 
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 In that situation it is also noteworthy that we revealed in our “operational code analysis” that 
Muammar al-Qaddafi had a rather negative perception of cooperation (ch. 5.2.1.1). Until the late 1999 he 
saw conflict and not cooperation as the best strategy to handle problems in foreign affairs (I1).  
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and the latter NRN always accompanied by Mohammed Zwai, the Libyan ambassador to 
London, and Abdellati Obaidi, the Libyan ambassador to Rome (Beaumont, Ahmed & Bright 
2003; Bowen 2006: 62). Third, the Lockerbie talks were also used as a format for U.S.-
Libyan intelligence exchange on Islamist terror organizations – an issue that was in 
particular close to the Qaddafi regime’s heart. Finally, the pending aspects of the Lockerbie 
case were reportedly easier to handle than the latter diplomacy on the WMD issue (Franz & 
Collins 2007: 305). The Lockerbie talks were, therefore, a perfect “testing ground” for the 
latter NRN.  
Against that background, it is little surprising that we encounter solid evidence suggesting 
that the “Lockerbie talks” helped the Qaddafi regime to reduced its distrust vis-à-vis the 
United States. For example, Martin Indyk has reported that the Libyans were during the 
“Lockerbie talks” very accommodative: “whatever we asked them to do, they would do it 
(…) In essence, we said ‘jump!’ and they said ‘how high?’” (Interview with M. Indyk, Nov. 
2011, Annex 16). Paul Pillar made a similar statement and recalled that the Libyans wanted 
to establish during the first meeting in May 1999 “a full-blown intelligence liaison 
relationship” – a leap forward that was certainly too big for Washington at that time 
(Interview P. Pillar, Dec. 2011, Annex 16). Moreover, we observe that the pattern of the 
diplomatic proposals Libya was putting forward changed when the “Lockerbie talks” 
started. In the period prior to the “Lockerbie talks”, the Qaddafi regime’s offers for a 
diplomatic process on WMD were rather unspecific and vague. The reach-outs to 
Washington were executed by emissaries of various kind (Hart 2004; Interview Wayn White 
Dec. 2011, Annex 16). With the beginning of the Lockerbie talks, however, Tripoli’s 
proposals were directly submitted by high-ranking members of the Qaddafi regime – such 
as Moussa Koussa or Saif al-Islam. Moreover, Libya’s proposals regarding the WMD issue 
became more concrete and precise when the bargaining process on the Lockerbie issue 
started. For example, in May 1999 on the sidelines of the nascent “Lockerbie talks”, Moussa 
Koussa made the relatively precise offer by putting forward Tripoli’s readiness to dismantle 
its unconventional weapons programs, to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 
and to allow international inspectors to visit Libya’s clandestine WMD sites. And in 
September 2002 ,Muammar al-Qaddafi himself voiced for the first time his willingness for 
nuclear reversal when he responded to a personal letter send to him by the British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair (Fidler, Huband & Khalaf 2004: 16; St. John: 398).331  
But the “Lockerbie talks” helped not only Libya to reduce its distrust vis-à-vis the United 
States. This pre-dating bargaining cycle also provided Washington with more confidence in 
the Qaddafi regime. For example, Martin Indyk, came to the conclusion that these 
predating talks “established a channel of communication that was working both sides and 
                            
331
 In that context it is also noteworthy that Libya took in the early 2000s several steps to integrate itself 
into the international arms control and non-proliferation architecture. In November 2001 Libya signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). One month later the Libyan Leader notified its readiness to sign 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). And in November 2002 Libya signed the International Code of 
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Bowen 2006: 61; Squassoni & Feickert 2004; St. John 2004: 
394).  
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allowed both sides to develop confidence” (Interview with M. Indyk, Nov. 2011, Annex).332 
Paul Pillar, who was acting as the responsible senior CIA officer for the engagement with 
the Libyans, has seconded Indyk’s assessment by saying: “I personally (…) came away from 
those rounds persuaded of their [Libyans] seriousness (…) and this was what I reported 
back to my superiors (Interview with P. Pillar, Dec. 2011, Annex 16).333  
Certainly, neither Washington nor Tripoli had planned the “Lockerbie talks” as a design 
element for the later NRN. The positive interplays between these two bargaining process 
was a favorable coincidence and not an expression of a well-planned sequencing strategy as 
some U.S. officials later alleged.334 Moreover, the successful conduct of the “Lockerbie 
talks” created no automatism for the latter WMD talks. Both sides, Libya and the United 
States, had not thought the NRN as a mere extension of the “Lockerbie talks” but regarded 
the negotiations on Libya’s nuclear weapons program as a different bargaining cycle which 
required an independent decision to be started. However, all that does not contest the fact 
that the “Lockerbie talks” had an important trust building effect primarily for the Qaddafi 
regime but also on the United States.  
C) Quiet Diplomacy 
Until late 2003 the American-Libyan engagement remained withdrawn from the public. 
Before the public announcement of Libya’s nuclear reversal was aired in the evening hours 
of the 19th December 2003, the negotiation process where tightly held under the cloak of 
secrecy. The few leakages to the press about the nascent diplomatic encounter that 
happened prior to December 2003 have apparently never caught any major media 
attention.335 It was only in 2004 that the entire history of the Libyan NRN with its long 
overture starting in the 1990s was revealed in the press (e.g. Hart 2004, Slavin 2004, Indyk 
2004). Already in his public statement delivered in the evening hours on 19th December 
2003 George W. Bush made clear that the agreement “with Libya came about through quiet 
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 It was also reported that the pre-dating “Lockerbie talks” had played a certain role for George W. 
Bush’s decision. In the decisive White House meeting in April 2003 George W. Bush was, reportedly, 
debriefed by its foreign policy and intelligence advisors of the past experience of the “Lockerbie talks” 
(Suskind 2006). It is very likely that the reference to this predating bargaining process was conducive for 
the positive presidential vote.  
333
 Tim Dowse, who participated for the UK in the talks with the Libyans, had likewise made clear that the 
decision to start a diplomatic process on WMD with the Libyans in early 2003 had been considerable 
facilitate by the pre-dating Lockerbie talks: “We engaged [in 2003] because we were able to talk to the 
Libyans anyway” (Interview with T. Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex 16).  
334
 According to an anonymous senior State Department officials interviewed by the Ron Suskind: “[I]t 
needed to be one step completed, before the next could begin (…) You do not want these families [the 
Pan Am 103 victimes families] and their compensation to be mixed with the dismantling of chemical 
weapons facilities” (Suskind 2006; see also Miller 2007: 28). This reasoning is alluding to an active US 
sequence strategy that gave priority to “Lockerbie talks” and scheduled WMD diplomacy as a second step. 
Reportedly, there was no deliberated sequencing strategy and the Lockerbie issue was given priority 
because the United States was in the late 1990s not fully aware of the acceleration the Libyan nuclear 
weapons program had taken starting by the late 1990s (Interview with M. Indyk, Nov. 2011, Annex 16; 
Interview with P. Pillar, Dec. 2011, Annex 16).  
335
 Prior to the public statement on 19th December 2003 there were several press articles reporting about 
the nascent diplomatic engagement between the United States and Libya – in particular the visit of 
Moussa Koussa to London in Fall 2001 (e.g. Pelham 2001; Taheri 2003; Awwad 2002). However, it appears 
that these reports, which were mainly published in Arab speaking newspapers (e.g. Asharq al-Awsat), 
never sparked any major media attention.  
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diplomacy” (Bush, 19th Dec. 2003). Consequentially, there is ground to assume that the 
design element of “quiet diplomacy” must have had some impact on the U.S.-Libyan 
engagement.  
The “best explanation” we could infer from the historical data is that the impact of “quiet 
diplomacy” was primarily of relevance for the resolution of the distrust trap Washington 
and Libya were embroiled with during the Imposed Deadlock Game. For Libya, the high 
level of secrecy was of particular importance. In the light of the Qaddafi regime’s strategic 
disposition, this design element represented – in all probability – a partial fit. For the 
United States, instead, “quiet diplomacy” gained relevance only at the very end of the pre-
negotiation phase and represented for Washington’s decision signifying an underfit (Figure 
26).  
All the backchannel approaches that the Qaddafi regime launched starting from spring 1992 
were held in utmost secrecy – an important distinction to the highly visible media campaign 
Tripoli had applied at regular intervals during the 1980s in order to pacify the United States 
(see e.g. Libya’s charm offensive, ch. 5.3.1.2). There is solid ground to assume that “quiet 
diplomacy” functioned for Libya as a sort of “diplomatic cocoon”. It allowed the Qaddafi 
regime to embark a cooperative course at a time when Washington was not yet ready to 
respond to Libya’s diplomatic offers. Speaking in game theoretical terms, throughout the 
1990s Libya repeatedly faced its least preferred strategic outcome – unreciprocated 
cooperation (CD). “Quiet diplomacy” signified for Libya a worst-case provision. Concealed 
from public attention, the consequences of ongoing U.S. rebuffs were mitigated. The cloak 
of secrecy shielded Libya’s diplomatic failure away from public critique. Since these 
initiative were official not existing, Libya was not facing any torment to explain publicly to 
the Libyan audience or to other Arab nations why it repeatedly missed influencing 
Washington in its interest. If there had been no cloak of secrecy, it is unlikely that Tripoli 
would have continued its offers for a diplomatic engagement despite ongoing rejection by 
the United States. Rather, the Qaddafi regime would have – in all probability – relapsed into 
the confrontational pattern it had pursued in the late 1980s. Harsh anti-American rhetoric 
would have been the logical consequence.  
Nevertheless, “quiet diplomacy” was only partial fitting to Libya’s strategic posture. While 
the high level of concealment functioned as a worst-case provision, this design element was 
not meeting another important aspect necessary for the resolution of the distrust trap: 
confidence building. The mere fact that Libya’s diplomatic activities were held under the 
cloak of secrecy was by itself not conducive to lower the suspicion Tripoli had vis-à-vis the 
United States. In particularly the ongoing rejection of its diplomatic offers throughout the 
1990s was certainly not helpful to allaying Libya’s doubts about Washington’s sincerity. 
For the United States instead “quiet diplomacy” gained only relevance at the very end of 
the pre-negotiation phase. According to our analysis, it was not until spring 2003 that the 
secret nature of the nascent NRN moved into the center of Washington’s attention. 
Moreover, while the cloak of secrecy represented for the Qaddafi regime an indispensable 
necessity that allowed Tripoli to pursue cooperation despite ongoing defection by the 
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United States, “quiet diplomacy” had for Washington during the pre-negotiation phase no 
operational relevance. United States was until spring 2003 not involved in any direct 
diplomatic action with Libya on WMD. Therefore “quiet diplomacy” was not a modus 
operandi that Washington was actively applying at that time.  
Nevertheless, concealment was still conducive when the United States eventually moved 
towards cooperation in spring 2003. Washington’s decision making was not affected by the 
practice of “quiet diplomacy” but – in all probability – by the prospect that future 
explorative talks on Libya’s WMD programs would be held in utmost secrecy. The 
assumption that concealment would be an inherent part of the upcoming negotiations with 
the Qaddafi was – in all probability – promoting George W. Bush’s decision in favor for a 
diplomatic engagement with Libya.  
If there would have been the slightest concern that the explorative talks on Libya’s WMD 
program would get the attention of the public and the U.S. media, Washington would have 
certainly hesitated to become involved in such a negotiation process. Moreover, the 
assumption that Washington had a strong interest to conceal future talks with Libya on 
WMD is also supported by the way it handled the diplomatic engagement with Tripoli on 
the Lockerbie issue which had already started by May 1999. Given that the U.S. public and 
media was highly critical of the Qaddafi regime, the Clinton and later the Bush Junior 
administration was eager to maintain a high level of secrecy. In the late 1990s and the early 
2000s, large parts of the U.S. audience and certainly many of the Pan Am 103 victim 
families which had close ties with key figures in U.S. Congress were not ready to take a 
diplomatic engagement with Libya at face value (Interview with M. Indyk, Nov. 2011, Annex 
16; Albright 2003: 328).336 “Quiet diplomacy” was for Washington a way to provide against 
domestic backlashes. Consequentially, an important U.S. precondition to which Libya had to 
agree in advance before the start of talks on the Lockerbie issue was that these 
negotiations had to be held in utmost secrecy and were not to be mentioned in public 
under any circumstances (Indyk 2004; St. John 2008: 134).337 
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 A conversation that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had with Attorney General, Janet Reno, at a 
dinner on January 15, 1998 illustrates the problem of domestic backlashes that were assumed to occur if 
the diplomatic engagement with Libya would attract the attention of the media and the wider public. 
When Madeleine Albright discussed with Janet Reno the possible option of direct talks with Tripoli about 
its involvement in the bombing of Pan Am 103 both came to the conclusion if this initiative would be 
leaked, the Clinton administration would “be accused of negotiating with terrorists” (Albright 2003: 329-
330).  
337
 Referring to the U.S.-Libyan talks on the Lockerbie issue, Martin Indyk made for example clear that in 
the late 1990 the “[f]ears about domestic backlash” was high in Washington “[b]ecause the Lockerbie 
victims had a very effective network (…) and they had some spokespersons who were (…) very strong and 
very opposed to having anything to do with Gaddafi (Interview with M. Indyk, Nov. 2012, Annex 16). Paul 
Pillar, who participated at the side of Martin Indyk at the early rounds of the talks on the Qaddafi regime’s 
involvement in international terrorism, seconded this assessment and said that if  
something had leaked “it would have open up the Clinton administration to undoubted charges especially 
from their political opponents (…) that we were playing footsie with the loathing dictatorship” (Interview 
with P. Pillar, Dec.  2011, Annex 16).  
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D) Biased Mediation – the UK’s involvement 
A particularly important element in terms of confidence building was the UK’s involvement 
during the second part of the pre-negotiation phase as a “biased mediator”.338 London’s 
participation in the nascent American-Libyan diplomacy process helped, in particular, the 
United States to reduce its distrust towards the Qaddafi regime. We therefore rate this 
design element as a fit.  
However, the UK’s involvement was not only conducive for Washington’s trust building. 
This design element also helped the Qaddafi regime to lower its suspicion towards a 
diplomatic engagement with Washington. But, since London was clearly siding with its close 
ally, the United States, and was applying a “biased mediation” effort, we have evaluated 
the confidence building implications of the London’s involvement for the Qaddafi regime 
only as an underfit.  
In addition, the UK’s efforts also had positive implications for the substantive negotiation 
problem. As we have outlined above, the effective resolution of Libya’s nuclear bad 
requires an optimal negotiation coalition (ch. 3.1.3.1). In order to arrive at a comprehensive 
and lasting resolution of the substantive negotiation problem, those actors who are 
affected by the corresponding “negative externalities” should “have a say” in the resolution 
process. Since the UK suffered from the Libyan nuclear bad, it was important to involve 
London in the U.S.-Libyan disarmament talks – and be it only in the role of a “biased 
mediator”. Consequentially, we have rated this design element with regard to this 
particular requirement as a fit (Figure 26).  
Before London took an active stance on the WMD issue and tried to persuade the United 
States to engage with Qaddafi regime, the mediation effort of the Blair government already 
surfaced during the diplomatic struggle in the Lockerbie case. For example, London spend 
considerable effort to convince the United States to agree with the compromise to hold the 
trial of the two Libyan suspects in a third country – a proposal Washington had at first 
vehemently opposed (Albright 2003: 329; Matar & Thabit 2004: 128). London also took the 
lead in arranging the practical steps that eventually led to the handover of Abdel Basset Ali 
al-Megrahi and Lamin Khalifah Fhimah (Niblock 2001: 55-8; Black 1998a; Black 1998b). And 
in the late 1990s, when the multilateral sanctions were suspended, London urged the 
Clinton administration to engage directly with Libya in the just discussed Lockerbie talks 
(Interview with M. Indyk, Nov. 2011, Annex 16).339  
When Libya eventually proposed in March 2003 its offer to “to clear the air about” WMD, 
London was clearly in favor for direct WMD talks and advocated this option also in 
Washington. On the sidelines of a Camp David meeting in late March 2003, Tony Blair 
raised the point of a secret negotiation process with the Qaddafi regime about WMD with 
                            
338
 For other literature that likewise come to the conclusion that the United Kingdom had played a 
positive role in American-Libyan diplomatic engagement on WMD see: Bowen 2006: 59; Jakobsen 2012: 
503; Joffé 2004; Matar & Thabit 2004: 195; U.K. House of Commons 2004: 20 
339
 According to Ambassador Martin Indyk, the British Prime Minister “Tony Blair was pushing [President] 
Clinton very hard” to stark the secret talks on the remaining issue of the Lockerbie issue (Interview with 
M. Indyk, Nov. 2011, Annex 16).
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Georg W. Bush (e.g. Beaumont, Kamal & Bright 2003; Corera 2006: 183; Tucker 2009: 364; 
Suskind 2006). According to William Tobey, a US State Department official, “the Americans 
were skeptical, but for several minutes, Bush and Blair huddled over whether the offer 
might be serious, and if it were, what it implied” (Tobey 2014). To our knowledge this 
conversation in March 2003 was the first time that the concrete opportunity of NRN with 
Libya was elevated to George W. Bush.340 A diplomatic process with a notorious Middle East 
dictator on unconventional weapons program must have appeared in many respect 
inconsistent with the official reading of the US intervention in Iraq, which was framed as a 
preventive military strike to avoid the danger of WMD. It is difficult to imagine that anyone 
else but the British Prime Minister would have been able to set such a difficult topic on the 
agenda of the U.S. President in spring 2003.  
Certainly, London was not a textbook mediator. It was not meeting the criteria of neutrality 
and impartiality that are often associated with third party interventions in international 
conflicts. Rather, the Blair government acted as a “biased mediator” that clearly sided with 
its traditional ally, the United States. But there is solid ground to assume that it was exactly 
the biased nature of the UK’s persuasion effort that helped Washington to build the 
sufficient confidence to engage directly with Libya in exploratory talks on unconventional 
weapons programs. 
Concerning their policy towards the Qaddafi regime, Washington and London were by and 
large on the same page. Although the United States was far more deeply entangled in a 
hostile turmoil with Tripoli, London had also a very troubled past with the North African 
country. There was no other U.S. ally that had experienced similar bad relations with the 
North African County than the UK. In particular the bombing of Pan Am 103 over the 
Scottish town Lockerbie had deepened London’s and Washington’s “companionship” in 
their stance towards the Qaddafi regime. We assume that it was this particular “brother-in-
arms relations” that formed the basis for UK’s successful mediation towards the United 
States. The certainty of shared goals must have made Washington in particular responsive 
to London’s recommendations. It eventually helped the Blair government to allay 
Washington’s worst-case perception vis-à-vis the Qaddafi regime.341  
                            
340
 There were also reports that Tony Blair had altered the need for a broader rapprochement with Libya 
with George W. Bush during a Camp David meeting held in September 2002 (see e.g. Corera 2006: 180-1). 
But it appears that at that time this option was still too unconcrete and was only loosely discussed.  
341
 But apart from the brother-in-arms relationship, London’s clout in Washington’s Libyan policy was 
presumably further increased by the fact that the UK was more knowledgeable and experience in the 
direct engagement with Libya. Unlike the United States, London had maintained – despite the official 
rupture of diplomatic ties – informal contact with the Qaddafi regime (Bowen 2006: 59; Viorst 1999). In 
the early 1992 Tripoli and the UK had engaged in an informal intelligence exchange in which the Qaddafi 
regime unveiled certain episodes of its past relations with the IRA including arms deliveries provided to 
the Irish terror group (Niblock 2001: 45; Norton-Taylor 1992; Pick 1992). Already in the late 1990s London 
had resumed formal diplomatic relation with Tripoli. This step was preceded by a direct British-Libyan 
engagement on the compensation of the family of Yvonne Fletcher, the British policewoman shoot from 
the inside of the Libyan embassy in April 1984. The way was paved for a diplomatic restart in 1999 after 
Libya eventually took responsibility for the murder, promised to support the investigation, and paid 
£250,000 in compensation to Yvonne Fletcher’s family (e.g. O’Sullivan 2003: 377; Bowen 2006: 59; 
Norton-Taylor 2009; Ronen 2006: 279-80; Jentleson & Whytock 2005/6: 70). 
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That the biased nature of London’s intervention was helpful to move Washington towards 
cooperation becomes, in particular, clear if we compare the Blair government’s efforts with 
third party interventions by other actors – namely, South Africa and Saudi Arabia. Even 
though Riyadh’s and Pretoria’s initiatives were more akin to the textbook concept of 
conflict meditation since their efforts were meeting in many respects the criterion of 
neutrality and impartiality, both actors had not the same political clout London enjoyed in 
Washington. Both, the famous South African President, Nelson Mandela as well as the 
influential Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin-Sultan, 
vehemently campaigned for a more benign stance towards the Qaddafi regime and 
conducted active shuttle diplomacy in the late 1990s when the United States and Libya 
were engaging on the Lockerbie issue (Boyd-Judson 2005; St. John 2003: 464-5; Niblock 
2001: 58; Matar & Thabit 2004; Interview with M. Indyk, Nov. 2011, Annex 16). But despite 
their assiduous diplomacy effort neither Saudi Arabia nor South Africa had any decisive 
impact on Washington’s willingness to agree to a rapprochement with Libya (Niblock 2001: 
58). Reportedly, the U.S. decision makers never fully trusted the involvement of both 
players (Boyd-Judson 2005: 86; Matar & Thabit 2004: 169). At certain points, Washington 
took even measures to sidestep and exclude these two players from the handling of the 
Lockerbie issue when Riyadh’s and Pretoria’s shuttle diplomacy became in the view of the 
Clinton administration too intense by the late 1990s. For example, the United States 
commissioned the UN General Secretary’s office to execute all coordination and 
communication with Tripoli – a strategy that was reportedly meant to cut back the 
initiatives of Saudi Arabia and South Africa (Matar & Thabit 2004: 181-88). And when the 
United States and Libya eventually started a direct negotiation process by May 1999, South 
Africa was completely excluded from this process, and Saudi Arabia’s role was downsized to 
the function of a practical facilitator. Represented again by Prince Bandar, Riyadh acted as a 
communication liaison between Tripoli and Washington and was on some occasions 
providing venues for the secret meetings at different Saudi-owned properties in Western 
Europe.342  
Thus, the UK involvement in the nascent American-Libyan engagement is a good example 
for all those scholars who have claimed that neutrality and impartially is not necessary a 
sine qua non condition for successful mediation (e.g. Carnevale & Arad 1996; Touval 1985; 
Smith 1985). At least in some negotiation dynamics “biased mediators”, who have close ties 
with one of the conflict parties, appear to achieve higher performance. In addition, the UK 
participation in the Libyan NRN is also a good example of the fact that even the 
disadvantaged conflict party (i.e. Libya) is appreciating biased mediation as long as the 
positive implications of this approach outweigh negative side-effects.  
                            
342
 But even as a facilitator the United States was not fully trusting Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Washington 
was using its connection with the PLO to verify the communication with Qaddafi regime. Martin Indyk said 
for example: “We used the Saudis because [Prince] Banda had direct connection to Gaddafi and Moussa 
Koussa. But we didn't quite trust the Saudis either (…) Even while we used him [Prince Banda], we set up a 
separate channel to verify what we were hearing from him. And that was an unusual channel. That was 
that was the PLO (…) a separate channel between Abu Masar [Jassir Arafat] and Moussa Koussa (Interview 
with M. Indyk, Nov. 2011, Annex 16). 
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Certainly, Libya had rather preferred Saudi Arabia or South Africa as the mediator for its 
diplomatic engagement with the United States. It was reported that Muammar al-Qaddafi 
was clearly in favor of the of Pretoria’s and Riyadh’s active role in the conflict with the 
United States. In several public statements, he highly appreciated the personal involvement 
of Nelson Mandela and Prince Bandar and effusively thanked them for their support (e.g. 
Matar & Thabit 2004: 198; Boyd-Judson 2005). However, when the Qaddafi regime 
eventually recognized that London was able to actually influence Washington in favor of 
the desired Libyan-American rapprochement, Tripoli was not opposed to the UK’s 
involvement and its role as “biased mediator”. On the contrary, Tripoli even actively tried to 
approach the UK in the early 2000s, pleasing London to act as an intermediate in Libya’s 
ongoing backchannel initiatives. And it was not for nothing that Saif al-Islam was sent by his 
father to London and not to any other Western European capital when Libya launched a 
new attempt to start a diplomatic process with the United States on its WMD program in 
March 2003 (Interview with T. Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex 16; Fidler, Huband & Khalaf 2004; 
Indyk 2004: 21; Ronen 2006: 277).   
In addition, the Blair government itself undertook not only active steps towards 
Washington but was also reaching out to the Qaddafi regime. The first approach London 
made in that regard occurred in August 2002 when Mike O’Brien, the British Minister for 
the Middle East, paid a visit to Libya and meet with Muammar al-Qaddafi – the first travel 
of a British cabinet member to Libya since the rupture of the diplomatic relations in 1984. 
In his conversation with the Libyan leader O’Brien, reportedly addressed the WMD issue 
and received from Qaddafi positive signals (e.g. Dejevsky 2004: 6; Joffé 2004: 223; Callies de 
Salies 2005: 31). One month later, in September 2002, Tony Blair wrote a letter to 
Muammar al-Qaddafi in which he also mentioned the option of direct talks on Libya’s WMD 
programs.343 Again Muammar al-Qaddafi showed openness to the British proposal. 
Moreover, the Libyan leader was indicated in his written reply he would instruct his foreign 
minister to prepare a diplomatic engagement with the West on unconventional weapons 
programs (e.g. Fidler, Huband & Khalaf 2004: 16; St. John 2004: 398). 
There is no historical data that allows us to evaluate how the UK initiatives affected the 
decision making of the Qaddafi regime. But since these two high-profile approaches were 
the first time that Western politicians seized the idea of a WMD dialogue Tripoli had floated 
at numerous occasions in the last 10 years, it is hard to believe that the UK outreach in 
summer 2002 left Tripoli unmoved. After the long rupture with the UK, Muammar al-
Qaddafi must have been delighted by the correspondence with Tony Blair. But since the 
Blair government’s approach towards Tripoli remained narrow and since the UK’s role as 
mediator was limited due to its close alliance with the United States, we have evaluated 
this link only as an underfit. While it – in all probability – contributed to the Qaddafi 
regime’s confidence building, this diplomatic tool had not tapped its full potential. We 
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 It was reported that the British Prime Minister received positive backing by the US President for this 
step (Beaumont, Kamal & Bright 2003; Bowen 2006: 62; Miller 2006: 27). In that sense the initiative by 
Tony Blair is clearly in the logic of mediation between the US and Libyan and is not just representing a 
unilateral effort to improve the British-Libyan relationship.  
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assume that if the London had taken a more vigorous mediation effort, the confidence 
building implications could have been even more intense.  
E) Ongoing Disclosure of the A.Q. Khan Network  
The disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network and the insights of this intelligence operations 
provided about the nature and scope of the Libyan nuclear weapons program, had likewise 
positive implications during the second part of the pre-negotiation phase. This non-
diplomatic instrument affected the procedural as well as the substantial negotiation 
problem. The ongoing intelligence disclosure of the A.Q. Khan helped to manipulate 
Washington’s preference in favor of a diplomatic engagement with the Qaddafi regime and 
signified a complete match with this particular “fit demand”.  
Moreover, this non-diplomatic instrument contributed also to the resolution of Libya’s 
nuclear bad. However, with regard to the substantial negotiation problem, its performance 
was less convincing. During the pre-negotiation phase, the intelligence about the network 
was still too limited and was not yet allowing the United States to take tangible actions that 
would have cut the business ties between the Qaddafi regime and the nuclear smuggle ring 
– an assessment that made us rate the disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network only as an 
underfit in light of this particular requirement (Figure 26).  
Throughout the 1990s, Washington rejected Tripoli’s repeated offers for WMD talks. A 
central motive behind Washington’s ongoing rebuffs was the assumption that Tripoli’s 
nuclear weapons program was entrapped in a standstill and was, therefore, posing no 
immediate threat to the United States. The U.S. intelligence community reportedly 
perceived Libya in the late 1990s as an “inept bungler, the court jester among the band of 
nations seeking (…) nuclear capabilities” (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 2005: 
259-260). And recalling the situation in the 1990s Martin Indyk said: “Disarmament was a 
lower priority at that time (…) We were not aware of his [Muammar al-Qaddafi’s] nuclear 
program (…) We did have Qaddafi’s chemical weapons on our agenda. But it was a lower 
priority because we didn’t think it was particular advance” (Interview with M. Indyk, Nov. 
2011, Annex 16).  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. and the U.K. intelligence community was 
however, disclosing more and more information about the A.Q. Khan network activities and 
thereby also became aware of the accelerated development of the Qaddafi regime’s 
nuclear weapons program. As a consequence, the risk assessment regarding Tripoli’s WMD 
ambition was rising sharply at that time. While it was originally assumed that Libya would 
cross the “nuclear threshold”, not before 2015, the estimated timeframe was reduced to 
the year 2007. New evidence stemming from the intelligence disclosure of the A.Q. Khan 
network “led technical analysts to change their views dramatically about the Libyans’ 
abilities” (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 2005: 260).344  
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 The British intelligence community came reportedly to similar results as their U.S. colleagues. For 
example, by July 2002 the MI6 concluded that the transnational smuggle ring was in essence “central to 
all aspects of the Libyan nuclear weapons programme [sic]” (U.K. House of Commons 2004: 18).  
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There is no available data about how the new risk assessment affected Washington’s 
decision making. However, it is very likely that it “manipulated” the Bush Junior 
administration’s preference in favor of a diplomatic engagement with the Qaddafi regime. 
Given that the Libya’s connection with the A.Q. Khan network was, reportedly, an 
important impetus for the UK to start its mediation efforts in favor of direct diplomatic 
process with Tripoli, there is solid ground to assume that this motive played for the United 
States was likewise an important role. According to Tim Dowse, a British diplomat who 
participated in the WMD talks in 2003, Libya’s “relation to the A.Q. Khan network (…) was a 
main concern (…) [A]nd some of the worst case assessments were that they would be the 
next country to get nuclear weapons – rather ahead of Iran. And so we were very keen to 
pursue it [a tripartite engagement on the Qaddafi regime’s WMD programs]” (Interview 
with T. Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex 16; see also: Interview with S. Hadley, June 2012, Annex 
16).  
While the disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network represented a fit in terms of the colliding 
interest trap, the performance of this non-diplomatic design element in the resolution of 
Libya’s nuclear bad was however less prominent. In the early 2000s, the U.S intelligence 
community, and their British colleagues had not yet revealed sufficient information about 
the A.Q. Khan network to take direct actions against the smuggling ring. Rather, the major 
progress in that regard took place during the year 2003 – at a time where the diplomatic 
process had already entered into the pre-agreement phase (e.g. Heupel 2008; Corera 2006: 
186; Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 2005: 257; U.K. House of Commons 2004: 
21).  
F) Strategic Readjustment: How the Iraq War Propelled the US into Cooperation  
Whether or not the Second Iraq War had an impact on Libya’s nuclear disarmament is 
certainly the most intensively discussed aspect about the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear reversal 
(e.g. Jentleson & Whytock 2005/6; Litwak 2007; St. John 2008). While the protagonist of the 
Bush and Blair administration have pointed out that it was the Second Iraq War that forced 
Qaddafi  into nuclear disarmament, this argument was vividly contested by numerous 
scholars (e.g. Indyk 2004a, Indyk 2004b; Leverett 2004; Müller 2006). To say it right from 
the start: none of the previous accounts grasp the full picture of the role the Iraq War had 
played in Libya’s nuclear reversal – although each sides appears to have disclosed at least a 
part of the complex reality.   
The massive deployment of US troops to the Gulf region in spring 2003 had an impact on 
Muammar al-Qaddafi. Always suspicious and distrustful of the United States, the Libyan 
leader was very concerned about Washington’s show of force first in Afghanistan and later 
in Iraq.345 It was reported that Muammar al-Qaddafi expressed concerns in a  conversation 
with the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi that after the Iraq invasion, the US military 
force could turn to Libya (Joseph 2009: 12).  Moreover, a classified cable sent from the US 
                            
345
 That neo-conservatives members of the Bush Junior administration – first and foremost John R. Bolton 
(Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the US State Department) – continued to 
utter harsh language against Libya was probably further inflaming these concerns.  
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embassy in Cairo reported – according to Judith Miller – a phone call Muammar al-Qaddafi 
had given to Egyptian president Mubarak in late 2002 in which he uttered strong fears 
about a future attack by U.S. forces. And according to a U.S, Congress delegation visiting 
Libya in 2004 after the conclusion of the disarmament deal, Muammar al-Qaddafi admitted 
that the Iraq War was an important driver behind his decision (Miller 2006; Joseph 2009: 
12). Moreover, one could not close its eyes from that fact that the massive deployment of 
troops in the Gulf region in March 2003 highly coincides with the Qaddafi regime’s renewed 
offer for disarmament talks. Saif al-Islam conveyed this message exactly in the same week 
as the Iraq intervention started (Interview with T. Dowse, February 2012, Annex 16).  
But one should not push this argument too far and should not misread Muammar al-
Qaddafi’s concerns. The U.S. Iraq intervention certainly affected the timing and sequencing 
of Tripoli’s negotiation offers. But the Second Iraq War neither urged the Qaddafi regime on 
a cooperative course nor forced Libya to reverse its WMD programs. The massive show of 
force in the Gulf region certainly alarmed Muammar al-Qaddafi. But as numerous scholars 
have laid out correctly, the Iraq war came simply too late to have had a meaningful impact. 
Libya had already been ready for direct negotiations on its unconventional weapons 
programs since the early 1990s (e.g. Hart 2004; Indyk 2004a; 2004b; Müller 2006). 
However, even if the Iraq War had been started some years early, it would not have 
contributed much to Libya’s decision for cooperation either. Being the non-deadlock player 
in the Imposed Deadlock Game, trust and a brief inciting interest stimulation to overcome 
the Nash Equilibrium were the only two drivers the Qaddafi regime needed to embark a 
cooperative course of during the pre-negotiation phase.  
As we have shown above, these two requirements were already provided to Libya during 
the 1990s. Moreover, if the Qaddafi regime had not been anyway on a cooperative course, 
the second Iraq War would have signified a massive preference manipulation which was for 
Libya – being the non-deadlock player in the Imposed Deadlock Game – irrelevant and 
unnecessary.  
However, the Iraq War was nevertheless of utmost importance for overcoming the 
Imposed Deadlock Game – but in a completely different way than discussed thus far. The 
show of force in the Gulf didn’t move the Qaddafi regime but the United States into 
cooperation. The Second Iraq War bestowed Washington with a new strategic desire and 
thereby rendered the diplomatic engagement with Tripoli in an attractive option.  
In the “interest profile” of the United States (ch. 5.2.1.2; see also Figure 19) we have 
already explained that the Bush Junior administration underwent a significant shift in spring 
2003. At that time, Washington became eager to link the Second Iraq War to the nascent 
diplomatic process with the Qaddafi regime. It was the emerging of this new desire that 
was the decisive driving force behind the U.S. decision to overcome the Imposed Deadlock 
Game in April 2003.  
The prospect to yield political profit from the bargaining process with Tripoli for the 
broader Bush Doctrine and the attempt to establish a new Pax Americana in the Middle 
East explains why Washington eventually agreed to start explorative talks with Tripoli on its 
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nuclear weapons program despite the fact that only few “preference manipulation” in favor 
of cooperation had been provided to the United States during the second part of the pre-
negotiation phase. The predating “Lockerbie talks”, “quiet diplomacy”, and the UK’s “biased 
mediation” were helpful to allay Washington’s concerns vis-à-vis the Qaddafi regime. But 
confidence building is under the condition of the Imposed Deadlock Game a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for cooperation. Despite the overcoming of the distrust trap, the 
colliding interest trap continued to prevail. Until April 2003 Washington had simply no 
interest in cooperating with the Qaddafi regime on WMD. This was only changed when the 
United States’ desire was shifted by the Iraq War linkage.  
Of course, at the very beginning, the Bush administration could not have known how 
exactly to use the bargaining process with Libya for its broader power projects in the 
Middle East. But what was clear was that the nascent diplomatic engagement should be 
integrated as a supportive component into the Bush Doctrine. In the White House meeting 
where the decision to engage Qaddafi regime was eventually taken, President Bush 
admonished that the diplomatic process with Tripoli should be pursued in a way that its 
outcome would “send a signal to the world” and that Bush Junior administration would “get 
some deliverable from this process” (Suskind 2006, Suskind 2007: 222-3; Frantz & Collins 
2007: 306). 
Without this shift in Washington’s strategic desires, it is rather unlikely that the Bush Junior 
administration had started a diplomatic engagement with Tripoli. In all probability, the 
Imposed Deadlock Game had not been overcome. After all, the bargaining process with the 
Qaddafi regime involved considerable political risk and was prone to provoke domestic 
turbulences. Without the U.S. policy towards Libya becoming a component in the broader 
Bush Doctrine, the voices of those who expressed concerns about engaging with the 
Qaddafi regime – first and foremost Vice President Dick Cheney (Suskind 2006) – would 
have exerted more influence on George W. Bush’s decision making. There is a good chance 
that under such circumstance George W. Bush had given his veto exploratory talks with 
Tripoli. However, the picture changed when the U.S. policy towards Libya became a 
supportive element for the Iraq War – by far the biggest foreign policy project of Bush 
Junior administration. The diplomatic engagement on Libya’s WMD was abruptly bestowed 
with a high priority. The bargaining process suddenly became an attractive and feasible 
endeavor that served Washington’s high politics interests. In that sense, the issue linkage 
marked a case of self-inducement into cooperation at a time when the nascent diplomatic 
process with Libya had by itself promised little concrete benefits.  
G) 9/11 and  the War on Terror  
Several scholars have pointed out 9/11 and the War on Terror as an important structural 
driver for the American-Libyan rapprochement (e.g. Ronen 2008; Joseph 2008: 13; 
Newnham 2009: 92). While this argument appears at first sight convincing, our analysis 
nevertheless reveals that these structural factors had no positive implications for resolving 
the procedural negotiation problem of the pre-negotiation phase but instead signified a 
misfit (Figure 26).  
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Islamic fundamentalists were declared enemies of the Qaddafi regime since the 1970s.346 
Libya’s struggle with the Islamic opposition intensified in the 1990s. Anti-government 
attacks by organizations such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Libyan Martyrs’ 
Movement caused around 600 causalities between 1995 and 1998 (e.g. Exenberger 2002; 
Jentleson & Whytock 2006: 66; Palkki & Smith 2012: 271). And in late May 1998, Muammar 
al-Qaddafi only closely escaped a terror attack on his convoy near Benghazi which killed 
three of his guards and wounded himself at the elbow (Martinez 2007: 57).  
When Washington launched after 9/11 the War on Terror, the Qaddafi regime saw a 
“window of opportunity” to implement the long desired rapprochement with the United 
States. Pointing out that many of the 9/11 terrorists came from Saudi Arabia, Muammar al-
Qaddafi and the power elite in Tripoli even indulged the hope to become Riyadh’s heir as 
the U.S. closest ally in the Middle East (Interview with T. Dowse, Fe. 2012, Annex 16).347  
Consequentially, Libya was not only the first Arab country that expressed its condolences to 
the United States after 9/11, according to a confidential U.S. cable sent from the American 
embassy in Cairo, Muammar al-Qaddafi even called “every Arab leader on his Rolodex” in 
the effort to persuade them to likewise condemn the terror attacks on New York and 
Washington (Frantz & Collins 2007: 304). During the preparations for the Afghanistan war, 
the Libyan leader denounced the Taliban as “godless promoter of political Islam” and 
justified the U.S. intervention as a justified act of self-defense (O’Sullivan 2003: 185). In 
January 2002 Libya announced internationally a $1 million reward for all information that 
would lead to members of Islamic terrorist groups (St. John 2004: 394). Moreover, the 
American-Libyan intelligence exchange on terrorist groups, which took place on the 
sidelines of the “Lockerbie talks” since the late 1990s, was intensified after 9/11 (Interview 
with P. Pillar, Dec. 2011, Annex 16).  
Certainly, the Bush administration noticed Libya’s antipathy towards Islamic 
fundamentalists. According to the CIA director George Tenet, the Qaddafi regime’s support 
for the U.S. War on Terror was noticed as “an interesting sign” (Tenet 2007: 288). However, 
Washington was in the early 2000s still very cautious vis-à-vis the Qaddafi regime. The Bush 
Junior administration was not prepared to jump into a joint U.S.-Libyan cooperation on 
anti-terrorism policy which Tripoli actively proposed at that time. Thus, 9/11 and the War 
on Terror had for Washington’s view on the American-Libyan rapprochement mainly 
atmospheric implications.  
For Libya instead, these two structural factors made the Qaddafi regime even more eager 
to cooperate with the United State (Interview with T. Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex 16).348  The 
                            
346
 Tellingly, in the early 1990s Libya was the first country that issued an Interpol arrest warrant against 
Osama Bin Laden (Joffé 2004: 223). 
347
 According to Tim Dowse, Muammar al-Qaddafi was in the early 2000s “very, very anti-Saudi. He was 
telling us [the UK] and in particular the U.S.: The Saudis they are not your best friends. You be better very 
suspicious about them. They are very dangerous. They are fundamentalists. They are very bad for you. 
What you need is me.” (Interview with T. Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex 16).  
348
 Even after the rapprochement with the United States had been executed, the members of the Qaddafi 
regime continued to overrate the implications of 9/11. In an interview with the journalist Judith Miller, 
Saif al-Islam said for example in reference to 9/11: “Overnight we found ourselves in a different world. So 
Libya had to redesign its policies to cope with these new realities” (Miller 2006).  
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U.S. War on Terror and 9/11 were, therefore, acting against the “fit demand” to bridle 
Libya’s first mover inclination. We therefore, rated these two structural factors as a misfit.  
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5.3.3 Pre-Agreement Phase (March – December 2003)   
In comparison to the previous pre-negotiation phase, which prevailed for more than 15 
years, the nine months long pre-agreement phase was relatively short. It was a period that 
was characterized by secret talks held mainly between senior figures of the Libyan, the US, 
and the UK intelligence community at different venues in Europe and North Africa. From 
March to December 2003 both sides – the members of Qaddafi regime and the UK-US team 
– pondered on the question whether to start direct negotiations on a disarmament 
agreement. Preparing for these final negotiations was the major purpose of this period.  
Unlike the previous pre-negotiation phase, structural factors and non-diplomatic 
interventions played during the pre-agreement phase no role. Instead, this episode of the 
Libyan NRN was “won” exclusively by diplomacy. The different diplomatic design elements 
that were applied – either intentionally or unintentionally – cleared the way for the 
following agreement phase. Diplomatic design moved the players into a stage where they 
were eventually ready to give their consent to direct negotiations on a final disarmament 
agreement by early December 2003.  
5.3.3.1 Procedural & Substantial Negotiation Problems  
The procedural negotiation problem the United States and Libya faced during the pre-
agreement phase is – according to our analysis – best described as an Alibi Game. While still 
challenging to resolve, the Alibi Game was more benign in terms of joint cooperation than 
the previous Imposed Deadlock Game – not to mention the pure Deadlock Game, which 
dominated the first part of the pre-negotiation phase in the late 1980s. But while the 
procedural problems became over the years less and less confrontational, the substantial 
negotiation problem (i.e. Libya’s nuclear bad) remained by and large unchanged. Certainly, 
we observed in the pre-agreement phase some efforts to address at least some aspects of 
Libya’s nuclear bad. Therefore, we describe the “fit demand” for the substantial negotiation 
problem already in this section (see part B and Figure 27). However, during the pre-
agreement phase, the resolution of Libya’s nuclear bad lived rather in the shadow. Between 
spring and fall 2003 the procedural problem dimensions were simply still too massive. 
Meaningful diplomatic progress to resolve Libya’s nuclear bad was not possible at that 
time. It was only during the following agreement phase (December 2003) that the 
substantial negotiation problem received full attention and became an agenda item in the 
negotiation process.  
A) The Alibi Game  
 
Alibi Games have been widely neglected by IR scholars. That is in every respect deplorable 
since it is very likely that Alibi Games occur relatively often in international politics.349 
During the Libyan NRN we encounter this strategic constellation twice (apart from the pre-
agreement phase, the Alibi Game also dominated the following agreement phase). 
                            
349
 For more a more detailed discussion on the neglect of Alibi Games see ch. 6.1.1.4.  
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Alibi Games share in appearance numerous similarities with the widely discussed PD Game. 
Like PD Games, Alibi Games have only one pareto-inferior Nash Equilibrium (N) that falls on 
the outcome of mutual defection (DD). And, like PD Games, the Qualified Pareto Optimum 
(P+) coincides in Alibi Games with the outcome of joint cooperation (CC) (Figure 22). 
However, unlike PD games, Alibi Games are marked by a biased structure.  
The nature of this particular 2x2 game constellations becomes more tangible if we return to 
the original PD metaphor and image that one of the imprisoned suspects (in our case Libya) 
is fortuned to have an alibi for the crime he is charged with. Under the condition of the Alibi 
Game, the classic PD metaphor would read as follows: Normally both player have a strong 
incentive for defection and are expected to confess individually to the public prosecutor. 
For the prisoner who is protected by an alibi, this logic, however, does not apply. Having a 
watertight excuse makes unilateral confession needless. The testimony of his comrade 
would not hold up against the alibi this suspect is able to present. Mutual confession (DD) is 
therefore for the prisoner with the alibi less threaining an more comfortble. In addition, 
normally both suspects would face only a short sentence for some pretext (say for example 
illegal possession of handguns) if they would collectively remain silent (CC). But here again, 
the alibi is also protecting against the minor charge and would lead to the outcome that the 
prisoner with the alibi is set free (Figure). 
Figure22: Alibi Game in the Pre-Agreement Phase (March - December 2003) 
 
 
Given the numerous similarities, there is a relatively high chance that strategic 
constellations which were described by past scholars as examples of PD Games – such as 
the Second Morocco Crisis in 1911 or the Middle East Conflict in the 1990s (Beck 1997; 
Synder & Dising 1977) – were in reality Alibi Games. This is problematic since, Alibi Games 
operated according to a different logic than PD Games and, consequentially, require a 
different resolution strategy.  
Alibi games are marked a by a double trap. If there is no external intervention that drives 
the conflicting parties into joint cooperation (CC), both sides are likely to step into the 
deadlock situation (DD) when striving to maximize their individual utilities. The non-alibi 
player (i.e. in our case the United States) acts in such a constellation as the spoiler of joint 
cooperation. Having a strong inclination for unilateral defection (DC), this actor is prone to 
trigger a “race to the bottom”. Its counterpart, the alibi player (i.e. in our case Libya), is 
instead more leaning towards joint cooperation (CC). This outcome signifies the alibi 
player’s best possible choice. However, once the non-alibi player has chosen unilateral 
defection, this actor is very likely to follow this pattern. First, because unilateral defection 
nuclear reversal negotiation  [C] no negotiation [D]
nuclear reversal negotiation  [C] 4,3 P+ 1,4
no negotiation [D] 2,1 3,2 M,N
USA
Libya
US preference hierarchy:              DC > CC > DD > CD    
C =  Cooperation  D = Defection  M = MaxiMin Solution  N = Nash Equilibirum  P+ = Qualified Pareto 
Libya's preference hierarchy:        CC > DD > DC > CD 
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(CD) is the most unfavorable outcome of the alibi player. Second, because the deadlock 
constellation (DD) is for the alibi player not a bad choice but its second best option. Once 
mutual defection (DD) is established, both players have little chance to escape from this 
situation. The deadlock scenario (DD) signifies a Nash Equilibrium (N) from which the actors 
could not depart unilateral without rendering themselves worse off (Figure 22). 
However, apart from the colliding interest trap Alibi Games are also marked by a distrust 
trap. Even if we assume that the players would overcome the colliding interest trap, distrust 
would still detain them in the deadlock constellation (DD). As soon as the both sides have 
doubts and concerns about their counterpart’s sincerity, the Maximin solution (M) would 
be their preferred choice to protect themselves against the consequences of the worst-case 
scenario of unreciprocated cooperation (CD). Since the Maximin Solution (M) coincides with 
the outcome of mutual defection (DD), distrust leads to the same outcome as the colliding 
interest trap (Figure 22). 
What kind of diplomatic intervention would fit the Alibi Game? What is the “optimal 
solution” in light of this particular procedural negotiation problem?  
(1) Colliding Interest Trap: We have already mentioned that the Alibi Game is relatively 
benign in terms of achieving the outcome of joint cooperation (CC). Due to the more 
cooperative nature of the Alibi Game, costly preference manipulation is rendered 
redundant – a fact that makes the “fit demand” of the Alibi Game clearly distinct from the 
resolution strategy required for previous Imposed Deadlock Game and the pure Deadlock 
Game. The manipulation of the players’ preferences would not be harmful for the 
resolution of the Alibi Game’s colliding interest trap. But it would certainly signify an 
inefficient investment of governance resources. The alibi player (i.e. Libya) is anyway in 
favor for joint cooperation (CC). Thus, in terms of the colliding interest trap the non-alibi 
player (i.e. the United States) is the real problem. However, with a well-choreographed 
diplomatic intervention it is also possible to nudge even this actor onto a cooperative 
course. If only the timing is handled properly, resolving colliding interest traps in Alibi 
Games is inexpensive and does not require costly rewards (or sanctions).   
For the non-alibi player (i.e. the United States) it is less the lacking inclination for 
cooperation that is problematic. After all the outcome of joint cooperation (CC) signifies for 
this actor the second best choice. In comparison to mutual defection (DD), it is, therefore, a 
far more attractive outcome. The essential stumbling block for sustainable cooperation is 
the non-alibi player’s strong temptation to exploit its counterpart’s favor for cooperation 
(Figure 27). As soon as the Alibi Game is turning into a cooperative course, defection would 
become for this actor an attractive choice. If the alibi player is opting for cooperation, the 
non-alibi player has the chance to reap in its best possible outcome by choosing defection 
(DC). This is, of course, a short-sighted move since the alibi player is likely to retaliate with 
the consequence that the players relapse again into the deadlock scenario (DD). However, 
following the principles of Enlightened Rationalism we do not assume that real world actors 
are hyper-rational players. Consequentially, such a short-sighted strategy is indeed possible 
in international politics.  
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A diplomatic intervention that aims to get along without costly preference manipulation of 
the non-alibi player’s payoff structure would, therefore, require “precautionary measures” 
against the possible exploitation of cooperation (Figure 27). How the precaution against 
exploitation is implemented is dependent to the strategic constellation in the individual 
cases. For example, if the non-alibi player has already experienced the painful 
consequences of the deadlock outcome (DD), the temptation for defection could be tamed 
by recalling this situation – in the sense of taking advantage of the “shadow of the past.” 
Precaution against the exploitation of cooperation could also take the form of highlighting 
the contrast between the long-term beneficial results of joint cooperation (CC) and the 
“flash in the pan” effects of unilateral defection. However, regardless of the actual 
implementation, a “precaution against cooperation-exploitation” is an important “fit 
demand” for the successful resolution of the Alibi Game (Figure 27).  
The “omission of preference manipulation” and “precaution against cooperation-
exploitation” is crucial for the resolution of the Alibi Game. However, a diplomatic 
intervention that is matching with the nature of this particular dilemma game has also to 
encourage the alibi player to “move first” into the direction of joint cooperation (CC) 
(Figure 27). Since joint cooperation (CC) signifies the alibi player's best possible choice 
anyway, animating this actor to take active steps towards this outcome is an intervention 
which involves little governance resources. Rather, what is required is a moderate impetus 
that makes the alibi player act according to its own interests. The alibi player’s choice for 
cooperation represents for its counterpart, the non-alibi player, not only a temptation for 
defection. This move is at the same time for the non-alibi player the crucial incentive for 
likewise choosing cooperation. If the alibi player is not moving first, the non-alibi player will 
not opt for cooperation. Without the alibi player’s first move the entire diplomatic 
intervention would be more complicated and more costly. In such a case we would need 
“preference manipulation” – equivalent to one pay off point – in order to drive the non-
alibi player from its most desired scenario (i.e. unilateral defection, DC) to the second best 
choice (i.e. joint cooperation, CC) (Figure 22). Timing and a well-tailored sequencing of 
moves are therefore essential in the Alibi Game and signifies an efficient substitution for 
costly rewards (or sanctions). 
(2) Distrust Trap: Rationality assumed, “first moving,” “omission of preference 
manipulation”, and “exploitation precaution” is the crucial “fit demand” for overcoming the 
colliding interest trap in Alibi Games (Figure 22). However, resolving the colliding interest 
trap alone is insufficient for sustainable cooperation. Rather, the Alibi Game requires a 
parallel resolution of the distrust trap. Ways and means need to be installed that helped to 
reduce the players’ mutual suspicion and overcome their worst-case thinking.  
As we have already outlined above, game theory has certain limits when it comes to the 
operationalization of (dis)trust (ch. 3.1.3.2 see also ch. 6.1.1.4). Confidence building is per 
se not the home-turf of game theory. However, what we can derive from the nature of the 
Alibi Game – and the finding is in many respect similar to our analysis of the previous 
Imposed Deadlock Game – is that distrust reduction needs to be biased. The players of the 
Alibi Game are assumed to have divergent tolerance regarding distrust.  
   
262 
 
When suspicion starts to loom, the alibi player (i.e. Libya) is more inclined to choose the 
Maximin solution (M) and hold on to this strategy. After all, mutual defection (DD) is for this 
actor the second best option and therefore in general relatively comfortable – in particular 
when the prospect of achieving the best possible outcome of joint cooperation (CC) turns 
into a “pipe dream” in light of the (real or perceived) insincerity of the non-alibi player (i.e. 
the United States). Therefore, the alibi player is assumed to opt more swiftly in favor of the 
Maximin solution. The non-alibi player is instead believed to be more hesitant regarding 
this decision since the deadlock scenario is for this actor less attractive (Figure 22).  
Obviously, the varying tolerance regarding distrust has a consequence for diplomatic 
design. The alibi player must be subjected to more intensive distrust reduction than its 
counterpart. What is required is a biased approach of confidence building (Figure 27).  
B) Libya’s Nuclear Bad  
Similar to the Alibi Game, the substantial negotiation problem – Libya’s nuclear bad – is 
marked by a double trap. Resolving this problem required the resolution of a colliding 
interest and of an injustice trap.  
The colliding interest trap was constituted by fact that the United States – and to a lesser 
extent also the UK – had the intention to escape from the “negative externalities” imposed 
by Libya’s nuclear bad. As we have outlined above in the application of our fit taxonomy 
(ch. 5.2.2.1), both, the United States but also the UK, were particular allergic to the security 
risks resulting from the Qaddafi regime’s WMD ambitions. Consequentially, Washington 
and London were eager to change this situation. Dismantling all of Libya’s WMD once and 
for all was their core objective. Libya for its part was, however, interested in maintaining its 
nuclear weapons program. Despite the direct diplomatic engagement starting in spring 
2003, Tripoli continued to strive for the atomic bombs. The efforts to build up a uranium 
enrichment facility with the help of the A.Q. Khan network were not slowed down during 
the pre-agreement phase.  
As long as at least one side continues to maximize its individual utilities, a sustainable 
resolution of Libya’s nuclear weapons program is impossible. If the bad doer (i.e. Libya) 
continues to strive for an atomic bomb, the bad sufferers (i.e. Washington and London) 
would be confronted with “negative externalities”. And if the bad sufferers succeed in 
eliminating Libya’s nuclear bad, the bad doer would be deprived of the benefits it 
envisioned to receive from its nuclear weapons program.  
Moreover, a lasting resolution of this substantial negotiation problem is only possible if 
both sides confront – apart from the colliding interest trap – also the injustice trap. Seen 
from the perspective of the US-UK negotiation team, the Qaddafi regime had violated every 
international disarmament and non-proliferation treaty it had ever signed. But not only that 
the North African country had placed itself outside the international norms, it had also 
caused by its rogue behavior fear and security concerns to its neighboring states and the 
entire region (ch. 3.1.3.1). In the Libyan perspective, however, disarmament would mean 
   
263 
 
doing away with an important power instrument which was expected to increase the 
Qaddafi regime’s prestige and security and on which one had invested already considerable 
resources. Nuclear reversal was therefore likely to lead to an unjust negotiation outcome in 
which Libya was rendered worse off.  
What does all this mean in terms of the fit demand? What is the “optimal solution strategy” 
design elements have to meet in order to achieve a sustainable resolution of Libya’s nuclear 
bad?  
(1) The Liberation Strategy: When facing a public bad, presumably the most pressing 
requirement is to neutralize its “negative externalities” and stop the suffering of by-
standing third parties. What is needed is a “liberation strategy”. As we have outlined 
already in the theoretical section (3.1.3.1) such a “liberation strategy” cannot be applied a 
gusto but has to be carefully applied in the sense of “surgical intervention”. It is important 
to avoid that neither too much nor too little of a bad doer’s strategic portfolio is cut-off, but 
only the “negative externalities” of the actual public bad are removed. We also explained 
above that while there are different ways to deactivate public bads and undo “negative 
externalities” (i.e. internalization, externalization or elimination, see also Table 5), the most 
important guidance for such an operation is the scope and nature of a public bad’s 
consumption – its “demand side.”  
In the application of our fit taxonomy to the Libyan case we revealed that Tripoli’s nuclear 
bad was with regard to its “demand side” exclusively tailored to the needs of the inner 
circle of the Qaddafi regime. It was not Libya’s security and its national prestige in general 
that was meant to increase with the nuclear program but the security and the prestige of 
the power elite in Tripoli. We therefore have drawn the conclusion that the “demand side” 
of Libya’s nuclear bad was constituted by a “private good” (ch. 5.2.2.3).  
Public bads that have a “private good demand side” allow for little strategic flexibility. 
Complete elimination is the only reasonable strategy that fits into this problem structure 
(see Table 5). The situation would have been different if the “demand side” of the Libyan 
nuclear bad had the structure of a “club good” instead of a “private good”. In such a 
situation one could have recurred to the strategy of “externalization”. Offering “club 
membership” to outsiders who suffer from negative consequences would be a viable 
strategy to deactivate a public bad.350 However, with regard to public bads that are based 
on “private goods” interventions beneath elimination – such as containment, reduction, or 
inclusion of bad sufferer – are neither a suitable nor a sustainable option. A “private public 
bad” would still radiate “negative externalities” to the outside world. Moreover, the “rivalry 
in consumption”, which is inherent to “private public bads”, set strict limits to flexible 
resolution approaches. In essence, a “liberation strategy” for private-public bads that builds 
on externalization of benefits or internalization of “negative externalities” is, in essence, 
synonymous with elimination since it drives the “rivalry of consumption” inherent in that 
                            
350
 In essence this is the central logic of the “nuclear umbrella” where allies are allowed to “consume” the 
“positive externalities” of a nuclear weapons program in the sense of “extended deterrence” with the 
consequence that these actors feel not threatened by the atomic bombs of their neighboring country.  
   
264 
 
particular bad type to a maximum. The intensive overuse of “private-public bads” lead 
likewise to their eradication.  
However, elimination strategies are not alike. Due to its specific nature, the Libyan nuclear 
weapons program required not a radical eradication. Such an approach would represent an 
overfit. As we have explained above, Libya’s nuclear weapons program was, in essence, a 
public bad “in the making.” It was built by the “best shot aggregation”. In late 2003 the 
Qaddafi regime was still years away from a deployable atomic bomb, and the individual 
component of its nuclear weapons program pose by itself little threat to the outside world. 
External supply was essential for Tripoli’s nuclear efforts. Without this pivotal support from 
abroad – provided since the mid-1990s by the A.Q. Khan network – the bad production 
would have remained a meaningless torso which posed no significant threat to the outside 
world. Without a capable “best shot manufacture” potent to piece the various loose ends 
of the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear efforts together, it is difficult to believe that Libya would 
have ever been able to cross the “nuclear threshold.” An intrusive eradication of the entire 
nuclear weapons program including the dismantlement of its entire scientific and 
technological infrastructure would, therefore “overshot the mark”. Consequentially, not 
“radical eradication” but “targeted elimination” represents the “optimal problem solution” 
that would best fit to the nature and scope of Libya’s nuclear bad.   
(2) The Substitution Strategy: But even “targeted elimination” would only signify a partial 
resolution of the colliding interest trap. It is relatively obvious that the “targeted 
elimination” would not satisfy Libya’s interest.  
Analyzing the Libyan nuclear program with the help of the public bad approach (ch. 5.2.2.2) 
we came to the conclusion that Tripoli’s WMD effort is best described as an “intermediate 
bad” which was embedded in a broader “fabrication chain”. The nascent nuclear weapons 
program was not an end in itself but rather served the realization of two strategic goals – 
the improvement of the regime’s security and its prestige. “Targeted elimination” would 
have certainly done away with the “negative externalities” but it would have also interrupt 
Libya’s “fabrication chain” and would deprive the Qaddafi regime from an important 
instrument to realize its “final goods” which were – when taken in isolation – by themselves 
unproblematic.  
Under these circumstances a lasting and sustainable negotiation outcome is unlikely. What 
is required is a “substitution strategy” that would fill the gap in the “fabrication chain” 
caused by the elimination of the nuclear bad and would allow an uninterrupted realization 
of the two “final goods”. A suitable replacement for the eliminated nuclear bad has thereby 
to fulfill two criteria:  
First, a well-matching substitution designated to replace the removed “intermediate 
production stage” once implemented by the nuclear bad has to be free of “negative 
externalities”. Anything else would signify “a jump out of the frying pan into the fire”. In 
terms of a satisfying and lasting resolution of the colliding interest trap it makes no sense to 
swap one public bad for another.  
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Second, the provided substitute has to match with the “final goods”. A replacement that is 
not or only partly in line with the nature of the original “fabrication chain” will not meet its 
end. Such a misfitting replacement would not restore the original “fabrication chain”. In 
that sense, the “substitution strategy” is distinct from the provision of ordinary rewards 
which often only provide incentives but which do in many cases not function as “gap filling” 
replacements suitable to the “final good(s)” of a bad doer.  
If these two criteria are met, the “substitution strategy” is contributing to a sustainable 
resolution of the colliding interest trap. The interest of the former bad doer would be 
satisfied since the replacement would restore the original “fabrication chain” allowing the 
realization of the “final goods” without causing any harm to the outside world (Figure 22). 
If, however, no substitution is provided or these two criteria are not or only partly meet, 
the diplomatic resolution of public bads is likely to result in an impasse. In such a case a 
former atomic renegade state would suffer “nuclear phantom pains” in light of its 
interrupted “fabrication chain” and would – in all probability – unilaterally search for a 
suitable replacement which would allow to resume the fabrication of its “final good”(s). The 
atomic renegade’s strive to fill the gap of the eliminated nuclear weapons program could, 
for example, lead to an intensified build-up of conventional armament. But also a 
clandestine restart of the nuclear program is in such a situation within the realm of 
possibility. 
Although it appears a first glance inappropriate – if not even despicable – to provide former 
bad doers with something in return for reverting to their negative and harmful behavior, a 
stable negotiation outcome is only possible if the “substitution strategy” and the “liberation 
strategy” are applied in parallel.  
 (3) The Injustice Trap: Apart from colliding interest traps, negotiation dynamics are often 
burdened by an injustice trap. Even if both sides profit from a negotiation results an unjust 
allocation of gains could still undermine the achieved agreement. If one side is gaining more 
than the other, the willingness to implement the negotiated agreement and to comply with 
its requirements is likely to dwindle. Injustice is assumed to give rise to disappointment, 
frustration, and anger (see ch. 3.1.3.1).  
In order to analyses injustice traps, we have introduced the concept of the Egalitarian 
Optimum (E+) (ch. 3.1.2.3). The Egalitarian Optimum signifies a state where the involved 
negotiating parties are not only gaining but where they are gaining equally. As we have 
already explained above in the “fit taxonomy chapter,” the Egalitarian Optimum is achieved 
if the substitution of the intermediate bad and the elimination of the bad’s “negative 
externalities” yield equal benefits for both sides. In such a situation the former bad doer 
(i.e. in our case Libya) is gaining as much as the former bad sufferer (i.e. in our case the 
United States but also the UK). Both the “liberation” and the “substitution strategy” are 
required to respond not only to the nature of a public bad, but they also have to be applied 
in a “harmonized” way. Although the benefits of these two strategies are often not 
comparable in qualitative terms (due to the fact that they often have a very different 
nature dependent on the involved actors), the profits that they provide have, however, to 
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harmonize with each other in qualitative terms.351 For example, if a bad sufferer is 
completed liberated from all “negative externalities”, this achievement has to be taken into 
consideration in the substitution provided to the bad doer.352  
With regard to the Libyan case, the crucial “fit demand” regarding the injustice trap, 
therefore, requires providing a substitute to the Qaddafi regime that is equivalent to the 
benefits the bad sufferers (the United States and the UK) would receive by the “targeted 
elimination” (Figure 27).  
5.3.3.2 Fit & Misfit during the Pre-Agreement Phase  
The pre-agreement phase was exclusively dominated by diplomatic design element (Figure 
27). During this episode of the Libyan NRN structural factors or non-diplomatic 
interventions played no role – a fact that makes the pre-agreement phase clearly distinct 
from the previous pre-negotiation phases. Consequentially, the Alibi Game was exclusively 
resolved by diplomacy. What is in that regard also noteworthy is that none of the applied 
diplomatic design elements signified a misfit or a negative fit. In particularly, no misplaced 
preference manipulation had been applied – a common mistake of mismatching diplomatic 
interventions of which we have witnessed in the previous pre-negotiation phase on several 
occasions. Certainly, not all diplomatic tools signified a perfect match. Rather, most of the 
design elements – namely “quiet diplomacy”, “London’s mediation efforts”, and the 
“technical visits to Libya’s WMD sites” – were marked by partial fits, underfits or overfits. 
The only factor that was an all-out success was the “interception of the BBC China” in early 
October 2003 and its diplomatic handling by the UK-US team. The seizure of a large 
quantity of uranium enrichment centrifuges on the German-owned vessel in the 
Mediterranean designated for the Qaddafi regime’s fit not only to the resolution of the Alibi 
Game’s distrust trap but also provided a crucial push for Tripoli to embark the path of 
cooperation as a “first mover” (Figure 27). 
Although the diplomatic engagement had already reached a certain level of “maturity” and 
the chance of a final disarmament agreement came in the course of the year 2003 more 
and more into reach, the pre-agreement phase was still primarily dominated by the 
procedural problem dimension. With one exception (technical visits), all applied design 
elements were focused on the resolution of the Alibi Game. The substantial negotiation 
problem – Libya’s nuclear bad – played almost no role. Its resolution was left to the 
following agreement and post-agreement phase.   
 
 
                            
351
 At that point we shall note that in some situations injustice traps might be resolved automatically as a 
by-produce of the balance resolution of the colliding interest trap. Equal distribution is unintentionally 
established by the negotiation parties.  
352
 Note that we are able to arrive at just constellation even in those situations where the colliding interest 
traps are not or only partly resolved. As we described above (ch. 3.1.2), injustice traps and their resolution 
are independent from the colliding interest traps. Equal distribution of losses or of inappropriate gains is 
likewise a suitable approach to overcome injustice traps.  
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Figure 27: The Varieties of (Mis)Fits in the Pre-Agreement Phase 
 
A) Worst Case Provision by Quiet Diplomacy  
“Quiet diplomacy” was already a crucial part of the previous pre-negotiation phase (ch. 
5.3.2.2). As we have outlined above, the high level of concealment contributed to the 
resolution of the Imposed Deadlock Game. When the trilateral talks on Libya’s WMD 
started in spring 2003, it was therefore only logical that this bargaining process was likewise 
held in utmost secrecy. According to our analysis the cloak of secrecy, which was 
maintained until the evening hours of the 19th December 2003 when Libya’s nuclear 
reversal was eventually made public, also had a positive impact on the resolution of the 
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Alibi Game’s distrust trap. However, the relevance of this design element swapped for the 
two sides in comparison to the previous pre-negotiation phase. Having been relatively 
important during the Imposed Deadlock Game, “quiet diplomacy” lost significance for the 
Qaddafi regime and represented in the pre-agreement phase only an underfit. However, 
ater haven been rather irrelevant during the previous pre-negotiation phase, distrust 
reduction gained for the United States considerable importance starting by March 2003 – a 
development that made us rate the implication of this design element for the United States 
as a partial fit (Figure 27).  
There is solid ground to assume that Libya held “quiet diplomacy” in high esteem when the 
negotiation process on WMD entered into the pre-agreement phase. As a dictatorial 
regime, Libya was in general little inclined to transparency. The high level of concealment 
allowed to shield the nascent diplomatic engagement away from the public and the 
international media and avoided potential audience costs. However, there are numerous 
indicators that “quiet diplomacy” lost much of its relevance it had for Libya’s strategic 
decision making during the previous pre-negotiation phase. After having entered the pre-
agreement phase, this design element became insufficient in meeting the high demand the 
Qaddafi regime now had in terms of distrust reduction in light of the dominating Alibi 
Game.  
First, the function of “quiet diplomacy” as a necessary worst-case provision was fading way. 
In the previous pre-negotiation phase, concealment had played for the Qaddafi regime’s 
decision making a considerable role. The high level of secrecy mitigated the negative 
consequences that were stemming from the fact that the United States was throughout the 
1990s rejecting Tripoli’s offers for diplomatic engagement. Now in the pre-agreement 
phase where the United States had eventually taken the decision to engage with Tripoli, the 
function “quiet diplomacy” once had for the Qaddafi regime lost relevance. Moreover, 
being the alibi player Libya was largely immune to the danger of unilateral defection by the 
United States. Bestowed with high strategic flexibility, Libya was in the position to easily 
retaliate and to protect itself against this worst-case scenario by opting for mutual 
defection – a state that would have been for the Qaddafi regime relatively comfortable at 
that time (Figure 27). Second, there is evidence that “quiet diplomacy” was perceived by 
Libya more and more as an indicator for the United States’ lacking will to move towards 
joint cooperation – the outcome which the Qaddafi regime, being the alibi player, desired 
the most. In 2003 Tripoli feared that Washington could simply walk away from the 
diplomatic process, could deny that there had been a diplomatic engagement, and could 
recur instead to military coercion in order force Libya into nuclear disarmament. Therefore, 
the Qaddafi regime showed by late summer 2003 growing unease with the unchanged high 
level of concealment.353 Third, the cloak of secrecy had for the Qaddafi regime – beyond 
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 For example, when Tony Blair made in September 2003 another effort to convince Libya to give up its 
unconventional weapons programs by sending a personal letter to Muammar al-Qaddafi, Tripoli 
demanded that this message was not passed on by a member of the secret service – the only officials 
Libya had meet so far during the numerous rounds of explorative WMD talks. Instead, the Qaddafi regime 
insisted to see someone from the UK’s political level in order to assure that the Western commitment to 
diplomacy was real (Corera 2006: 184-5). It was never revealed who was send by London to convey Tony 
Blair’s message to Muammar al-Qaddafi. But according to the BBC journalist, Gordon Corera, who 
   
269 
 
some atmospheric implications – no substantial impact in terms of distrust reduction at that 
time. The mere fact that one was talking with the United States in a forum which was 
withdrawn from public eyes were by itself not conducive for reducing the suspicion Tripoli 
continued to hold vis-à-vis Washington in 2003.  
While for Libya “quiet diplomacy” lost importance compared to the role it played in the 
previous pre-negotiation phase, the opposite applied to the United States. While in 
generally interested in holding any engagement with the disliked Qaddafi regime firmly 
under the cloak of secrecy, concealment had for the United States prior to spring 2003 no 
operational relevance (see ch. 5.3.2.2). What made George W. Bush eventually give his 
“green light” to the diplomatic encounter was not the practice of “quiet diplomacy” but the 
prospect that the upcoming talks with Libya would be held in secrecy. 
When the diplomatic process entered into the pre-agreement phase, this picture changed. 
Concealment became for Washington an actual diplomatic tool. It transformed from a 
hypothetical to a practical instrument to lower the risk of the worst-case scenario. The high 
level of secrecy was deemed important since in shielded the talks with the Libyans away 
from the media and domestic critique (Interview with R. Joseph, Nov. 2011, Annex 16; see 
also: Litwak 2007: 185; St. John 2002: 190-1). Correspondingly, Tim Dowse, a British 
diplomat who participated in the talks with the Libyans, said that the nascent negotiations 
with the Libyans were “held extremely tight because we had the concern that any sort of 
leak could wreck the whole thing” (Interview with T. Dowse 2012 Annex 16; see also: 
Interview with S. Hadley June 2012, Annex 16).  
However, “quiet diplomacy” was not only important for hiding the engagement with Libya 
from the public. Washington held this design element – in all likelihood – also in high 
esteem because it provided against the danger of Libya turning its back on the diplomatic 
process and returning to the aggressive anti-American foreign policy it had pursued in the 
past. Reportedly, Washington was in summer and fall 2003 still fearful that the Qaddafi 
regime could choose unilateral defection (e.g. Corera 2006: 185; Joseph 2009).354 Very 
similar to the logic that applied to Libya in the early 1990s (ch. 5.3.2.2), “the cloak of 
secrecy” would have in such a case helped Washington to mitigate the negative 
consequences and would have allowed simply to deny the existence of a diplomatic 
engagement with Libya.  
The relevance the Bush junior administration associated to “quiet diplomacy” is reflected 
by the relatively small circle of insiders who were involved in this diplomatic effort. Unlike 
the talks with Libya on the Lockerbie case, which started in spring 1999, both the State 
Department and the Department of Defense were completely excluded from this process. 
Throughout the entire pre-agreement phase the engagement with the Qaddafi regime was 
exclusively run by US intelligence community. Apart from a handful of key figures at the CIA 
                                                                             
investigated this episode of British foreign policy, it was a “sufficiently distinguished figure to show the 
Libyans that this was a serious negotiation” (Corera 2006: 185) 
354
 For example, Robert Joseph recalled that those of the Bush junior administration that were involved in 
this diplomatic encounter were very skeptical about Libya and were assuming that the Qaddafi regime 
would simply “hedge its bets” (Interview with R. Joseph Nov. 2011, Annex 16).  
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and the White House, other members of the Bush junior administration were not even 
informed – not even Secretary of State, Colin Powell, or Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld (e.g. Joseph 2009; Rice 2011; Suskind 2006; Tobey 2014).355  A similar level of 
secrecy was applied in London where apart from some senior MI6 officials, Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw and Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon were the only members of the 
Prime Ministers Cabinet who were let in on the tripartite talks on Libya’s WMD (Evans 
2004).  
However, while the relevance of “quiet diplomacy” has increased for Washington at the 
turn from the pre-negotiation phase to the pre-agreement phase, we would rate the impact 
of this particular design element not higher than a partial fit (Figure 27). While the high 
level of concealment was important to provide against the worst-case scenario of 
unreciprocated cooperation, this design element was nevertheless unlikely to contribute to 
actual distrust reduction.  
B) The UK’s Ongoing Involvement 
Apart from “quiet diplomacy” London’s ongoing involvement was another constant factor 
that remained in place when the nascent negotiation process on Libya’s WMD programs 
entered from the pre-negotiation into the pre-agreement phase. The explorative talks 
which started in spring 2003 had a tripartite nature and the engagement with the Qaddafi 
regime was jointly shouldered by London and Washington. Reportedly, Steven Kappes, who 
steered the talks with the Libyans for the Bush junior administration, was always 
accompanied by British counterpart, the MI6 senior officer Mark Allen. However, the role of 
the “biased mediator” London had played in the previous pre-negotiation phase (ch. 
5.3.2.2) lost relevance by April 2003. While the UK’s efforts to persuade the Qaddafi regime 
to reverse its WMD program remained in the state of an underfit, the positive mediation 
effects the Blair government had on Washington during the resolution of the Imposed 
Deadlock Game vanished – in all probability (Figure 27).  
We found no indication that the Blair government had between April and December 2003 
any meaningful influence on Washington’s stance in the engagement with Libya. Rather, 
the UK and the United States became highly intertwined during this phase. The historical 
evidence suggests that these two actors almost acted as a monolithically player in the talks 
with the Qaddafi regime. For example, Tim Dowse described the British-American 
cooperation during the pre-agreement phase as “very close”. Coordination between the 
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 But the high level of secrecy lead unintendedly also to some negative side-effects. Those members of 
the administration who were not involved – first and foremost John Bolton (Undersecretary of State for 
International Security and Arms Control) – undertook actions which contradicted Washington’s stance 
involving the danger that the U.S. strategy would appear inconsistent. For example, in June 2003 John 
Bolton publically accused Libya for having build-up a bioweapons program – a reproach that was not only 
misplaced with regard to the parallel disarmament negotiations but also overdrawn in light of the 
inexistent Libyan bioweapons (Bolton 2003).  
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two capitals was tight and at “every stage of the diplomatic process” the United States and 
the UK “agreed beyond the next step” (Interview with T. Dowse Feb. 2012, Annex 16).356 
For the sake of political influence and close relations to one of the conflict parties, 
neutrality and impartiality play subordinated roles for “biased mediators”. Therefore, his 
particular type of third party intervention walks “on a thin line”. The danger to transform 
from a mediator into a conflict party is always high. In hindsight, it appears that London had 
cross this line during the pre-agreement phase. The “best explanation” we could reveal 
based on the historical evidence is that the Blair government had not maintained the 
necessary strategic distance required to exceed influence on Washington as a mediator. 
The positive role London had played for the United States’ decision-making in the 
resolution of the Impose Deadlock Game therefore lacked in the pre-agreement phase.357  
But abandoning the role of the “biased mediator” meant in no way that the Blair 
government would have improved its clout on Tripoli’s decision making. In September 2003 
the UK undertook again a mediation effort towards Libya in the form of a personal letter 
Tony Blair wrote to Muammar al-Qaddafi asking for further experts visit to Libya’s 
clandestine WMD sites. While this step was, reportedly, welcomed by the Libyan leader, it 
had – in all likelihood – no meaningful impact beyond atmospheric improvements 
(MacLeod 2006; Corera 2006: 185). In essence, with the exchange of letters, Tony Blair 
reran an approach he had already used in summer 2002 (ch. 5.3.2.2). Since the strategic 
setting had changed considerable and Libya was now engaged in direct talks with the West, 
a simple “replay” of last year’s mediation initiative was unlikely to create new momentum 
in terms of confidence building. The Blair government’s mediation efforts towards the 
Qaddafi regime, therefore, remained below its possibilities – a finding that made us rate 
this diplomatic design element as an underfit (Figure 27).  
C) The Interception of the BBC China & its Diplomatic Handling  
The seizure of the BBC China in early October 2003, as well as the diplomatic handling of 
this intelligence operation, had a decisive impact on the disarmament negotiations. The 
character of the pre-agreement phase was changed by the interception of the German-
owned vessel, which had boarded among its cargo five 40-foot containers with nuclear 
weapons-related equipment dedicated for the Libya’s WMD program. According to Robert 
Joseph, it was only the by seizure of the BBC China that the diplomatic process gained 
momentum after it hand entered by summer 2003 into an impasse (Interview with R. 
Joseph, Nov. 2011, Annex 16).  
                            
356
 A similar description was given by Stephen Hadley, at that time Deputy National Security Advisor. 
Asked about the relationship between the United States and the UK during the negotiation process with 
the Libyans in 2003, Hadley said “it was a joint approach. We shared intelligence and cooperated in the 
operational aspects” (Interview with S. Hadley, June 2012, Annex 16). And according to Robert Joseph, the 
Bush junior administration’s principal negotiator, London and Washington worked “very closely together” 
at that time (Interview with R. Joseph Nov. 2011, Annex 16). 
357
 While not acting as a mediator anymore, the UK slipped into the role of a facilitator. Since the UK’s 
embassy in Tripoli was already reopened in the late 1990s, London provided crucial diplomatic 
infrastructure that facilitated the interaction with the Libyans during the pre-agreement phase (Frantz & 
Collins 2007: 307).   
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Almost all previous studies on Libya’s nuclear disarmament have given considerable 
attention to the BBC China incidence (e.g. Bowen 2006; Frantz & Meyer 2005; Joseph 2009: 
7; Rice 2011: 249; Suskind 2007). The seizure of the clandestine A.Q. Khan delivery to 
Libya’s nuclear weapons program was mainly described as “intelligence leverage” (Bowen 
2006). It was believed that it had put additional pressure on Muammar al-Qaddafi, forced 
him to forego the evasive and fickle strategy Libya had pursued in the three-way talks 
during summer 2003, and stirred him towards a more cooperative stance in WMD 
diplomacy. However, it appears that this view is misleading. With the help of our fit 
taxonomy, we are able to show that past scholars have misinterpreted the function the BBC 
China interception had played for Libya’s nuclear reversal.  
It is beyond question that the seizure of the vessel shocked Tripoli. It showed Muammar al-
Qaddafi and his advisors that Western intelligence was able to track down his clandestine 
proliferation efforts and had the capability to thwart the plan to build a nuclear weapons 
capacity (e.g. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 2005: 252; 
Joseph 2009: 16).358 However, the historical evidence suggests that it was not the seizure of 
the BBC China but rather the diplomatic handling of this event by the US-UK negotiation 
team that causes crucial impact on Tripoli. The way Washington and London dealt with this 
disclosure had – in all probability – an important confidence-building effect on the Qaddafi 
regime. And since this design element signified a crucial factor that helped Libya to escape 
from the distrust trap, we rate it as a fit (Figure 27).   
Immediately after the interception on October 4, Washington and London worried about 
negative consequences for the disarmament negotiations with Libya (MacLeod 2006; Tobey 
2014). According to a senior US official who had been interviewed by Robin Wright under 
anonymity, there was a tangible danger that the seizure would “derail the effort” to 
dismantle Tripoli’s WMD programs (Wright 2004). Already three days after the interception 
on October 7, Steven Kappes and Mark Allen flew to Tripoli and meet with Muammar al-
Qaddafi. Apart from repeating their demand for technical visits to the sites of Libya’s WMD 
program, allaying Tripoli’s concerns which had sharply risen after the seizure was the major 
objective of their conversation. Reportedly, Kappes and Allen made clear that the 
interception of the BBC China would remain under the “cloak of secrecy” and that it was on 
no account the prelude for a public campaign to shame the Qaddafi regime for its illegal 
proliferation efforts (Suskind 2006; Joseph 2009: 7; Tobey 2014).359 Stephen Kappes was 
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 Time Dowse, British Foreign Office, said for example: “We did reveal it [the interception of the BBC 
China] to the Libyans (…) and they did realized how good our information was and this clearly shocked 
them” (Interview with T. Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex 16). John S. Wolf, US Assistant Secretary for Non-
Proliferation, made a similar observation: “The capture of the BBC China helped make clear to Libya that 
we had a lot of information about what it was doing” (Rubin 2014: 143; Frantz & Meyer 2005).  
359 
After Libya’s nuclear reversal rumors emerged that Libya had used the BBC China as a “bargain chip” 
for the disarmament talks (e.g. Crawford 2004). The delivery should have underscored that Libya was 
really determined to build up a nuclear weapons program. Libya had the hopes, the argument goes, to rise 
thereby its stakes in the negotiation process, increase its leverage, and achieve a better position for 
demanding rewards and compensation for its nuclear reversal. According to these rumors, it had been the 
Libyans themselves who gave the tip that lead to the interception of the BBC China (Crawford 2004). This 
argument appears however unlikely in light of Libya’s motivation we have survey in this chapter. 
Moreover, when I asked Tim Dowse about these allegations he said: “No – Certainly not. They certainly 
didn’t try to do that” (Interview with T. Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex 16). In addition, it was reported that Mr. 
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quoted to have said during the meeting with Muammar al-Qaddafi: “You are the drowning 
man and I am the lifeguard” (Frantz & Collins 2007: 310).  
The interception of the BBC China was presumably one of the most successful intelligence 
operations in the entire history of counter-proliferation. The amount of confiscated nuclear 
weapons-related equipment was by all means spectacular (Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States 2005: ch. 6). In 2003 it perfectly fit into the Bush 
administration’s commitment to pursue a more robust and active policy towards the spread 
of WMD (e.g. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002). 
If this successful operation had been hailed in public, it would have underscored the Bush 
junior administration’s firm stance in terms of counter-proliferation – a tempting prospect 
in the light of the crescendo of critique on the U.S. intelligence inglorious performance 
regarding WMD in Iraq. Moreover, the seizure of the BBC China would have perfectly 
matched to the Bush junior administration’s objective to establish a new global non-
proliferation regime (Meier 2008). In May 2003 Washington had launched the so-called 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Aiming to improve the international framework for 
like-minded states to interdict clandestine shipments of WMD and related items by air, land 
and sea, the BBC China incident appears as a textbook example of how the PSI was meant 
to operate. While ten states had joined the PSI at its inauguration, Washington was in fall 
2003 actively lobbying for further support to this initiative. Making the seizure of the BBC 
China public would have considerably bolstered these efforts.  
Given that there were numerous tempting reasons to “go public”, the decision to not 
trumpet this big intelligence success to the media was a tough decision in October 2003. 
The White House staff weighed the pros and cons. After all, the interdiction of the BBC 
China had been authorized directly by George W. Bush and had therefore high priority. 
After some considerations Robert Joseph and Stephen Hadley came, reportedly, to the 
decision to keep the secret in order to not jeopardize the diplomacy engagement with the 
Qaddafi regime. Reportedly, President George W. Bush and his Cabinet approved this 
decision (Tobey 2014).  
We do not know whether Muammar al-Qaddafi and his close entourage were fully aware 
how great the sacrifice was that the Bush junior administration made by keeping the 
seizure of the BBC China secret. What was, however, reported is that Tripoli highly 
appreciated Washington’s accommodative step to maintain strict silence. According to Saif 
al-Islam it was in particular the discreet handling of the BBC incidence that increased 
Muammar al-Qaddafi’s trust in the United States. “We realized” Saif al-Islam said later in 
2004 “that we were dealing with friends and sincere people” (MacLeod 2006; Tobey 2014). 
The handling of the BBC China seizure was the first time that Tripoli could really see that 
Washington was a trustworthy negotiation party. Equipped with a “smoking gun” of Libya’s 
proliferation effort, Washington had in essence all what it needed to launch a public 
shaming campaign against Libya. That Washington was not opting for that choice but was 
instead willing to continue the diplomatic process, proofed Tripoli’s worst case thinking 
                                                                             
Ghanem, the Libyan Primer Minister in 2003, was bursting out in laughter when he was asked whether 
this allegations were true (Fidler, Huband & Khalaf 2004).  
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wrong. It sent a strong confidence-building signal. Tellingly, the immediate outcome of the 
meeting between Kappes, Allen and Muammar al-Qaddafi on 7th October was that Tripoli 
eventually gave “green light” for the technical visits to the clandestine WMD side – a 
demand the US-UK team had put forward since spring 2003 only to be constantly rebuffed 
by Tripoli.  
Thus, there is solid ground to assume that the interdiction of the BBC China and in 
particular its discreet handling by the US-UK team signified a design element that fit to the 
requirement of intensified distrust reduction.360 We assume that the entire negotiation 
process would have taken a different turn, if the Bush junior administration had not 
decided to keep the seizure of the BBC China secret. If this interception had been made 
public, the Qaddafi regime would have – in all probability – walked away from the 
diplomatic engagement and had instead returned to the antagonistic and confrontation 
ridden pattern in had pursued in its policy towards the United States during past decades.  
Consequentially, the suggestion put forward by past scholars that the seizure of the BBC 
China was a coercive tool that forced the Qaddafi regime to advance in the diplomatic 
encounter is very likely to be misleading. Apart from the historic evidence we just cited, this 
argument is at odds with the nature of the procedural negotiation problem Libya and the 
United States faced during the pre-agreement phase.  Being the alibi player Tripoli was – in 
all probability – highly interested in joint cooperation with the United States before the 
seizure of the BBC China. It was instead distrust that prevented the North African country 
to embark a more cooperative pathway (Palkki & Smith 2012: 272; Corera 2006: 185).361 
Moreover, that Libya was running a nuclear weapons program and that the U.S. intelligence 
knew about it, was for all parties involved in the trilateral talks not a secret (Frantz & Meyer 
2005). The interception of the BBC China was a shock for Tripoli but it was – in all 
probability – not a completely unexpected event. The seized delivery of the large amount of 
loaded uranium enrichment centrifuges was an important evidence of Libya’s quest for the 
atomic bomb. However, in strategic terms it was not new information but rather a 
confirmation of what all players already knew of.  
However, while the BBC China interception and its handling had primarily implications for 
the distrust trap, this diplomatic design element did also contribute to the resolution of the 
colliding interest trap. Certainly, it is unlikely that the interception was a preference 
manipulation in favor for cooperation – as suggested by past scholars. But there is ground 
to believe that this incident encouraged the Qaddafi regime to act according its desires. 
Being the alibi player Libya wanted cooperation. The BBC China was the nudge that made 
Tripoli take the first step in that direction (Figure 27).   
                            
360
 It appears that intersections of clandestine shipments played already in the late 1990s a certain role for 
the Qaddafi regime’s inclination. Although public available information of this episode remains murky, it 
was reported that in May 1999 the Great Britain intercepted a delivery of missiles component on their 
way to Libya. Two months later Libya and the UK established diplomatic relations (Rubin 2014: 141).  
361
 It was reported that distrust in Tripoli was still very high during the course of the year 2003. The power 
circle in Tripoli was concerned that a negotiated reversal of its WMD programs would make Libya appear 
weak. In particular in the high times of the second Iraq War, the Qaddafi regime wanted to avoid the 
impression to have backed down to the West in light of Washington’s show of force (MacLeod 2006).  
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Typically for an Alibi Player, Libya’s bargaining strategy was oscillating on cooperation-
confrontation continuum throughout the pre-agreement phase. While the series of 
explorative talks were kicked off by the cooperative offer put forward by Saif al-Islam and 
Moussa Koussa in London in March 2003, Libya showed throughout spring and summer a 
rather confrontational bargaining pattern. Most noteworthy in that regard is the fact that 
Libya started even to deny the existence of a WMD program – a step back in comparison to 
Tripoli’s relative accommodative opening (Rice 2011: 249; Interview with R. Joseph, Nov. 
2011, Annex 16; Interview with T. Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex 16). By October 2003, after the 
seizure of the BBC China, this pattern however changed. Libya not only allowed for 
technical visits to its WMD sites but appeared in general more open and accommodative. 
Tellingly, in an interview given to Bruce St. John Saif al-Islam gave already in October 2003 
the hint that Libya was about to make soon an “important announcement” (St. John 2004: 
397).  
It is likely that this changing pattern is not only attributed to the reduction of distrust but 
also the result of an encouraging nudge Libya got from the seizure from the gentle handling 
of the BBC China incident. Libya was now acting as a “first mover” in terms of joint 
cooperation – a requirement that we have identified as crucial for the resolution of the 
Alibi Game (ch. 5.3.3.1, see also: Figure 27). 
D) Technical Visits to Libya’s WMD Sites  
On 7th October 2003, Libya eventually gave its “green light” to technical visits to the sites of 
its clandestine WMD program – a request the US-UK negotiation team had put forward 
since spring 2003.362 With that step Libya underscored that it was ready to embark the 
pathway of nuclear reversal. In late October (19th - 29th October) and in early December (1st 
- 12th December) a joint team of MI6 and CIA WMD-experts inspected Libya’s secret WMD 
facilities (Fidler, Huband & Khalaf 2004; Bowen 2006: 66; Evans 2004; Miller 2006; Tucker 
2009). The transparency provided to the Western fact-finding mission increased from the 
first to the second visit (Corera 2006: 188-9). While in October 2003 Libya had allowed 
access to the facilities of its chemical weapons and ballistic missiles programs, it unveiled its 
nuclear weapons program only during the December visit.363 Towards the end of the second 
visit, Tripoli put its will for disarmament in concrete terms. Moussa Koussa conveyed to his 
western counterparts that Libya was ready to admit its proliferation efforts, disarm its 
nuclear and chemical weapons program, host inspections by the IAEA and by the OPCW, 
and abide by the MTCR (Joseph 2009: 7-8).  
There is solid ground to assume that these visits, which are best described as a 
measurement of “ex-ante verification,” represent the pivotal confidence building impetus 
                            
362
 The term “inspections” which was originally used by the Western side saw vehemently resistance by 
Tripoli. The representatives of the Qaddafi regime, however, became more relaxed if London and 
Washington started to speak of “visits” instead (Tenet 2007: 292).   
363
 It was, for example, at the second visit in early December 2003 that it became clear that Libya had no 
active biological weapons program – a concern that had haunted Western experts for a long time. The 
Qaddafi regime had only briefly toyed with the idea to set up such a program but had never achieved 
substantial progress in that regards (Tucker 2009: 363).  
   
276 
 
for the United States. This design element matched to the distrust reduction required to 
solve the Alibi Game. As Libya was making credible and sound advance in terms of joint 
cooperation, Washington was able to allay its long-held suspicion vis-à-vis the Qaddafi 
regime.364 But at the same time, it appears that this type of ex-ante verification marked an 
overfit. There is evidence that the technical visits were too intrusive, implied the danger of 
depriving Tripoli of its diplomatic leverage for the future disarmament talks, and had, 
therefore, the potential to jeopardize the solution of the entire Alibi Game. 
Since Libya’s unconventional weapons programs were first and foremost pointed against a 
possible US aggression, Libya would have hardly envisioned that CIA weapons experts and 
their British colleagues from MI6 would be the first “sightseer” of its clandestine WMD 
facilities. That these least likely visitors were now welcomed by Libya, marked a sea change 
that was clearly understood by decision makers the United States. After Libya had 
allergically refused throughout summer 2003 any form of on-sight-inspections to its WMD 
programs, Tripoli’s consent and the ample transparency reportedly affected the strategic 
considerations of the relevant policy makers in Washington. It was a clear signal of a new 
momentum. That Libya revealed aspect about its program that Western intelligence was 
not aware of was in particular trust building. Reflecting the technical visits Tim Dowse 
(British Foreign Office) later said, for example, “(…) it was the fact that they told us 
something that we didn’t know. That gave us the high confidence that this time they are 
ready to deal with us” (Interview with T. Dowse 2012).  The joint US-UK inspector team 
were for example ushered by their Libyan hosts to a “turkey farm” which turned out to be a 
covered site for chemical weapons production (Interview with Tim Dowse 2012; Tobey 
2014). Moreover, it was revealed to the surprised Western experts that Libya’s chemical 
weapons program had not only produced the blister chemical warfare agent “mustard 
sulfur” but also had started to fabricate small amounts of nerve agents (Tucker 2009). And 
a moment that caused a particular surprise was when the Libyans handed over towards the 
end of the second visit blueprints for nuclear warhead design which they had shopped from 
the A.Q. Khan network (Bowen 2006: 66; Frantz & Meyer 2005; Tucker 2009; Miller 2006; 
Evans 2004).365  
                            
364
 In fall 2003 the Bush junior administration had still considerable doubts about Libya’s sincerity. In 
particular that Tripoli displayed an evasive and fickle bargaining strategy and started to deny its WMD 
programs, which it had already admitted at the beginning of the pre-agreement phase, caused concern in 
Washington. The former National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, said for 
example in her memoires: “As we were getting close to agreement, though, the Libyans started to balk 
(…). It looked as if the whole effort was unraveling as Tripoli started to deny the existence of programs to 
which it had already admitted” (Rice 2011: 249). Uncertainty that Libya would in the end not cooperate is 
also reflected in a debriefing Stephen Kappes reportedly gave at the White House in September 2003. He 
said: “the Libyans have multiple reasons for wanting to do a deal now (…) Still – Tripoli’s track record is 
such that they would likely get cold feet before the deal was done” (Tenet 2007: 293). But also 
Washington’s brother-in-arms during the engagement with Libya, the Blair government, had at that time 
considerable concerns. According to the BBC journalist, Gordon Corera, “[t]here was no doubt in the 
minds of the Prime Minister’s closest national security advisers that Gaddafi wanted to rejoin the 
international community but that was not the same as being willing to give up all his weapons” (Corera 
2006: 183).  
365
 In the literature we occasionally encounter the argument that the Bush junior administration pressed 
for early technical visits as a farsighted anticipation of the later involvement of the U.S. Congress. If the 
NRN were about to proceed, it was expected by Washington that Libya would demanded a swift 
suspension of all sanctions the United States had imposed on the North African country. However, such a 
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Asked about the decisive turning point in the US expectation vis-à-vis the Qaddafi regime 
during the WMD reversal diplomacy Robert Joseph said for example “It didn’t really change 
for me until the second visit (…) that was when I said to myself: I think they probably made 
a strategic decision to give up their WMD” (Interview with R. Joseph 2011). Later Robert 
Joseph’s boss, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, described the technical visits 
and its consequences in similar ways: “At first, we didn’t put much faith in the overture, but 
we ultimately decided to send a joint CIA/MI5 team to assess the situation. It returned with 
a positive report: Qaddafi was serious” (Rice 2011: 249).366  
The technical visits had clearly a positive impact on Washington’s distrust reduction. 
However, we assume that this diplomatic design element represented – in all probability – 
an overfit. As an instrument of confidence building, it appeared overdosed and too intrusive 
implying the danger of provoking unintended negative side effects. After all, Libya was 
exposing the lifelines of its WMD program – a step that was close to unilateral 
disarmament.367 Libya revealed almost all of its nuclear weapons programs before the 
negotiation process was completed. Thereby, the Qaddafi was giving away much of its 
diplomatic leverage it could make use of during the final agreement phase. According to 
Frantz and Collins, who wrote an investigative study on the A.Q. Khan network which also 
addressed in length the Libyan nuclear weapons program, the technical visits provided 
London and Washington with “enough information to bomb the programs out of existence 
if need be” (Frantz & Collins 2007: 311). Thus, the technical visits were close to leaving the 
realm of diplomacy and almost represented non-diplomatic intervention. 
Although it never played out and Libya continued its willingness for cooperation throughout 
fall 2003, the far-reaching “ex-ante verification” implied the danger of re-establishing 
Libya’s distrust. Being the alibi player, Libya was at that time sensitive to any signs of US 
                                                                             
step would have required a positive vote by the U.S. Congress which was expected to be more inclined to 
comply with this request if the White House would have been able to provide inventory about the scope 
of the Libyan WMD program (Fidler, Huband & Khalaf 2004; MacLeod 2006; Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 
68). While this argument seems plausible we have not found additional evidence for this consideration.  
366
 This view was also echoed by Paula DeSutter (Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and 
Compliance) at a Hearing before the U.S. Senate in February 2004. According to DeSutter it had been 
these expert visits that laid the ground work for the later successful disarmament of Libya’s WMD 
programs (U.S. Congress (2004)).  
367
 A moment were the over-scaled nature of the technical visits became in particular obvious was in 
meeting held between Stephen Kappes, Mark Allen and Moussa Koussa in London in November 2003. Not 
fully content with the first expert visit where Libya has not fully unveiled its nuclear weapons program, 
Allen and Kappes were demanding for more information and were applying an “intelligence leverage”. A 
compact disc was handed over to Moussa Koussa containing the record of an intercepted phone call 
Maqtoub Maqtoub, the head of the Libyan nuclear weapons program, had made on 28th February 2002 
with Abdul Kadir Khan, the operation leader of A.Q. Khan network. Reportedly, the eavesdropped 
conversation revolved around technical details of Libya’s nuclear weapons program (Miller 2006; Tenet 
2007: 296; Jospeh 2009: 56; Corera 2006: 190).  Certainly, the Libyans became at the following visit in 
early December more open. In light of the trust building impact of the BBC China incidence, it is however 
questionably whether the applied “intelligence leverage” was really conducive in that regards or whether 
it contributed to the over-scaling of the “ex-ante verification”. By November 2003 Libya had already 
demonstrated its willingness to cooperate and had shown openness in the technical visits that was 
remarkably in the light of the traditional hostility of the American-Libyan relationship – given that the 
diplomatic process was still in the pre-agreement phase were Libya could have not been certain that the 
United States was in the end really willing to negotiated a final disarmament deal. Moreover, after the 
spectaculars seizure of the BBC China which revealed thousands components of uranium enrichment 
centrifuges, it is questionable whether an intercepted phone conversation could have at all exceed any 
additional pressure on the Qaddafi regime.  
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dishonesty. The intrusive inspections by the American and British WMD experts could have 
been easily interpreted in that light. The danger of a “zero-sum trust building” – increasing 
the U.S. confidence while decreasing Libya’s trust – was high.  
Certainly, it is difficult to say how much distrust reduction is sufficient to allow the non-alibi 
player (i.e. the United States) agree to joint cooperation. But it is likely that Washington 
would have been able to move to the next step of direct negotiations on a final 
disarmament agreement also with the less intrusive on-site inspection.  
But the technical visits to Libya’s clandestine WMD sites had not only an impact in terms of 
the procedural negotiation problem. Rather, this diplomatic design element also affected 
the substantial negotiation problem and marked an additional step to dismantle Libya’s 
nuclear bad (Figure ). The CIA and the MI6 began to investigate the Libyan nuclear weapons 
program starting by the early 2000s –  in many respects a side product of the effort to track 
down the A.Q. Khan network (Frantz & Collins 2007: 305; Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities 2005). By 2003 London and Washington were however still uncertain about the 
actual scope of the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapons program. From that point of view, 
technical visits were regarded as an essential tool to gain further intelligence. When Tripoli 
eventually agreed the allow these visits the MI6 and CIA intelligence officers involved in the 
on-site inspections were eager to disclose as much of the Libyan weapon program and push 
as much as possible for the additional information.  
Stocktaking is not the same like dismantling. But the inventory the UK and the US made of 
Libya’s nuclear program during the two visits were the necessary precondition for the later 
efforts that lead to the elimination of the “negative externalities” of Libya’s nuclear bad. In 
that sense, we evaluate the technical visits as a design element that had at least partial fit 
for this particular “fit demand”.  
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5.3.4 Agreement: Nuclear Bad & Continued Alibi Game  
In early December 2003, the diplomatic process eventually entered into the agreement 
phase. In a relatively short period of time, Libya and the United States, supported by the 
UK, negotiated a disarmament accord that was announced in the evening hours of the 19th 
December 2003. Most of the work was done in a single meeting, which took place on 16th 
December in London. Taking less than three weeks, the agreement phase was the shortest 
episode of the entire diplomatic process on Libya’s nuclear reversal. However, its swiftness 
shall not blur the fact that the agreement phase was still relatively “bumpy”. The 
negotiating parties had to overcome several obstacles that all had the potential to wreck 
the diplomatic process. And the negotiation outcome – the disarmament accord that 
initiated Libya’s nuclear reversal – was in the end marked by a series of shortcomings. In 
particular, the negotiated agreement announced on the 19th December did not address all 
aspects of the substantial negotiation problem (i.e. Libya’s nuclear bad). Thus, when the 
agreement phase came to an end in late December 2003, the U.S.–Libyan bargaining 
process was haunted by challenges that needed to be addressed in the following post-
agreement phase.  
5.3.4.1 Procedural & Substantial Negotiation Problems  
The diplomatic task the players faced was changing when the negotiation process entered 
in early December 2003 from the pre–agreement phase into the agreement phase. They 
were not anymore confronted with the question whether or not to start direct negotiations 
on a final disarmament accord. Instead, they had to weigh the decision whether they were 
willing to give their consent to a final disarmament agreement. To agree or not to agree 
was the crucial question (Figure 22).   
Figure 22: Alibi Game during the Agreement Phase 
 
 
But while the diplomatic task was changing, the nature of the 2x2 dilemma game that 
underlay this strategy constellation remained stable. Similar to the pre–agreement phase, 
the United States and Libya were confronted with an Alibi Game. Like in the previous 
episode, the procedural negotiation problem the two sides were facing was determined by 
this particular game constellation. Consequentially, the relation between the two parties – 
the US–UK team on one side and the Qaddafi regime on the other – remained relatively 
tense. Despite all the preparatory work that had been executed in the pre–agreement 
phase, Tripoli and Washington still faced the very same procedural negotiation challenge. 
Despite nine months of direct talks and two on-site inspections at Libya’s WMD facilities, 
distrust still prevailed and the interest between the players were still ridden with conflicts. 
agree to the disarmament accord  [C] not agree [D]
agree to the disarmament accord  [C] 4,3 P+ 1,4
not agree [D] 2,1 3,2 M,N
USA
Libya
US preference hierarchy:              DC > CC > DD > CD    
C =  Cooperation  D = Defection  M = MaxiMin Solution  N = Nash Equilibirum  P+ = Qualified Pareto Optimum 
Libya's preference hierarchy:        CC > DD > DC > CD 
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In that sense, the agreement phase was the only episode in the negotiation process on 
Libya’s nuclear reversal where the trend of a constant improvement of the procedural 
negotiation problems, which we observed in the diplomatic phases since the late 1980s 
thus far, was interrupted. The strategic constellation had not become more benign in 
comparison to the previous phase.  
Figure 28: Varieties of (Mis)Fit during Agreement Phase 
 
 
However, not only the procedural problem, but also the substantial problem constellation 
(i.e. Libya’s nuclear bad) remained by and large unchanged. Since the negotiating parties 
had in the previous diplomatic episodes only addressed certain parts of Libya’s nuclear bad, 
the actual resolution of the substantial negotiation problem was still pending. Since the 
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diplomatic handling of Libya’s WMD programs was squeezed into the agreement phase into 
a period of less than three weeks, it is in hindsight little astonishing that the outcome 
remained unsatisfactory in the end.  
5.3.4.2 Fit & Misfit during the Agreement Phase  
Libya’s nuclear bad had played only a subordinated role during the previous phases of the 
U.S.–Libya bargaining dynamic. In the agreement phase, however, this challenge became a 
major focus of the NRN process. The attempt to agree upon a disarmament accord that 
would bring an end to Libya’s nuclear bad, absorbed most of the diplomatic activities in 
December 2003. At first glance, the result of these efforts – the disarmament accord of 19th 
December – appears like an outstanding success. It initiated Libya’s nuclear reversal, 
significantly curtailed Tripoli’s strategic missiles capability, and established an intrusive 
verification regime. But as soon as we apply the public bad approach, we reveal that the 
outcome of the agreement phase was less promising. Rather, Libya’s nuclear bad was only 
partly resolved. The disarmament accord was biased in favor of the United States. By 
agreeing to reverse its nuclear weapons program, the Qaddafi regime lost an important 
power tool without receiving tangible compensation in return.  
In essence, the biased nature of the disarmament accord is primarily explained by the fact 
that the negotiating parties tried to resolve the substantial negotiation problem before they 
had settled all procedural negotiation problems. The talks that eventually led to the 
agreement took place in a daylong session on 16th December 2003. At that time, the Alibi 
Game was still “under full steam”. The colliding interest and distrust trap of this game 
constellation were still unbridled when the tripartite talks on the final disarmament accord 
started. Efforts to resolve this problematic constellation – such as the UK’s mediation effort 
– took place after the key features of the disarmament accord were already negotiated. 
Thus, many of the diplomatic design elements applied during the agreement phase simply 
too late to have a meaningful impact for the resolution of the substantial negotiation 
problem.   
A) The Capture of Saddam Hussein  
On 14th December 2003, two days before the US–UK team met with Moussa Koussa and 
those accompanying him in London to negotiate the final disarmament accord, US special 
forces pulled the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein out of a spider hole on a farm near 
the city of Tikrit. Later, members of the Bush junior administration claimed that Saddam 
Hussein’s capture had a decisive impact on Muammar al-Qaddafi. It was said that this 
operation, which received intensive media coverage around the world, was the final 
impetus for the Libyan leader’s decision to give in to nuclear disarmament. Vice President 
Dick Cheney made, for example, the argument that Muammar al-Qaddafi “watched what 
we did in Afghanistan and Iraq (...) Five days after we arrested Saddam Hussein, Colonel 
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Qaddafi went public and said, I give up, come and get it, it’s all yours” (Office of the Vice 
President 2004). 368  
However, the historic evidence suggests that the capture of Saddam Hussein was not 
helpful for the resolution of the Alibi Game. On the contrary, it rather signified a structural 
factor that hampered the negotiation process as it inflamed Tripoli’s worst case thinking 
and strengthened the distrust trap. Anti–US feelings were reportedly reemerging among 
the members of the Qaddafi regime in 2003 due to the US lead Iraq intervention (MacLeod 
2006; Miller 2006; Tucker 2009: 365). The humiliating capture of Saddam Hussein added to 
this general trend. Reportedly, Muammar al-Qaddafi had even toyed with the idea to 
postpone the diplomacy engagement after the capture of the former Iraqi dictator became 
public (MacLeod 2006). Correspondingly, the Qaddafi regime later denied the narrative of 
the Bush junior administration that the Iraq War in general and the capture of Saddam 
Hussein in particular were important drivers for Libya’s nuclear reversal (Jentleson & 
Whytok 2005).369 Moreover, being the alibi player during the agreement phase, Libya’s 
choice for cooperation would have not required additional coercion. Joint cooperation was 
Tripoli’s most desired outcome anywy. There was no need for any additional preference 
manipulation (Figure 28).   
To some extent, the negative impact of Saddam Hussein’s capture was mitigated by the fact 
that this incident was not actively brought-up by the US–UK team during the final round of 
talks with the Libyan on 16th December 2003. Robert Joseph, the head of the US delegation 
in this meeting, denied that the Western side had made any hints that Libya would face a 
similar fate like Iraq if it would not agree to nuclear disarmament (Interview with R. Joseph, 
Nov. 2011, Annex 16).370 However, since the seizure of Saddam Hussein was to some extent 
shielded away from the actual negotiation process, we still have to rate this factor as a 
negative fit (Figure 28).  
B) An Unfinished Agreement  
The disarmament accord that the US–UK team negotiated with the representatives of the 
Qaddafi regime remained unfinished. It did not fulfill all the requirements that were 
necessary for a lasting resolution of the substantial negotiation problem. When the 
agreement phase came to an end in late December 2003, Libya’s nuclear bad remained only 
partly resolved. The dismantlement of Libya’s nuclear weapons program was relatively 
intrusive. The accord codified a deep cutting disarmament process. Libya did not, however, 
receive any meaningful concession in return. The disarmament agreement entailed no 
tangible substitution that could have replaced the function Libya’s nuclear bad had for the 
                            
368
 Interestingly, George W. Bush was more cautions in his assessment. In his memoir the former US 
President wrote „the liberation of Iraq had an impact beyond its borders. Six days after Saddam’s capture, 
Colonel Muammar Qaddafi (…) publicly confessed that he had been developing chemical and nuclear 
weapons (…) It’s possible the timing was a coincidence. But I don’t think so” (emphasis by the author) 
(Bush 2010: 268). 
369
 For example, Mohammed Bukhres, a Libyan-American with close ties to the Qaddafi family said in 
2004: “We tried for a long time to get relations with the United States. Don’t let anyone tell you it’s 
because of the invasion of Iraq” (Slavin 2004).  
370
 Asked whether any threats have played a role during these talk, Robert Joseph said: “No absolutely 
not. I didn’t threat anybody” (Interview with R. Joseph, Nov. 2011, Annex 16).  
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Qaddafi regime’s “fabrication chain”. Rather, with the complete dismantlement of the 
Libyan WMD programs, the fabrication of the “final goods” Tripoli desired to achieve – 
regime security and prestige – remained distorted. The agreement made the United States 
better off. Libya instead remained trapped in a state of a biased distribution of gains and 
losses.  
(i) Exaggerated Elimination  
Nuclear bads impose “negative externalities” to the outside world. As we have explained 
above, the United States and the UK were the major bad sufferers of Libya’s nuclear 
ambitions. London and Washington were not only entangled in a decade long confrontation 
with the Qaddafi regime, but were also the only two players in the early 2000s who were 
aware of Libya’s accelerated nuclear build up. At that time, new intelligence evidence made 
the United States and the UK very sensitive to Tripoli’s nuclear efforts. To escape from the 
“negative externalities” of Libya’s nuclear bad, the elimination of the nuclear weapons 
program was the only possible choice.  
Above, we have explained that Libya’s nuclear bad had at its very core a “private good”, 
which was exclusively reserved for the powerful elite of the Qaddafi regime. When the 
internal structure of a human-made “public bad” has the internal structure of a “club”, a 
“common pool” or a “network good”, policy makers could apply other resolution strategy 
than elimination (such as externalization or internalization, see Table 5). In the case of 
“private public bads”, however, elimination is the only possible option.  
Against that background, the disarmament agreement appears at first sight as a perfect 
match. Libya agreed to dismantle its nuclear and its chemical weapons programs and gave 
consent to an international inspection regime which would control its former WMD sites. 
However, Tripoli agreed in addition to two requests of the United States that were at that 
time unprecedented in the history of WMD disarmament:  (1) the removal of all sensitive 
equipment and materials to the United States and (2) a deep cutting limitation on Libya’s 
arsenal of strategic missiles. With that, the disarmament accord was relatively strict and 
intrusive and – in all probability – “overshot the mark”.  
In 2013, ten years after Libya’s nuclear reversal, the removal of WMD technology and 
material was an important element of the international effort to eliminate Syria’s chemical 
weapons stockpiles in the midst of a severe civil war. However, in December 2003, such 
procedure was a novelty in the history of WMD disarmament. Even the UNSCOM Mission 
to Iraq, which destroyed Saddam Hussein’s unconventional weapons program in the 1990s 
based on an sweeping UNSC mandate, had executed the dismantlement process within the 
country. That Libya agreed to deep-cutting restrictions of its strategic missiles arsenal (max. 
range 300 km, max. payload 500 kg) was the second historic novelty. This request was not 
supported by international law. There is no disarmament or non-proliferation treaty that 
would outlaw the development, stockpiling, and use of strategic missiles. The technical 
parameters put forward to limit Libya’s strategic arsenal stem from the MTCR which restrict 
only the export but not the possession of ballistic missiles. 
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From the US point of view, these far-reaching demands were perfectly understandable. In 
mid-December 2003 the talks on the disarmament accord took place at a time where the 
procedural negotiation problem was anything but resolved. The Alibi Game continued to 
dominate Tripoli’s and Washington’s strategic pattern and the logic of this game 
constellation were leaving its marks on the content of the agreement. Consequentially, 
distrust towards Libya was still high on the Western side and an intrusive disarmament 
accord was perceived as a well matching precaution measures if the Qaddafi regime would 
try to backpedal its nuclear reversal (e.g. Corera 2006: 191; Frantz & Meyer 2005; Frantz & 
Collins 2007: 312). But aiming for a comprehensive and strict disarmament accord the 
United States was – in all likelihood – demanding too much. According to our analysis, the 
far-reaching disarmament agreement signified with regard to the required “targeted 
elimination” an overfit (Figure 28).  
Libya’s nuclear weapons program was a public bad in the making. In late 2003, Tripoli was 
still years away from a functioning nuclear weapons program – let alone a deployable 
nuclear weapon. Applying the public bad approach, we came to the conclusion that Libya’s 
nuclear build up was following the best shot logic. It was a program that was completely 
dependent on external support. Without foreign supply of technology, know how, and 
material delivered by the A.Q. Khan network, Libya’s nuclear weapons program was 
unlikely to operate. Its individual components posed by themselves only a faint security 
risk. As the A.Q. Khan network was about to be disclosed in late 2003, Tripoli would have 
had little chance to resume its nuclear ambitions. 
In all probability, the requirement of “targeted elimination” would have been fulfilled with 
a less intrusive approach. Removing only the most sensitive parts of Libya’s nuclear 
weapons program would have been sufficient. In such a case, the “best shot aggregation” 
that the Qaddafi regime applied would have been thwarted. The Qaddafi regime would 
have been unable to restart its program for the foreseeable future.  
Certainly, the far-reaching disarmament deal meant no immediate harm to the negotiation 
process. However, it signified an inefficient investment of resources that could have been 
saved if the elimination strategy had been tailored more closely to the nature and scope of 
Libya’s nuclear bad. After all, the swift removal of all sensitive WMD related materials and 
technology, which started in early 2004, was relatively costly. Already, by February 2004 
the United States had invested more than $2.5 million dollars for this task (U.S. Congress 
2004).  
(ii) No Suitable Substitution 
The disarmament agreement was not only “half-baked” because of the too intrusive 
requirements. It also failed to provide the Qaddafi regime with a suitable substitution. As 
we have explained above, it is only possible to achieve sustainable and lasting resolutions 
of substantial negotiation problems if former bad doers are able to resume their 
“fabrication chains”. In order to assure an uninterrupted production of “final goods”, it is 
compulsory to fill the gaps caused by the elimination of public bads.   
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Although the nascent Libya nuclear weapons program was in late 2003 still a public bad in 
the making, the power elite in Tripoli deemed it nevertheless a valuable tool to enhance its 
security and, to a lesser extent, its prestige. With the disarmament agreement of December 
2003, Libya lost an important instrument to realize these “final goods”. In order to assure 
lasting compliance with the agreement, Tripoli was in need of a suitable replacement. 
However, the negotiated disarmament accord contained no tangible substitution that 
would have made a noticeable contribution to the Qaddafi regime’s security or prestige. 
Apart from rather loose and undefined promises about the future rapprochement, no solid 
replacement for the eliminated nuclear bad was provided. With regard to this particular “fit 
demand”, the Libyan disarmament agreement signified a misfit. The omission of a 
“substitution strategy” was not helpful for the resolution of the substantial negotiation 
problem (Figure 28).   
Already during the trilateral talks in spring and summer 2003, Moussa Koussa and his team 
had demanded some form of concession for Libya’s nuclear reversal. Referring to the “final 
goods” of its nuclear weapons program, Tripoli was primarily requesting a concession that 
would ensure regime security. Apart from a complete lifting of the unilateral sanctions, 
Moussa Koussa and his entourage asked primarily for US security guarantees and military 
assistance. When the diplomatic engagement entered into the agreement phase in 
December, Libya started to reiterate these requests more vigorously (e.g. Fidler, Huband & 
Khalaf 2004; Braut-Hegghammer 2008: 68; Palkki & Smith 2012: 275). But apart from the 
security related demands, Libya also asked at that time for considerations that were 
speaking the language of prestige and respect. Tripoli tried not only to tie its nuclear 
reversal to an immediate restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States but also 
made attempts to force the promise that Muammar al-Qaddafi would be invited to an 
official visit to London as a follow-up to the announcement of Libya’s nuclear reversal 
(Interview with T. Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex 16; MacLeod 2006). 
However, all Libyan requests were rejected by the Western side – an act that made the 
intrusive and far-reaching dismantlement of Tripoli’s WMD program appear even more 
biased. Even though the Bush junior administration was pressing for an intrusive and deep 
cutting disarmament agreement, it was not ready to provide concession. Instead, 
Washington followed a no-bargain strategy and was shrinking back from giving in to any of 
Tripoli’s concessions.371 The inner circle of the Bush junior administration was eager to 
avoid the impression that the disarmament accord looked too much like a “deal”. In all 
probability, there was the fear that yielding to Libya’s requests could be interpreted as an 
inconsistency with the tough approach the United States was pursuing toward rogue states 
at that time (Corera 2006: 192; Joseph 2009: 94; Tobey 2014; Interview with Joseph 
2011).372 
                            
371
 Later Robert Joseph, the head of the U.S. delegation during the agreement phase, said:  “at the 
[negotiation] table I gave them nothing. I certainly made the argument that this [nuclear reversal] would 
be in the interest of Libya (…) But I wasn’t there to negotiate some half-baked, consensus, compromise 
document” (Interview with R. Joseph, Nov. 2011, Annex 16).  
372
 After Libya’s nuclear reversal was announced in late December 2003, numerous members of the 
Qaddafi regime tried to depict the disarmament accord as the outcome of a give-and-take negotiation 
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Thus, there was no room for substitution. All that Tripoli received in return was the rather 
vague promise that the American–Libyan relationship would improve in the future. 
Tellingly, in their public statements on December 19 neither George W. Bush nor Tony Blair 
mentioned any concrete concession – such as the lifting of sanctions or the resumption of 
diplomatic ties. Both Western leaders remained relatively evasive in that regard. For 
example, President Bush said in his statement: “Libya can regain a secure and respected 
place among the nations, and over time, achieve far better relations with the United States 
(…) As Libya becomes a more peaceful nation, it can be a source of stability in Africa and the 
Middle East” (Bush 19 Dec. 2003).373  
(iii) Prevailing Injustice Trap 
The international applause Libya received after having publically announced its decision for 
nuclear reversal could not obscure the fact that the Qaddafi regime faced an injustice trap 
at the end of the agreement phase. The disarmament agreement was obviously biased. The 
accord made the United States better off.  
The requirement for distributive justice we have introduced based on the public bad 
approach was not met. The Qaddafi regime was certainly not receiving a substitution 
equivalent to the benefits the United States and the UK gained by the elimination of Libya’s 
nuclear bad (ch. 3.1.3.1). Consequentially, we have to rate the disarmament accord with 
regard to this requirement as a misfit (Figure 28).  
That the agreement was biased in favor of the United States was a fact that neo-
conservative members of the Bush junior administration in particular liked to emphasize. 
For example, after the deal had been wrapped up, John Bolton (Under Secretary of State 
for Arms Control and International Security Affairs) proudly portrayed the agreement at 
various occasions as a the outcome “no freeze negotiation” (Bolton 2004).374 And in 
September 2004, Paula DeSutter (Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, 
and Implementation) delivered a similar statement when she said that “Libya's 
commitment was not made with preconditions. There was no freeze proposal” (U.S. 
Congress 2004b).  
                                                                             
process. For example, Muhammed al-Zitani (Secretary of the Libyan General People’s Congress), claimed 
that during the negotiation process the “United States has promised to defend Libya against any foreign 
aggression”. A similar assertion was made by Saif al-Islam: “This is not a secret. It is a political deal; give 
and take. We give you this much and you give me this much” (Joseph 2009: 94-95). However, these claims 
were – in all probability – attempts to disguise the biased nature of the negotiation process and its 
outcome. Consequentially, members of the Bush junior administration had contradicted to these 
statements – in particular since they were uttered only those members of the Qaddafi regime who had 
personally played no role in the tripartite talks during the agreement phase. Robert Joseph said, for 
example: “Such assertions, although often cited by others without direct knowledge of the secret 
discussion, simply were incorrect” (Joseph 2009: 94).  
373
 Prime Minister Tony Blair was similar evasive as he said: “I have spoken to Colonel Gaddafi to say that, 
as the process of dismantlement goes forward, I now look forward to developing a productive relationship 
with him and with Libya” (Blair 19 Dec. 2003).  
374
 In the early 2000s the diplomatic engagement on Iran’s nuclear program had gained momentum. The 
option to “freeze” Teheran’s nuclear efforts was at that time widely discussed in Washington.  
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C) Safeguarding the Agreement by the Leader’s Blessing  
Although the disarmament deal was very much in favor of the United States and the Bush 
junior administration, Washington had likewise concerns by late December 2003. The fear 
was that Libya would get cold feet in the end and would walk away from the agreement in 
the “eleventh hour”. According to an anonymous British official who was involved in these 
talks, the West was at that time still “worrying that it was all going to get called off” (Frantz 
& Meyer 2005). And another Western participant said: “We lacked confidence that the 
Libyans would really go ahead with this [the agreement]. Gaddaffi [sic] was the kind of 
mercurial character you could never be sure was going to do it” (Corera 2006: 191). 
Consequentially, the United States was on the search for a mechanism that would provide 
against this worst case scenario. The request of a personal commitment by Muammar al-
Qaddafi that would attach the Libyan dictator to the agreement was, against that 
background, a crucial design element that fit to the nature of the Alibi Game and helped 
allay Washington’s distrust (Figure 28).  
After the diplomatic engagement with the Qaddafi regime was strictly pursued under the 
cloak of secrecy, Washington was ready to allow a high level of transparency. The public 
eye was now thought as a safeguarding mechanism. According to Tim Dowse, a public 
statement by the Libyan leader was crucial for the Western negotiators because then the 
“personal prestige and credibility of the Muammar was attached to the agreement”. That 
would assure that agreement would “stay in the Libyan system” and would not be easily 
repudiated (Interview with T. Dowse, Feb. 2012, Annex). 
The request for the leader’s blessing turned out to be one of the most challenging and time 
consuming aspects in the trilateral negotiations. The US–UK team insisted on the request 
that Muammar al-Qaddafi himself should read the text of the disarmament statement.375 
However, Moussa Koussa and his team were reluctant to agree to the Western demand, 
which they described as an embarrassing step for the Libyan leader (Corera 2006: 192; 
Frantz & Collins 2007: 311; Tobey 2014).376 In the end, a face saving compromise was found. 
The Libyan foreign minister would read the agreed statement on Libya’s state TV followed 
by a brief public blessing of Muammar al-Qaddafi (Joseph 2009: 59-60, 63). 
D) The UK Returned to its Role as “Biased Mediator” 
The disarmament accord was biased and put Libya into a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis 
the United States. Confidence building and successful distrust reduction is a crucial 
explanation why the Qaddafi regime agreed nevertheless to the disarmament accord. That 
                            
375
 That request was directly approved by President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair (Joseph 2009: 63; 
Tobey 2014; Fidler, Hubad & Roula 2004; Corera 2006: 191).  
376
 What in addition aggravated the negotiation situation, were the uncalculated consequences that were 
bound to a public disarmament announcement. As the negotiation process was held extremely close and 
had been conducted in utmost secrecy, neither the national audiences nor the lower ranks of the 
bureaucratic hiearchy had been prepared for the deal. In particular for the Libyan population, which had 
been indoctrinated that the United States is the neo-colonialist enemy, the decision to reverse its nuclear 
weapons and search a rapprochement with the West must have appeared as a sharp U-turn (Frantz & 
Collins 2007: 312).  
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the UK returned during the agreement phase to its role as mediator was, in that particular 
constellation, supportive and helped to ease the resolution of the Alibi Game. Therefore, 
we have evaluated this design element as a fit (Figure 28).  
As we have outlined above (5.3.3.1), in Alibi Games one player (i.e. the alibi player; in our 
case Libya) is in need of intensified distrust reduction. As soon as doubts about the other 
side’s sincerity are emerging, this actor is tempted to choose defection and remain in the 
situation of mutual defection (DD) since this outcome coincides within Alibi Games with the 
Maximin Solution (M). While in general inclined in favor of joint cooperation (CC), it is 
distrust that holds the alibi player back from embarking on a cooperative pathway. 
Considerable confidence building efforts are required to change this situation. It appears 
that this task was accomplished in the agreement phase by an intervention of the British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair. While the UK had during most parts of the pre-agreement phase 
ceased to play the role of an active mediator (ch. 5.3.3.2), it retrieved this function in 
December 2003.  
After the US–UK team had negotiated the disarmament accord with the representatives 
from Tripoli on December 16th, the crucial obstacle was to gain Muammar al-Qaddafi’s 
consent. The Libyan leader hesitated to give the “green light”. In particular in light of the 
biased nature of the agreement, the Western side was well aware that this would not be an 
easy task.377 However, Moussa Koussa and his team reportedly had doubts too. When they 
were getting ready to depart in the evening hours of 16th December after a day-long talk 
with the US–UK team, they were not confident that the negotiation outcome would be 
approved by Muammar al-Qaddafi (Tobey 2014). Qaddafi was not only discontent with the 
working of the negotiated reversal statement and disliked the idea that he himself should 
make the announcement, the Libyan leader had also two more fundamental concerns. 
Qaddafi wanted to avoid the impression that Tripoli had bent down to Western pressure. In 
the light of the recent capture of Saddam Hussein, the Libyan dictator appeared particularly 
alert to the fact that the audience in the Arab world would draw this conclusion too easily. 
In addition, Muammar al-Qaddafi was still haunted by the fear that the United States could 
use Libya’s public acknowledgement of WMD possession as a pretext to attack Libya and 
even launch a military intervention against the country.378  
It was in that difficult situation that Tony Blair reached out to Muammar al-Qaddafi and 
thereby managed to allay his concerns. The British Prime Minister reassured the Libyan 
leader that as long as Tripoli would clearly express its decision to abandon all its 
unconventional weapons programs, Washington and London would immediately react with 
welcoming statements (Beaumont, Ahmed & Bright 2003; Corera 2006: 193; Joseph 2009: 
63; Tobey 2014; Ahmed & Bright 2003).  
                            
377
 For example, Robert Joseph said: “I tell you I wouldn’t have wanted to be the Libyan guy going to 
Gaddafi” (Interview with R. Joseph, Nov. 2011, Annex 16).  
378
 According the recollection of Robert Joseph the Libyans “were concerned if they did give it up [the 
nuclear weapons program] they would be next on the target list. Because if they acknowledge having this 
nuclear weapons program publically, that would be an invitation to an American strike” (Interview with R. 
Joseph, Nov. 2011, Annex 16).  
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It is hard to believe that this high profile mediation initiative had no impact on Muammar 
al-Qaddafi’s decision making. The phone call between Tripoli and London in December 2003 
was in every sense historic. It was Qaddafi’s first direct conversation with a British Prime 
Minister since the early 1980s. Moreover, the direct intervention by Tony Blair was 
probably well adjusted to Qaddafi’s mindset, since the Libyan dictator perceived foreign 
policy and international affairs in many respects as an expression of personal ties and 
individual relations. Tellingly, after Libya’s nuclear reversal was announced in December 
2003, several members of the Qaddafi regime – including Saif al-Islam, Prime Minister 
Shukri Ghanim, and Muammar al-Qaddafi himself – gave high credit to the UK’s vital role in 
the WMD talks (Bowen 2006: 59; St. John 2004: 398).   
E) Diplomatic Velocity  
The agreement phase is in particular outstanding because it was so astonishingly short. In 
the previous pre-agreement phase where the same negotiating parties were likewise 
confronted with an Alibi Game, it took altogether nine months to achieve a resolution. The 
agreement phase was over in less than three weeks. According to our analysis, the high 
degree of “diplomatic velocity” is not only outstanding it was, in all probability, also 
conducive for the resolution of the Alibi Game. We assume the swiftness of the negotiation 
process played a crucial role for the resolution of the colliding interest trap. The “best 
explanation” we revealed from the historic evidence is that “diplomatic velocity” 
encouraged the alibi player (i.e. Libya) to embark the pathway of cooperation. Therefore, 
we rated this design element as a fit (Figure 28).  
Alibi players always have a strong inclination for joint cooperation. Cooperation is their 
most desired outcome. However, alibi players are also prone to choose defection and 
remain within the deadlock situation (DD). Once stepped into this strategic constellation 
they are unlikely to depart given that this outcome is relatively comfortable for these 
players. What is therefore required is that the alibi players are provided with a “nudge” to 
leave the state of mutual defection and with precaution measures that avoid them ever 
ending up in that situation.  
In the previous pre-agreement phase, the explorative WMD talks entered into a non-
conclusive back-and-forth mode soon after its start in spring 2003, where neither side could 
pull themselves together and dare a cooperative move. In the agreement phase, however, 
it appears that the diplomatic process never became trapped in the deadlock situation 
(DD). The number of strategic moves was simply too limited and the diplomatic schedule 
too tight. As soon as the direct tripartite talks started, the momentum of cooperation was 
by and large maintained. Since Libya – the alibi player – never stepped into the outcome of 
mutual defection (DD), the need for additional impetus for cooperation was simply not 
needed. The fast moving negotiation process and the quickly agreed disarmament accord 
helped to maintain the momentum in favor for joint cooperation.  
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5.3.5 Post-Agreement Phase: Biased Stag Hunt Game & the Lingering 
Nuclear Bad 
With the announcement of Libya’s nuclear reversal on 19th December 2003, the bargaining 
process entered into its final stage – the post-agreement phase. The central task of this 
episode was the implementation of the disarmament accord. The elimination of the most 
critical parts of Tripoli’s WMD programs was conducted swiftly by two removal operations 
in January and March 2004. However, the destruction of the less sensitive components 
dragged on. In particular, the dismantlement of Libya’s chemical weapons stockpile was 
rather slow.  
The WMD issue remained a “standing item” in the slowly improving U.S.–Libyan 
relationship. When Muammar al-Qaddafi was toppled in summer 2011, the disarmament 
accord was still not fully completed. Rather, new chemical weapons were found in the 
Libyan Desert by rebel forces. The Qaddafi regime had never declared them, neither to the 
United States nor to the OPCW – a flagrant violation of the disarmament accord.  
1.3.5.1 Procedural & Substantial Negotiation Problems  
During the post-agreement phase, the substantial negotiation problem remained by and 
large unchanged. Libya’s nuclear bad, which was only partly resolved by the disarmament 
accord of December 2003, continued to linger. However, with regard to the procedural 
negotiation problem, we witnessed a major shift in the post-agreement phase. The players 
were confronted with a new strategic situation that is best described as a Biased Stag Hunt 
Game – a 2x2 game constellation that is marked by a distrust trap but not by a colliding 
interest trap.  
A) Biased Stag Hunt Game  
The historic evidence suggests that the procedural negotiation problem between the United 
States and Libya improved substantially when the diplomatic process entered into the final 
post-agreement phase. Applying our fit taxonomy to this final episode of the American–
Libyan bargaining process, we come to the conclusion that it was, in all probability, 
dominated by a Biased Stag Hunt Game.  
Although the Biased Stag Hunt Game is not completely unproblematic, it signifies a 
relatively benign strategic constellation where the chance of joint cooperation is relatively 
high. Both players have a strong tendency for joint cooperation (CC) – an outcome that 
coincides within the Biased Stag Hunt Game with the Qualified Pareto Optimum (P+) (Figure 
24). Joint cooperation is self-sufficient. Once achieved, this situation is likely to continue 
since it represents one of the two Nash Equilibriums (N) of the Biased Stag Hunt Game, 
from which none of the players could depart without rendering themselves worse off.  
Given the overall cooperative nature of the Biased Stag Hunt Game, one might wonder 
whether there is at all a procedural negotiation problem. Certainly, the Biased Stag Hunt 
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Game knows no colliding interest trap. Since both sides are strongly inclined for joint 
problem resolution, there is no room for conflict interest. The major challenge of this 
particular game constellation is instead the distrust trap. Lacking confidence in the other 
side’s sincerity could drive the players easily into the unattractive but safe outcome of 
mutual defection (DD). As soon as the players have the impression that their counterparts 
are intending to cheat, they are likely to recur to the Maximin Solution (M) – a strategy that 
coincides in the Biased Stag Hunt Game with the deadlock situation (DD). Once the players 
have stumbled into this constellation, they are trapped. Distrust makes them pursue a 
behavioral pattern that is against their desire for joint cooperation.  
Figure 24:  Biased Stag Hunt Game 
 
In the Biased Stag Hunt Game, the deplorable and “irrational” nature of social traps 
becomes particularly obvious. Since both players are strongly interested in joint 
cooperation, the perception of the other side’s insincerity is obviously wrong. However, 
misinterpretation, diplomatic mishaps, or unintended side effects could nevertheless 
initiate a “race to the bottom” that neither of the players had wanted.  
In terms of the “optimal problem resolution” revealed with the help of our fit taxonomy, 
the Biased Stag Hunt Game is similar to the previous Alibi Game in the sense that it likewise 
requires no preference manipulation. Since there is no colliding interest trap, there is no 
need to change the strategic calculation of the involved negotiating parties in favor of joint 
cooperation. Another similarity with the previous Alibi Game is that mutual defection (DD) 
is less harmful for one of the players – in our case Libya. Although Libya would have 
preferred joint cooperation (CC) during the post-agreement phase, mutual defection would 
have signified a more comfortable outcome for the Qaddafi regime than for the United 
States. After all, the deadlock situation (DD) was Tripoli’s second best choice during the 
post-agreement phase (Figure 24). Consequentially, as soon as evidence appeared that its 
counterpart might play tricks, the Qaddafi regime was more likely to choose defection than 
the United States. It is primarily this divergent “distaste” for mutual defection that makes 
this game constellation “biased”.  
The divergent dislike for mutual defection has implications for the “fit demand”. A 
diplomatic intervention designed to overcome the distrust trap has to respond to the 
relatively benign but biased nature of this game constellation. Moreover, unlike the 
previous Alibi Game, direct action to reduce distrust and build confidence among 
negotiating parties is not needed. Such an approach would instead signify an inefficient 
intervention. Under normal conditions, we assume that the players cooperate with each 
Implement the Agreement  [C] Defect from Implementation [D]
Implement the Agreement  [C] 4,4 N,P+ 1,3
Defect from Implementation [D] 2,1 3,2 M,N
USA
Libya
US preference hierarchy:              CC > DC > DD > CD    
C =  Cooperation  D = Defection  M = MaxiMin Solution  N = Nash Equilibirum  P+ = Qualified Pareto Optimum 
Libya's preference hierarchy:      CC > DD > DC > CD 
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other and that their daily interaction provides sufficient momentum in terms of confidence 
building.  
 
Figure 28: Varieties (Mis)Fits in the Post-Agreement Phase (2004-2011) 
 
What is instead needed is not an active confidence building intervention but rather a 
precautionary measure that provides against the (re)emerging distrust. It is important to 
avoid at an early stage misinterpretation and false perception of the other side’s honesty, 
which might occur unintendedly during the negotiation process. Thus, prevention is the 
central strategy to resolve Biased Stag Hunt Games.  
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Given its higher sensitivity to distrust, the biased stag hunter (in our case Libya) needs 
special attention. The “fit demand” to resolve the distrust trap is in that sense biased too. 
This negotiating party requires a more intensive precaution against the danger of 
(re)emerging suspicion (Figure 24).  
B) The Lingering Nuclear Bad  
In the post-agreement phase, the explanatory power of the public bad approach becomes 
particularly obvious. If one had tried to grasp the substantial negotiation problem the 
players faced at that time without the help of the public bad approach one would have, in 
all probability, been tempted to jump to the apparent but false conclusion that the Libyan 
NRN were an overall success. Although most of Libya’s nuclear weapons program was 
eliminated by mid–2004, the resolution of the underlying substantial negotiation problem 
was uncompleted. While the procedural problem dimension took a “cooperative turn” at 
the beginning of the post-agreement phase, the substantial negotiation problem – Libya’s 
nuclear bad – lost little of its complexity. It lingered on and caused – as we will show in this 
section – ongoing problems in the post-agreement phase. In essence, the WMD issue 
remained a burden to the slowly improving U.S.–Libyan ties until the Qaddafi regime was 
toppled in 2011. If we had not looked upon the post-agreement phase through the prism of 
the public bad approach, this finding would appear illogical. However, with the help of this 
approach we could clearly pinpoint the difficulties of the post-agreement phase.  
Given that the swift negotiations of the agreement phase had resulted in a biased 
disarmament accord, many aspects of Libya’s nuclear bad remained unresolved after 
December 2003. Most outstanding in that regard was the fact that Libya had not received a 
suitable substitution that would replace its abandoned nuclear weapons program. No 
surrogate had been provided that could have replaced the function the nuclear weapons 
program once had for Tripoli’s broader “fabrication chain”. In essence, Libya remained 
entangled in a colliding interest trap.  
In addition, the situation at the beginning of the post-agreement phase was also 
dissatisfying for the Qaddafi regime in terms of distributive justice. With the intrusive 
elimination of Libya’s nuclear bad, which was quickly implemented between winter and 
spring 2004, the United States had gained considerably more benefits from the negotiation 
process than Libya. Thus, not only the colliding interest trap but also the injustice trap 
remained unresolved during the post-agreement phase.  
5.3.5.2 (Mis)Fit in the Post-Agreement Phase   
In the recollection of US officials who participated in the post-agreement phase, this last 
episode of the diplomatic engagement with Libya is often depicted in a rather positive light 
(e.g. DeSutter 2004a, Mahely 2004). However, our analysis reveals that there was no 
reason to a positive portrayal. Rather, the diplomatic efforts undertaken during the post-
agreement phase had numerous shortcomings – both with regard to the procedural and the 
substantial negotiation problem. Even though most parts of the Libyan WMD programs 
were swiftly eliminated, this episode of the American–Libyan engagement dragged on. 
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Although Libya had not restarted to strive for unconventional weapons, the Qaddafi 
regime’s enthusiasm in terms of implementing the disarmament agreement was dwindling, 
starting in the mid-2000s. When the post-agreement phase came to an abrupt end with the 
toppling of Muammar al-Qaddafi, the situation still remained unsatisfactory.  
In hindsight, the post-agreement phase appears even more problematic than the two 
previous episodes of the NRN process (i.e. the pre-agreement and the agreement phase). 
We witnessed more misfitting diplomatic design elements than we had seen in the 
bargaining dynamic between March and December 2003. Given that the final episode of 
the Libyan NRN was dominate by the relatively benign and cooperative Biased Stag Hunt 
Game, the number of imperfect diplomatic interventions is astonishing.   
Certainly, there is no evidence that the Biased Stag Hunt Game had ever slipped into the 
deadlock situation (DD). Although the Qaddafi regime interrupted the implementation of 
the disarmament agreement at some occasions (e.g. withholding the removal of highly 
enriched uranium or the suspended dismantlement of Scud-B missiles), both players stayed 
mostly on a cooperative course. However, that shall not blur the fact that little precaution 
was provided to prevent such a scenario. In terms of effective diplomatic intervention, the 
post-agreement phase remained under-provisioned. While Libya – being the biased stag 
hunt player – would have been in need for a special treatment in terms of confidence 
building, it was the United States that was clearly better off in that regard. With its 
sequenced “quid pro quo” approach and with the “double verification”, Washington was 
bestowed with two tools that helped to overcome its suspicion vis-à-vis the Qaddafi 
regime. Tripoli’s quest for confidence building was instead primarily satisfied though active 
communication – a very conventional and low-cost design element. The priority of Libya’s 
distrust reduction, determined by the nature of the Biased Stag Hunt Game, was not 
properly reflected during the post-agreement phase.  
A) Celebrating the alleged Iraq War Connection   
The outlook that the diplomatic engagement with the Qaddafi regime could be useful for 
the Bush junior’s major power project – the intervention into Iraq – was an important 
driver for Washington’s decision to start negotiating with Tripoli in spring 2003 (ch. 5.3.2.2). 
However, while having been crucial for overcoming the Imposed Deadlock Game in the pre-
negotiation phase, it turned out that the Iraq War linkage had negative implications for the 
resolution of the Biased Stag Hunt Game in the post-agreement phase. Consequentially, we 
have rated this structural impact factor as a misfit.   
Right after the Qaddafi regime had announced its disarmament decision, the foreign policy 
establishment in Washington – including members of the Bush administration – was eager 
to celebrate the “demonstration effect” the Second Iraq War allegedly had on Libya’s 
decision to abandon its WMD programs. Vice President Dick Cheney said for example that 
Libya’s nuclear reversal was “one of the great by-products (…) of what we did in Iraq and 
Afghanistan” (Washington Post, October 5, 2004). Congressman Tom Lantos portrayed the 
Iraq War as a “pedagogic value” for Libya (Palkki & Smith 2012: 269). George W. Bush made 
a similar although more cryptic statement when he said “Libya is now peacefully 
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dismantling its weapons programs. Libya understood that America and others will enforce 
[Bush] doctrine” (New York Times, October 1, 2004).379 
Celebrating the Iraq War connection is the logical consequence of the instruction George 
W. Bush had given in April 2003: “to get something deliverable from this process” for 
Washington’s policy in the Middle East (Suskind 2006, Frantz & Collins 2007: 306). Hailing 
this linkage publically was in that sense a “negative echo” of the positive implications this 
factor had for overcoming the Imposed Deadlock Game of the pre-negotiation phase.  
Certainly, the assertion that it was the Iraq War that forced Libya into disarmament was 
historically false. Tripoli had already been ready for a diplomatic process on WMD 
disarmament in the early 1990s. And, as we have explained above, it was in the end not 
Libya but the United States that was driven into a diplomatic process by the Iraq 
intervention. However, the fact that the Iraq War linkage was an inaccurate historic 
description did not limit its negative implications.  
Celebrating the alleged “demonstration effect” must have been a satisfying pleasure for the 
members of the Bush administration – particularly in light of the growing international and 
domestic critique of the Iraq War. But in terms of the Biased Stag Hunt Game, this 
structural factor signified, in all probability, a misfit (Figure 28). Since Libya was in need for 
an intensive provision against remerging distrust, the hailing of the positive impacts of the 
Iraq War was clearly mismatching. After all, it was nourishing exactly the narrative the 
Qaddafi regime eagerly wanted to avoid. Tripoli attached great importance to the portrayal 
that it had not backed down to Western pressure but had taken the decision of nuclear 
reversal of its own free will (Bowen 2006: 72; Joseph 2009). Consequentially, Muammar al-
Qaddafi and his entourage were frustrated when they witnessed in 2004 a growing number 
statements that depicted Libya’s nuclear reversal as a consequence of the Iraq War (Miller 
2006; St. John 2008a: 138).  
Members of the Qaddafi regime publically rebuffed these assertions. For example, in 
February 2004 the Libyan foreign minister, Abdel Rahman Shalgham, vigorously rejected 
the assertion that Libya had made “concession” to the United States and that this false 
impression was owed to the “poisonous pens” of the Arab media (Dejevsky 2004: 6). 
Interviewed in 2004, Mohammed Bukhres, a Libyan-American with close ties to the Qaddafi 
family, said: “We tried for a long time to get relations with the United States. Don’t let 
anyone tell you it’s because of the invasion of Iraq” (Slavin 2004). In particular, Tripoli found 
it annoying that the United States decided in July 2004 to present to the media the uranium 
enrichment centrifuges and other highly sensitive technology that had been shipped from 
Libya to Tennessee. The sensational press conference, which was held at a high security 
facility of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, was in every sense a high-profile event since 
not only the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham, but also President George W. Bush 
attended. Reportedly, the Libyans were disturbed by the pictures taken at this event, which 
presented Libya’s WMD technology like a spoil of war (Wing & Simpson 2013: 133-4).  
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 See also: Blair 2010: 391; Cheney 2011: 420.  
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B) Active Communication Channels  
Particularly at the beginning of the post-agreement phase, Libya and the United States still 
had considerable concerns about the other side’s sincerity. For example, an official of the 
Bush junior administration who had been interviewed anonymously by the Los Angeles 
Times said that Washington and London were living at that time “with the possibility that 
Kadafi [sic] might change his mind” (Frantz & Meyer 2005). That assessment was also 
echoed by Jodie Daniel, a Secretary of State official who was involved in the dismantlement 
of the Libyan WMD programs, who said that in 2004 the United States was concerned “to 
get the stuff [WMD related technology and materials] out [of Libya] as fast as possible 
before Qaddafi changes his mind” (Interview with D. Jody; Dec. 2011, Annex 16). 
Reportedly, the members of the Qaddafi regime had similar concerns and were distrustful 
towards the United States (Tobey 2004; Tucker 2009: 367).  
Against that background, the communication channels between Washington and Tripoli, 
which were quickly established in early 2004, were most likely helpful in providing against 
the risk of reemerging distrust. This final episode of the bargaining process was dominated 
by technical experts. The post-agreement phase was primarily about the practical 
implementation of the negotiated disarmament. An active diplomatic channel parallel to 
the dismantlement practice was therefore not a matter of course. We interpret the dense 
interaction between the United States and Libya as a helpful instrument to settle the 
misunderstandings and false perceptions that continued to linger between the negotiation 
parties. Consequently, we rate this design element as a fit (Figure 28). 
The first trilateral meeting in the post-agreement phase was held already on the 5th January 
2004 with the objective to agree upon the numerous details of the disarmament process 
that had not been addressed in the original disarmament agreement.380 This meeting was 
the beginning of a series of coordination sessions, which were reportedly all held in a 
cooperative and open atmosphere (Interview with J. Daniel Dec. 2011, Annex 16; Interview 
with K. Ward, June 2012, Annex 16; Joseph 2009: 71-76). In order to further streamline the 
communication process, the two sides agreed to establish the so-called “Trilateral Steering 
and Cooperation Committee”.381 This coordination mechanism brought high ranking 
officials from the UK, the United States, and Libya together on a regular basis and also 
organized the exchange between responsible officials on lower ranks (DeSutter 2004; 
Interview with K. Ward June 2012, Annex 16; Tucker 2009: 370).382 Numerous problems 
that occurred during the implementation of the disarmament accord were addressed 
through this channel – such as the issue on Libya’s Scud-B missiles or the halted shipment 
of highly enriched uranium to Russia (see section E). It is likely that these problems would 
have caused higher collateral damage if there had been no active communication channel 
between Tripoli and Washington.  
                            
380
 It was, for example, only at the meeting on 5th January that the redirection of former employees of the 
Libyan WMD programs was put on the agenda.  
381
 Other practical elements that were believed to be conducive for the exchange between the two sides 
were for example the reciprocal reopening of diplomatic missions in Washington and Tripoli in summer 
2004 or the fact that the group of actors who were responsible for WMD issues on both sides had been 
rather small (Interview with K. Ward, June 2012, Annex 16).  
382
 Officially the TSCC was established in September 2004. However, this mechanism had existed de facto 
already in the months before (Blanchard 2009: 26; DeSutter 2004).  
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C) Washington’s Sequenced Quid Pro Quo Approach  
In the implementation of the December 2003 disarmament accord, the United States was 
applying a sequenced “quid pro quo” approach. Washington only took action after the 
Qaddafi regime had moved first. In late September 2004, Paula DeSutter (Assistant 
Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance) presented this approach in a hearing at 
the U.S. Congress by explaining that the State Department had separated Libya’s 
disarmament process in three steps and had only reciprocated to Libya “in response to 
each phase of the elimination effort” (U.S. Congress 2004b).383 Already at a hearing in 
February 2004, William Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, had 
explained that this biased “quid pro quo” road map towards Libya “would depend upon 
continued good-faith implementation by Libya of its commitments on terrorism, WMD, and 
missiles” (U.S. Congress 2004a: 6). Ken Ward, a Department of State official who had played 
a responsible role in the elimination of Libya’s unconventional weapons programs, 
portrayed the U.S. engagement with Libya in the post-agreement phase by the picture of 
two persons on ladders where the second (i.e. the United States) was only taking steps 
after the first (i.e. the Qaddafi regime) had moved (Interview with K. Ward, June 2012, 
Annex 16; see also interview with S. Hadley, June 2012, Annex 16).384  
It was perfectly rational for the United States to follow this cautious scheme in the post-
agreement phase. The sequenced “quid pro quo” approach provided Washington with a 
sort of “safety net” if Libya would choose to cheat. For the United States, this design 
element therefore marked a fit in terms of the required provision against reemerging 
distrust (Figure 28).  
However, while the “quid pro quo” approach was conductive for Washington, it is obvious 
that this scheme was not helpful for Tripoli’s decision making in the post-agreement phase. 
This bargaining tactic was not reflecting the biased nature of the procedural negotiation 
problem that dominated the U.S.–Libyan relations in the WMD policy field after December 
2003. In the Biased Stag Hunt Game, it was Libya and not the United States that was in 
need for intensive confidence building. Moreover, Washington’s “quid pro quo” approach 
had all the ingredients to cause reemerging distrust and ran the risk of inflaming Libya’s 
suspicion.  
Although there is no explicit evidence that the “quid pro quo” approach had actually 
increased the Qaddafi regime’s distrust, there are at least some indicators signifying that 
                            
383
 Phase I: lifting travel restriction after the removal of high risk WMD equipment and materials by air, 
Phase II: termination of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act with respect to Libya, restarting diplomatic relations, 
and general license for trade and investment after the less critical WMD equipment had been removed 
from Libya by ship.  Phase III: lifting of the national emergency state vis-à-vis Libya, ending economic 
sanctions including unfreezing Libyan assets, and permitting aviation trade after Libya had allowed for a 
comprehensive inspection to verify the completion of their disarmament efforts (U.S. Congress 2004b). 
384
 Even after the vast majority of Libya’s unconventional weapons programs had been eliminated, 
Washington was not changing track and continued to apply its “quid pro quo approach”. For example, in 
August 2009 when confronted with the renewed request from the Qaddafi regime for more support in the 
effort to redirect former Libyan WMD scientists and technicians, the U.S. embassy in Tripoli clearly 
express the view that it was the responsibility of the Libyans to “move first”. In the cable send to the head 
office in Washington it is said: “we are unable to consider expanded cooperation until Libya makes good 
faith efforts to meet the (…) critical deadlines for destruction and/or disposal of its WMD and related 
materials“(U.S. Embassy Tripoli 10 Aug. 2009).  
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Tripoli became more and more disturbed by Washington’s bargaining pattern towards the 
mid-2000s. At the beginning of the post-agreement phase, the Qaddafi regime was 
apparently tolerant towards the United States preference to act as the “second mover”. 
However, Tripoli started to complain when the Bush junior administration was not changing 
its hesitant cooperation strategy, even though Libya had dismantled the vast majority of its 
WMD programs (St. John 2008: 137-9; Jakobson 2011; Reynolds & Wan 2012: 101). 
Consequentially, in light of the “optimal problem resolution” required for Libya’s ongoing 
cooperation, the sequenced “quid pro quo” approach signified a misfit.  
D) Double Verification 
The monitoring of Libya’s WMD disarmament, which was established at the beginning of 
the post-agreement phase, was relatively intense. Apart from inspections at the various 
sites of Libya’s WMD programs, numerous former Libyan weaponeers were interviewed 
about their past activities and a considerable amount of documents and records were 
studied in order to gain insights into the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear ambitions. Most 
outstanding in that regard was, however, that Libya was subjected to a double verification 
regime. In parallel to the efforts of the two specialized international organizations – the 
IAEA and the OPCW – the United States together with the UK set up a second line of 
monitoring (Interview with K. Ward June 2012, Annex 16; Hart & Kile 2005; Tucker 2009). 
Libya’s compliance with its disarmament obligations were checked twice. The inspection 
focused on the same facilities and sites. Both monitoring regimes took place around the 
same time. In both cases, the bulk of the work was done between January and September 
2004, and both lines of verification were relatively intrusive (Boureston & Feldman 2004: 
87; Bowen 2006: 73). Both the US–UK team as well as the IAEA and the OPCW were 
provided with ample information. Libya had already been very open during the two 
technical visits in October and December 2003. However, in the post-agreement phase, 
Tripoli became even more transparent and was ready to fully disclose its entire WMD 
programs (Bowen 2008; Mahley 2004: 6; Tobey 2014).385  
The double layer of monitoring was not free of friction. In particular, Washington and the 
IAEA became entangled in a “turf war”, which was, according to Wing and Simpson, 
sparked “over the place of and the need for the agency” in the project of Libya’s 
disarmament (Wing & Simpson 2013: 102). The IAEA was disappointed that it had not been 
included in the trilateral negotiations in December 2003 and publically called into question 
the U.S. assessment of the Libyan nuclear weapons program, describing it as less dangerous 
and implying that Washington had issued an alarmistic evaluation of the Qaddafi regime’s 
nuclear ambitions (Bowen 2006: 73; Koppel 2003). That Washington was instead eager to 
establish a second line of monitoring different to the efforts of the OPCW and the IAEA was 
presumably owed to the fact that the Bush junior administration held verification by 
                            
385
 For example, the Libyans were now revealing that they had additional 750 unfiled 500-kilogram 
chemical bombs – weapons that had not been mentioned during the early visits in October and December 
2003 (Tobey 2014). According Donald Mahley, the first US diplomat that touched Libyan soil after the 
rupture of diplomatic ties, the Qaddafi regime was completed open and fully disclosed every part of the 
its WMD program. Having later recollect his memories Donald Mahley wrote: “When we asked to see 
equipment or inside buildings, or a site where we thought there might be some activity that had not been 
declared, we got what we asked for, in the overwhelming majority of cases quickly and with outstanding 
effort on the part of our Libyan hosts” (Mahley 2004).  
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international organization in general in rather low esteem. This instrument was often 
portrayed as providing only a “false sense of security” (Charbonneau 2004; Cirincione 2007: 
112-115).386 In the particular circumstance of the Libyan case, Washington’s critique of the 
IAEA and its verification practice was not baseless. After all, the watchdog organization had 
monitored Libya’s civil nuclear research reactor in Tajoura since the 1970s without 
detecting any inconsistencies (Wing & Simpson 2013: 102). 
Despite these frictions, there is solid ground to assume that the doubled layered 
verification was indeed helpful to allay the concerns that Washington had vis-à-vis the 
Qaddafi regime at the beginning of the post-agreement phase. We assume that this non-
diplomatic intervention fit to required precaution against reemerging distrust (Figure 28).  
Despite the squabbling with the IAEA, the United States was content with the practical 
monitoring of Libya’s disarmament. At a Congress Hearing in late September 2003, Paula 
DeSutter said: “Verification is not a science, and no verification determination can be 
absolutely certain. But (…) what I am saying with regard to Libya, is that we have verified 
with reasonable certainty that Libya has eliminated, or has set in place the elimination of all 
its WMD and MTCR-class missile programs” (U.S. Congress 2004a). This assessment was 
also echoed by the U.S. intelligence community, which came – by referring to the intensive 
verification of Libya’s effort to dismantle its WMD programs – in 2004 to the conclusion 
that there is only an “extremely low probability of things going wrong“ (Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities 2005: 262). 
However, for Libya the double verification signified only a partial fit – at least this is the 
“best explanation” we could reveal from the historic evidence (Figure 28). In all probability, 
the Qaddafi regime had no problem with verification as such. Most likely, the intensive 
monitoring was regarded as an instrument to demonstrate that there was no reason for 
further indulging distrust and suspicion towards Libya. Verification was in that sense a 
“show case” of Libya’s willingness for joint cooperation. However, Libya made no secret of 
the fact that it would have preferred a single verification regime. While its preference for 
the two layers of monitoring shifted over time, Tripoli was always in favor for a 
comprehensive approach.387 
E) Slow & Insufficient Substitution 
When analyzed through the lens of the public bad approach, the disarmament agreement 
negotiated in December 2003 was incomplete. As we have explained above, the U.S.–
                            
386
 In particular John Bolton (Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs 
from 2001 to 2005) who became in the post-agreement phase the key player at the Bush administration 
on the effort to eliminate the Libyan WMD programs, were an outspoken critic of verification by 
international organization in arms control and non-proliferation (Cirincione 2007: 112-115).  
387
 At first Tripoli clearly preferred the monitoring by the United States and the UK in an expression of its 
inclination for a swift rapprochement with Washington. At that time Libya was rather reluctant in its 
cooperation with the international organizations. However, several months after the Qaddafi regime’s 
announced its decision for nuclear disarmament the Arab press started to became more skeptical about 
Tripoli’s move. Critique was uttered that Libya had bent down to U.S. pressure and the show of force in 
Iraq. As a consequence, the Qaddafi regime ostentatious searched the cooperation with international 
organizations in order to dispel this impression (Interview with K. Ward, June 2012, Annex 16; Bowen 
2006: 72; Wing & Simpson 2013: 133).  
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Libyan accord was biased and insufficient since it provided no suitable substitution for 
Libya’s eliminated nuclear bad. The Qaddafi regime’s original “fabrication chain”, oriented 
at the “final goods” of security and prestige, remained interrupted. This failure of the 
agreement phase dragged on in the post-agreement phase. During its implementation, the 
biased nature of the disarmament accord was not corrected. The substation of Libya’s 
nuclear bad was slow and insufficient – a finding that made us rate the implementation of 
the disarmament agreement as a misfit (Figure 28). 
Deprived from an important power tool to realize its desired “final goods”, the Qaddafi 
regime started to suffer “nuclear phantom pains” towards the end of the post-agreement 
phase. The historic evidence suggests that, at least on some occasions, Tripoli was sorry to 
have let their nuclear weapons program go so cheaply (e.g. Yonhap, 26th April 2010; Annex 
3). Although this argument is hypothetical, one could not exclude that the Qaddafi regime, 
which was toppled in 2011, might have tried one day to ease its longing by a return to 
nuclear efforts. Certainly, during the post-agreement phase, the rapprochement with the 
United States gained pace and the Qaddafi regime received, starting by 2004, several 
rewards in return for having abandoned its WMD programs. However, these concessions 
were not sufficient to close the gap the eliminated nuclear bad had teared in Tripoli’s 
“fabrication chain”. For Libya, the substantial negotiation problem was not resolved and the 
North African country remained entangled in a colliding interest and an injustice trap.  
At the beginning of the post-agreement phase, it appears that Libya was not annoyed by 
the fact that it had gained relatively little in return for its decision to reverse its WMD 
programs. In all probability, the international applause for its nuclear disarmament and the 
swift reintegration as a normal player into world politics superimposed the lacking 
substitution and the biased disarmament deal.388 Libya was at that time expecting that its 
decision for nuclear reversal would pay off as soon as the desired rapprochement with the 
United States gathered pace. At that time, the signals Tripoli was receiving were promising. 
Until September 2004, Washington had lifted most of its unilateral sanctions,389 U.S. 
companies started to return to the Libyan market, and Western European leaders – first 
and foremost Tony Blair – were welcoming Muammar al-Qaddafi back in international 
politics (Jakobson 2012; Reynolds & Wan 2012: 101). Tellingly, in early 2005 Saif al-Islam 
was still portraying the disarmament accord as an “attractive deal” due to the “promise and 
incentives from the United States and Britain” (AFP, 5th April 2005). In correspondence with 
this optimistic view, Libya was during the first years also actively supporting the elimination 
of its WMD programs, including the swift removal of its most sensitive technologies and 
materials (Interview with K. Ward, June 2012, Annex 16; interview with M. Mininni 
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 There were only very few governments that were not welcoming Libya’s decision for nuclear reversal – 
among them North Korea and Iran (Joseph 2009: 90).  
389
 In February 2004 the Bush administration lifted the travel restriction on Libya. In April 2003 the ILSA 
sanctions package was terminated for Libya and commercial activities including investment to the North 
African country were resume. In June 2004 a crucial step towards resuming normal diplomatic ties were 
taken by the inauguration of a Libyan Liaison Office in Washington. In September 2004 the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act was lifted – a step that set free approx. $1.3 billion of Libyan asset which 
had been frozen in U.S. banking accounts. But to the disappointment of Tripoli the Qaddafi regime 
remained relatively long on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorist. It was only in May 2006 that Libya 
were crossed from that list (St. John 2008: 137-9; Frantz & Mayer 2005; Jakobson 2011; Reynolds & Wan 
2012: 101).  
   
301 
 
December 2011, Annex 16; see also Mahley 2004). The IAEA praised Libya for its “excellent 
cooperation” (AFP, 30th Aug. 2004). Also, the non-proliferation experts in London and 
Washington were content since Libya helped at the beginning of the post-agreement phase 
to throw light on the activities of the A.Q. Khan network (Wing & Simpson 2013: 134).  
However, by mid-2005 the picture started to change. As the glee of the early post-
agreement phase was fading away, the Qaddafi regime began to complain that it had not 
received enough in return for having decided in favor of WMD disarmament (Interview with 
Daniel December 2011, Annex 16; interview with M. Mininni December 2011, Annex 16; 
see also: Corera 2006: 194). From then onward, Libya’s grumble never came to a halt and 
was constantly expressed both in direct talks with U.S. representatives and in public 
forums. Frustrated with the little U.S. support, Libya recanted its status as a successful 
model for other nuclear weapons states. For example, in 2010 Muammar al-Qaddafi said 
during an interview with the South Korean press: “The problem is that Libya has not been 
compensated for its good deed. Therefore, the Libyan example is not attractive (…) Libya 
has not made any big gain, for example, using the nuclear peaceful purposes” (Yonhap, 26th 
April 2010; Annex 3).  
There is solid ground to assume that the Libyan complaints were not just the product of 
disappointed hopes for more lucrative Western rewards. Rather, Libyan grumble were 
clearly framed along the lines of regime security and prestige – a fact that makes us 
interpret Tripoli’s dissatisfaction as a consequence of the insufficient substitution.  
For example, Tripoli demanded constantly for close military relations with the United 
States. Throughout the 2000s, Libya was frequently asking for lethal military equipment and 
U.S. security guarantees (see, e.g. U.S. Embassy Tripoli, 31 Dec. 2008). When Muammar al-
Qaddafi met, for example, the U.S. congressman Richard Lugar in summer 2005, he 
explained that in his view of an “appropriate reward” for Libya’s WMD disarmament meant 
the delivery of defensive weapons that would provide protection against external threats 
(U.S. Embassy Tripoli, 21. Aug. 2008). And in August 2009, Libya National Security Advisor, 
Muatassim al-Qaddafi, the Libyan dictator’s third born son, underscored the request for 
more military support by the United States by saying “Libya had given up much” and that it 
was “time for the U.S. to show some trust and confidence in the relationship” (U.S. 
Embassy Tripoli, Feb. 2009).  
Apart from security related demands, Tripoli made also requests that could be interpreted 
as an expression of prestige. The Qaddafi regime was, for example, eager to conclude with 
the United States a “strategic alliance” and envisioned that Libya would, because of its 
nuclear reversal, receive a special treatment from Washington that would make the 
American–Libyan ties distinct from the U.S. policy towards other Arab countries (U.S. 
Embassy Tripoli, 31 Aug. 2005, 1 Sep. 2006, and 31 Dec. 2007). Presumably the most 
important vehicle for Libya’s desire of respect and special treatment was its demand for a 
large civil nuclear power plant – a request that oil-rich Tripoli uttered constantly towards 
the United States during the second half of the 2000s (U.S. Embassy Tripoli 8 May 2008).  
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However, Washington was not prepared to respond to Libya’s demands. In the US 
perspective, Libya had violated all arms control and non-proliferation treaties it had signed 
prior to December 2003. It was only naturally that Tripoli was obliged to undo its 
misbehavior. In Washington’s view, it was only logical to apply “cautious rapprochement” 
with the former opponent.390 In a Hearing before the U.S. Congress in March 2005, William 
Burns said that despite the numerous positive evidences for a change in Libya’s foreign 
policy “there remains a number of very real concerns. We should have no illusions about 
them, and addressing them will require steady determination and candor” (U.S. Congress 
2005: 5).391  
Consequentially, the U.S. embassy in Tripoli described the Libyan demands for appropriate 
substitution as a “ritualistic incantation” and as a “bid to put US interlocutors at a 
disadvantage at the beginning of a conversation” (U.S. Embassy 31 Aug. 2006). The U.S. 
officials who were directly entrusted with the Libyan affairs during the post-agreement 
phase were convinced that Libya had received sufficient rewards in return for its nuclear 
reversal (Interview with J. Daniel, December 2011; Interview with K. Ward June 2012, 
Annex 16).392 The logic of a gap filling substitution that would have allowed Libya to 
continue the fabrication of its “final goods” – regime security and prestige – apparently 
never came into their mind.393 
Towards the end of the post-agreement phase, the ongoing failure to resolve the 
substantial negotiation problem started to affect Libya’s actual behavior in the 
disarmament field. The disappointment with the insufficient substitution, which had 
beforehand been expressed by complaints, was now translated into concrete actions. 
Presumably, the first step in that regard was Libya’s withdrawal from a joint venture project 
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 Two aspects that in particular hampering Washington’s reengagement with Libya and increased the 
United States’ distrust were the alleged Libyan attempts to assassinate the Saudi Crown Prince and the 
Libyan Prime Minister’s public equivocation over the Qaddafi regime’s responsible for the Pan Am 103 
bombing (Interview with R. Joseph, Nov. 2011, Annex 16; U.S. Congress 2005: 12). In addition, the families 
of the Lockerbie victims were also affecting Washington’s cautious policy towards Tripoli. For example, 
when the Bush administration requested in June 2007 $1.15 Million for measures to normalize the 
relationship with the Qaddafi regime the House Appropriation Committee blocked this funds until the 
Bush administration would certify that the families of the Lockerbie victims were fully compensated by 
the Qaddafi regime (St. John 2008: 139-40).  
391
 As Ronald St. John has pointed out in his analysis of the American-Libyan relations after December 
2003, it was in particular the “Bush administration’s ideologues [that] worried about the Qaddafi of old 
and put their priority on punishing Libya for past deeds as opposed to rewarding it for policy change“ (St. 
John 2008: 146).  
392
 In 2009 the United States and Libya signed a non-binding pact on defense cooperation. However, this 
framework agreement had no immediate and tangible security implications. In the late 2000s the United 
States also made attempts to introduce Libya to the US lead Trans-Sahara-Counter-Terrorism-Partnership 
(TSCTP). However, insisting to be treated as a special partner, Libya was rather reluctant to become part in 
this regional initiative which was in Tripoli’s perspective not reflecting the bilateral cooperation the 
Qaddafi regime had envisioned (St. John 2011: 140).  
393
 However, at least at the very beginning of the post-agreement phase there were indicators that 
Washington might have been aware of the logic of substitution. At least we could interpreted a statement 
provided Paula DeSutter (Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance) to the House of 
Representative in that regard. DeSutter said in September 2004: „It is, however, important that we 
recognize the momentous changes taken by Libya in dismantling its WMD and long-range missile 
programs. It could not have been an easy decision to abandon weapons programs in which it had invested 
untold amounts of money. It could not have been an easy decision for Libya to seek new ways to ensure 
its security” (U.S. Congress 2004b).  
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with the United States on the destruction of chemical warfare agents. As Libya became 
aware that the United States agreed to provide North Korea with a considerable amount of 
crude oil in exchange for a diplomatic breakthrough achieved in the six-party talks on the 
Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, Muammar al-Qaddafi, reportedly, felt neglected 
and disrespected. Instead of a joint venture project, Tripoli was now requesting that 
Washington should pay for the entire destruction of the Libyan chemical warfare agent. As 
Washington declined this demand, Libya concluded a contract with a private Italian 
company (Interview with K. Ward, June 2012; Interview with M. Mininni, Dec. 2011, Annex 
16; see also: Tucker 2009: 377). The American–Libyan joint venture project of a “nuclear 
medicine center” took a very similar fate.394 Libya also stopped the agreed dismantlement 
of its Scud-B missiles – an act of non-compliance with the disarmament accord of December 
2003, which was only resolved after considerable diplomatic back-and-forth by a 
compromise with the United States.395 In addition, in late 2009 the Qaddafi regime even 
suspended the removal of seven containers of highly enriched uranium (HEU) designated to 
be flown to a special disposal plant in Russia. Libya explained that it had halted the 
shipment because it was “fed up” with the slow pace in the improvement of bilateral 
relations with the United States and the little compensation Washington had “promised in 
exchange for an end to its WMD programs, including cooperation in the military, security, 
nonproliferation, civil-nuclear and economic spheres” (Fisher 2010; Sanger 2011).  
Probably the most important indicator for Libya’s frustration with the slow and insufficient 
substitution of its nuclear bad was, however, the withholding of a considerable amount of 
chemical weapons – including hundreds of artillery shells loaded with mustard agents. In 
2011, shortly after the downfall of the Qaddafi regime, rebel fighters discovered this 
arsenal at a remote military site in the Libyan desert (e.g. Smith, Warrick & Lynch 2011). 
The Qaddafi regime had never declared these chemical weapons, neither to the US–UK 
team nor to the OPCW. The purpose of this arsenal remains by and large unknown – 
including the question whether these weapons were intentionally hidden by the Qaddafi 
regime. It is possible that the Qaddafi regime had simply forgotten about this hidden 
arsenal – an expression of the North African country’s chaotic bureaucracy (Interview with 
K. Ward, June 2012, Annex 16). However, in light of Tripoli’s dissatisfaction with the U.S. 
rapprochement it is also likely that this flagrant violation of the American–Libyan 
disarmament accord was done on purpose.  
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 Here too Libya ratcheted up its demands towards the United States and eventually withdrawal from 
the project (Interview with J. Daniel, Dec. 2011, Annex 16). Moreover, one could interpreted Libya’s 
growing effort to establish civil nuclear cooperation with a series of countries – including France, 
Argentina, Canada, Ukraine, and Russia – as an additional indicator for the growing frustration with the 
United States (Blanchard 2009: 26).  
395
 Libya had stopped the dismantlement of the Scud-B missiles with the argument that this requirement 
would cause harm to its national security strategy since it was not able to substitute the ageing Soviet 
Scud-B missiles with an alternative system within the five years grace period the United States had 
originally granted. After six months of negotiations with the Qaddafi regime, Washington eventually 
decided that Tripoli could keep its missiles although this concession was against the disarmament 
agreement of December 2003 (Interview with K. Ward, Dec. 2012, Annex 16). 
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6. CONCLUSION  
In the introduction, we said that IR and rock n’ roll have many things in common. One of 
the most striking similarities is certainly the common “pattern of consumption”. On the one 
hand, rock n’ roll fans love to hear “more of the same”. After having tried and tested 
different schools and trends, most listeners of rock n’ roll music develop an inclination for a 
particular style. IR is consumed in very similar ways. Once scholars have developed a 
“taste” for a particular “style”, they apply the same set of theories, analytical approaches, 
and methods over and over again. In the introduction, we said that this “more of the same 
attitude” is not adverse to innovation. Innovation takes place in the form of an incremental 
process where external impulses are translated and adapted to the preferred “style”. On 
the other hand, IR scholars and rock n’ roll fans also adore “thrilling moments” – situations 
when they are electrified by breakthroughs which enlarge the spectrum of their cherished 
styles. In IR and rock n’ roll, “thrilling moments” are rare. However, when they occur, they 
have the nature of “intriguing shock waves”. While the “more of the same attitude” builds 
on the so-called “within style innovation”, the “thrilling moments” are instead “innovation 
by discovery”.  
Since we now sum up our PhD project, we return to this two-fold “pattern of 
consumption”. In the first part (ch. 6.1) of this chapter, we will discuss the results we 
achieved by applying the “more of the same attitude” to the single hard case study on the 
Libyan NRN. We will show that we have revealed many new and interesting insights about 
the performance of diplomatic design and about the bargaining dynamics with atomic 
renegades. Our research project was certainly innovative. We used a series of concept that 
were never or only rarely applied in IR before – such as diplomatic design, the problem of 
fit, the public bad approach or the IBE based model development. However, although the 
different analytical perspectives we used were new or unused, they all signified “innovation 
by translation” since all of these concepts originated from neighboring (sub-)disciplines. The 
findings we revealed were pioneering but they do not substantially push the border of our 
“style”. Instead, they signify welcoming analytical developments that could be smoothly 
integrated into the existing body of literature on trans- and international negotiations. 
In the second part (ch. 6.2), we will present the research desiderate of our PhD project: the 
logic of wisdom (LoW). As a research desiderate, the LoW is not a result of our analysis in 
the narrow sense of the meaning. It was neither part of our research question nor have we 
actively studied it. But although we have not “searched” for it, we still deem it as a 
“finding” of this PhD project. We grant it a proper place in our conclusion. We are 
convinced that the research desiderate is the “thrilling moment”. What we believe to have 
discovered en passant is, in essence, a new strategic mode of action and decision making 
that is rare but highly relevant for the understanding of world politics since it is likely to 
apply particularly in those situations where power differences are prominent, where 
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foreign policy challenges are high, or foreign policy makers are impelled to take decisions 
and actions under high time pressure.  
  
   
306 
 
6.1 “More of the Same”:  Answering the 
Central Research Question in Two Steps  
In the introduction chapter, we made clear that a proper response to our central research 
question (How to design well-fitting NRN that drive atomic renegade states into nuclear 
disarmament) requires both “backward-looking analysis” (ch. 6.1.1) and “forward-looking 
prescription” (ch. 6.1.2). Any answer to our central research question has to remain 
unsatisfactory if it does not respond properly to these two central research orientations 
prescribed by the overarching policy paradigm. Consequentially, we will structure the 
discussion of the findings we revealed under the “more of the same attitude” along these 
lines. In the section on the “backward-looking analysis”, we will at first discuss the 
performance of diplomatic design and its rival explanations (ch. 6.1.1.1). We will show that 
Libya was “won by diplomacy” and that alternative factors played a subordinated role at 
best. But we will also show that diplomatic design – and not other explanations promoted 
in the past by the literature on negotiation research – where the major driver behind the 
Libyan negotiation success. However, despite its overall impact, it is also true that the 
performance of individual diplomatic design elements was relatively diverse. What we 
encounter in the Libyan “hard case” was a “variety of (mis)fits”. We will devote an extra 
section showing the diversity of diplomatic design’s performance (ch. 6.1.1.2).  
Moreover, the summary on the “backward-looking analysis” would be incomplete if we do 
not discuss the explorative and evaluative strength of the fit taxonomy (ch. 6.1.1.3 and ch. 
6.1.1.4). The “backward-looking analysis” did not only reveal insights into the performance 
of diplomatic design elements, it also highlighted the evaluative and explorative strengths 
of the fit taxonomy. After all, it was primarily because of the fit taxonomy that we were 
able to develop a new narrative on Libya’s nuclear reversal. 
Turning to the “forward-looking prescription” – the second part of our response to the 
general research question – we will elaborate not on the design but on the designing. The 
“forward looking prescription” takes what we have discovered in the “backward-looking 
analysis” and translates these findings into policy recommendations. It signifies in that 
sense the culmination of our multi-staged answer to the question: how to design well-
fitting NRN that drive atomic renegade states into nuclear disarmament. Against that 
background, the most straightforward response we could give to our central research 
question without specifying a particular future NRN case is methodic in nature and goes as 
follows: (1) take the fit taxonomy we have developed and apply it in a prescriptive mode to 
the given strategic constellation (2) with its help, identify the “optimal problem solution” 
(3) on that basis, consider the available diplomatic tools that are likely to fit well to the 
ascertained problem and (4) piece them together into a coherent negotiation strategy. 
However, all those readers who would prefer a more concrete and substantial answer to 
the “forward looking part” of our overarching research question instead of a general 
methodic recommendation do not have to despair. In order to show the prescriptive power 
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of the fit taxonomy we will run in the forward-looking section of the conclusion a brief 
“thought experiment”. We will elaborate on the promising diplomatic leverages 
Washington and Tripoli could have used in order make the Libyan NRN an even greater 
diplomatic success, if we assume that they had the chance to use the fit taxonomy (ch. 
6.1.2).  
6.1.1 The Backward-Look Analysis: The Performance of Diplomatic 
Design & the Fit Taxonomy  
Libya was “won” by diplomatic design. Well-fitting diplomatic design is the most important 
explanation for Tripoli’s nuclear reversal. Of course, during the 23 years of the American-
Libyan diplomatic struggle, we encounter numerous mismatching design elements and 
even diplomatic tools that were counter-productive signifying misfits and even negative 
fits. There were standstills in the bargaining dynamic and phases that were marked by 
deadlocks and diplomatic impasses. Moreover, some aspects of the substantial negotiation 
problem, which were studied through the lens of the public bad approach, were never fully 
resolved and lingered on until the Qaddafi regime was toppled in 2011. But even though a 
more carefully designed negotiation strategy could have achieved even better results, the 
NRN on Libya’s nuclear weapons program was nevertheless a “diplomatic success story”. 
The two key negotiation parties – the United States and the Qaddafi regime – moved from 
a very hostile and antagonistic situation in the late 1980s to a relatively benign 
constellation in the mid-2000s, resolving a “strategic cascade” of five consecutive social 
traps. Once a disarmament agreement was achieved in December 2003, Libya’s nuclear 
weapons program was quickly dismantled. The North African country – for a long time a 
textbook atomic renegade regime – returned into the global nuclear order allowing 
intrusive inspections to its clandestine WMD sites by the IAEA, by teams of U.S.-U.K. 
weapons experts, and by the OPCW.  
Among the 14 examples of NRN, the U.S.-Libyan negotiation dynamic signified the “hard 
case” – if not even a “double hard case” (ch. 4.4). Given the hostile relationship and the 
state of the Libyan nuclear weapons program, we would have not assumed a successful 
negotiation outcome a priori. The fact that diplomatic design had a very high “fit 
performance” despite these adverse conditions is nourishing our optimistic assumption 
about man-made structures and procedures. In the Libyan case, we found that nuclear 
reversal was not dependent on a favorable structural environment. Apart from some 
occasions in the pre-negotiation phase, the diplomatic success was not promoted by 
endogenic shifts within the internal structure of the involved negotiation parties but was 
primarily achieved by the “manipulation” of the actor’s strategic calculations implemented 
by the impact of diplomatic design elements. The Libyan NRN therefore further bolsters our 
general assumption that one could successfully bargain even with the Devil – if only the 
negotiation strategy is well designed.  
In negotiation research, diplomatic design was often thought as an epiphenomenon. It was 
often operationalized as a “projection surface” for larger impact factor – such as power-
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based, structural, cognitive, or cultural approaches (see e.g. Kremenyuk 1991). With our 
PhD project, we showed that diplomatic design is an independent factor. Like neo-liberal 
scholars who showed in the 1980s and 1990s that international institutions and regimes are 
not mere epiphenomena (e.g. International Organization, 1982 vol. 36, no. 2), this doctoral 
thesis gives rise to the conviction that diplomatic design is a “stand-alone explanation” of 
autonomous analytical power.  
6.1.1.1 Diplomatic Design & Alternative Explanations  
NRN and its diplomatic design was the most important explanation for the Qaddafi regime’s 
nuclear reversal. Other explanations for nuclear reversal played no or only a limited role. 
Even the most prominent alternative factors (i.e. ideational shifts and liberal explanations) 
could have – when taken in isolation – not explained the Qaddafi regime’s successful 
disarmament. Already the bare numbers speak in favor for our assumption. In the 23 years 
of the American-Libyan struggle on the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapons program, we 
counted 20 design elements but only five structural factors and three non-diplomatic 
interventions. That finding is supporting the general historic assumption that in the post-
Cold War era nuclear reversal was first and foremost a “negotiated phenomenon”. Without 
a profound comprehension of NRN, we are unable to understand why and how atomic 
renegade states reverse their nuclear weapons program and (re)turn to the global nuclear 
order.  
But diplomatic design was not only the most important driver when compared to the 
alternative explanations for nuclear reversal (discussed in section A below). It was also the 
dominant factor within the logic of diplomacy. Other explanations for diplomatic success 
often discussed in negotiation research – such as number of participants, “veil of 
uncertainty”, or the “shadow of the future” – were irrelevant or did not apply in the Libyan 
case (discussed in section B below). 
A) Alternative Explanations for Nuclear Reversal  
Technology based, neorealist, ideational, and liberal approaches are certainly the most 
important alternative explanations for nuclear reversal. We have briefly described these 
concepts in the setup chapter (ch. 2.2.1). Now we will discuss why they were not or only 
partly applying in the Libya case.  
(i) Technological Explanations: Technological explanations have traditionally played an 
important part in the nuclear policy field (see the “technological pull theory”). In that view, 
nuclear reversal is attributed to the severe technological and management problems that 
atomic renegade states face when attempting to pursue a nuclear weapons program.  
The Libyan nuclear weapons program was constantly haunted by technological setbacks 
and failures (ch. 5.1.2). When it was dismantled in 2004, it was still in an “embryonic state” 
and several years away from crossing the “nuclear threshold”. However, technological or 
managerial problems are nevertheless unlikely to explain Tripoli’s nuclear reversal. On the 
contrary, the years that immediately preceded Libya’s nuclear reversal represent the most 
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successful period in the entire history of the Qaddafi regime’s weapons program. Due to 
the support from the A.Q. Khan network, Tripoli was able to accelerate its proliferation 
efforts. The Libyan nuclear weapons program witnessed considerable progress at that time. 
From Tripoli’s perspective, the chance to cross the “nuclear threshold” in the foreseeable 
future was never better than in the early 2000s (Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities 2005; see also ch. 5.1.2). 
(ii) Neo-Realism: Although the key approach for proliferation and not for deprolifeation – 
neo-realism has also a say in nuclear reversal (ch. 2.2.1). It is for example said that when the 
external threats, which once gave rise to a nuclear weapons program, start to decrease, 
atomic renegades will consider abandoning their nuclear endeavors.  
The Qaddafi regime indeed witnessed a reduction of external pressure starting in the early 
1990s. At that time, the Clinton administration halted the U.S. efforts to topple Muammar 
al-Qaddafi – an objective Ronald Ragan and George H.W. Bush had pursued, among other 
strategic goals, in their foreign policy towards the North African country (ch. 5.2.1.2). 
However, Tripoli’s threat perception vis-à-vis the United States was constantly relatively 
high. Before 2004, the North African county was, in effect, always in a “state of alert”. Even 
in the fall of 2003 when the final agreement on Libya’s WMD programs was within close 
reach, Muammar al-Qaddafi was reportedly very concerned given the U.S. lead Iraq 
intervention. There is, for example, solid ground to assume that the capture of Saddam 
Hussein in early December 2003 in particular inflamed the Libyan leaders’ concerns and 
was decreased his willingness to cooperate with the United States on WMD (ch. 5.3.4.2).  
However, it would be likewise misleading to interpret Libya’s threat perception as proof for 
the second neo-realist explanation of nuclear reversal. Several neo-realist scholars have 
argued that running a nuclear weapons program is risky since it renders the atomic 
renegade state vulnerable to military counter-proliferation measures. In order to avoid this 
danger, nuclear reversal is a viable option, these authors say (ch. 2.2.1). Certainly, 
Muammar al-Qaddafi and his close entourage were concerned by the U.S. power politics in 
the region. However, the Second Iraq War is still unlikely to be an explanation for Libya’s 
nuclear reversal – although that was often the argument of neo-conservative analysts (ch. 
5.3.2.2 and ch. 5.3.5.2). Apart from the fact that the “show of force” argument neglects 
more than a decade of American-Libyan diplomatic struggles which was kicked-off by 
Tripoli starting in the early 1990s (ch. 5.1.1), the U.S. lead intervention to topple Saddam 
Hussein was – in all probability – too distant to increase Tripoli’s threat perception beyond 
the existing high state of alert. The “Iraqi theater” was several thousand kilometers away 
from Libya’s border. Washington had not issued any concrete military threats against 
Tripoli at that time, and apart from the Gulf Region, U.S. troops were not significantly 
amassed in other parts of the Middle East in 2003.396 
                            
396
 Moreover, the argument that Libya chose nuclear reversal because of fear in the early 2000’s, is also 
unlikely when we apply a historic perspective. The only time that the Qaddafi regime witnessed a tangible 
military attack was when the Presidency of Ronald Reagan ordered the Operation El Dorado Canyon in 
April 1986. However, this military strike had not cooled down Tripoli’s efforts to acquire an atomic bomb 
but had instead considerably inflamed Libya’s nuclear ambition (ch. 5.3.1.2).  
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(iii) Ideational Explanations: However, in light of the ideational explanations, it is likewise 
incorrect to assume that the Second Iraq War was completely irrelevant for Libya’s nuclear 
reversal – an argument that was made by a series of scholars (e.g. Indyk 2004a; Indyk 
2004b; Leverett 2004; Müller 2006). Instead, it is one of the counter-intuitive findings of 
our PhD project stemming directly from the innovative powers of the fit approach that the 
U.S. lead intervention had a considerable impact – although quite different from the “show 
of force” argument. The Iraq War did not move Libya into disarmament but instead was a 
crucial factor that pulled the Bush junior administration into a diplomatic engagement with 
the Qaddafi regime (ch. 5.3.2.2). By spring 2003, the intervention to topple Saddam Hussein 
became Washington’s major power project and initiated a shift in U.S. policy towards Libya. 
In light of the Iraq war, the diplomatic engagement with the Qaddafi regime on WMD, 
which Washington had refused throughout the 1990s, became a desirable project 
supportive to the broader U.S. Middle East strategy. The “Iraq War linkage” was in that 
sense an ideational explanation that affected the Bush junior administration’s decision-
making towards the end of the pre-negotiation phase.   
The second ideational explanation was the gradual alternation of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s 
worldview, which took place between the late 1980s and early 1990s, steering Libya’s 
foreign policy towards a more cooperative and less hostile course, which made Tripoli more 
inclined to negotiate with the United States (ch. 5.2.1.1). The alternation in Muammar al-
Qaddafi’s “operational code” was an important variable for Tripoli’s intensive backdoor 
channel initiative launched by spring 1992 with the objective to start a diplomatic process 
on a series of issues, including WMD.  
Certainly, without these two ideational explanations, we would have been unable to 
understand the nature of the pre-negotiation phase of the American-Libyan bargaining 
dynamic. Both ideational explanations played a meaningful role in the resolution of the two 
strategic games that underpin that phase (i.e. the Deadlock Game and the Imposed 
Deadlock Game). However, ideational explanations neither dominated the NRN nor were 
they responsible for the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear reversal. Consequentially, it is an 
exaggeration to say that Libya’s denuclearization could have been achieved already in the 
1990s if the United States had only agreed to the Libyan proposal for direct talks (e.g. 
Müller 2006). Instead, when taken in isolation, the effect of these two ideational 
explanations is rather limited. Ideational factors exerted an impact on the NRN process 
because they were supported and flanked by design elements. The shift in Washington’s 
strategic desires that made the diplomatic engagement an element in the U.S. broader 
politics with the Middle East in general and to the Iraq War in particular, was, for example, 
supported by British mediation efforts including a personal intercession by Tony Blair (ch. 
5.3.2.2). And despite a more cooperative Libyan foreign policy expressed by the alternation 
in Muammar al-Qaddafi’s world view, Tripoli was only propelled to take concrete actions 
towards a diplomatic engagement when it was confronted by multilateral sanctions in 
spring 1992 (ch. 5.3.2.2).   
(iv) Liberal Explanations: Like ideational factors, a liberal explanation played a certain role 
in the early phase of the American-Libyan negotiation process. In response to ongoing 
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socio-economic crises, which Libya witnessed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series of 
reforms were undertaken – the so-called “Libyan Perestroika” (ch. 5.3.1.2). Several steps 
were undertaken to liberalize and privatize the Libyan economy. Likewise, the harsh 
suppression Libya witnessed in the 1980s was at that time at least partially relaxed. These 
reform efforts were supported by a group of protagonists in the power circles of the 
Qaddafi regime, that had a “pro economy” and “outward-looking” perspective (Solingen 
2007: ch. 10) and were arguing in favor of a more cooperative stance towards the West. 
Apart from Saif al-Islam, the second oldest son of Muammar al-Qaddafi who was, during 
the 1990s and 2000s, regarded by many observers as his father’s potential successor, Prime 
Minister Shukri Ghanem was assumed to be the second key figure of this reformist branch.  
In our analysis, we found that these internal shifts had, in all probability, a positive impact 
on Tripoli’ decision making in the early 1990s and were working in parallel with the 
ideational changes in Muammar al-Qaddafi’s world view (ch. 5.3.1.2). However, similar to 
the ideational factors, the impact of the liberal explanation was too limited. When taken in 
isolation, these factors could likewise not explain the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear reversal. The 
changes in the internal structures of the Qaddafi regime never went far enough to have 
meaningful implications. When the Qaddafi regime was toppled in 2011, it was still a harsh 
dictatorship. Its socio-economy system was still primarily state controlled and subjected to 
intensive inference by political players. Moreover, the reform-oriented members of the 
Qaddafi regime (e.g. Saif al-Islam or the Libyan Prime Minister Shukri Ghanem) never 
developed a sufficient political cloud to influence the general strategic course of Libya’s 
foreign policy. In particular, in security-related issues – such as Libya’s nuclear weapons 
program – Muammar al-Qaddafi remained the central and uncontested decision maker (ch. 
5.2.1).  
B) Alternative Explanations for Diplomatic Success  
Successful NRN was the central explanation for nuclear reversal and diplomatic design was 
the central explanations for successful NRN. Although far from perfect, the totality of 
design elements that were operating during the 23 years of the American-Libyan 
negotiation process satisfied the “optimal problem solution” identified with the help of the 
fit taxonomy. As we will show in this section, alternative explanations for this negotiation 
success were irrelevant and were not applied.  
(i) Number of Participants: An important design-independent explanation for negotiation 
success often discussed in the literature is the number of participants, who take part in the 
bargaining processes (e.g. Olson & Zeckhauser 1966; Oye 1986: 18-22; Wanis-St. John & 
Dupont 2012: 205-210). Most scholars point out that the transaction costs increase with 
the growing number of actors and that cooperation becomes more difficult. Reductions in 
the number of participants is therefore an important explanation for “diplomatic success”.  
However, this factor did not apply in the Libyan NRN. The bargaining process had, first and 
foremost, a bilateral character with the Qaddafi regime and the United States signifying the 
primary negotiation parties. Moreover, when the diplomatic engagement turned towards a 
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more cooperative mode by spring 2003, the number of participants was increased instead 
of decreased. In the pre-agreement and agreement phase, the U.K. became an important 
player in the negotiation process in its role as “biased mediator”. And during the post-
agreement phase – the most benign episode of the NRN process – the number of 
participants was further enlarged when starting by early 2004 in the IAEA but also the 
OPCW became involved in the bargaining dynamics on the implementation of Libya’s 
disarmament.  
(ii) Veil of Uncertainty: Another alternative explanation for negotiation success is the so-
called “veil of uncertainty” (e.g. Oshrenko & Young 1993: 13; see also: Brennan & Buchanan 
1985: 28-31). When actors are unable to foresee how a negotiation outcome might affect 
their own interest over time, they are more likely to apply an integrative instead of a 
distributive bargaining strategy. According to this approach, these actors become more 
inclined to formulate provisions that are fair or equitable.  
While this argument might apply to negotiation dynamics in general, it was irrelevant in the 
Libyan case. Since Tripoli’s nuclear weapons program was illegal and violated the principles 
and norms of the NPT, it was relatively clear to the members of the Qaddafi regime that 
complete disarmament was the only possible outcome of a successful negotiation process 
with the United States. In that sense, there was no “veil of uncertainty” regarding the 
consequence of the American-Libyan engagement on Tripoli’s nuclear weapons program.  
(iii) Shadow of the Future: Finally, the often-discussed “shadow of the future” concept 
represents another important design-independent explanation for successful bargaining 
dynamics (e.g. Axelrod 1987; Oye 1986: 12-18). The major argument of this approach is that 
the likelihood of cooperation is increasing when actors are expecting future interactions.  
At first sight, this explanation appears to be relatively convincing for the Libya case, given 
that the negotiation dynamic was constantly improving over the years and the two parties 
were moving, step-by-step, from a hostile constellation to a relatively benign situation. 
However, a closer look reveals that this approach is likewise useless for the Libyan case and 
is unable to “dethrone” diplomatic design as the key driver for the successful NRN process.  
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Table 6: Overview on Diplomatic Design Elements 
 
First, the “shadow of the future” argument only applies when the involved parties expect 
continued interactions within the same strategic setting – conventionally expressed by a 
stable payoff structure (Oye 1986: 12; see also: Telsor 1980). Since the payoff structures 
were changing in the American-Libyan negotiations when the bargaining dynamic moved 
through the “five-stages cascade” of social dilemmas, this pre-condition is clearly not met. 
Second, the “shadow of the future” explanation is not universally valid. While it was found 
to promote cooperation in PD and Stag Hunt Games (e.g. Oye 1986a), it is believed to have 
even been counter-productive in Chicken Games (Goldstein 2010). As we have explained in 
the case study (ch. 5.3.1.1 and ch. 5.3.2.1), strategic iteration and the outlook of future 
interactions are also assumed to have negative implications for the Deadlock Game and its 
different subtypes (including the Imposed Deadlock Game) which dominated the 
procedural problem dimension in the Libyan case during the 16 years of the pre-negotiation 
phase. Under the antagonistic situation of these game constellations, iterated strategic 
interactions are likely to deepen the deadlock scenario and promote the perception that 
confrontation is a normal “form of living” and the “natural choice” from which the 
discussed players could not escape anyway. 
6.1.1.2 Varieties of (Mis)Fit 
However, although NRN and its design were the major explanations for Qaddafi regime’s 
nuclear reversal, the picture of this overall success becomes more amorphous as soon as 
we start to explore the performance of the individual design elements. When we dive into 
more detail, we encounter very distinct “varieties of (mis)fits”. While the high general 
performance was the primary characteristic of diplomatic design in the Libyan case, it is 
safe to say that variation was its second major feature. The U.S.-Libyan negotiations were in 
essence a “patchwork rug” where well-matching design elements were followed by 
interventions that were weak, indifferent, and ineffective, or even counter-productive. 
Tellingly, if we look through a quantitative lens on the performance of diplomatic design, 
Fit Overfit Partial Fit Underfit Misfit Negativ Fit 
Coercive Diplomacy 1 3 3
Multilateral Sanctions (ch. 5.3.2.2) ● ●
U.S. Military Threats (ch. 5.3.1.2) ● ● ●
U.S. Naming & Blaming  (ch. 5.3.1.2) ●
U.S. Unilateral Sanctions (ch. 5.3.1.2) ●
Inducements & Positiv Incentives 2 5 1
Libya's Charm Offensive (ch. 5.3.1.2) ● ●
Disarmament Accord (ch. 5.3.4.2) ● ●●
The Implementation of the Disarmament Accord (ch. 5.3.5.2) ● ●●
Third Party Interventions 3 2 2
Mediation by Arab States (ch. 5.3.1.2) ●●
UK mediation efforts (ch. 5.3.2.2, ch. 5.3.3.2, and ch. 5.3.4.2) ●●● ●●
Structure of the Diplomatic Process 5 2 2 1
Quiet Diplomacy (ch. 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.3.2) ●● ●●
Diplomatic Velocity (ch. 5.3.4.2) ●
Choreography of the Public Announcement (ch. 5.3.4.2) ●
Washington's Quid Pro Quo Approach (ch. 5.3.5.2) ● ●
Communication Channel on Implementation (ch. 5.3.5.2) ●●
Confidence Building Measures 3 1 2
Handling of the BBC China Interception (ch. 5.3.3.2) ●●
Technical visits to Libya's WMD sites (ch. 5.3.3.2) ● ●
Lockerbie Talks (ch. 5.3.2.2) ● ●
Total 11 3 4 5 11 4
● = number of individual (mis)ﬁt impacts 
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we find that those design elements that were ranked as fits represent an equally large 
group than those evaluated as misfits (eleven cases each) (Table 6).  
Given that we have already elaborated on the nature of the individual design elements in 
detail in the case study, here in the conclusion, we will not be repetitive. Instead of focusing 
on individual design elements, we will try to decipher common patterns within the 
“varieties of (mis)fit”. The variations in the diplomatic design’s “fit performance” that are, 
in our view, most interesting and revealing are (A) the five uneven categories of diplomatic 
design (B) the varying causal pathways of individual design elements (C) the dissimilar 
resolution of the procedural and substantial problem dimension (D) the shortcomings in 
settling the colliding interest and the injustice trap, and (E) the variations between sender 
and receiver of diplomatic design. We will discuss these aspects in the following section. 
A) Five Uneven Categories of Design Elements 
For the sake of systematization, we have grouped the 20 individual design elements into 
five broader categories often discussed in IR literature (coercive diplomacy, inducements & 
positive incentives, mediation & third party interventions, design elements related to the 
structure of the diplomatic process, and confidence building measures). Apart from 
revealing that the U.S.-Libyan bargaining dynamic saw manifold and diverse design 
elements and was not dominated by a particular negotiation pattern, this five-tier 
systematization discloses that the performance between the different categories varied 
widely (Table 6).  
Coercive diplomacy (i.e. military force, economic sanctions, and naming and blaming 
strategies) was among the five categories of the group of diplomatic design elements with 
the lowest “fit performance”. The Libyan case is therefore supporting the mainstream IR 
view that coercive diplomacy is in general not working (e.g. Haas 1997, Gause 1999, 
Mueller & Mueller 1999; Nurnber 2009). Misfits were dominant and a single underfit was 
the best achievement the different coercive design elements contributed to the Libyan-
American bargaining process. But coercive diplomatic design was not only found to be in 
most of the cases ineffective and inefficient. We also revealed that it represents the group 
with the highest proportion of negative fits among the different categories of design 
element. When applying coercive design elements, the danger was high that these tools 
provoke counter-productive consequences and in essence make the problem they aim to 
resolve even more complicated (Table 6). 
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Table 7: Diplomatic Design Elements with Varying and Complex Causal Pathways  
 
In terms of its overall performance, the category of positive inducement achieved only 
slightly better results.397 Misfits were clearly dominating the picture and we even 
encountered a negative fit (Table 6). That incentives were found in the “hard case” of the 
Libyan NRN to have an overall “fit performance” similarly as weak as coercive diplomacy, is 
particularly problematic for all those analysts who think foreign policy tools merely along 
the dichotomous categories of “carrots and sticks”.  
Another aspect that is noteworthy about positive inducement – apart from its similarity to 
coercive diplomacy – is the “outlier structure” in its “fit performance” (Table 7). While the 
majority of design elements had mainly indifferent or negative implications, we encounter 
two overfits in this category – the rare constellation where an impact factor is effective but, 
in terms of efficiency, widely overdosed for the actual problem resolution.398 
While positive inducements were marked by an “outlier structure”, third party 
interventions and process related design elements were found to have a “bifurcated fit 
performance”. Both categories achieved relatively solid results in the sense that around half 
the individual design elements were evaluated as fits (Table 6). However, despite high 
performing potentials, both categories are characterized by an equally strong cluster of 
ineffective or inefficient design elements.  
Among the different categories of design elements, confidence building measures were 
found to have operated relatively efficiently and effectively in the specific setting of the 
Libyan NRN. While not every design element yielded a fit, the overall performance was 
relatively high and showed neither outliers nor bifurcations (Table 6).  
                            
397
 Note that we have grouped the disarmament accord of December 2003 as well as its implementation 
into the category of “positive inducement” since both were – when seen in a broader perspective – 
primarily about initiating a rapprochement between the United States and Libya which could be 
understood as the overarching incentive for the entire negotiation dynamic.  
398
 The outlier structure as well as the similarity to coercive diplomacy represents important factors which 
will later (ch. 6.1.2.1) bolster our argument that the impact of positive inducement is, in essence, akin to a 
premodern “cannonball”. 
Fit Overfit Partial Fit Underfit Misfit Negativ Fit Design Category 
Multiple Mismatching Design Elements 1 5 3
Multilateral Sanctions (ch. 5.3.2.2) ● ● Coercive Diplomacy
U.S. Military Threats (ch. 5.3.1.2) ● ● ● Coercive Diplomacy
Libya's Charm Offensive (ch. 5.3.1.2) ● ● Coercive Diplomacy
Mediation by Arab States (ch. 5.3.1.2) ●● Positive Inducement
Multiple Matching Design Elements 5 1 2
Communication Channel on Implementation (ch. 5.3.5.2) ●● Process Related Design Element 
Handling of the BBC China Interception (ch. 5.3.3.2) ●● Confidence Building Measures 
Technical visits to Libya's WMD sites (ch. 5.3.3.2) ● ● Confidence Building Measures 
Lockerbie Talks (ch. 5.3.2.2) ● ● Confidence Building Measures 
Ambiguous Design Elements 4 2 5
Washington's Quid Pro Quo Approach (ch. 5.3.5.2) ● ● Process Related Design Element 
UK mediation efforts (ch. 5.3.2.2, ch. 5.3.3.2, and ch. 5.3.4.2) ●●● ●●
Disarmament Accord (ch. 5.3.4.2) ● ●● Positive Inducement 
The Implementation of the Disarmament Accord (ch. 5.3.5.2) ● ●● Positive Inducement 
Evergreen Design Elements 3 2 4
UK mediation efforts (ch. 5.3.2.2, ch. 5.3.3.2, and ch. 5.3.4.2) ●●● ●● Mediation 
Quiet Diplomacy (ch. 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.3.2) ●● ●● Process Related Design Element 
● = number of individual (mis)ﬁt impacts 
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B) Varyiable & Complex Causal Pathways  
Looking beyond the just discussed categories and specifying more on the causal pathways 
of the individual design elements, we encounter additional variations in the “fit 
performance”. In essence, most of the design elements we studied in the Libyan NRN were 
marked by complex and multilayered causation. The most interesting causal pathways were 
the multiple and ambiguous (mis)fits as well as evergreen matches (Table 7). 
Multiple (mis)matches are causal pathways that not only address one particular negotiation 
problem, but have instead several – either positive or negative – implications for a given 
negotiation dynamic. The interception of the BBC China and its diplomatic handling 
signified a multiple match, for example. This design element had positive implications in 
terms of trust building, but it also increased the Qaddafi regime’s interest in cooperation 
with the United States on nuclear disarmament and encouraged Tripoli to take the first step 
in that direction (ch. 5.3.3.2). In totality, multiple matches were as common as multiple 
mismatches – a category of particular problematic diplomatic design which included 
diplomatic tools such as the U.N. sanctions (ch. 5.3.2.2), Libya’s charm offensive in the late 
1980s (ch. 5.3.1.2), or the hapless mediation efforts by Arab states (ch. 5.3.1.2) (Table 7). 
Evergreen matches are causal pathways that have positive implications over time and 
provide contributions to the resolution of negotiation problems not just in one but across 
several bargaining phases. It is less their frequency or their impact intensity that makes 
these types of design elements particular, but rather their stabile and constant 
performance.399 Quiet diplomacy represents, for example, an evergreen match (Table 7). It 
was not only conductive for the efforts to overcome the Imposed Deadlock Game in the 
pre-negotiation phase (1990 - 2003) but also contributed to resolve the Alibi Game in the 
following pre-agreement phase (April - December 2003) (ch. 5.3.2 and ch. 5.3.3).  
Ambiguous (mis)matches (or backfiring (mis)matches) instead represented causal pathways 
of design elements with opposite implications either for the involved negotiating parties or 
for the different negotiation phases. Ambiguous (mis)matches therefore often have the 
character of zero-sum instruments since the positive effects they provide to one 
negotiation party are the logical consequence of the negative implications they have for 
their counterparts. The quid pro quo approach which the United States applied during the 
post-agreement phase (2004-2011) would, for example, fall into this category (ch. 5.3.5.1). 
However, ambiguous (mis)matches go beyond the conventional idea of zero-sum or 
distributive bargaining strategies, since they also cover “echo effects”. That is when, for 
example, a misfitting impact factor is transformed over time into a fitting design element – 
and vice versa.400  
                            
399
 While there is, in theory, the possibility of evergreen mismatches, we have encountered no design 
element in the Libyan NRN that would fall into this particular category.  
400
 Take, for example, London’s mediation efforts. While this design element had, during most parts of the 
negotiation dynamic, a relative high “fit performance”, the U.K.’s role as a mediator suffered a set-back 
during the pre-agreement phase (April - December 2003) when this well-fitting diplomatic tool was turned 
into an underfit instrument – only to regain its strength in the following agreement phase (December 
2003) (ch. 5.3.2.2, ch. 5.3.3.2, and ch. 5.3.4.2).  
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C) Dissimilar Resolution of the Procedural and Substantial Problem Dimensions  
If we evaluate the diplomatic design with regard to the two central problem dimensions 
(i.e. substantial and procedural negotiation problem dimension), we encounter further 
variations in terms of “fit performance”. While the procedural negotiation problems were 
relatively convincingly resolved, the performance in terms of the substantial problem 
dimension was rather weak. While the two parties managed to move through the five-stage 
cascade of social traps step-by-step and were even able to overcome such challenging 
strategic constellations like the Impose Deadlock Game, they achieved only a partial 
resolution of the Libyan nuclear bad. Certainly, Tripoli’s nuclear weapons program was 
swiftly dismantled. However, due to the inappropriate resolution of the substantial 
problem dimension, the WMD issue remained an obstacle in the slowly improving 
American-Libyan relation after 2004 (ch. 5.3.5).  
Table 8: Fit Performance in the Substantial & Procedural Problem Dimension 
 
 
The dissimilar resolution of the procedural and substantial negotiation problem is clearly 
visible when we look at the number of the applied design elements. While we counted 17 
individual design elements addressing the operational challenges the Qaddafi regime and 
the United States faced during the negotiation process, we found only five diplomatic 
impact factors directed towards the Libyan nuclear bad.  
In addition, the dissimilarity in the resolution of the two central problem dimensions has 
not only a quantitative but also a qualitative aspect. In relation to the absolute numbers of 
design elements applied, the “fit performance” varies strongly. We found that the 
intervention applied towards the substantial negotiation problem was proportionally more 
often marked by a misfit than with regard to the procedural problem dimension (Table 8).  
Of course, we could name some reason for this dissimilarity. Substantial problems are often 
more difficult and challenging to resolve than the various procedural problems negotiating 
parties face during the bargaining process. Before the United States and Libya were able to 
move on to address the nuclear bad, they at first had to develop a solid relationship which 
was expressed in game-theoretical terms by the step-by-step passage through the five-
stage cascade of social traps. Consequentially, it was only during the pre-agreement phase 
(April - December 2003) that the substantial problem dimension moved into the focus of 
the negotiating parties. In the previous pre-negotiation phase, the nuclear bad was, at best, 
only relevant in the form of preventive measures (ch. 5.3.1 and ch. 5.3.2).  
Obviously, the varying performance of diplomatic design regarding these two essential 
problem dimensions is an annoying finding for all those practitioners and academics who 
are – implicitly or explicitly – inspired by the assumption that bargaining and diplomacy is, 
Fit Overfit Partial Fit Underfit Misfit Negativ Fit 
Substantial Problem Dimension ● ●● ● ●●●● ●
Procedural Problem Dimension ●●●●●●●●●● ● ●●● ●●●●● ●●●●●●● ●●●
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in essence, the “engine room” of today’s inter- and transnational affairs capable of 
providing solutions to all different types of problems. While the Libyan NRN were a 
“success story”, the shaky “fit performance” with regard to the substantial problem 
dimension could nevertheless nourish the traditional suspicion against diplomacy 
entertained by many experts in international security policy. It fuels the conventional 
argument that diplomacy – in comparison to non-diplomatic interventions (first and 
foremost, military force) – is likely to fail when asked to handle “real global issues” that go 
beyond mere operational challenges.401  
D) Shortcomings in Settling the Colliding Interest and the Injustice Trap  
If we study the “fit performance” in light of the three social traps, which – apart from the 
two problem dimensions – represent a crucial element of our fit taxonomy, we encounter 
additional “varieties of (mis)fit”. We found that the distrust trap was – aside from some 
exceptions (see Table 9) – relatively convincingly resolved. In the Libyan NRN, diplomatic 
design elements – not just those we have grouped into the category of confidence building 
measures – were relatively conductive in allaying distrust and suspicion among the 
negotiation parties.  
Table 9: Varying Performance regarding the three Social Traps 
 
 
However, the positive implications with regard to distrust stands in stark contrast to the “fit 
performance” we revealed with regards to the injustice trap. (In)justice – operationalized in 
our PhD project by the public bad approach and the idea of the “good production chain” – 
was basically not on the agenda in the American-Libyan negotiations. We encountered only 
two misfitting interventions that were addressing this particular social trap (Table 9). Many 
of the problems that haunted the bargaining dynamics in the post-agreement phase (2004-
2011) were associated with an omission to address the injustice trap. While the magnitude 
of this failure is stunning, the fact that diplomatic design was unable to resolve unjust and 
unfair situations is, by itself less puzzling. That inter- and transnational negotiations have a 
“justice problem” was widely discussed in the relevant literature in recent years (e.g. Müller 
& Druckman 2014; see also ch. 3.3.2). In light of the prohibitive nature of NRN, the 
persistence of injustice is even logical and understandable. The idea that an atomic 
                            
401
 Although the dissimilar problem resolution does not belittle the fact that Libya was “won” by 
diplomacy, it nevertheless points to the danger that negotiations have a tendency of becoming self-
referential instruments. Above, we explained that procedural negotiation problems signify management 
problems that occur during the attempt to resolve the real, tangible issue – the substantial problems. But 
smooth, streamlined, and well-functioning management is only cold comfort, if it is not yielding any 
further impact. It is relatively evident that the successful handling of operational management problems is 
of little value by itself if substantial problems continue to prevail.  
Fit Overfit Partial Fit Underfit Misfit Negativ Fit 
Colliding Interest Trap ●● ●● ● ● ●●●●●●● ●●
Distrust Trap ●●●●●●●● ● ●●● ●●●● ●● ●
Injustice Trap ●●
● = number of individual (mis)fit impacts 
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renegade state, who has violated the NPT for decades and has contested the global nuclear 
order, might be entitled to receive a suitable substitution that fills the gap caused by the 
dismantled nuclear weapons program, is difficult to conceive of and even more challenging 
to implement – in particular, when the negotiation parties have a tense and hostile 
relationship.  
While the failure in terms of the injustice trap is understandable, the poor performance 
with regard to the colliding interest trap is a real surprise. Although the conflicting interests 
between Libya and the United States were addressed by many design elements, the actual 
impact was low and haunted by misfits (Table 9). The “fit performance” towards the 
colliding interest trap clearly lagged behind the achieved resolution of the distrust trap. 
Unlike the “(in)justice problem”, the literature on trans- and international negotiation does 
not suggest that diplomatic design would be weak in terms of resolving interest conflicts. 
On the contrary, the idea of the colliding interest trap and the chance to resolve it by 
diplomatic interventions, it is situated at the very heart of negotiation research (ch. 3.3.2).  
E) Variations between Sender and Receiver of Diplomatic Design  
Turning to the negotiating parties, we find additional varieties in the performance of 
diplomatic design. First, the Qaddafi regime was the primary addressee of the different 
diplomatic impact factors applied during the American-Libyan negotiations. Given that 
Libya was the atomic renegade who had to reverse its nuclear bad, it is little astonishing 
that the North African country received considerably more diplomatic interventions (17) 
than the United States (12) (Annex 14). However, not only in absolute numbers also with 
regard to the “fit performance”, we saw considerable variations between the two 
negotiation parties. The design elements applied towards Washington were less often 
marked by misfits and negative fits and saw proportionally more underfits and partial fits – 
two categories that played with regard to Libya almost no role (Annex 14). 
If we look upon the sender and initiator of diplomatic design, the variety in terms of 
performance becomes even more pronounced.402 We find that the Qaddafi regime was 
strikingly inactive. Apart from a single instrument (i.e. Tripoli’s failed charm offensive in the 
late 1980s, ch. 5.3.1.2) and the series of back-door initiatives Tripoli launched through 
various intermediaries starting in spring 1992, we saw no autonomous Libyan efforts to 
shape and influence the negotiation dynamic with the United States (Annex 15). Libya’s 
diplomatic actions were limited to design elements that the North African country 
“initiated” together with the United States. On the one hand, Tripoli’s strategic lethargy is 
astonishing given that it stood in stark contrast to the adventurous and ambitions activities 
the Qaddafi regime showed in other fields of its foreign policy. On the other hand, Libya 
was often bestowed with a very favorable strategic position in the bargaining process with 
                            
402
 Of course, diplomatic design does not require purposeful initiation. As we have discussed in the Setup 
chapter, it is this particularity that makes diplomatic design distinct from alternative concepts such as 
“policy tools” or “governance instruments” (ch. 2.3). Nevertheless diplomatic design is a malleable man-
made structure. Design elements do not fall from the sky but have “designers” who – deliberately or 
unconsciously – initiate design elements. 
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the United States that, in theory, gave the North African country a powerful position to 
dominate the negotiations – a leverage Tripoli had not made use of.403  
6.1.1.3 The Evaluative Performance of the Fit Taxonomy  
We said above that the summary on the “backward-looking analysis” would be incomplete 
if we do not discuss the strength of the fit taxonomy. After all, it was primarily because of 
the fit taxonomy that we were able to develop a new narrative on Libya’s nuclear reversal. 
While we will elaborate in this section on the evaluative performance of the fit taxonomy 
(how accurate it analyzed the “fit performance” of diplomatic design), we will discuss in the 
following section (ch. 6.1.1.4) the explorative and innovative capacity of this model (how it 
opened up new perspectives on diplomatic design and negotiation dynamics).  
In methodic terms, fit taxonomies are analytical models.404 Consequentially, all that is said 
in the literature about evaluating analytical models is relevant for our effort to assess the 
evaluative capabilities of fit taxonomies.  
Scholars who want to clarify the nature of academic models often refer to maps (e.g. Clarke 
& Primo 2007: 742; Snidal 2004: 227-8). Like a map, a model is a “simplified picture of a 
part of real world” (March & Lave 1975). Maps and models do not represent social reality in 
totality but radically reduce complexity and isolate key factors that are of specific 
importance for their particular users. Like maps, models vary widely depending on their 
purpose and their scope of applicability.405 Like maps, the primary question we ask when 
                            
403
 The strategic lethargy is remarkable in the pre-agreement in particular (ch. 5.3.3) and the agreement 
phase (ch. 5.3.4) when Libya was the alibi player and had therefore considerable strategic leverage to 
shape the negotiation dynamics in its favor.  
404
 Elaborating the evaluative performance of our fit taxonomy provides a good opportunity to 
recapitulate the various reasons why we made the effort to build this relatively complex model. 
Throughout our PhD project, we have discussed the different implications of this model. Now in the 
conclusion, it seems appropriate – for the sake of clarity – to summarize these different reasons. The fit 
taxonomy is a “multiple-purpose tool” with four distinct implications: First and most obviously, the fit 
taxonomy is mandatory for the application fit approach. Without a concise scheme to analyze a given 
problem structure and thereby identify the “optimal problem solution”, we are unable to study the 
“problem of fit”. Second, the fit taxonomy is also essential in light of the policy paradigm’s since it 
functions as a “prescriptive scheme” allowing us to identify well-matching diplomatic interventions to 
resolve current or future proliferation crises. Similar to construction manuals which are essential for the 
proper do-it-yourselfer handicraft for weekend repairs at one’s own property, “prescriptive schemes” are 
compulsory to formulate policy recommendations. Without guidance by “prescriptive schemes”, IR 
scholars as well as foreign policy practitioners would be either overwhelmed by the wide range of 
strategic opportunities or are prone to fall easy prey to misinterpretation and misperception of the actual 
problems they are asked to resolve. Third, the fit taxonomy has also methodic implications. In the method 
chapter (ch. 4.1), we explained that theoretical models are important when studying complex causal 
relations by the “process tracing technique”. By specifying cause-effect relations, narrowing down the 
critical aspects for the causal process which need to be studied in detail, and by listing a series of 
alternative explanations, the fit taxonomy was streamline our “process tracing” and help to avoid 
analytical errors (such as equi-finality, multi-finality or false causality, see footnote 42, Set Up ch.XXX). 
Finally, theoretical models are also essential in light of our overarching meta-theoretical position – 
Scientific Realism. It is one of the central claims of Scientific Realists that social reality is constituted of 
“ideas all the way down” (Wendt 1999: 68) and “that the objects under investigation in the social sciences 
are irreducible theoretically (Jackson 2008: 140). Our fit taxonomy which builds on different theories and 
analytical approaches is implementing this view.  
405
 For example, a topographical map, which contains relatively detailed spatial information (e.g. altitude, 
planting, settlement areas, and traffic route), is clearly distinct from a simple and plain metro map. 
Similarly, we encounter sophisticated formal mathematical models in IR (e.g. models axiomatic game 
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evaluating the performance of a model is not whether it is “true” or “false” but whether it 
is similar to the outside world.406 The performance of models – like those of maps – is first 
and foremost measured by their accuracy. When we speak about the “testing” of models, 
we mean probing its accuracy. Do models correctly represent the “slice of reality” that they 
claim to describe? Is the model coherent with our observation of reality?  
The testing of models is the conventional view strongly associated with regression analysis 
(Clarke & Primo 2007: 741). Given that large-N statistical tests of a model’s accuracy lead to 
generalizable and representative findings, this preference is logical and understandable. 
However, although running regression analysis is desirable in general, it would be 
misleading to assume that the similarity between an analytical model and social reality 
could per se only be evaluated with the help of quantitative methods. Qualitative methods 
– such as small or single case studies – do also apply. For example, tourists are able to 
verify, by a single stroll through the alleys of an unknown city, whether their city plan is 
accurate or not.407 The same logic is also relevant for analytical models – such as our fit 
taxonomy.  
But while there is nothing wrong with exploring the accuracy of our fit taxonomy within the 
narrow frame of the Libyan NRN case, the practical question is: how exactly do we assess 
the coherence between our fit taxonomy and our real-world observations of the American-
Libyan negotiation process? We suggest a test that compares the fit taxonomy’s prediction 
with the real-world observations we made based on the historic evidence about the 
development of the Libyan-American negotiation process (i.e. “observation-prediction 
coherence”).  
The “optimal problem solutions” (also known as the fit demand) are the central predictions 
stemming from our fit taxonomy. The central assumption of the fit taxonomy is that the 
substantial and procedural negotiation problems Libya and the United States faced during 
the 23 years of diplomatic struggle would resolve the better individual design elements (or 
its alternative explanation) were matched to the “optimal problem solution”. Instead, the 
central real-world observation we made in the history of the American-Libyan negotiation 
is the step-by-step evolution of the diplomatic process moving though five distinct 
bargaining phases before leading to the physical dismantlement of the Qaddafi regime’s 
nuclear weapons program.  
Evaluating the fit taxonomy’s accuracy is testing the similarity between the taxonomy-
based predictions with the real-world observations. It is exploring the question to what 
degree did the satisfaction of the inferred “optimal problem solution” by design elements, 
affecting the observed passing of the American-Libyan diplomatic process from one phase 
to another and the physical dismantlement of Libya’s nuclear weapons program? Our 
                                                                             
theory) and rather simple verbal models (e.g. the “balance of power”) (Snidal 2004: 228; see also: Powell 
1999). 
406
 For a more detailed discussion about the question whether or not models are “true” or “false”, see 
Clarke & Primo 2007.  
407
 It was Robert Powell who made it clear by referring to the seminal work of Kenneth Waltz (Theory of 
International Politics) and Robert Jervis (Cooperation under the Security Dilemma) that a statistics test is 
not a sine qua non condition for testing the accuracy of IR models (Powell 1999: 104-5).  
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model is accurate, if the satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) of the “optimal problem solution” – 
expressed by fitting (or misfitting) design elements – is either translating into real-world 
success (or failure). However, the model is inaccurate if we record – despite well matching 
design elements – no progress in the negotiation process or in the physical dismantlement 
efforts. We would arrive at the same assessment of inaccuracy if we observe an 
improvement of the real-world problems despite rampant misfits.408  
A) Relatively High Accuracy of the Fit Taxonomy  
Given that our fit taxonomy is a holistic model that stems from an IBE based development 
process which is condensing decades of research on inter- and transnational negotiation in 
to a single model, it is a little astonishing that our fit taxonomy was found to have a 
relatively high accuracy. The model-based predictions were, in many respects, coherent 
with the real-world observations we made in the NRN on the Qaddafi regime’s WMD 
programs. In the following, we will briefly discuss the “observation-prediction coherence” 
for the example of the pre-agreement, the pre-negotiation and the post-agreement 
phase.409  
Pre-Agreement Phase (April - December 2003): In the pre-agreement phase, the “optimal 
problem solution” we have identified with the help of the fit taxonomy was satisfied to a 
very high degree. Misfits and negative fits were inexistent during that phase. Rather, the 
picture was dominated by fits and its different sub-categories (partial fits, underfits, and 
overfits; Figure 27). The relatively high “fit performance” was coherent with the real-world 
observations about the American-Libyan negotiation process. The pre-agreement phase 
was relatively swiftly resolved. Libya and the United States were able to clear the way 
forward for a final disarmament agreement within only nine months. Given the long history 
of very tense and hostile relations, this remarkable swift process becomes logical in light of 
the “observation-prediction coherence”.  
Second Pre-Negotiation Phase (1990-2003): In the second pre-negotiation phase, the 
coherence between predictions and real-world observations are also relatively high – 
although it might appear, at first glance, that our fit taxonomy was rather inaccurate during 
this episode of the American-Libyan negotiation process. On the one hand, the “optimal 
problem solution” we identified with the help of the fit taxonomy was satisfied to a 
relatively high degree. We observed four fits, three underfits, and two partial fits but only 
                            
408
 Of course, there is also the chance that (in)coherence between model-based predictions and our 
observations about social reality results from analysis and measuring errors. That is the case if either our 
inference from the fit taxonomy or our observations about the Libyan NRN are incorrect. Both would lead 
us to false findings. While those errors could never be ruled out entirely, we nevertheless we regard it as a 
negligible risk given that our PhD project is the most profound and detailed analysis of the American-
Libyan negotiations that was ever conducted.  
409
 The first part of the pre-negotiation phase (1987-1990) is irrelevant for the “prediction-observation 
comparison” since the alternative explanation for diplomatic design (i.e. the shift in Libya’s foreign policy) 
played a relatively dominant role. Therefore, we cannot properly evaluate the degree to which the 
prediction of the fit taxonomy was coherent with the real-world development in the American-Libyan 
negotiation dynamics. The agreement phase instead is akin to the pattern of the three phases we discuss 
in the text. It was likewise marked by a relatively high coherence between the taxonomy-based 
predictions and the real-world observations. We therefore decided to exclude it from the discussion.  
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two misfits and one negative fit in this phase (Figure 26). On the other hand, the second 
pre-negotiation phase was anything but swiftly resolved as one might expect given the 
convincing resolution of the “optimal problem solution”. Rather, it dragged on for 13 years 
until Washington eventually took the strategic decision to move the process to the next 
level and start exploratory talks on Libya’s WMD programs in spring 2003.  
However, it would be too short-sighted to interpret this delay as a sign of inaccuracy of the 
fit taxonomy. If we analyze the satisfaction of an inferred “optimal problem solution” in a 
timely perspective, the initial impression of imprecision is resolved quickly. This view 
reveals that all the factors we evaluated as meaningful contributions to the problem 
resolution (namely the Lockerbie Talks, the mediation efforts of the United Kingdom, and 
the disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network) became relevant only at the very end of the pre-
negotiation phase. This episode stagnated for a long time due to lacking diplomatic 
intervention. We observe little to no process throughout the 1990s. However, expressing a 
high “observation-prediction-coherence”, this phase of the American-Libyan negotiation 
dynamic was swiftly overcome as soon as design elements capable of resolving the 
predicted “optimal problem solution” were applied.  
Post-Agreement Phase (2004 - 2011): In the post-agreement phase, the coherence 
between predictions of the fit taxonomy and the real-world observations were likewise 
high, although in the sense of a negative relation. In our analysis, we have disclosed that, in 
this final episode of the Libyan-American, it was first and foremost the “optimal problem 
solution” on the substantial problem dimension (i.e. Libya’s nuclear bad) that was only 
inadequately satisfied. Libya had received an insufficient substitution for its dismantled 
nuclear weapons program. Expressing similarity between the model’s prediction and real-
world observation, we found that the WMD issue indeed continued to linger as a 
consequence of the unsatisfied “optimal problem solution”.  
B) The Fit Taxonomy’s Imprecision: Precaution against Cooperation Exploitation 
However, while in general very accurate, the fit taxonomy is imprecise with regards to one 
aspect: the precaution against cooperation exploitation. Based on our fit taxonomy, we 
have revealed on several occasions (e.g. for the pre-agreement, agreement, and post-
agreement phase) that successful negotiations would need safeguarding against the risk 
that one negotiating party is exploding the cooperative attitude of its counterpart.  
In general, it is a very obvious assumption that rational actors, who negotiate with 
outspoken opponents, are more inclined to cooperate if they are provided with some sort 
of “safety net” which is reducing the danger that the other side is free-riding. Moreover, 
this idea is very central in the neoliberal research on international institutions and 
compliance. The problem of free riding plays a crucial role in the relevant literature and was 
often pointed out as one of the most essential preconditions for successful cooperation 
(Simmons & Martin 2002; Raustiala & Slaughter 2002).  
   
324 
 
However, in the Libyan NRN, this aspect was completely irrelevant for successful 
negotiations. In all three phases where that aspect was predicted by the fit taxonomy, we 
found that “precaution against cooperation exploitation” was not addressed by a single 
design element (or an alternative explanation factor). In clear contradiction to the fit 
taxonomy’s prediction, the omission of safeguarding remained without consequences for 
the evolution of the Libyan NRN. The bargaining process moved forward despite the danger 
that the United States could exploit Libya’s cooperation by unilateral defection (ch. 5.3.3.2, 
ch. 5.3.4.2, and ch. 5.3.5.2). Although Washington sometimes showed behavioral patterns 
that were at least close to unilateral defection, it did not – despite lacking precaution 
against exploitation – undertake any concrete efforts in that direction.410 And the lack of 
design elements that could have avoid or at least mitigated the free-riding danger did not 
prevent Tripoli from giving cooperation a chance and moving actively ahead in the 
bargaining process – even though the Qaddafi regime put itself at considerable risk with 
that move.  
This finding stands obviously in stark contrast to the mainstream research on compliance 
and international governance. The lack of a “cheating precaution” might be a particularity 
to the Libyan NRN. However, there is at least some grounds to assume that this aspect 
plays no or only a little role in negotiation dynamics in general. After all, the American-
Libyan diplomacy on the Qaddafi regime’s nuclear weapons program – the “hard case” of 
NRN – must have been in particular sensitive to proper safeguarding against free-riding, 
given it was a very difficult, antagonistic and on many occasions a hostile negotiation 
process.  
6.1.1.4 Exploration: Innovative Strength & Weakness of the Fit Taxonomy  
Our doctoral thesis is the most in-depth, detailed, and comprehensive analysis of the 
American-Libyan diplomatic process. However, it would be misleading to ascribe the 
innovative powers of our study merely to the extensive study of documents and sources. 
Rather, most of our PhD project’s innovative implications stemmed from the fit taxonomy. 
It is owing to the fit taxonomy that we revealed a new narrative on Libya’s nuclear reversal 
and identified new analytical approaches we would have otherwise never applied to the 
research on international negotiations.  
                            
410
 During the final part of the pre-agreement phase between October and December 2003, we observed 
numerous signs that the United States was at least close to exploding the Qaddafi regime’s inclination for 
cooperation. When the Qaddafi regime had eventually agreed to allow technical visits to its WMD sites 
(ch. 5.3.3.2) – a central demand the United States had requested since April 2003 – Washington was not 
diminishing its pressure but instead pushed for more intrusive inspections. By December 2003, Libya had, 
in essence, exposed the lifeline of its WMD program. Given the comprehensive insights Libya allowed to 
US-UK experts, it must have been clear to the members of the Qaddafi regime that they had “slammed 
the door” to any future proliferation efforts. With agreeing to the intrusive technical visits, Libya was 
already on the route to disarmament – before the direct negotiations on a final disarmament agreement 
had even started. While Tripoli was making wide concessions, it was gaining little in return from the 
United States. Already during the first meeting of the pre-agreement phase held in April 2003, Libya had 
asked the United States of a “sign of good faith” (Tenet 2007: 290). However, even after Muammar al-
Qaddafi had given his “green light” to the technical visits, the United States was not ready to show 
flexibility with regards to the Libyan request.  
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In view of its genesis (ch. 3.3), the innovative performance of the fit taxonomy does little to 
astonish. By developing the fit taxonomy based on our IBE approach, we dug deep into the 
literature on international negotiations and investigated a large series of potential 
approaches and concepts. Without the IBE approach, we would have certainly not taken 
the public bad approach into consideration. In all likelihood, we would have not developed 
a three-fold concept of social traps incorporating the colliding interest, the injustice, and 
the distrust problem. Moreover, we would have without the IBE approach probably not 
studied the procedural and substantive problem dimension in parallel. Against that 
background, it is only logical that the innovative fit taxonomy is leading to new, intriguing 
and even counter-intuitive findings.  
However, despite its explorative powers and innovative potentials, the fit taxonomy has 
certain limits too. There are grounds to believe that our rationalist operationalization of 
“distrust” and “injustice” is delivering only a relatively narrow description of social reality 
with regards to these two particular aspects. However we have not encountered no 
evidence that this narrow concept on justice and distrust would negatively affected our 
analysis.  
In the following section, we will briefly elaborate on some of the fit taxonomy’s innovative 
strengths and weaknesses. Apart from the evaluative performance discussed in the 
previous section, the explorative capacity of our model also signifies an important part of 
the “backward looking” analysis of our PhD project.  
A) A New Narrative of Libya’s Nuclear Reversal  
With the help of our fit taxonomy, we were able to develop a new narrative of Libya’s 
nuclear reversal. If we had not applied this concept, we would have – in all probability – at 
one point embarked on the “beaten track” laid out by previous scholars and may have 
failed to unearth important aspects about the negotiation dynamics. 
For example, without our fit taxonomy we would have described, in all likelihood, the effort 
to disarm Muammar al-Qaddafi as an outstanding success story and had not taken into 
account that the WMD issue was never fully resolved – despite the complete 
dismantlement of Libya’s nuclear weapons program. Since the injustice trap was never 
really resolved and Libya was not provided with a suitable substitute that could have filled 
the gap of its abandoned nuclear bad, the post-agreement phase starting in January 2004 
was never smooth (ch. 5.3.5.2). Moreover, without the fit taxonomy, we would have been 
unable to reveal the numerous counter-intuitive insights we found with regard to the 
individual design elements and negotiation problems (e.g. the role of the Second Iraq War 
or the interception of the BBC China).411 
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 Apart from the BBC China incidence and the role of the Second Iraq War – two diplomatic episodes we 
have already discussed in length on other occasions of our PhD project (see ch. 5.3.3.2, ch. 6.1.1.1, and ch. 
6.2.1.2), we could name more counter-intuitive findings that resulted from the application of the fit 
taxonomy and which clearly draw a different picture about the Libyan case than past studies: (1) It was 
already indicated by some scholars that the United States, not Libya, was the major spoiler during the pre-
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Given that the fit taxonomy provided us with a new narrative of the Libyan case, we could 
only speculate what findings we might achieve if we would apply this analytical scheme to 
other NRN cases. There are grounds to believe that the South Korean, the Taiwanese, the 
Ukrainian NRN or even the recent negotiation on the Iranian nuclear program were in 
reality quiet different than they are conventionally described in the literature.  
B) Conceptual Innovation: The Alibi Game and the Public Bad Approach  
Apart from a new narrative, the explorative powers of the fit taxonomy are not exclusively 
limited to factual aspects. It is also innovative in conceptual terms in the sense that it 
introduced new analytical models, revealed general patterns, and gave “food for thought” 
to new academic questions. The conceptual innovation stemming from the application of 
the fit taxonomy becomes tangible with regard to the discovery of the Alibi Games and the 
public bad approach.412  
(1) The Example of the Alibi Game: The application of the fit taxonomy nourishes the 
assumption that the textbook examples of 2x2 games (such as the PD, the Chicken, the 
Assurance, or the Battel of Sexes Game) occur less often in international affairs than 
suggested by IR literature. Moreover, there are grounds to assume that the intensive use of 
these classic strategic constellations – which stem primarily from the mathematical-
axiomatic application of game theory – might have led to misinterpretation and false 
description of real world problems in international affairs.413 This problem, the alienation 
                                                                             
negotiation phase. Washington refused to bargain a diplomatic solution to the Qaddafi regime’s WMD 
programs throughout the 1990s (e.g. Müller 2006). What was, however, not revealed thus far is that Libya 
with its forward leaning and pro-active behavior rushing pre-maturely onto a cooperative course in the 
early 1990s was no less problematic in the diplomatic process. Given the specific characteristics of the 
Imposed Deadlock Game which dominated the second part of the pre-negotiation phase, Libya’s hurried 
cooperation was not decreasing but instead increasing Washington’s reluctance to start direct talks with 
Tripoli about its WMD programs (ch. 5.3.2.2) (2) In addition to this, past studies have drawn a relatively 
positive picture of the multilateral sanctions (ch. 5.3.2.2). Libya was often hailed as an example for the 
positive performance of economic sanctions. We, however, showed that this assessment is incorrect and 
that the multilateral sanctions had rather negative implications for the American-Libyan negotiation 
process.  
412
 There are, of course, other examples where we could pinpoint the innovative potentials of the fit 
taxonomy: (1) The finding that strategic constellations belonging to the “family” of Deadlock Games (in 
the Libyan case, the Deadlock Game and the Imposed Deadlock Game) are less hopeless as they are often 
described in the literature (e.g. Dombrowsky 2007: 156; Oye 1986a). Although it is difficult to achieve 
cooperation under these circumstances, there is still a chance to resolve Deadlock-Games and Deadlock-
like Games (ch. 5.3.1). As Celeste Wallander has pointed out, it is indeed puzzling why Deadlock Games 
have received so little attention in security studies even though this game type underlies many security 
problems (Wallander 1999: 20). (2) As we have outlined above (ch. 2.5), studying social change is often 
regarded as the “home turf” of constructivism, while rationalism is assumed to be static and motionless. 
However, by sequencing a cascade of social traps, we were able to conceptualize dynamic processes in 
high frequency. Constructivist analytical schemes would have difficulties to stand up to such a highly 
dynamic process. While the first part of the pre-negotiation phase – the shift from the Deadlock Game to 
the Imposed Deadlock Game – was primarily explained by an internal change in the Qaddafi regime’s 
payoff structure; most of the strategic dynamic in the American-Libyan negotiation process remained in 
the realm of rational choice. With the two sequencing methods we introduced (sequencing by translation 
and sequencing by weighing; ch. 4.3), we showed that we could grasp even very fast and small-scale 
strategic changes occurring in a frequency not of years but of weeks (see for example the agreement 
phase).  
413
 In essence, this argument is reflecting a nearly two decade-old debate triggered by Stephen Walt 
(Rigor or Rigor Mortis?) in International Security (see: Martin 1999; Powell 1999; Walt 1999a; Walt 1999b; 
Zagare 1999).  
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between theoretic and empirical application of game theory, becomes particularly clear 
with regard to the Alibi Game – a strategic constellation that was only discovered by 
recurring to the fit taxonomy.  
Alibi Games are a relatively “young” strategic concept. Even though Alibi Games laid 
already dormant in the 2x2 game taxonomy developed by Rapoport and Guyer (1966),414 it 
was only in 2005 that they were unearthed as a meaningful “family” of strategic games 
when Robinson and Goforth developed a renewed classification of ordinal 2x2 games 
(Robinson & Goforth 2004, 2005). As we have outlined above, Alibi Games signify 
asymmetric PD Games (ch. 5.3.3.1). In essence, one could interpret the PD game as a 
“symmetric outlier” in the broader Alibi Game family. Among the 144 mathematical 
possible game constellations, there are six Alibi Games but only one PD game.415 If social 
reality is not discriminating symmetry from asymmetry (which is rather unlikely), it is safe 
to assume that Alibi Games occur far more often than the classical PD Game. The 
assumption that Alibi Games are in reality more dominant than the often discussed PD, is 
also supported by our PhD project. Two out of five strategic constellations in the Libyan 
NRN were Alibi Games.  
However, the relevance of the Alibi Games was thus far neglected in IR literature. Apart 
from the few studies that have analyzed asymmetric PD Games and thereby touch – 
without knowing – on Alibi Games (e.g. DeCanio & Fremstad 2013; Maoz & Felsenthal 
1987), our PhD project is the first systematic empirical exploration of this particular game 
constellation. The ignorance of the Alibi Game stands in stark contrast to the near 
obsession that IR scholars showed for the PD Game. According to Robert Keohane, the PD 
game is the most central conceptualization for collective action problems and applies to 
various real-world situations within world politics (Keohane 1984: 68). Axelrod seconds this 
view by describing the PD Game “the E.coli of social science” (Axelrod 1997).  
Of course, from a theoretical perspective, there are good reasons for focusing on the PD 
game. After all, the PD game is one of the most central concepts to challenge Adam Smith’s 
assumption of the “invisible hand” which had for a long time determined the thinking in 
social and economic science. As Arthur Stein has pointed out, the PD game “is the only two-
actor example of a Pareto-deficient equilibrium that occurs when both actors have 
dominant strategies. It is for this reason that it has received so much scholarly attention” 
(Stein 1982: 305, fn. 11). 
However, the theoretical value of the PD Game is not necessarily translating into real-world 
relevance. Consequentially, in our view, the strong misbalance between PD Games and the 
Alibi Games is symptomatic of the alienation between the mathematical-axonometric and 
the empirical-historical application of game theory in IR (for a detail discussion see Zangl 
1994 and in particular Zürn 1992). The ignorance of the Alibi Games and the theoretical 
overdrawing of the PD Game strongly hints at the suggestion that many real-world 
phenomena that IR scholars have described in the past as PD games – such as the Second 
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 See for example game no. 47 and 48 (Rapoport & Guyer 1966) 
415
 According to the taxonomy provided by Robinson and Goforth, the Alibi Games signify the cases no. 
221, 231, 241, 412, 413, and 414 (cf. Robinson & Goforth 2005).  
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Morocco Crisis 1911 (Synder & Diesing 1977) or the Middle East Conflict in the 1990s (Beck 
1997) –  are in reality Alibi Games. As Robinson and Goforth have put it: “[T]he apparent 
real-world ubiquity of the PD may (…) be illusory – all those situations with nasty equilibria 
may seem to be PDs because we haven’t looked closely” (Robinson & Goforth 2004: 13).  
Obviously, all this is not just a deplorable academic mishap that one could easily shrug off. 
For half a century, many IR scholars have based their consultancy to policy advisors on 
game theoretical reasoning. It is likely that many of their recommendations had been false 
or wrong.416 As we have shown in our analysis of the Libyan NRN, Alibi Games require a 
particular resolution strategy that is not only different but also more complicated than the 
efforts demanded to overcome PD constellations (ch. 5.3.3.1).  
(2) The Example of the Public Bad Approach: The introduction of the public bad approach is 
another conceptual innovation of the fit taxonomy. The public bad approach was only 
called into being by turning the conventional Theory of Collective Goods (TCG) up-side 
down. It would, however, be wrong to see the public bad approach only as a mirrored 
imitation of the TCG. Instead, the public bad approach is best understood as an extension of 
the TCG into a field where it was not operating beforehand. With the public bad approach 
areas of international security policy for which we could previously only report the absence 
of collective goods, become subjected to a detailed, sophisticated, and multifaceted 
analytical concept. Due to its systematic character, the public bad approach is, in addition, 
particularly suitable for comparison even between very diverse issue areas. Moreover, in 
our doctoral thesis, we prove that the public bad approach is an analytical scheme that 
allows a study of both the structure of problems and their resolution. 
Presumably the best illustration of the public bad approach’s academic value is its analytical 
strength. It provided us with new insights and helped to clear up contradictions past 
scholars and analysts stumbled over when studying the Libyan case. Take for example the 
controversies about the maturity of Libya’s nuclear weapons program. There are conflicting 
views about how advanced and how dangerous the Qaddafi regime’s proliferation effort 
actually was. This debate became particularly prominent by the “bickering” in early 2004 
between the IAEA and U.S.-U.K. security expert. The Vienna based watchdog organization 
held the opinion that Libya’s nuclear attempts had been “embryonic” and that the danger 
of a Libyan bomb had been exaggerated (El-Baradei 2011: ch. 6). Western non-proliferation 
experts were instead convinced that Tripoli’s efforts and, in particular, its cooperation with 
the A.Q. Khan network posed a serious security threat (Commission on Intelligence 
Capabilities 2005).  
By applying our fit taxonomy and by describing Libya’s nuclear weapons program as a public 
bad that was following the “best shot threshold” aggregation logic, we were able to resolve 
these conflicting views and showed that both descriptions – the IAEA and the US-UK view – 
were only partly reflecting the historic reality (ch. 5.2.2). On the one hand, Libya’s nuclear 
weapons program was a “public bad in the making” which was still years away from 
crossing the nuclear threshold. On the other hand, the Qaddafi regime’s WMD ambitions 
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 For a good starting point into the debate about use and misuse of game theory see Stone (2001).  
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nevertheless poses a considerable security risk since cooperating with the A.Q. Kahn 
network brought Tripoli into the relatively fortunate position to implement the “best shot 
logic” of nuclear proliferation Libya had longed to apply since the early 1970s.  
In the past literature, we found from time to time sporadic reference to the notion of public 
bads (e.g. Göker 2013; Sandler 2004). But it was only in this PhD project that this approach 
was for the first time introduced and systematically applied. Concerning the Alibi Game, we 
were empirically exploring a relatively young concept. With regards to the public bad 
approach, the innovative power of our PhD is even higher since we were breaking new 
academic ground.  
C) Innovative Shortcomings: The Narrow Concepts of Injustice and Distrust  
One of the major advantages of analytical models is that they clearly define their 
shortcomings. According to Duncan Snidal, it is even the “greatest virtue of a good model 
that it makes its own limitations apparent” (Snidal 2004: 228-9). With that in mind, we have 
to admit that our fit taxonomy is conceptually weak in terms of distrust and injustice.417 
Both aspects are relatively narrow and therefore likely to limit the explorative power of the 
fit taxonomy.  
By definition, (dis)trust and (in)justice are about collective interpretation. What is regarded 
as (in)just and (un)trustworthy is, in essence, a social construction – a shared normative 
understanding. Although there is rational research on (dis)trust and (in)justice, both aspects 
are the “home turf” of constructivist approaches (see e.g. ch. 3.3.2.1). For scholars who 
follow the rationalist approach – even when they side with the non-orthodox Enlightened 
Rationalism – (dis)trust and (in)justice signify certainly not the first-choice research 
objective. Rather, “interest” is their most central and most dominate analytical category.  
Since we have endeavored to develop a holistic and comprehensive model for the analysis 
of inter- and transnational negotiation dynamics we – as outlined above – nevertheless 
decided to integrate distrust and injustice into our research project. It is obvious that this 
inclusive approach had its price. With game theory and the public bad approach, the 
operationalization of both concepts was subjected to two rationalist theories – an aspect of 
our fit taxonomy that might attract most criticism by constructivist scholars. And honestly, 
they would have a point. Our operationalization of distrust and injustice is relatively 
narrow. In essence, we neither studied the nature of (in)justice and (dis)trust. We have not 
analyzed what being (un)just or (un)trustworthy actually meant for Tripoli and Washington 
during the NRN. The perception of the negotiating parties regarding these two aspects was 
not on our agenda. Rather, we applied a “negative concept” and were only studying the 
degree to which justice and trust were absent in the American-Libyan bargaining process. 
Moreover, by operationalizing distrust through the Maximin solution (i.e. game theory) and 
injustice by the “good production chain” (i.e. public bad approach), we subordinated both 
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 Another shortcoming one could possibly discuss is the fact that our approach has many hyper-rational 
elements – an aspect that we initially wanted to avoid when we criticized Orthodox Rationalism in the 
Setup chapter (see ch. 2.5.2).  
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concepts to the logic of “interest” (i.e. the realization of individual benefits) – a step that 
limits the independent analytical substance of these concepts (ch. 3.1.3).  
In light of this conceptual weakness, it is only logical that the innovative potential of the fit 
taxonomy is limited – in theory. However, in terms of practical research on the Libyan NRN, 
we have not encountered any major difficulties. And we are unable to name concrete 
examples where the relatively narrow concept of distrust and injustice we applied had led 
to an under-complex description of social reality.  
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6.1.2 The Forward-Look: A General Answer to our Research Question 
& A Thought Experiment for better NRN  
  
Since we were able to reveal with the “backward-looking analysis”, numerous findings 
about the fit performance of diplomatic design, we are now in the position to move on to 
the “forward looking prescription”. As we made clear above, this dimension is likewise 
essential to respond to our central research question (how to design well-fitting NRN that 
drive atomic renegade states into nuclear disarmament). The “forward looking 
prescription” represents the second mandatory research orientation request by the policy 
paradigm. Any response to our central research question has to remain unsatisfactory, if 
both aspects – the “backward looking” and the “forward-looking” dimension – are not 
answered adequately.  
However, it is owed to the logic of the “forward-looking prescription” that without referring 
to a specific case of NRN, the response to our overarching research question has the nature 
of a “methodic” policy recommendation. The most straightforward answer we could 
envisage without referring to an individual example of a proliferation crises (such as 
currently the North Korean nuclear weapons program) reads as follows: IR scholars and 
foreign policy makers who search to drive an atomic renegade state into disarmament with 
the help of diplomacy should (1) take the fit taxonomy we have developed and apply it in 
a prescriptive mode (2) identify the “optimal problem solution” with its help (3) on that 
basis, consider the available diplomatic tools that are likely to fit well to the ascertained 
problem and (4) compile them into a coherent negotiation strategy.  
That statement is the closest we get to the often desired “blueprint solution” for 
international negotiation challenges. It is the most compensated response one could give 
when bringing the “backward-looking analysis” and the “forward looking prescription” 
together.  
However, all those readers who prefer a more concrete answer with a tangible 
recommendation regarding individual design elements must not be disappointed either. In 
order to give at least a certain impression about the prescriptive strength of the fit 
taxonomy, we have run a brief “thought experiment” based on our analysis of the Libyan 
NRN (ch. 6.1.2) and asked ourselves: In light of the findings we achieved in our PhD project, 
what could Libya and the United States have done differently in order to improve the 
negotiation outcome, if they had had the chance to rerun the bargaining dynamic by 
systematically applying the fit approach? What diplomatic tools would have allowed them 
to enhance the overall design of the NRN process?  
The forward-looking “thought experiment” has two aspects: First, we will elaborate about 
promising diplomatic leverages Washington and Tripoli could have used in order make the 
Libyan NRN an even greater diplomatic success (ch. 6.1.2.1). Certainly, studying this 
question in length and detail would necessitate an extra research project. However, in a 
cursory outline, we identified at least five critical aspects that could have led to a better 
negotiation outcome – given that Tripoli and Washington had only been aware of the 
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insights we disclosed in the “backward looking analysis” of our PhD project and given that 
they had the willingness to act accordingly. Since the Libyan NRN in essence signifies a 
“double hard case”, there is a good chance that these five “lessons learned” would also 
improve the outcome of negotiation dynamics in other fields of international security 
policy. Second, we have to elaborate on whether real-world negotiating parties have any 
chance to apply the fit approach and the findings of diplomatic design in a prescriptive 
mode (ch. 6.1.2.2). After all, it could turn out that the fit taxonomy is too academic, too 
theoretical, and too complicated. The question is whether the fit taxonomy we have 
developed has relevance for world politics or whether it is merely fostering a “strategic 
illusion” (Betts 2000).  
6.1.2.1 Five Diplomatic Leverages for more Bargaining Success  
In a brief cursory overview, we have identified by applying the fit taxonomy five diplomatic 
leverages that would have rendered the Libyan NRN into an even greater “success story”: 
(A) use a “hidden champion” (B) take advantage of “evergreen” and “multiple fitting” 
diplomatic tools (C) take full advantage of the unsuspected potential of negotiation 
dynamics (D) give special credit to the design of agreements (E) unleash the impact of 
coercive diplomacy and positive inducement by thinking of both categories of design 
elements in terms of a “shotgun” and a “pre-modern cannon analogy”.  
A) Take Advantage of the “Hidden Champions” 
In a backward-looking section of the conclusion, we have grouped the different design 
elements into five categories (Table 6). In our view, the process-related design elements 
signify “hidden champions”. On the one hand, these factors had a relatively high “fit 
performance”. Except for Washington’s quid pro quo approach, misfits were absent in this 
category of diplomatic tools. On the other hand, this category of diplomatic design has 
received relatively little attention from policy makers and IR scholars. While other 
diplomatic tools – such as economic sanctions – have sparked major debates with vivid 
resonance in the public sphere, process related design elements were widely neglected. 
Only a handful of studies on international negotiation research have explicitly analyzed 
these aspects (e.g. Sjöstedt, Spector & Zartman 1994; Stanford 1992; Tallberg 2002). 
Instead foreign policy leaders tend to underappreciate process-related design elements 
because they often regard them as ordinary features of the day-to-day diplomatic practice 
and do not take them into consideration when they think in broader strategic terms.  
In our view, however, these “hidden champions” of diplomatic design are very relevant for 
practical foreign policy. Being an effective but neglected category, process-related design 
elements could signify an unexploited recourse in difficult negotiation dynamics which is 
providing the chance for new diplomatic momentum. Moreover, process-related design 
elements represent often relatively inexpensive instruments that are immediately available 
to foreign policy practitioners (unlike, for example, coercive diplomacy or positive 
inducement). If the United States and Libya had made more use of these diplomatic 
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designs, the Libyan NRN would have been – in all probability – an even greater “success 
story”.  
B) No “Blueprint Solutions” but Evergreen and Multiple Fits 
That there are no “blueprint solutions” in international negotiations is a very obvious lesson 
we could draw from the Libyan “hard case”. While many academics and policy makers 
appear to indulge in the hope of “one size fits all” strategies which are capable of resolving 
a wide spectrum of problems in international affairs (see Ostrom et.al. 2007), we have 
revealed that, in reality, diplomatic design is first and foremost characterized – despite its 
overall impact – by a diverse and varying performance which surfaces as soon we climb 
down the “ladder of abstraction” and focus on the individual impact factors. Thus, the 
closest thing to “blue print solutions” we get are evergreen and multiple fits (Table 9).   
In order to improve NRN and arrive at a more well-fitting design, Libya and the United 
States could have recurred more often to this type of design element. For example, one 
could have granted more importance to London’s mediation efforts – a prominent 
evergreen fit element. If London had already participated in an earlier stage in the pre-
negotiation phase, and if Tripoli had, instead of relying at first on the mediation of Saudi 
Arabia and South Africa, turned to the Blair government as “biased mediator”, the overall 
impact of the Libyan NRN could have been enlarged (see ch. 5.3.2.2).  
C) The Unsuspected Potentials of Negotiation Dynamics 
Apart from hidden champions, we also ecnounter hidden potentials for a better and swifter 
negotiation outcome in Libyan-American negotiations – a finding that becomes salient by 
the systematic application of the fit taxonomy. There is evidence that diplomatic resources 
remained untapped which would have allowed for a more focused problem solution.   
First, we have explained above that the activity of the two negotiation parties varied 
widely. While the United States were very active, the Qaddafi regime showed a rather 
passive bargaining behavior (ch. 6.1.1). Tripoli’s “strategic lethargy” could be regarded as an 
unused resource for high negotiation performance. Of course, more activism does not lead 
to a better negotiation outcome per se. However, there are grounds to believe that the 
failure to address the injustice trap is, in many respects, associated with Libya’s passive 
bargaining practice. A more well-balanced negotiation dynamic between Washington and 
Tripoli is therefore likely to have caused a different bargaining result.  
Table 10: Ratio of (Mis)Fits in the Five Negotiation Phases 
 
Fit Overfit Partial Fit Underfit Misfit Negativ Fit Ratio 
1st Pre-Negotiation Phase (1987-1990) 1 5 3 16
2nd Pre-Negotiation Phase (1990-2003) 3 2 2 1 1 33
Pre-Agreement Phase (March-December 2003) 2 1 2 2 31
Agreement Phase (December 2003) 3 1 2 27
Post-Agreement Phase (2004-2011) 3 1 3 29
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Second, regarding the overall “fit performance”, the Libyan NRN showed a distinct pattern 
which is best described as “strategic sluggishness”. Apart from the first part of the pre-
negotiation phase which was particularly difficult since it was marked by a pure Deadlock 
Game, the ratio between misfits, fits and its different sub-categories (e.g. overfit, partial fit, 
and underfit) remained by and large unchanged in the following four negotiation phases 
(Table 10).418 Between the second pre-negotiation phase starting in early 1990 and the post-
agreement phase ending in 2011, the overall “fit performance” was not improving – despite 
the fact that the problems the two parties were facing became constantly more and more 
benign and less difficult to handle.419 
The logic that difficult problems are difficult and simple problems are simple to resolve 
appears not to apply to the Libyan case. Expressing the idea of “strategic sluggishness”, it 
was as if the “fit performance” was adapted to the given level of difficulty in each 
negotiation phase. The more benign the problem became the more “relaxed” were the 
intervention. The ratio between negative and positive design element were for example in 
the second pre-negotiation phase by and large identical as in the post-agreement phase 
(Table 10).  
That finding obviously signifies a “hidden potential”. It can be assumed that Libya and the 
United States could have achieved a better negotiation outcome if they had increased their 
diplomatic activity and creativity at the same pace the malignity of the actual bargaining 
problems were decreasing.  
D) Give special Credit to the Design of Agreements 
In our analysis, we found that the performance of diplomatic design is disturbingly weak 
with regard to the substantial negotiation problems and the injustice trap (ch. 6.1.1). Both 
shortcomings were closely related to the biased disarmament agreement that Libya and the 
United States rashly negotiated, supported by the UK, in December 2003. The achieved 
accord, publically announced in the evening hours of 19th December 2003, is a good 
example of an “agreeing-implementing trade-off”. Swiftly negotiated in a one-day meeting, 
the accord was not probably reflecting the nature of the Libyan nuclear bad. It failed to 
provide Tripoli with a suitable substitute for its dismantled nuclear weapons program. 
Implementation problems in the post-agreement phase in the form of the unresolved 
injustice trap were the consequence. In the light of this finding, there is solid ground to 
assume that a better and more carefully designed disarmament agreement could have 
increased the overall “fit performance” of the negotiation dynamic. If Washington and 
                            
418
 Given that the six (mis)fit categories of our evaluation scheme haven an ordinal structure we have 
multiplied the numbers of individual performance with ascending values (negative fit x 1, mistfit x 2, 
underfit x 3, etc.). The outcome of this operation – the proportion between the evaluation categories – is 
depicted in the right column of (Table 10).  
419
 For example, negotiation phases which were marked by numerous misfits witnessed proportionally 
also many well-fitting design elements (e.g. the post-agreement phase, (Table 10). And in other phases 
where the “fit performance” of diplomatic design elements was instead less prominent, the negative 
implications were moderate too (e.g. pre-agreement phase (Table 10). 
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Tripoli had had the insights we gained with the help of the fit taxonomy, they might have 
had a chance to realize a better and more sustainable bargaining outcome.420  
E) Coercion & Incentives – the Shotgun and the Cannonball Metaphor 
In the Libyan NRN, we were surprised that the performance of diplomatic design was 
relatively weak with regard to the colliding interest trap. While the handling of the injustice 
trap and the substantive negotiation problem could have been improved by a better 
“agreement design”, we claim that resolution of the colliding interest trap could have been 
enhanced by a more prudent use of incentives and coercive tools.  
Among the categories of diplomatic design elements, coercive diplomacy and positive 
inducement represent the group of diplomatic impact factors that had the highest 
relevance for the colliding interest trap and were most directly focused on this particular 
negotiation problem. Therefore, the insufficient resolution of the colliding interest trap and 
the weak performance of coercion and positive inducement are closely connected in the 
Libyan NRN.  
A quick literature review reveals that the low “fit performance” of coercion and positive 
inducement we discovered in the Libyan NRN is not astonishing at all. Apart from some 
exceptions (e.g. Lopez & Cortright 2004), there are countless remarks in the literature 
pointing out that coercion is ineffective and is unlikely to work in general (e.g. Haas 1997, 
Gause 1999, Mueller & Mueller 1999; Nurnber 2009). Large-N studies have, for example, 
found that economic sanctions have a relatively low success rate which varied depending 
on the actual research project between 5 to 34 % (Hufbauer et.al. 1990; Pape 1997; Pape 
1998). Although there is less research on incentives, we come to a similar conclusion if we 
tap into the debates about “appeasement” (e.g. Richardson 1988; Treisman 2004).  
However, we claim that the American-Libyan bargaining dynamic could have been more 
successful, if the parties had been bestowed with the fit taxonomy and would have been 
able to decipher the fundamental logic of these two design elements: that coercion is, in 
essence, analogous of a “shotgun round” and the impact of positive inducement is basically 
akin to “pre-modern cannonballs”. Like shotguns and pre-modern cannons, coercion and 
positive incentives are powerful tools that are able to “take out” the “target” they are 
aimed at. But like shotgun rounds and cannonballs, both design elements are remarkably 
inaccurate. They often miss the desired objective (i.e. strategic consideration and the 
decision making of a particular opponent) and instead cause series of unintended side-
effects. However, similar to shotgun rounds and pre-modern cannonballs, the accuracy of 
coercion and positive inducement could be substantially enhanced. Both tools need to be 
subjected to a process of “accuracy improvement”. If Washington and Tripoli – or other 
                            
420
 The neglect of “agreement design” appears to be a more general problem in negotiation research that 
is not limited to the Libyan case. While agreements are obviously an integral part of international 
negotiations, they were relatively rarely studied in the literature. We saw intensive research on the 
bargaining process that lead to agreements in the last decades. However the scope, nature, and functions 
of bargaining accords were relatively seldom addressed by scholars (see e.g. Iklé 1964). Consequentially, 
“brink agreement design back in” would, in all probability, be for the benefit of the entire sub-discipline.  
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potential players – had applied this logic, the Libyan NRN would have been an even greater 
“diplomatic success story”.  
(1) Coercive Diplomacy and the Shotgun Round Metaphor: It is undeniable that coercive 
diplomacy had a relatively low “fit performance” in the Libyan NRN. Coercive tools were 
the design category that was overrepresented by misfits and negative fits (Table 6). A more 
detailed and in-depth scrutiny of these design elements does not alter our negative 
evaluation. But it reveals that the coercive policy tools were not per se mismatching but 
instead had the potential to unfold considerable sway if we only focus on specific aspects. 
Like a shotgun round fired into the dark at the murky contours of an opponent, the 
coercive tools applied in the Libyan NRN where inaccurate but “hit” at least some parts of 
the “target”. For example, if we evaluate the military threat Washington applied towards 
the Qaddafi regime in the late 1980s exclusively against the requirement of a “massive and 
lasting interest manipulation” – one of the “optimal problem solution” we identified with 
the help of the fit taxonomy (see Figure 25) – it would have been the most successful 
design element during the entire first part of the pre-negotiation phase. It was the only 
impact factor that yielded, under the adverse circumstance of the Deadlock Game, at least 
an underfit. All other diplomatic tools applied during this phase did less well. The problem, 
however, was that the U.S. military threat against Tripoli triggered unintended side effects 
(i.e. increasing Libya’s distrust in the United States and further inflaming the desire for 
nuclear weapons, ch. 5.3.1.2) which were undermining the performance of this tool and 
rendered it – when the other aspects of the “optimal problem solution” (such as 
confidence building) are taken into account – in the overall perspective into a negative 
fit.421 Thus, like a shotgun round, the military threat applied towards the Qaddafi regime 
“hit the target” but its inaccuracy undermined its overall impact. 
The research on coercive diplomacy is haunted by inconsistencies. For example, despite the 
fact that the problematic nature of coercion is widely known, foreign policy leaders 
continue to use this instrument intensively. Coercive diplomacy, in particular economic 
sanctions, is a “course in the menu” of policy tools decision makers prefer to choose – 
although they are often very much aware of its shortcomings (Bapat & Morgan 2009; 
Hufbauer et.al. 2007). Another inconsistency is the varying impact of coercive diplomacy 
which was revealed by several large-N studies. When exploring the effects of sanctions 
beyond the conventional failure-success-dichotomy, Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat, and 
Valentin Krustev found, for example, that the effectiveness of this particular design element 
is rising to a relatively high rate of 30 %. And in situations where a negotiated settlement 
was achieved among conflict parties, the impact of sanctions was found to increase even 
further by an additional 25 % (Morgan, Bapat and Krustev 2009: 101; see also: Drezner 
2011). Obviously, these findings stand in stark contrast to the mainstream view which 
                            
421
 A similar conclusion could be drawn from the analysis of the UN sanctions imposed on Libya in the 
early 1990s. At first sight, one might be inclined to see this coercive tool as a full-blown success. Already 
the prospect of the UN coercion moved the Qaddafi regime onto a cooperation course (ch. 5.3.2.2). But 
the diplomatic momentum the UN coercion created eventually fell flat due to the negative side effects it 
triggered (i.e. acting against the fit demand to avoided preference manipulation and to bridle the first 
mover inclination). 
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emphasizes the low success rate of economic sanctions (see, in particular, Pape 1997; Pape 
1998).  
However, once we apply the metaphor of the shotgun round, these inconsistencies resolve 
and start to make sense. In all probability, policy makers recur intensively to coercive 
diplomacy – despite the well-known critique – because this design element is a very 
feasible “opener” for difficult conflict situations when the scope and nature of the actual 
problem constellation at hand is still unclear or is still changing. Although seldom a direct 
hit, coercive diplomacy – like shotgun rounds – represent “a shot into the dark” that is very 
likely to have at least some impact on the target. Moreover, in all probability, the higher 
performance of sanctions revealed by Morgan, Bapat and Krustev is attributed to the 
embeddedness in a negotiation process which allows for an adjustment of the accuracy of 
this tool – similar to a series of shotgun rounds. Embeddedness in a diplomatic strategy 
helps to readjust and correct the coercion and avoid negative side effects.422 The diplomatic 
frame is improving the accuracy of coercion because it helps to translate the impact of this 
tool into a concrete political momentum which could lead to actual conflict resolution.423  
 (2) Positive Inducement & the Cannonball Metaphor: While the literature on coercion in 
general and on economic sanctions in particular is extensive, there is – apart from some 
exceptions – relatively little research on positive inducement (e.g. Bernauer & Ruloff 1999; 
Forsberg 2005; Newnham 2000; Newnham 2002; Nincic 2011; Nielsen & Simmons 2015; 
O’Sullivan 2000; Solingen 2012).424 Given the lack of research that was conducted, it is not 
astonishing that diplomatic inducement and rewards are primarily perceived as the mirror-
inverted counterpart to coercive diplomacy. This view finds expression in the fact that 
incentives are often labeled as “positive sanctions” (Baldwin 1971). However, there is solid 
ground to believe that “positive sanctions” are more than just the flip-side of coercive 
diplomacy. Rather, we claim that positive inducement operated along a distinct logic that is, 
in essence, akin to pre-modern cannonballs.  
Like shotguns, antique cannons are known for their inaccuracy. But unlike shotgun-rounds, 
which are very likely to always have an impact on the target although they rarely achieve a 
direct hit, pre-modern cannons often missed the target completely. Pre-modern artillery 
normally had to fire several rounds to get the range of the opponent they were aiming at. 
                            
422
 The positive impact of the “diplomatic embeddedness” of coercion tools appears logical and seems to 
be supported by historic cases (see, for example, Perthes 2014). However, this aspect was thus far not 
addressed by the recent debate on the “scope conditions” that are assumed to make coercive instruments 
more successful (e.g. Bapat & Kwon 2015; Drezner 2003). It was, for example, revealed that coercion in 
foreign policy is likely to improve its impact when international organizations are involved (Drezner 2000; 
Bapat & Morgan 2009), when the issue is of little relevance for the target actor (Morgan & Schwebach 
1997; Ang & Peksen 2007), when the costs the sender had to bear by imposing and implementing the 
coercion policy were moderate or low (Bapt & Known 2015) or when the target is an allied democracy 
(Allen 2005; Bolks & Al-Sowayel 2000). Diplomatic embeddedness is missing in this list.  
423
 Note that all the coercive tools we witnessed during in the Libyan NRN were applied during the pre-
negotiation phases when the American-Libyan diplomatic process was still embryonic – an explanation for 
their relatively low “fit performance”. At that time the diplomatic process was still unable to provide the 
just mentioned “accuracy improvement”.  
424
 Miroslav Nincic has, for example, pointed out that there are numerous large-N data sets on coercive 
diplomacy (e.g. the Correlates of War data set, the International Military Intervention project and the 
Threat and Imposition of Sanctions data set) but that none are devoted to positive inducement (Nincic 
2011: 139).   
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But – unlike shotgun-rounds – once aiming accurately, cannon balls have a massive impact 
and normally took-out the target in a single shoot.  
It is obvious that the cannonball metaphor has much in common with the discussion on 
positive incentives in foreign policy. “Positive sanctions” are likely to fail as many squander 
high amounts of resources. Moreover, “positive sanctions” could have also counter-
productive implications in the sense that they provide rewards to bad-doers and, in the 
worst-case, even encourage them to continue to intensify their undesired behavior. But 
once incentive tools fit to a particular conflict situation, they often yield a remarkable 
impact and resolve many aspects of problems. Provided with well-matching incentives to 
change their behavioral patterns, bad doers stop their harmful course of action once and 
for all.  
The nature of positive inducement in the sense of pre-modern cannonballs is primarily 
expressed in the Libyan NRN by the outlier structure of the “fit performance” we 
discovered with regard to this particular category of diplomatic design (ch. 6.1.1.2). While 
inducements and rewards applied during the Libyan NRN were predominantly marked by 
misfits, we found that once they “hit the target” in the sense of fitting to the “optimal 
problem solution”, they have a massive impact (in the Libyan case signified by one of the 
rare overfits) and resolves much of the given problem (Table 6).  
6.1.2.2 Is the Fit Approach a Strategic Illusion?  
Developing a feasible and successful strategy in foreign and security policy is a very difficult 
task and we encounter much skepticism in IR literature regarding this question (e.g. Betts 
2000). Consequentially, it is an urgent and justified question whether IR scholars and even 
more so the practitioners of foreign policy have the chance to apply the fit approach. After 
all, the fit taxonomy is a very complicated and demanding model “soaked” with multiple IR 
theories. We claim, however, that the fit approach is indeed relevant and applicable for 
practical foreign policy – providing that the three following challenges are addressed 
properly.  
First, the users of the fit taxonomy need to have a minimum of academic and theoretical 
training. In particular, they have to have the ability to use game theory and the public bad 
approach. However, we assume that this requirement is realizable given that bureaucracies 
of modern foreign and security policy (e.g. foreign offices, defense ministries, secret service 
organizations, etc.) are staffed with many academics, among them numerous IR scholars.  
Second, fit taxonomies are particularly data hungry analytical tools. As we have explained 
above, users must at first conduct “constructivist research” and identify the motivations of 
involved actors (i.e. their desire and beliefs), before they can apply fit taxonomies in order 
to disclose the “optimal problem solution”. However, given that we were able to fulfil this 
task with the limited resources available to a PhD candidate, government organizations (as 
well as NGOs or international organizations) with more time, budge, and manpower, are 
assumed to handle this challenge even better.  
   
339 
 
Third, the application of the fit taxonomy could lead to unpleasant findings for those 
players who are embroiled in a diplomatic struggle. Take, for example, the discovery that 
the Qaddafi regime was, in the Libyan NRN, in need of a suitable substitute. Even if 
Washington had been aware of this particular fit demand, it would have been a 
requirement that was difficult to accept and even more difficult to implement in terms of 
concrete diplomatic actions – given the long and relatively hostile history of the American-
Libyan relationship. But acknowledging this problem, we nevertheless assume that if users 
of the fit approach really endeavor to achieve sustainable and lasting negotiation 
outcomes, they are likely to follow its recommendations – even if the revealed fit demands 
are unpleasant from a short-term perspective.  
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6.2 “The Thrilling Moment”:  The Logic of 
Wisdom 
If there was something like a universal human DNA for social behavior, the desire for 
wisdom would probably be part of it. Since the beginning of time and in all civilizations, it 
appears that (un)wisdom has been a central reference point for human thought and action. 
Wisdom seems to be a key element in the worldview of indigenous people as much as it is a 
central theme in the vivid and growing “life coaching” literature in modern Western 
societies (e.g. Welsch 2011). It is therefore not astonishing that the notion of wisdom also 
plays a significant role in international affairs – in particular, in situations where foreign 
policy makers are confronted with potentially far-reaching and game-changing decisions.425   
All this stands in stark contrast to the meagre existence the concept of (un)wisdom has 
eked out on the fringes of modern social science – including the discipline of International 
Relations (IR). While of unfailing prominence in the thinking and action of ordinary people 
and political leaders alike, “wisdom abstinence” (Speer 2004) in academia is striking. Since 
the 19th century, wisdom was only mentioned by scholars in passing and has not generated 
any meaningful debates, neither as a theoretical concept nor as a research subject. It is not 
an exaggeration to single out Aristotle as the last world-class scholar who granted the study 
of wisdom a primary place in his academic career (Smith 1998).  
Studying the Libyan NRN, we discovered, on several occasions, a distinct pattern of 
strategic decision-making and actions for which we had no other explanation than to 
describe it as a feature of wisdom. On the one hand, the actors were intensively using far-
reaching knowledge they had required about the given conflict situations. On the other 
hand, we witnessed acts of “strategic humility” in which the involved parties downsized 
their desires in order to reach the highest possible impact with limited means. The 
discovery of the so-called “Logic of Wisdom” (LoW; or the “wise strategy”) was our 
“thrilling moment” – an intriguing and overwhelming “shock wave” very similar to what 
rock n’ roll fans feel when they listened to a punk or grunge song for the first time. 
In the common sense view, wisdom is primarily perceived as a static stock of knowledge, a 
personal competence, or even a virtue. We however claim – based on the discovery we 
made in the Libyan NRN – that wisdom is first and foremost a behavioral pattern. What we 
describe as the LoW is not reserved to elderly, knowledgeable, experienced, and 
charismatic personalities. It is not esoteric hermectism or a secrete science. Rather, LoW 
signifies a purposive and strategically applicable approach of decision-making and action. It 
                            
425 Take for example the recent negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. After the six parties involved in 
these talks (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) reached an agreement 
in July 2015, the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, praised it as a “victory of wisdom” – a slogan he had 
used repeatedly since his presidential election campaign in 2013 (Krüger 2015). The Republican 
presidential candidate in the election campaign 2016, Jeb Bush, instead rejected the deal as “extremely 
unwise” (Nagourney 2015), whereas President Obama said his successor would be “unwise to scuttle” the 
nuclear accord with Tehran (Olorunnipa 2015).  
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is a systematic process, which is scientifically explainable and understandable. It is a 
rational strategy relevant for ordinary people – such as foreign policy makers.  
Residing in the realm of rational choice, LoW is clearly distinct from ideational or 
constructivist approaches of social change. However, LoW also differs from the logic of 
conventional rational strategy. In its general reading, the conventional rational strategy is 
understood as “the art or science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field of 
conflict” (Bull 1968: 593). LoW represents exactly the opposite. What was unintentionally 
discovered in our PhD project was that LoW revolves around the idea of a “strategic self-
manipulation” of one’s own desires. It represents the rare but influential act where actors 
deliberately adapt their ends (E) to the available means (M) and the given strategic context 
(S). In essence, LoW is a phenomenon most of us might have already experienced at some 
point in our professional careers or private lives. It is, in many respects, synonymous with 
the painful but liberating decision to let go cherished but increasingly unrealistic goals for 
the sake of regaining new opportunities. If ordinary people apply this strategy, why should 
state actors not do the same?  
Although we find fragments of LoW in recent IR studies (e.g. Gelb 2009; Nye 2011: ch. 7; 
Nye 2008b: ch. 4; Yarhi-Milo 2013)426 and in the writings of historic intellectuals seen as the 
founding fathers of modern strategic studies (e.g. Niccolò Machiavelli or Carl von 
Clausewitz),427 LoW has never been studied before. It is a completely new academic 
concept. Research on LoW promises to reveal a rare but very significant phenomenon in 
foreign policy that is likely to be particularly relevant in strategic situations where actors are 
weak, in a hurry, or impelled to tackle challenging problems. Moreover, given the “wisdom 
abstinence” in academia, studying LoW would signify the first systematic approach to a 
phenomenon that had been neglected by social science since pre-modern times. At the 
moment, LoW is nothing more than an intriguing hypothesis that is urgently demanding for 
further research. But given that we found evidence for this phenomenon on several 
occasions in the Libyan NRN, there is solid ground to assume that at least some of the great 
success stories and some of the big failures we saw in the general history of foreign policy 
are the product of a proper or falsely used “wise strategy”. 
                            
426
 In particular, in the work of Joseph Nye, we found numerous references pointing in the direction of 
wisdom. Apart from his concept of “smart power” (Nye 2009, 2011), it is especially Nye’s idea of 
“contextual intelligence” that is noteworthy (Nye 2008b: ch. 4). The concept “contextual intelligence” 
describes the ability of political leaders to acquire relevant strategic information that is needed to develop 
smart strategies. Historic leaders with high “contextual intelligence” were – according to Nye – Otto von 
Bismarck, Winston Churchill, or Dwight Eisenhower (2008: 88-91). Certainly, the concept of “contextual 
intelligence” is falling short in terms of revealing the phenomenon of LoW. Namely, it is not disclosing the 
procedures of “strategic self-manipulation” that is at very heart of the “wise strategy”. Nevertheless, 
“contextual intelligence” is very close to LoW. Tellingly, Nye has described his approach as follows:  
“contextual intelligence is an intuitive diagnostic skill that helps a leader to align tactics with objectives to 
create smart strategies in varying situations. Others have called it judgement or wisdom [author’s 
emphasis] (Nye 2008b: 87-8). 
427
 It is also noteworthy that we find fragments of the LoW already in the writings of those historic 
intellectuals who are regarded in the 20th century as the classic founding fathers of strategic studies. The 
ability of accurate political judgment and strategic “farsightedness” paired with tactic pragmatism – 
abilities one could classify as insignia of wisdom – has played, for example a central role in the thinking of 
Thukydides and Niccolò Machiavelli. For the Prussian war theoretician Carl von Clausewitz it was even the 
quintessence of all political competence (e.g. Münkler 1987: 492).  
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LoW is a “thrilling moment”. It has all that is needed to qualify for a real scientific 
“discovery”. It goes beyond the conventional “innovation by translation” or interpretation. 
Provided that future research will show that this phenomenon has relevance beyond the 
Libyan NRN, the “wise strategy” is likely to push the border of the discipline at least in the 
specific field of foreign policy and strategic studies. 
6.2.1 What is Wisdom & Where Have We Found it in our PhD Project?  
Before we discuss LoW in detail, we will at first elaborate on the nature of “wisdom” (ch. 
6.2.1.1) and explain where exactly we have found evidence for the “wise strategy” in the 
Libyan NRN (ch. 6.2.1.2).  
6.2.1.1 What is Wisdom?  
Given the striking “wisdom abstinence”, it is perhaps little surprising that an exact 
definition of this phenomenon is missing in modern social science. Lacking an academic 
definition, we have operated with a “synoptic” concept building on our everyday 
understanding of wisdom. In essence, wisdom is assumed to revolve around three basic 
components:  
First, wisdom is associated with pragmatism. It denotes a non-abstract inclination for 
feasible actions. For example, most of us would intuitively rather ascribe wisdom to an 
experienced country doctor than to a university professor. Consequentially, it is very likely 
that the “wisdom abstinence” we observe in modern social science stems exactly from the 
non-abstract, latently anti-theoretical connotations of the common sense understanding of 
wisdom. Most modern intellectuals, scholars, and philosophers who perceive themselves as 
“proper” scientists would hesitate to focus on a subject that has the potential to bestow 
them with the doubtful aura of esoteric gurus. 
Second, wisdom implies comprehensive and farsighted knowledge as well as techniques to 
acquire new insights. In that sense, wisdom differs from “smartness”. Being just smart (or 
clever) does not necessarily require a comprehensive stock of accurate knowledge.  
Third, wisdom appears to be bound to the notion of simplicity and humility. The idea of 
humble, self-restrained, and (in most cases) very old wise men and women seems to be a 
universal and trans-cultural theme we encounter in civilizations around the world. Likewise, 
it is not surprising that modern coaching literature, which in general has a strong inclination 
for the concept of wisdom, builds on the idea of humbleness and is regularly calling on its 
readers to “simplify” their lives (Kustenmacher 2004). Wisdom is thereby not necessarily 
synonymous with total abstinence or the renouncement of all worldly things. However, it 
requires at least the ability to be self-restrained and humble if circumstance requires.  
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6.2.1.2 The “Site of the Discovery”: Interception of “BBC China” and its Diplomatic 
Handling 
We found evidence for the “wise strategy” – and for its failure – on several occasions in the 
Libyan NRN. The most prominent example, however, was the interception of BBC China and 
its diplomatic handing (ch. 5.3.3.2).428 It was already mentioned that the interception of BBC 
China and particularly its diplomatic handling was probably one of the most successful 
design elements in the entire history of the NRN on Tripoli’s WMD programs. This 
diplomatic tool was rated as a “multiple fit” and contributed significantly to the resolution 
of the Alibi Game. The interception of “BBC China” and its diplomacy was the major turning 
point in the pre-agreement phase and, as such, cleared the way for the disarmament 
agreement of December 2003. 
However, if we look beyond the high “fit performance” and dig deeper into the causal logic 
of this particular design element, we found evidence of the LoW. The diplomatic 
momentum generated by the seizure of “BBC China” was in essence triggered by an act of 
“strategic humility”. If the Bush junior administration had followed the logic of conventional 
strategic decision-making and had applied the tools (M) that best matched at that time to 
its ends (E), it would have disclosed the seizure of “BBC China” to the media.  
Washington had started the pre-agreement phase in spring 2003 with the firm desire 
expressed by George W. Bush’s instruction to “get deliverables from this process” that 
could “send a signal to the world” (ch. 5.3.1.2). The seizure of BBC China had everything 
that would qualify for a deliverable with world-wide resonance. After all, the interception 
of this nuclear smuggling incident was one of the most spectaculars success stories in the 
history of counter-proliferation. Making it public would have been very convincing proof of 
the Bush junior administration’s resolute commitment to fight nuclear proliferation. This 
step would have been perfectly in line with the tough approach against the “nuclear rogue 
states” Washington pursued in the early 2000s.429 
 
 
 
 
                            
428
 Other occasions in the Libyan NRN where we have encountered evidence for the “wise strategy” (and 
its failure) are for example: the carefully scripted choreography of the public statements announcing the 
disarmament deal on 19th December 2003 (ch. 5.3.4.2) and in the hapless Libyan charm offensive 
launched in the late 1980s (ch. 5.3.1.2).  
429
 Moreover, as we have already outlined above, making the interception of the BBC China public would 
have been also in line with Washington’s effort to promote the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) – a 
new non-proliferation instrument the Bush junior administration had introduced in spring 2003 (ch. 
5.3.3.2). In addition, the U.S. intelligence community was at that time still under critique for not having 
prevented 9/11 and were also facing new accusations due to lacking evidence that Saddam Hussein had 
pursued an illegal WMD program. Publically celebrating this “counter-proliferation coup” would have 
been crucial to re-establish the self-esteem of the U.S. secret service (see, for example, the Commission 
on the Intelligence Capabilities 2005).  
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Figure 29: Varieties of the Logic of Wisdom (part 1) 
 
In early October 2003, John Bolton’s (Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 
Security at the US State Department) behavior is probably the best yardstick of what 
Washington would have done, if it had applied conventional strategic logic where means 
are shaped in accordance to ends. Due to the high level of secrecy, John Bolton – a neo-
conservative, officially the responsible player in the Bush junior administration’s non-
proliferation policy and under normal circumstances a close confident to the President – 
had been not aware of the ongoing talks with Tripoli. As soon as the interception of “BBC 
China” was reported to him through classified government channels, he hastily prepared a 
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press conference in order to trumpet this success story to the world pointing out the 
smoking gun that clearly indicated the existence of a Libyan nuclear weapons program. 
Figure 30: Varieties of the Logic of Wisdom (part 2) 
 
However, those actors who were involved in the nascent American-Libyan engagement 
(namely Robert Joseph and his colleagues at the White House) came – based on their 
knowledge of the strategic context and the nature of the Qaddafi regime – to the 
conclusion that the public disclosure of the “BBC China” incident would “wreck” the entire 
negotiation dynamic with Libya (MacLeod 2006; Tobey 2014; Wright 2004).430 Although the 
                            
430
 And in hindsight, there is indeed little doubt that a public disclosure of the interception would have 
affected the entire engagement with the Qaddafi regime. As we have outlined in detail in the case 
chapter, there was no need for a negative incentive. Being the alibi player during the pre-agreement 
phase, Libya was strongly inclined for cooperation anyway. If Washington had made the seizure of the BBC 
China public and hailed it as a big non-proliferation success to the press (which it undoubtedly was), 
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prospect of announcing this big counter-proliferation success to the media was, reportedly, 
very tempting in light of the ends (E) the Bush junior administration was aiming to realize at 
that time, it was correctly understood as a mean (M) that was not coherent with the 
strategic context (S) of the Libyan-American negotiation process. In light of the swift actions 
that were required after the seizure, Washington instead showed self-restraint, scaled back 
its far-reaching desires, and chose instead to give priority to a cautious non-proliferation 
engagement with Libya. President George W. Bush decided for a discreet diplomatic 
handling of this affair through back-door channels. The press conference that John Bolton 
had organized was called off as soon as the White House and the CIA got wind of this plan 
(Tenet 2007: 294). 
The strategic self-manipulation of Washington’s ends (E) turned out to be the right choice 
and represented a powerful tool for the further NRN with the Qaddafi regime. The seizure 
of “BBC China” created a new situation in which the relation between means (M), ends (E), 
and the strategic context (S) became incoherent. LoW – the self-manipulation of one’s own 
ends (E) – helped to restore this strategic imbalance and thereby created significant impact. 
The BBC China incident is therefore a good example of LoW. It was an act of “strategic 
humility”.431 
6.2.2 The Logic of Wisdom and how it How it Differs from the 
Conventional Rational Strategy? 
The conventional rational strategy is understood as the art of promoting ends (E) by 
shaping (M) and the strategic context (M). By shaping ends (E) in coherence with the 
available means (M) and the given strategic context (S), LoW is operating in the opposite 
direction to conventional rational strategy. But while distinct and different, it would be 
misleading to characterize the “wise strategy” as a logic that is opposed to the conventional 
view of strategic actions. Rather, LoW is a “situational corrective”. As long as the 
conventional strategy is functioning well – expressed by coherence between ends (E), 
means (M) and strategic context (S) (signified in Figure 29 and 30 by straight red “boundary 
lines”) – LoW is irrelevant. In fact, in such a situation, it would be “wise” to follow the 
conventional rational strategy (case A1 and A2, Figure 29.  
However, it is a different case in situations where the conventional strategy goes “off 
track”. As soon as the strategic layers become incoherent (signified by twisted red 
“boundary lines” in Figure 29 and 30), actors are not able to exert the impact (I) that would 
be possible in a coherent constellation (see the difference between a dotted or solid 
“impact line” in Figure 29 and 30). Such an incoherent constellation represents a foreign 
policy crisis and strategy failure. Apart from ineffective problem resolution (expressed by 
                                                                             
Tripoli would have, in all probability, denied that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, rejected all 
accusations, desisted from the secret negotiation process on its WMD programs, and returned to an 
antagonistic and hostile policy towards the United States.  
431
 In the taxonomy of ideal-typical LoW constellations, the example of the “BBC China” interception 
would signify the case B1/B2 (Figure 29).  
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the scope of impact (I)), it leads to a series of follow-up problems (among them political 
frustration (F) and strategic decay (D)).  
Of course, in the logic of conventional rational strategy, actors could react to incoherence 
and reestablish harmony by increasing either their means (M) and/or by directly 
manipulating the strategic context (S) (see case B3-M3; Figure 29 and 30). However, the 
application of the “wise strategy” – understood as a “situational corrective” – would 
achieve in general better results under these conditions. While not necessarily better in 
terms of effectiveness (i.e. achieving a higher impact in a given strategic constellations), 
LoW is certainly operating more swiftly and more efficiently (i.e. economical use of 
resources; expressed by the blue arrows in Figure 29 and 30) than the conventional rational 
strategy. In a foreign policy crisis where actors are either weak, faced overwhelming 
problems, or are impelled to operate under high time pressure, the “wise strategy” is 
therefore generally a better choice than the conventional rational strategy.  
We assume that misbalance between means (M), ends (E), and the strategic context (S) is a 
very common phenomenon in international affairs and is likely to occur more often than 
coherent strategic situations (see case A). Based on this assumption, we have modeled 13 
ideal typical constellations of incoherence (see Figure 29 and 30). Misbalance is arriving 
because the available means are too small (e.g. case E1), the ends are either too humble 
(e.g. case C1) or too exaggerated (e.g. case B1), or because the strategic context is too 
challenging (e.g. case D1). Moreover, in international affairs, it is relatively safe to assume 
that we would also encounter a series of ideal types that build on a combination of the just 
mentioned factors (e.g. case F1 to L1, Figure 29 and 30).  
In these situations of strategic incoherency, (1) actors are unable to achieve what they 
actually desire given that their means are limited (e.g. case B1 or G1). (2) Or they are 
unwilling to realize what they potentially could attain given the means that are available to 
them (e.g. case C1 or H1). (3) Or they do not desire what would be required give the 
challenging strategic context (e.g. case D1 or I1). However, regardless of the individual 
situation, as soon as misbalance settles, the players are not able to exert the impact (I) that 
would be possible in a more coherent situation.  
Moreover, apart from falling short in terms of strategic impact (I), these situations of 
incoherency are likely to produce two types of follow-up problems that further complicate 
the situations: frustration (F) and decay (D). Frustration (F) is the logical consequence when 
actors are unable to achieve what they actually desire to attain. When the means (M) do 
not match an actor’s desire (E), dissatisfaction and grievance are the logical consequence 
(e.g. case B1, E1, or G1). The problem of decay (D) is instead assumed to occur in those 
cases where actors are unwilling to realize what they could potentially attain given the 
available means or when they do not desire what would be required to resolve the strategic 
challenge (e.g. case C1, D1, or H1). In a “decay constellation”, actors have “made 
themselves comfortable” in an unpleasant and awkward situation. The policy impact (I) is 
constantly too small in light of the strategic challenge. But since effective and sustainable 
problem resolution is not desired, the actors do not to change course. However, not 
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resolving the strategic challenge is slowly eroding the chance for future actions. The 
strategic challenge is assumed to grow over time. And the unused means that actors are 
not applying are likely to gradually fall  into disrepair.  
In almost all of these ideal-typical situations (see detail discussion of the outlier case M2 
below), LoW could restore coherency between the different layers and thereby allows the 
involved actors to regain strategic impact and eliminate the follow-up problems of decay 
(D) and frustration (F). When the conventional rational strategy has become unbalanced, 
LoW is an effective corrector. How the “wise strategy” is operating is thereby dependant on 
the scope and nature of the original state of incoherency. What is, however, always at the 
very heart of the LoW is that it builds on the “strategic self-manipulation of one’s own 
desires. For the sake of coherency, the deliberate alternation of ends (E) makes LoW an 
approach that is clearly distinct form conventional strategic thinking.  
In many situations, the self-manipulation of one’s own of ends (E) requires an act of 
“strategic humility” – similar to the approach the United States applied in the diplomatic 
handling of the BBC China interception. To regain coherence, actors are required to down-
size their desires in correspondence with the available means (M) and the given strategic 
context (S) (e.g. case B2 and E2). However, it would be misleading to equate LoW in general 
with the humble, difficult, and often painful act of “strategic humility”.432 In many 
situations, the self-manipulation of one’s own ends instead requires “strategic boldness” 
(e.g. case C2, D2 or I2). To restore coherence between the different strategic dimensions, 
actors are required to extend existent desires and actively develop new objectives. In these 
constellations, it would be extremely “unwise” to humbly down-size one’s ends (E). 
Essentially, the “wise strategy” signifies “political jiujutsu”. Its major strength is strategic 
flexibility. In a confrontation, the users of the “wise strategy” win and triumph not by firm 
resistance and with dogged determination but by strategic suppleness implemented by the 
agility of their desires – expressed either by strategic humility or boldness.  
LoW is effective in the sense that it resolves strategic incoherence and thereby strikes at 
the root of foreign policy crises including the follow-up problems of political frustration (F) 
and strategic decay (D). However, when compared to the conventional rationalist efforts 
against incoherence (see cases B3-L3), LoW is not necessarily better in terms of 
effectiveness. The picture is rather mixed and the two approaches to handle the misbalance 
between the strategy layers – LoW and conventional strategy –  “are on level pegging”. 
While the application of the “wise strategy” is yielding a higher impact (I) in some 
constellations than the conventional strategy against incoherence (e.g. case C2, D2, or H2), 
the conventional rational strategy is doing better in other situations (e.g. case B3, E3, or J3).  
                            
432
 The notion of “humility” is particularly prone to misunderstanding. “Strategic humility” is a purposive 
act that should not be confused with altruism. Moreover, “strategic humility” is not automatically leading 
to a gentle, cooperative, and accommodating foreign policy. The self-manipulation of one’s desires is 
completely indifferent to the way individual players might act in foreign affairs. Since it only signifies a 
particular mode of how actors “shape their minds”, “strategic humility” is applicable for military actors 
who eagerly try to win a war as much as it is relevant for diplomats who ponder the best cooperation 
strategy with a partner country.  
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But while not necessarily more effective, LoW is always the more efficient approach. When 
the conventional rationalist strategy tackles constellations of incoherence, it does it by 
either changing the available means (M) and/or by directly manipulating the strategic 
context (S) (see case B3-M3). Efforts to change the strategic context (S) are particularly 
difficult and costly (see, for example, the strategy of “nudging”; Thaler & Sunstein 2009). 
But enhancing one’s means (M) by enhancing the quantity and quality of availed foreign 
policy tools is resource-demanding too (expressed in the figures by the blue arrows (Figure 
29 and 30)).  
Certainly, the “wise strategy” requires power resources too. In several of the ideal-typical 
situations we have modeled, the strategic self-manipulation of one own’s ends is likewise 
triggering the need to change the available means (e.g. case C2, D2, F2) or, very 
occasionally, even the strategic context (case K2 and L2). However, even in those ideal-
typical situations where power resources are required, the “wise strategy” is nevertheless 
always the more efficient choice (apart from the special case of M2 which we will discuss 
below). The strategic self-manipulation of one’s desires is saving power resources that 
would otherwise be needed to cope with incoherent strategic situations.433  
Being more efficient and swifter makes the “wise strategy” a convincing approach to handle 
foreign policy crises. It is the very nature of foreign policy crisis that the relevant actors are 
confronted by more powerful opponents, face severe and challenging problems, or are 
impelled to operate under high time pressure. In all these situations, the LoW signifies a 
better choice than the conventional rational strategy. When weak, overwhelmed, or under 
time pressure, strategic self-manipulation of one’s ends is a powerful tool to regain 
strategic momentum and win a confrontation. Moreover, LoW is “high politics”. 
Manipulating one’s own ends is not an everyday practice left to subordinate bureaucratic 
actors. Rather, only the highest political levels (of a state, international organization, NGO, 
etc.) are entitled to take such far reaching and decisive decisions. Consequentially, we 
assume that big success and great failure in foreign policy is not always, but at least 
sometimes, the product of decision makers unknowingly applying the “wise strategy” or – 
in the case of failures – disrespecting its logics.  
Certainly, the “wise strategy” is not a “blue print solution”. In constellations when foreign 
policy is not in a crisis mode, the conventional strategic approach might be more suitable. 
Moreover, there is, in addition, a fundamental restriction to the application of the “wise 
strategy”. The LoW resides in the realm of rationalism. Consequentially, self-restraint and 
downsizing of one’s own desires has its limits. The ultimate bottom line for LoW is defined 
by the concept of “core desires” (CD) – important vital ends that rational actors could 
                            
433
 However, LoW is not free of charge. While conventional rational strategy is strongly oriented at power 
resources, the decisive vehicle of LoW is instead the “flexibility of the mind”, the willpower of foreign 
policy leaders, and strategic knowledge. The strategic self-manipulation of one’s desires represents, in 
most of the cases, a politically demanding, intellectual challenging, and often very painful decision. 
Moreover, expressing the common-sense understanding of “wisdom”, LoW is assumed to be in particular 
knowledge-hungry. What is required is not only “contextual intelligence” (Nye 2008b: ch. 4) of the 
strategic constellations but also a very clear understanding about the “interior” of one’s own desires. 
Strategic self-manipulation of one’s ends (E) is only possible when based on detailed knowledge about the 
scope and nature of current (in the case of “strategic humility”) or future desires (in the case of “strategic 
boldness”).  
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impossibly suspend. LoW is not applicable in situations where the effort to reestablish 
coherency would require abandoning parts of these “core desires” (see case M2, Figure 30).   
Like deterrence or balance of power LoW is a strategic middle-range theory. Therein lies its 
central strength. LoW allows us to study not only shifts of an actor’s motivation – a process 
we could also analyze with more conventional approaches – but it also gives practical 
guidance on how to shape strategic desires in order to improve the impact of foreign policy. 
When systematically applied, the LoW has therefore a “backward-looking analytical” as well 
as a “forward-looking prescriptive” dimension. 
6.2.4 Outlook 
That we discovered LoW as an unintended side-effect of our PhD project was, in hindsight, 
not only pure chance. Rather, it is, to a considerable extent, a result of how we studied the 
Libyan NRN. It was because we took the burden “to hike all the way” from the “snowy 
heights” of meta-theory (i.e. the Enlightened Rationalism), over the foothills of our 
academic manifesto (the policy paradigm) to the low-lands of analytical research 
(diplomatic design and the fit approach). The unplanned discovery of LoW was the reward 
for this “challenging hike”. If we had structured this PhD project differently – for example, 
more along the idea of a book proposal (p. 17-18), we would have most certainly missed 
this point.  
For example, the discovery of LoW would not have been possible without studying the 
“problem of fit” through the fit taxonomy. It was only by parallel insights into four strategic 
dimensions (ends (i.e. desires and beliefs), means (i.e. design elements), strategic context 
(i.e. negotiation problems) and the impact (i.e. “fit performance”)) that we became aware 
of the varying (in-)coherencies. Without such an in-depth understanding about these 
different strategic components, we would have, in all probability, been unable to discover 
the phenomenon of LoW.  
The meta-theoretical approach of Enlightened Rationalism was likewise essential for the 
discovery of LoW. If one had to sketch out a research puzzle that perfectly match to the 
nature of Enlightened Rationalism, the “wise strategy” would be among the first candidate. 
LoW is, on the one hand, a rationalist approach were actors are assumed to maximize their 
utilities. But, on the other hand, it places the concept of strategic self-manipulation with 
the idea of an endogenic change of an actor’s motivation at the central stage and therefore 
goes clearly beyond Orthodox Rationalism. Consequentially, it was only by the strict 
application of Enlightened Rationalism that we were able to discover LoW.  
Studying the “wise strategy” is methodically a very challenging endeavor. For example, 
considerable efforts are required to disclose the varying constellations of (in)coherency. 
However, a future research project on LoW would certainly be worth the effort given that 
the “wise strategy” signifies a promising added-value both for academic as well as for the 
sphere of practical foreign policy. As we said in the beginning of this section: at the 
moment, “logic of wisdom” is nothing but an intriguing hypothesis. But after IR scholars 
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have debated in the last two decades over the role of hard, soft and smart power (Nye 
2011), the time has come to start thinking about “wise power”. Once better understood, 
LoW holds the promise to be a powerful strategic tool for practical foreign policy.
434
 
  
                            
434
 There is, for example, some ground to believe that perhaps the most controversial foreign policy 
decision in recent years – Obama’s choice not to launch a punitive strike against the Assad regime in 
response to its chemical weapons attack on 13th August 2013 – had many elements of the LoW.  
In his recent interview with the Atlantic journalist Jeffery Goldberg, Obama explained that “dropping 
bombs on someone to prove that you’re willing to drop bombs on someone is just about the worst reason 
to use force” (Goldberg 2016). When looking through the prism of “deterrence theory”, his words are 
probably the most absurd statement ever given by an acting U.S. President. After all, using force in order 
to retain strategic credibility is one of the core elements of deterrence.  Consequentially, most foreign 
policy experts – including Obama’s national security advisers – were shocked by his decision in August 
2003. Calling off the attack against the Assad regime was certainly at odds with the “Washington 
playbook” the U.S. foreign policy establishment is normally supposed to follow. But when thinking in 
terms of LoW the canceled strike appears as a farsighted decision which seems to express, in light of the 
circumstances in August 2013, a more abstract and higher-ranking strategic logic than the traditional 
“deterrence theory”.  
Immediately after the devastating chemical weapons attack, which killed more than 1,000 people in the 
suburbs of Damascus, the Obama administration was determined to respond militarily. The Pentagon 
made all necessary preparations including the development of a target list. The primary reasoning was to 
enforce the “red line” Obama had drawn one year earlier in a public statement given on 20th August 2012 
for a scenario in which chemical weapons would be used in Syria.  
But while the machinery of the U.S. security apparatus was in full tilt towards a strike, Obama’s concerns 
grew. That the U.K. was withdrawing from military action since the British Parliament voted against 
Cameron’s plan to support the U.S. attack, further inflamed Obama’s doubts. In his own words, the major 
argument for canceling the attack at the “eleventh hour” was, however, the conviction that the mean (M) 
of a military strike was inconsistent with the strategic constellations (S). In his interview with Jeffery 
Goldberg, Obama said: “[O]ur assessment [was] that while we could inflict some damage on Assad, we 
could not, through a missile strike, eliminate the chemical weapons themselves, and what I would then 
face was the prospect of Assad having survived the strike and claiming he had successfully defied the 
United States, that the United States had acted unlawfully in the absence of a UN mandate, and that that 
would have potentially strengthened his hand rather than weakened it” (Goldberg 2016).  
In an act of “strategic humility” Obama took on 30th August 2013, the very difficult decision and 
downsizing his own ends (E) in the LoW typical “self-manipulation” of his mind. While the objective to 
inactivate the Syrian chemical weapons program was still on the agenda, the goal of enforcing the “red 
line” and retain U.S. strategic credibility was off the table. Instead of a military strike, the Obama 
administration searched for a different mean (M) that was assumed to be more suitable to the given 
strategic context (S) – negotiations with Russia. Typical of LoW, Obama later described this difficult 
decision as a liberating act which in the end provided a higher impact (I) than conventional strategy. He 
speaks in the logic of “wise strategy” when he said: “[T]he fact that I was able to pull back from the 
immediate pressures and think through in my own mind what was in America’s interest (…) was as tough a 
decision as I’ve made — and I believe ultimately it was the right decision to make” (Goldberg 2016).  
The historic evidence suggests that Obama’s “wise strategy” indeed had more impact (I) in the end than a 
military strike. The disarmament deal the U.S. negotiated with Russia lead to a swift removal of Syria’s 
chemical weapons program. Of course applying limited force against the Assad regime had restored U.S. 
credibility in light of the “red line”. But it would have – in all probability – not led to an inactivation of the 
Syrian chemical weapons program. The “show of force” Washington planned to deliver in summer 2013 
(e.g. five Arleigh Burke destroyers in the Mediterranean) was too small to topple the Assad regime or 
change the course of the Syrian Civil War. But it would have been large enough to put the U.S. on a 
“slippery slope” with the danger of becoming more entangled in “Syrian theater”. Of course, the Syrian 
regime, sadly, continues to use chemical weapons against civilians – even today. But, the current chemical 
warfare by the Assad regime has never reached the same scale – in substance (nerve agents (mainly sarin) 
vs. choking agent (mainly chlorine)) or in intensity (the series of medium and larger attacks between April 
to August 2013 vs. tactical and point-to-point use of chemical warfare agents mainly as admixture to 
barrel bombs) – it had before Syria’s a accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013.  
Certainly, the argument that Obama’s decision in 2013 was in essence an expression of LoW is nothing but 
an intriguing hypothesis at the moment. Whether it really happened the way we described it is a question 
that needs to be studied in a future research project.  
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8. ANNEX 
 
Annex 1: Overview on Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Reversal   
 
Source: Sagan 2011: fig. 2 
 
 
  
   
391 
 
Annex 2: Challenging Negotiation Environment  
 
Annex 3: Documents of the “Operational Code Analysis”  
Date Title  Type Source Date 
State Previous Conflicts [a] Intensity Bilateral Trade [b]
Quantity and Qalitiy of 
Overlapping Alliances [c] [d]
Dissimilarity of "National Identities" 
[e] 
Challenging 
Negotiation 
Environment 
very low high high very low 
no conflict since 1945 with 
negotiation party 
Exports form Argentina to Brazil: 
14.8 %; exports form Brazil to 
Argentina: 6.7 %
One defense pact with BRA since 
1947
(1) no common language (Spanisch vs. 
Portuguese) (2) common civilization (Latin 
American) (3) common socio-economic 
system (SL)
very low low very low low 
No conflict since 1945 with 
negotiation parties
Exports form Belarus to USA & 
Russia: 40 %; exports from USA & 
Russia to Belarus: 0.4 % 
No formal alliance with U.S. and 
Russia during negotitions
(1) common language: yes (with Russia) no 
(with the West) (2) different civilizations: yes 
(with Russia: Orthodox civilization) no (with 
the West) (3) socio-economic system: yes 
(with Russia: OS) no (with U.S.: IS)
very low high high very low 
No conflict since 1945 with 
negotiation party
Exports form Argentina to Brazil: 
14.8 %; exports form Brazil to 
Argentina: 6.7 %
One defense pact with BRA 
since1947
(1) no common language (Spanisch vs. 
Portuguese) (2) common civilization (Latin 
American) (3) common socio-economic 
system (SL)
very high high medium low 
11 conflicts since 1945 with 
negotiation parties. Average HIIK 
(COSIMO) Conflict Intensity 2,8.  
Exports form India to Pakistan & 
USA: 19.6 %; exports form USA & 
Pakistan to India: 0.3 %
No formal alliance with U.S.; and 
one neutrality pact with Pakistan 
(entered into force on the 27th 
January 1991)
(1) common language: yes (English as official 
language)  (2) no common civilization 
(Islamic vs. Hindu civilization) (3) common 
socio-eco. system: no with US (IS vs. EL) yes 
(with Pakistan: both EL)
high very high very low medium 
5 conflict since 1945 with 
negotiation party. Average HIIK 
(COSIMO) Conflict Intensity 2,2.  
Exports from Iran to USA, 
Germany, Russia, UK, China and 
France: 5.7 %; exports form 
China, France, Germany, Russia, 
UK, and USA to Iran: 0.3 %
No formal alliance with 
negotitating parties
(1) no common language (Persian vs. French, 
German, Russian, Chinese and English) (2) no 
common civilization (Islamic vs. Western, 
Orthodox, and Sinic civilization) (3) no 
common socio-economic system (EL vs. IS, vs. 
OS, vs. SL)
very low very low very low very low 
No conflicts since 1945 with 
negotiation parties
Exports form Kazakhstan to USA 
& Russia: 58 %; exports form 
Russia & USA to Kazakhstan: 0.4 
%
No formal alliance with U.S. and 
Russia 
(1) common language: yes (with Russia) no 
(with the West) (2) different civilizations: yes 
(with Russia: Orthodox civilization) no (with 
the West) (3) no common socio-economic 
system (EL vs. OS, vs. IS)
very low medium low very high 
No conflicts since 1945 with 
negotiation party 
Exports form South Korea to 
USA: 24.1 %; exports from USA to 
South Korea: 1.8 %
One entente with the US (entered 
into force on October the 1st, 
1953)
(1) no common language (Korean vs. English) 
(2) no common civilization (Sinic civilication 
vs. Western civilication) (3) no common socio-
economic system (SL vs. IS)
medium very high very low very high 
2 conflict since 1945 with 
negotiation party. Average HIIK 
(COSIMO) Conflict Intensity 2,5.  
Exports form Libya to UK & USA: 
0.5 %; exports form UK & USA to 
Libya: 0.003 %
No formal alliance with U.S. and 
U.K.
(1) no common language (Arabian vs. 
English)  (2) no common civilization (Islamic 
vs. Western civilization) (3) no common socio-
economic system (EL vs. IS)
very high medium medium low 
11 conflicts since 1945 with 
negotiation parties. Average HIIK 
(COSIMO) Conflict Intensity 2,8.  
Exports from Pakistan to India & 
USA: 13.8 %; exports form India 
& USA to Pakistan: 10.4 % 
No formal alliance with U.S.; and 
one neutrality pact with India 
(entered into force on the 27th 
January 1991)
(1) common language: yes (English as official 
language)  (2) no common civilization 
(Islamic vs. Hindu civilization) (3) socio-eco. 
system: no with US (IS vs. EL) yes (with India: 
both EL)
high very low very high high 
4 conflicts since 1945 with 
negotiation parties. Average HIIK 
(COSIMO) Conflict Intensity 2,8.  
Exports from North Korea to USA, 
Russia, China, South Korea & 
Japan: 49.1 %; exports form 
China, Japan, Russia, South 
Korea, and USA: 0.05 %
No formal alliances with U.S, 
Japan and South Korea; one 
defence pact with China (entered 
into force on July 11th 1961); one 
entente with Russia (entered into 
force February 9th 2000)
(1) common language: yes (with South 
Korea) no (with China, Russia, Japan and 
U.S.) (2) common sinic civilication with China, 
and South Korea; no common civilication 
with Japan (Japanese civilization), Russia 
(Orthodox civilization) and the U.S. (Western 
Civilization) (3) no common socio-economic 
system (EL vs. IS)
very low high high very high 
No conflicts since 1945 with 
negotiation party 
Exports form Taiwan to USA: 
18.7 %; exports form USA to 
Taiwan: 4.3 %
One defence pact with the US 
(entered into force on December 
the 2nd, 1954)
(1) no common language (English vs. 
Chinese) (2) no common civilization (Sinic 
civilication vs. Western civilication) (3) no 
common socio-economic system (EL vs. IS)
low high very low low 
2 conflicts since 1945 with 
negotiation parties. Average HIIK 
(COSIMO) Conflict Intensity 1,5.  
Exports form Ukraine to USA & 
Russia: 20.9 %; exports form USA 
& Russia to Ukraine: 0.3%
no formal alliance with U.S. and 
Russia (1) common language: yes (with Russia) no 
(with the West) (2) common civilization: yes 
(with Russia) no (with the West) (3) common 
socio-eco system: yes (with Russia: OS) no 
(with U.S.: IS)
(e) The coding of the different socio-economic system bases on a recod made by the Heidelberger Conflict barometer: IS = industrialized states of the Northern/Western hemisphere with market 
economies and pluralistic regimes; SH = Socialist and communist bloc states, Former USSR, eastern satellite states, PR China, Mongolia ; EL = Developing economies, Third World states with 
underdeveloped market economies and weak or authoritarian political systems; OS = Eastern European democracies, Former East bloc states, in transformation process toward market economy and 
democracy; ISE = Industrialized states in developing regions like Austraila, New Zealand, and South Africa; SHE = Socilaist states in developing regions, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba; SL = Southeast 
Asian market economies; NIE = Newly industrialized economies (COSIMO 1; cf. Variable 12 http://www.hiik.de/en/kosimo/kosimo1.html) (02.04.2011). 
low 
medium 
(b) Source: The Correlates of War Project: International Trade, 1870-2006 (v2.01) (Barbieri, Katherine, Omar Keshk, and Brian Pollins.  2008.  Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 
2.0., Online: http://www.correlatesofwar.org (02.04.2011)
(c) Source: Formal Alliances Data Set Version 3.03 (1816-2000) ( cf. Correlates of War-Program http://www.correlatesofwar.org (07.08.2011); Gibler, Douglas M., and Meredith Sarkees. 2004. 
“Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816-2000.” Journal of Peace Research 41(2): 211-222; for the original version cf. : Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. 
1966. "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939." Journal of Peace Research 3:1-31. 
(d) The Correlates of War Data set allows to evaluted the quality of alliances: (1) high = Defense Pact; (2) medium = Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pact (2) low = Entente
(a) Source: Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), COSIMO (Conflict Barometer). Value is a function of number of conflicts and average conflict intensity. The COSIMO 1 Data 
has four categories of conflict intensity: 1: Latent conflict, completely non-violent, open verbal claims; 2: Crisis, non violent, more intensive claims; 3: Severe crisis, sporadic irregular use of force, 
blockade, threat; 4: War, organized continuing use of force.
very low 
low 
very high 
medium 
low 
Negotiating Period & 
Partner(s)  
Argentina 
Belarus
Brazil 
India 
approx. from 1990 to 
2001 with USA an 
Pakistan
since 2003 with 
France, Germany and 
UK; since 2006 also 
with China, Russia and 
USA (P5+1-talks)
approx. from 1990 to 
1994 with Russia and 
USA 
approx. from 1975 to 
1976 with USA 
in 2003 with UK and 
USA
approx. from 1976 to 
1978 and again from 
1987 to 1988 with USA 
approx. from 1990 to 
1994 with Russia and 
USA 
Ukraine
Taiwan 
North Korea 
Challenging Negotiation Environment 
approx from 1990 to 
1994 with Russia and 
USA 
approx. from 1980 to 
1994 with Brazil
approx. from 1990 to 
2001 with USA and 
India
since 1993 with the 
USA; since 2003 also 
with China, Russia, 
Japan, and South 
Korea (six-party-talks)
Pakistan 
Iran 
Kazakhstan 
South Korea 
Libya 
very low 
low 
very low
very low 
very high 
approx. from 1980 to 
1994 with Argentina
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2010 
Libya's Al-Qadhafi Explains Reasons for 
Switzerland Dispute 
May 03 Interview 
der Spiegel, Germany; World News 
Connection, 298350386 
2010 
Al-Qadhafi Addresses Delegation of 
Israeli Arabs 
Apr 30 Speech World News Connection, 298201760 
2010 
Al-Qadhafi Addresses Delegation of 
Israeli Arabs 
Apr 30 Speech al-Quds al Arabi Online 
2010 
KUNA: Al-Qadhafi Says US-Libyan 
Relations are 'Excellent' 
Apr 26 Report KUNA Online, Kuwait  
2010 
Yonhap: Qadhafi Dismisses Int'l Calls 
For Pressure on North Korean Nuke 
Dismantlement  
Apr 26 Report Yonhap 
2010 SBS Dateline Interview with Gaddafi Feb  Interview SBS Dateline 
2009 
Russian TV interviews Libyan leader on 
Obama, Iran, UN 
Dec 29 Interview Center TV 
2009 
NATO wants to seize Russia's riches, 
Libyan leader tells Russian TV 
Sep 03 Interview Vesti TV 
2009 
Muammar Gaddafi Warns Against 
Provoking Russia 
Apr 30 Report ITAR-TASS 
2009 
Sky News exclusive interview with 
Libyan Leader colonel Gaddafi  
Oct 25 Interview Sky News  
2008 The Pakistani Conundrum Dec 18 Speech Revolution Comitté Website  
2008 
Libyan Leader attacks Obama, calls on 
him to change US Mideast policy 
June 11 Report Great Jamahiriyah TV 
2007 
The Brother Leader addresses the 
Students of Oxford University 
May 16 Speech Revolution Comitté Website  
2006 
ROK Daily: Gaddafi 'Unsuccessful in N. 
Korea Mediation Efforts' 
Sep 21 Report Chosun Ilbo WWW-Text  
2006 Qadhafi personal web page Sep 21 Quote 
Solingen, Etel: Nuclear Logics, 
Princeton/ Oxford: Princeton 
University Press 2007: 341/FN 37 
2005 10 Question for Muammar Gaddafi  Jan 30 Interview Time 
2004 
Qadhafi Says US Should Adopt Libyan 
System; Speech Covers Zionism, Oil, 
Terrorism 
Aug 31 Speech 
Tripoli Great Jamahiriyah TV; FBIS-
Nes-2004-0901 
2004 
Al-Jazirah TV Interviews Libyan Leader 
on Weapons, US Ties, Other Issues 
Dec 31 Interview FBIS Report 
2004 
Libya: Al-Qadhafi Addresses General 
People's Congress 
Mar 04 Speech Tripoli Great Jamahiriyah TV 
2004 
Libya leader says the race to develop 
nuclear weapons is 'crazy' 
Feb 29 Report 
Raghavan, Sudarsan in: Tribune 
News Service 
2004 
The Arab League: Ignoring Reality, or 
Ignorance of it? 
June 22 Speech Revolution Committee Website  
2003 The Makeover  Jan 19 Quote 
Anderson, Scott: "The Makeover", 
in: The New York Times, January 19, 
2003 
1999 
Al-Qadhafi on Palestinian State, 
Lockerbie 
Mar 10 Report Cairo MENA  
1998 
Libya: Al-Qadhafi Urges Arabs to Serve 
Ties with US  
Oct 13 Report Amman al-Dustur  
1996 
Libya: Al-Qadhafi on Terrorism, Peace, 
Other Issues  
Mar 23 Interview 
Dubayy Space Channel TV, Abu 
Dhabi; FBIS-NES-96-061 on 1996-03-
28 
1996 
Al-Qadhafi, Mubarak Say No To 
Weapons of Mass Destruction  
Aug 11 Report  
Tripoli Great Jamahiriyah TV; FBIS-
NES-96-157 on 1996-08-13 
1995 Smaller Nations "Fooled"  Into UN  Mar 08 Report  Tripoli JANA 
1995 
Qadhafi Shortly After NPT Review & 
Extension Conference 
June Quote Bowen (2006) 
1994 
Al-Qadhafi Interviewed on Current 
Concerns 
Mai 25 Interview 
London, Al-Hayah; FBIS-NES-94-102 
on 1994-05-26 
1993 
Al-Qadhafi Interviewed on Lockerbie, 
Peace Process 
Nov 07 Interview JANA; FBIS-NES-93-214 
1992 
Al-Qadhafi Discuses Lockerbie, Nuclear 
Weapons 
Apr 23 Interview 
Budapest REFORM in Hungarian, 
FBIS-NES-92-084 on 1992-04-30 
1992 
Al-Qadhafi on Lockerbie, Nuclear 
Weapons 
Mar 28 Interview 
Paris, Le Figaro, FBIS-NES-92-063 on 
1992-04-01 
1990 Al-Qadhafi on Nationalism, Israel, U.S.  Aug 10 Interview 
Vienna Domestic Service, FBIS-NES-
90-157 on 1990-08-14 
1990 Al-Qadhafi on Gulf, Terrorists, Israel Nov 12 Interview 
Germany, Der Spiegel, FBIS-NES-90-
219 on 1990-11-13 
1990 Qaddafi in April 1990 April Quote Bowen (2006: 22) 
   
393 
 
1990 
Al-Qadhafi Comments on Hostages, 
Recent Issues 
Mai 25 Interview 
Al-Hawadith/London; FBIS-NES-90-
102 
1989 
Al-Qadhafi Interviewed on Bulgaria, 
Cyprus 
Jun 25 Interview 
Ankara Domestic Service; FBIS-NES-
89-121 
1989 Al-Hawadith Interviews al-Qadhafi  Jun 30 Interview 
London/Al-Hawadith; FBIS-NES-89-
124 
1988 Austrian Paper Interviews al-Qadhafi  Feb 29 Interview 
Vienna, Neue Krone-Zeitung; FBIS-
NES-88-040 
1988 
JANA: Al-Qadhafi BBC Interview 
"Distorted" 
Jan 16 Report Tripoli JANA; FBIS-NES-88-011 
1988 Al-Qadhafi Cited in Al-Safir Interview Jan 01 Interview Al-Safir/Beirut; FBIS-NES-88-007 
1987 
Qadhafi Press Conference at Arab 
Summit in Amman  
Nov  Quote Bowen (2006: 22) 
1987 Qaddafi: Address to University Students Jul  Speech 
Spector, Leonard: Nuclear 
AmbitionsBoulder, CO: Westview 
Press 1990: 178 
1986 Qadhafi interviewed by Der Kurier Jan 23 Interview 
Kurier, Austria; FBIS-MEA-86-016 on 
1986-01-24 
1986 
Qadhafi interviewed by Lebanese 
Weekly  
Jan 20 Interview 
Al-Nahar al-Arabi Wa al-Duwali, 
Lebanon; FBIS-MEA-86-016 on 1986-
01-24 
1986 
Al-Qadhafi Pledges Not to Produce 
Nuclear Bombs 
Mrz 12 Interview 
Kuwait KUNA; FBIS-MEA-86-048 on 
1986-03-12 
1986 
Al-Qadhafi on Relations With Chad, 
U.S., Europe 
Feb 23 Interview 
Athens, Kiriakatiki Elevtherotipia; 
FBIS-MEA-86-036 on 1986-02-24 
1986 
Nuclear Weapons a great mistake 
against Humanity 
Mar 10 Report 
Bowen, Wyn Q.: Libya and Nuclear 
Proliferation. Stepping Back From 
the Brink, London: Routledge 2006: 
18 
1985 
al-Qadhafi Interviewed on Nuclear 
Arms, Terrorism 
03. Jun Interview 
Tokyo NHK Telev. Network; FBIS-
MEA-85-109 on 1985-06-06 
1985 
Al-Qadhafi Receives USSR Message on 
Arms Talks 
Jun 02 Report  
Tripoli Jana; FBIS-MEA-85-106 on 
1985-06-03 
1984 Al-Qadhafi interviewed by DER SPIEGEL Jan 09 Interview 
der Spiegel, Germany; FBIS-NES-89-
006 on 1989-01-10 
1984 al-Qadhdhâfî Grants Interview  Nov 28 Interview 
Triploi Voice of Arab Homeland; 
FBIS-MEA-84-230 on 1984-11-28 
1983 
Al-Qadhdhafi Speech at Opposition 
Movements Meeting 
Feb 02 Speech 
Tripoli JANA; FBIS-MEA-83-024 on 
1983-02-03 
1983 Al-Qadhafi Toast Jan 22 Speech 
Romania, Scinteia; FBIS-EEU-83-017 
on 1983-01-25 
1982 
Al-Qadhafi: To Hell with U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia 
Mar 02 Speech 
Tripoli Domestic Service; FBIS-MEA-
82-043 on 1982-03-04 
1982 
Al-Qadhafi Interviewed on Role in 
Mideast 
Nov 09 Interview 
Kuwait, Al-Watan; FBIS-MEA-82-221 
on 1982-11-16 
1981 
Al-Qadhafi Speaks on Defense of Arab 
Nation  
Mai 07 Speech 
Tripoli JANA; FBIS-MEA-81-089 on 
1981-05-08 
1981 
Al-Qadhafi Comments on Foreign 
Affairs Issues 
Mar 22 Interview 
Paris, AFP; FBIS-MEA-81-055 on 
1981-03-23 
1981 
Al-Qadhafi Interviewed on Chad, Sudan, 
Mideast 
Feb 15 Interview 
Tripoli Voice of Arab Homeland; 
FBIS-MEA-81-031 on 1981-02-17 
1981 
Text of Der Spiegel Interview With Al-
Qadhafi  
Sep 21 Interview 
Germany, Der Spiegel;  FBIS-MEA-
81-183 on 1981-09-22 
1981 An  Interview with Gaddafi  Jun 08 Interview Time 
1980 Al-Qaddafi : Liquidation Policy Jun 16 Interview 
Germany, Der Spiegel; FBIS-NES-90-
219 on 1990-11-13 
1980 
Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi Interviewed by 
French TV 
Jul 28 Interview 
Paris, AFP; FBIS-MEA-80-147 on 
1980-07-29 
1980 
al-Qadhafi Discusses Relations with 
Egypt, Atom Bomb 
Jun 07 Interview 
Tripoli JANA;  FBIS-MEA-80-112 on 
1980-06-09 
1979 
Jana Reports Al-Qadhafi Interview with 
Lebanese Paper 
Feb 07 Report  
Tripoli, Jana;  FBIS-MEA-79-030 on 
1979-02-12 
1979 
Qaddafi in Dec. 1979 on Nuclear 
Weapons  
Dec Speech Bowen 2006: 18  
1978 
Qadhafi Speaks of Need For Libyan-U.S. 
Dialog 
Oct 11 Report  
Tripoli, Domestic Service, FBIS-MEA-
78-198 on 1978-10-12 
1976 Al-Qadhafi Discusses Ties with Soviets  Jun 07 Interview 
DPA, Cairo, FBIS-MEA-76-111 on 
1976-06-08  
1976 
British Correspondent Interviews Al-
Qadhafi 
Mai 02 Interview 
London, The Sunday Telegraph, FBIS-
MEA-76-087 on 1976-05-04  
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1974 The Ramadan War   Interview 
Al-Usbu al-ArabiLondon, Qaddafi 
(1976) The Battel of Destiny: 
Speeches and Interviews, London: 
Kalahari Pub. 
1974 Interview with a Yugoslav Newspaper    Interview 
with Dara Janikovic/Zagreb, Qaddafi 
(1976) The Battel of Destiny: 
Speeches and Interviews, London: 
Kalahari Pub. 
1974 Freedom   Speech 
Qaddafi (1976) The Battel of 
Destiny: Speeches and Interviews, 
London: Kalahari Pub. 
1974 Inter-Arab Relations Apr 14 Interview 
Beirut newspaper an-Nahar, Qaddafi 
(1976) The Battel of Destiny: 
Speeches and Interviews, London: 
Kalahari Pub. 
1973 The Paris Symposium Nov 24 Interview 
Discussion at Plaza Hotel/Paris, 
Qaddafi (1976) The Battel of 
Destiny: Speeches and Interviews, 
London: Kalahari Pub. 
1973 Euro-Arab Relations Mai 14 Speech 
key-not Speech/Tripoli, Qaddafi 
(1976) The Battel of Destiny: 
Speeches and Interviews, London: 
Kalahari Pub. 
1973 The Third International Theory   Speech 
Qaddafi (1976) The Battel of 
Destiny: Speeches and Interviews, 
London: Kalahari Pub. 
1970 Evacuation of U.S. Airbase Jun 11 Speech 
Qaddafi (1976) The Battel of 
Destiny: Speeches and Interviews, 
London: Kalahari Pub. 
1970 Libya and the World  Sep 01 Speech 
Qaddafi (1976) The Battel of 
Destiny: Speeches and Interviews, 
London: Kalahari Pub. 
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Annex 4: Reenactment of Tripoli’s Preferences in the Deadlock Game  
  
  
DESIRES TRANSLATING & WEIGHING REENACTMENT 
rank ≈ fulf illed desires
Resist against U.S. 
power politics 
Starting direct talks w ith the United States w ould contradict the 
goal of resistance. 
0%
Respect & Recognition 
Holding talks w ith the United States on the same eye level 
w ould execute Libya's goal to achieve respect and recognition 
from the United States. 
100%
Resist against U.S. 
power politics 
Rejection of a US offer for exploratory talks on WMD w ould
fulf ill Libya's objection for resistance. 
100%
Respect & Recognition 
That the United States is w illing to open w ith Libya a diplomatic 
channel w ould fulf ill  Libya's strategic objective to achieve 
respect and recognition. Washington’s reach-out for a 
diplomatic process w ould have meant that the United States 
had recognized Libya as an a crucial regional player and w as 
ready to meet w ith Tripoli on the same eye level. 
100%
Resist against U.S. 
power politics 
Rejection of a US offer for exploratory talks on WMD w ould
fulf ill Libya's objection for resistance. 
100%
Respect & Recognition 
Reciprocating the U.S. defection w ould be in line w ith the 
Qaddafi regime's  respect & recognition objective. Not 
reciprocating U.S. defection w ould undermined this goal.  
How ever, in view  of this particular desire Libya w ould have 
assigned higher value to situation w ere the U.S. is proposing 
cooperation. 
75%
Resist against U.S. 
power politics 
This move w ould be completely inconsistent w ith the goal to 
resist U.S. pow er politics. 
0%
Respect & Recognition 
Seen from a Libyan point of view , an unilateral offer for
cooperation w ould be inconsistent w ith the objective to acquire 
respect and recognition from the United States.
0%
Outcome: DC > DD > CC > CD 
2
4
LIBYA: First Part of the Pre-Negotiation Phase (Deadlock Game 1987- late 1980s)
OPPORTUNTIES
C C  
Both sides agree to 
start exploratory 
talks
PREFERENCES
3
C D  
While the US is 
w illing to talk, Libya 
is defecting
D C  
While the US is 
w illing to talk, Libya 
is defecting
D D  
Mutual 
disagreement; no 
exploratory talks
1
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Annex 5: Reenactment of Washington’s Preferences in the Deadlock Game  
 
Annex 6: Reenactment of Libya’s Preferences in the Imposed Deadlock Game 
DESIRES TRANSLATING & WEIGHING REENACTMENT 
rank ≈ fulf illed desires
Improve US Security 
Starting exploratory WMD talks w ith Libya w ould hold the 
promise that U.S. national security is improved by such a step. 
In general starting talks  w ould be more likely to provide benefit 
for U.S. security than not speaking to Libya. How ever, it is 
uncertain w hether such an process w ould lead at tangible 
results at all - let alone the question w hether Libya is in the end 
really taking concrete steps tow ards disarmament
50%
Orchestrate a regime 
change in Libya
Cooperation is inconsistent w ith the "regime change" objective. 0%
Libya: a testing 
ground for anti-
terrorism policy
Cooperation is inconsistent w ith the "testing ground" objective . 0%
Improve US Security 
Libya’s w illingness to engage w ith Washington in an diplomatic
process w ould indicate an cautious improvement of U.S.
security. How ever, it w ould be uncertain w hether Tripoli w ould 
sincerely propose disarmament or w hether it w ould not merely
setting up a diplomatic smoke screen. Moreover, apart from a
Libyan offer to talk, one w ould not gain any tangible
improvement in terms of security. Not reacting to Libya's offer
w ould also send the signal to Tripoli and beyond that the US is
not easy to sw ay by charm offensives of its opponents.
75%
Orchestrate a regime 
change in Libya
Rejecting the Libyan offer for exploratory talks fulf ills the
objective to orchestrate a regime change in Libya. 
100%
Libya: a testing 
ground for anti-
terrorism policy
Defection is consistent w ith the objective to convert Libya into 
a testing ground for the US anti-terrorism policy. 
100%
Improve US Security 
In such a scenario the United States w ould not gain any 
tangible security improvement. How ever, reciprocating Libya’s 
defection w ould represent a clear signal to the Qaddafi regime 
that the United States is acting in terms of Realpolitik . 
Although no substantial improvement w ould be achieved in 
terms of disarmament or non-proliferation, the clear signaling 
could be interpreted as a globl contribution to U.S. national 
security. 
50%
Orchestrate a regime 
change in Libya
Mutual defection fulf ills the objective to orchestrate a regime
change in Libya.
100%
Libya: a testing 
ground for anti-
terrorism policy
Mutual defection is consistent w ith the objective to convert 
Libya into a testing ground for the US anti-terrorism policy. 
100%
Improve US Security 
Such a scenario w ould represent a security risk to the United 
States. 
0%
Orchestrate a regime 
change in Libya
Unreciprocated cooperation is inconsistent w ith this objective. 0%
Libya: a testing 
ground for anti-
terrorism policy
Such a move w ould not serve the goal to convert Libya into a 
testing ground for the US anti-terrorism policy. 
0%
Outcome: DC > DD > CC > CD 
UNITED STATES: First Part of the Pre-Negotiation Phase (Deadlock Game 1987- late 1980s)
OPPORTUNTIES PREFERENCES
C C  
Both sides agree to 
start exploratory 
talks
3
C D  
While the US is 
willing to talk, Libya 
is defecting
4
D C  
While the US is 
willing to talk, Libya 
is defecting
1
D D  
Mutual 
disagreement; no 
exploratory talks
2
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DESIRES TRANSLATING & WEIGHING REENACTMENT 
rank ≈ fulf illed desires
Resist against U.S. 
power poli tics 
Generally speaking, starting  a negotiation process w ith the US w ould contradict the 
goal of resistance. How ever, as the United States is in this scenario cooperative too 
and is not defection, resistance w ould have appeared misplaced - in particular since a 
diplomatic process is per se not the primary expression of U.S. pow er politics and 
therefore represents not the best platform to implement and manifest the general taste 
to oppose Washington. 
50%
Search rapprochement 
with U.S. 
Exploratory talks on disarmament w ould have contribute substantially to the desired 
rapprochement w ith the United States. How ever, in this state of the diplomatic process 
the concerns in Tripoli about the United States' sincerity w ould have still been relatively 
high.  The fear to be double crossed w ould have still loomed large.  
75%
Resist against U.S. 
power poli tics 
Rejection of a US offer for exploratory talks on WMD w ould have fulfill Libya's
objection for resistance. 
100%
Search rapprochement 
with U.S. 
This move w ould have be inconsistent w ith the goal to achieve a rapprochement w ith 
Washington. How ever, there is a certain likelihood that the US offer w ould have been 
not sincere. Therefore, it w ould have remained at this point a degree of uncertainty 
w hether this choice is really inconsistent w ith the objective of  rapprochement. 
25%
Resist against U.S. 
power poli tics 
Reciprocated defection w ould have fully comply to the goal of  resistance. 100%
Search rapprochement 
with U.S. 
Mutual defection w ould be inconsistent w ith the goal to achieve a rapprochement. 
Without having tried to reach-out to the United States, Libya w ould have acted clearly 
against the logic of  the rapprochement objectives 
0%
Resist against U.S. 
power poli tics 
This move w ould have been completely inconsistent w ith the goal to resist U.S. pow er 
politics. 
0%
Search rapprochement 
with U.S. 
Although unilateral appeasement w ould have increased the chance of a
rapprochement w ith the United State, the fact that Washington w as in such a scenario
not reciprocating, w ould have rendered the prospect of a normalization in the
American-Libyan relationship uncertain. 
50%
Outcome: DC > CC > DD > CD 
LIBYA: Second Part of the Pre-Negotiation Phase (Imposed Deadlock Game early 1990s - March 2003)
OPPORTUNTIES PREFERENCES
CC 
Both sides agree to 
start exploratory 
talks
2
CD 
While the US is 
willing to talk, Libya 
is defecting
4
DC 
While the US is 
willing to talk, Libya 
is defecting
1
DD 
Mutual 
disagreement; no 
exploratory talks
3
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Annex 8: Reenactment of Libya’s Preferences in Alibi Game (Pre-Agreement Phase) 
DESIRES TRANSLATING & WEIGHING REENACTMENT 
rank ≈ fulf illed desires
Improve US Security 
In general, starting talks  w ould be more likely to provide benefit for 
US security than not speaking to Libya. How ever, in such a scenario 
it w ould have been uncertain w hether such an process w ould lead 
to tangible results - let alone the question w hether Libya w ould in the 
end take concrete steps tow ards dismantling its nuclear w eapons 
program. 
50%
No softy impression 
Starting talks w ith Libya  w ould have implied the high risk of domestic 
criticism. Washington could have been accused of being too that soft 
on a grim Middle East dictator. How ever, potential domestic critique 
could have be tamed to a certain extent by the fact that Washington 
w ould have in the CC-scenario not taken a unilateral step but that the 
diplomatic move w as reciprocated by Libya. 
25%
Improve US Security 
That Libya w as ready to start negotiation on its WMD disarmament
w ould have been interpreted in Washington as a cautious signal that
the U.S. security is improving and that Libya w as starting to embark
the path of WMD disarmament. How ever, unilateral defection by the
United States w ould have also implied the danger of not encouraging
Libya to further continue its cooperative pathw ay.  
75%
No softy impression 
Unreciprocated cooperation w ould have been a clear proof that 
Washington w as pursuing a tough stance tow ards the Qaddafi 
regime. 
100%
Improve US Security 
In such a scenario the United States w ould not gain any tangible 
security improvement. How ever, reciprocating Libya’s defection 
w ould represent a clear signal to the Qaddafi regime that the United 
States is acting in terms of Realpolitik . Although no substantial 
improvement w ould be achieved in terms of disarmament or non-
proliferation, the clear signaling could be interpreted as a global 
contribution to U.S. national security. 
50%
No softy impression 
Washington w ould have been able to show  that it w as not soft on 
the Qaddafi regime. 
100%
Improve US Security 
Such a scenario w ould have represented a security risk to the United 
States. 
0%
No softy impression 
Such a step of unilateral appeasement tow ards Tripoli w ould have 
lead to a crescendo of domestic criticism.
0%
Outcome: DC > DD > CC > CD 
UNITED STATES: Second Part of the Pre-Negotiation Phase (Imposed Deadlock Game early 1990s - March 2003)
OPPORTUNTIES PREFERENCES
CC 
Both sides agree to 
start exploratory 
talks
3
CD 
While the US is 
willing to talk, Libya 
is defecting
4
DC 
While the US is 
willing to talk, Libya 
is defecting
1
DD 
Mutual 
disagreement; no 
exploratory talks
2
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Annex 9: Reenactment of U.S. Preferences in the Alibi Game (Pre-Agreement phase) 
DESIRES TRANSLATING & WEIGHING REENACTMENT 
rank  ≈ fulf illed desires
Resist against U.S. 
power politics 
In general, starting  a negotiation process w ith the U.S. w ould contradict 
the goal of resistance. How ever, since in this scenrio the United States 
w ould have been coopertive too and w ould have likew ise not defection, 
resistance w ould  appeare misplaced - in particular since a diplomtic 
process is per se  not the primary expression of U.S. pow er politics and 
therefore represents not the best platform to implement and manifest 
opposition against Washington. 
50%
Search rapprochement 
with U.S. 
Negotiation on disarmament w ould contriubute substantially to the desired 
rapprochement w ith the United States. 
100%
Resist against U.S. 
power politics 
Rejection of a US offer for a negotiation process aimed on Libya’s
disarmament w ould fulf ill Libya’s objection for resistance. How ever, as
the US is w illingly to negotiate - although Washington's sincerity is
uncertain - this diplomatic process w ould not the best platform to execute
resistance. 
50%
Search rapprochement 
with U.S. 
The scenario w ere Libya w ould not respond to an U.S. offer for 
negotation, w ould be inconsistent w ith the goal to achieve a 
rapprochment w ith the United States. How ever, in the pre-agreement 
phase there is still a certain likelihood that the US offer is not sincere and 
that Libya is not missing the desired rapprochment by turning dow n 
Washington's proposal. 
25%
Resist against U.S. 
power politics 
Reciprocated defection w ould fully comply to the goal of resistance. 100%
Search rapprochement 
with U.S. 
To reciprocate for a U.S. defection by rejecting likew ise the proposal of 
negotiation w ould not contribute to the desired rapprochement. How ever, 
as the United States w ould be in such a scenario not w illing to normalize 
its relationship w ith Libya - despite the fact that a diplomatic process w as 
set-up that could possiblely lead to such an outcome - the chance of 
rapprochement is anyw ay uncertain.
25%
Resist against U.S. 
power politics 
This move w ould be completely inconsistent w ith the goal to resist U.S. 
pow er politics. 
0%
Search rapprochement 
with U.S. 
Although unilateral disarmament w ould increase the chance of a
rapprochement w ith the United State, the fact that Washington is not
reciprocating and is rather playing defection, renders the prospect of a
normalization in the American-Libyan relationship uncertain. 
50%
Outcome: CC > DD > DC > CD 
LIBYA: Pre-Agreement Phase (Alibi Game, March-December 2003)
OPPORTUNTIES PREFERENCES
CC 
Both sides agree to 
begin direct 
negotiations on a 
binding 
disarmament 
agreement
1
CD 
While the US is 
willing to negotiate, 
Libya is defecting; 
no negotiations
4
DC 
While the US is 
willing to negotiate, 
Libya is defecting; 
no negotiations
3
DD 
Mutual 
disagreement; no 
negotiations
2
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Annex 10: Reenactment of Libya’s Preferences in Alibi Game (Agreement Phase) 
DESIRES TRANSLATING & WEIGHING REENACTMENT 
rank ≈ fulf illed des ires
Improve US Security 
Starting direct negotiations on a final disarmament agreement could 
lead to a future improvement of U.S. security.  In general starting 
negotiations w ith the Qaddaf i regime w ould be more likely to provide 
benefit for U.S. security than not speaking to Tripoli. How ever, it is not 
certain that such an accord is achievable - let alone the question 
w hether Libya w ould in the end really taking concrete steps tow ards 
disarmament.  
75%
No softy impression 
Starting negotiations w ith Libya  w ould certainly spark domestic 
criticism that Washington is too soft on a grim Middle East authoritarian 
regime. Moreover, it is at that early phase of the negotiation process 
still relatively uncertain w hether such a negotiation process w ould in 
the end lead to Libya’s disarmament. This fact w ould flame additional 
disapproval. The criticism  w ould, how ever, be tamed to a certain 
extent by the fact that Washington is not proposing a unilateral act of  
appeasement but is negotiating w ith Libya in a tit-for-tat manner. 
25%
Linkage to 2nd Iraq 
War 
That Libya is ready to start disarmament negotiations could be put 
forw ard as an evidence for the impact of  the Second Iraq War. 
How ever, the persuasiveness of this argument is reduced by the fact 
that Libya’s w illingness to negotiated is connected to the United States 
readiness to reciprocated w ith such a step and likew ise start 
negotiations. Moreover, it is uncertain w hether the negotiation process 
w ould really lead to Libya’s disarmament. 
75%
Improve US Security 
That Libya’s is ready to start negotiation on its WMD programs could be 
interpreted in Washington as a signal that the U.S. security is
improving. Such a move by Libya could be indicate an early sign that
Libya is starting to reverse its strive for WMD. Thus, not reciprocating
to such a proposal could be counterproductive to US security.
How ever, at this early stage of the negotiation process it w ould still be
uncertain w hether Libya is sincerely proposing disarmament or rather
is setting up a diplomatic smoke screen. In addition, launching
negotiations w ould not lead to any immediate, tangible improvement of
US security.  
50%
No softy impression 
Washington w ould clearly show  that it is not soft on the Qaddaf i 
regime. 
100%
Linkage to 2nd Iraq 
War 
While not having offered any negotiation to Libya, Washington w ould 
be able to promote the narrative that the Iraq War forced Qaddaf i's 
hand on proposing a diplomatic engagement w ith the US. 
100%
Improve US Security 
In such a scenario the United States w ould not gain any tangible 
security improvement. How ever, reciprocating Libya’s defection w ould 
send a clear signal to the Qaddaf i regime that the United States is 
acting in the logic of Realpolitik and is ready to deter aggressive 
actions. Although no substantial improvement w ould be made in terms 
of disarmament, the clear signaling could be interpreted as a 
contribution to the improvement of US in its security struggle w ith 
unfriendly regimes. Along these lines one could flag the argument that 
not reciprocating Libya’s defection w ould hurt Washington’s longer 
terms security considerations. 
50%
No softy impression 
Washington w ould clearly show  that it is not soft on the Qaddaf i 
regime. 
100%
Linkage to 2nd Iraq 
War 
There w ould be no direct linkage to the 2nd Iraq War since Libya is not 
ready to give diplomacy a chance - let alone its w illingness to reverse 
its WMD. 
0%
Improve US Security 
Such a scenario w ould represent a security risk to the United States, 
as Libya is not w illing to reverse its WMD programs.  
0%
No softy impression 
Policy maker w ould face a crescendo of criticism as the strategy of 
unilateral appeasement w ould rew ard Libya for its defection. 
0%
Linkage to 2nd Iraq 
War 
No linkage to the Second Iraq War w ould apply. 0%
Outcome: DC > CC > DD > CD
CD 
US readiness to 
negotiate is not 
reciprocated by 
Libya; no 
disarmament 
negotiations
4
DC 
While Libya is 
w illing to negotiate, 
the US is defecting; 
no negotiations 
1
DD 
Mutual defection; 
no disarmament 
negotiations
3
UNITED STATES: Pre-Agreement Phase (Alibi Game March - December 2003) 
OPPORTUNTIES PREFERENCES
CC 
Both sides agree to 
begin direct 
negotiations on a 
formal 
disarmament 
agreement 
2
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DESIRES TRANSLATING & WEIGHING REENACTMENT 
rank ≈ fulf illed desires
Resist against US 
power politics 
That Libya w ould make substantial concession to the US by 
voluntarily disarming its WMD programs, represents an 
inconsistency w ith the strategic goal of “resistance”. 
How ever, a settlement w ith the US in reach, the strive for 
“resistance” against Washington's pow er politics appears 
more and more misplaced. A joint agreement is not the best 
platform to implement this particular policy goal. In that phase of 
the negotiation process, this strategic goal therefore becomes 
to a certain extant indifferent to the CC option. 
50%
Search rapprochement 
with US
A jointly negotiated disarmament agreement w ould fulf ill to the 
desired rapprochement w ith the United States. 
100%
Resist against US 
power politics 
Rejection to a positive US vote in the disarmament w ould fulf ill 
Libya's goal of resistance. How ever, as the proposal of a joint 
agreement is per se  not an expression of U.S. pow er politics 
but rather manifest Washington's readiness to search 
consensus w ith Libya, such a move w ould be misplaced. 
75%
Search rapprochement 
with US
 This move w ould be completely inconsistent w ith the goal to 
achieve a rapprochement w ith Washington.
0%
Resist against US 
power politics 
Reciprocated defection w ould fully comply to the goal of 
resistance. 
100%
Search rapprochement 
with US
To reciprocate US defection by a parallel rejection w ould not 
contribute to the desired rapprochement w ith Washington. 
How ever, as the United States is in such a situation not w illing 
to normalize its relationship w ith Libya, the chance of 
rapprochement w ould have been anyw ay uncertain. 
25%
Resist against US 
power politics 
This move w ould be completely inconsistent w ith the goal to 
resist U.S. pow er politics. 
0%
Search rapprochement 
with US 
Although unilateral disarmament w ould increase the chance of 
a rapprochement w ith the United State, the fact that the 
Washington is not reciprocating and rather playing defection, 
makes the prospect of a normalization in the American-Libyan 
relationship uncertain. There w ould be the danger that Libya's 
move tow ards disarmament is not rew arded by the Untied 
States. 
50%
Outcome: CC > DD > DC > CD 
CD 
Libya declares 
unilaterally its 
willingness to 
disarm while the US 
is defecting    
4
DC 
USA is ready to 
agree but Libya is 
rejecting the accord 
3
DD 
Mutual 
disagreement; no 
disarmament 
accord 
2
LIBYA: Agreement Phase (Alibi Game, December 2003)
OPPORTUNTIES PREFERENCES
CC 
Both side agree on 
a settlement to 
disarm Libya
1
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Annex 11: Reenactment of U.S. Preferences in the Alibi Game (Agreement phase) 
 
  
DESIRES TRANSLATING & WEIGHING REENACTMENT 
rank ≈ fulf illed desires
Improve US Security 
US security w ould be improved by a disarmament agreement. 
Washington w ould be relatively safe since in this scenario 
Libya is required to make all the costly  moves (dismantle its 
WMD program). The danger to be double crossed by Tripoli is 
relatively little given that the diplomatic process on Libya's WMD 
reversal is already relatively advanced. How ever, this 
particular risk is still existing. 
75%
No softy impression 
A deal w ith Libya w ould certainly spark criticism that the US is 
too soft on a grim Middle East dictator. The criticism w ould, 
how ever, be tamed by the fact that Washington is not 
proposing an unilateral act of  appeasement but is negotiating 
w ith Libya in a tit-for-tat manner. 
50%
Linkage to 2nd Iraq 
War 
In this scenario of joint cooperation, the narrative that it w as 
primarily the Iraq War that propelled Libya into disarmament 
w ould lose a considerable extent of its persuasiveness. 
How ever, the fact that Libya had come so far to reverse its 
WMD programs can still be linked to the US lead intervention to 
topple Saddam Hussein despite the fact that eventual 
breakthrough w as achieved by an diplomatic agreement. 
50%
Improve US Security 
The United States w ould substantially improve its security. 
Libya w ould disarm its WMD programs w ithout putting 
Washington at risk of being double crossed in a direct 
negotiations w ith Tripoli. 
100%
No softy impression 
Washington w ould clearly show  that it is not soft on the 
Qaddaf i regime. 
100%
Linkage to 2nd Iraq 
War 
Having not provided any concession to Libya, Washington 
w ould be able to promote the narrative that the Iraq War forced 
Qaddaf i's hand on WMD disarmament. 
100%
Improve US Security 
Without holding negotiation and agreeing on an disarmament 
accord, Washington w ould avoid the danger to be double 
crossed by Libya.This attainment w ould, how ever, stand in a 
stark contrast to the obvious and tangible security threat as 
Libya's WMD program w ould - most likely -  continue, if the DD 
option is chosen.  
25%
No softy impression 
Washington w ould clearly show  that it is not soft on the 
Qaddaf i regime. 
100%
Linkage to 2nd Iraq 
War 
There w ould be no direct linkage to the 2nd Iraq War as Libya 
is not ready to agree to disarmament. 
0%
Improve US Security 
Such a scearnio w ould represent a security risk to the United 
States, as Libya is not w illing to reverse its WMD programs.  
0%
No softy impression 
Policy maker w ould face a cresendo of criticism as the 
strategy of  unilateral appeasement w ould rew ard Libya for its 
defection. 
0%
Linkage to 2nd Iraq 
War 
No linkage to the Second Iraq War w ould apply. Washington 
could, at best, ascribe the missing link to the false strategy of  
appeasement.
0%
Outcome: DC > CC > DD > CD
CD 
US readiness to 
agree is not 
reciprocated by 
Libya; no 
disarmament 
agreement 
4
DC 
Libya declars an 
unilateral 
disarament accord; 
the USA is 
defecting. 
1
DD 
Mutual 
disagreement; no 
settlement that 
disarms Libya 
3
UNITED STATES: Agreement Phase (Alibi Game, December 2003) 
OPPORTUNTIES PREFERENCES
CC 
Agree on an 
settlement that 
disarms Libya 
2
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Annex 12: Reenactment of Libya’s Preferences in the Biased Stag Hunt Game  
 
  
DESIRES TRANSLATING & WEIGHING REENACTMENT 
rank ≈ fulf illed desires
Cautious 
rapprochement with 
Libya 
This choice w ould be in full compliance w ith the goal to reach a 
cautious rapprochement w ith Libya. 
100%
Improve US Security 
The US security w ould be improved by the implementation of 
the disarmament agreement. 
100%
Linkage to the 2nd 
Iraq War 
The narrative of  the Iraq War linkage w ould be more 
persuasive if  Libya w ould have implement the disarmament 
agreement unilaterally and the United States w ould not provide 
incentives. Nevertheless, the very fact that Libya w as 
disarming its WMD w ould still allow  to draw  ample connection 
to the recent U.S. lead Iraq intervention. 
75%
Cautious 
rapprochement with 
Libya 
This move w ould clearly contradict the objective of a cautious 
rapprochement w ith Libya. 
0%
Improve US Security 
The United w ould substantially improve its security. Libya 
w ould disarm its WMD programs w ithout putting Washington at 
risk of being double crossed. 
100%
Linkage to the 2nd 
Iraq War 
The narrative of  the Iraq War linkage w ould be very persuasive 
in the DC game constellation. 
100%
Cautious 
rapprochement with 
Libya 
Rapprochement w ith Libya w ould not be possible in the DD 
situation. How ever, as Libya w ould be in this scenario likew ise 
not w illingly to normalize its relationship w ith the US, the 
chance of rapprochement w ould be anyw ay unlikely. 
Moreover, not reciprocating Libya’s defection w ould contradict 
the effort to pursue the Libyan-American rapprochement w ith 
caution. 
50%
Improve US Security 
Not implementing the disarmament agreement w ould not 
contribute to US security. How ever, not reacting to Libya's non-
compliance w ith defection w ould likew ise undermine US 
security. 
50%
Linkage to the 2nd 
Iraq War 
There w ould be no direct linkage to the 2nd Iraq War as Libya 
is not ready to disarm.  
0%
Cautious 
rapprochement with 
Libya 
Moving tow ards cooperation w hile Libya is choosing defection
could be seen as a forthcoming step tow ards a
rapprochement. How ever, in light of Libya’s rejection to
implement the disarmament agreement such a step w ould not
gain any immediate tangible impact. Moreover, such an
appeasement move w ould also contradict the idea to pursue
the Libyan-American rapprochement w ith caution.
25%
Improve US Security 
Such a scenario w ould represent a security risk to the United 
States, as Libya is not w illing to reverse its WMD programs.  
0%
Linkage to the 2nd 
Iraq War 
There w ould be no direct linkage to the 2nd Iraq War as Libya 
is not ready to disarm.  
0%
CD 
While the US is 
implementing, 
Libya is defecting  
4
DC 
While Libya is 
implementing, the 
US is defecting  
2
DD 
Both sides are not 
implementing the 
agreement 
3
UNITED STATES: Post-Agreement Phase (Biased Stag Hunt, since January 2004) 
OPPORTUNTIES PREFERENCES
CC 
Both sides agree to 
implement the 
agreement
1
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Annex 13: Reenactment of U.S. Preferences in the Biased Stag Hunt Game  
 
  
Policy  Goals Translating Policy Goals into Considerations about Strategic Moves 
 Goal 
Attainment 
Rank 
Resist against US 
power politics 
Although Libya w as make substantial concession to the US by voluntarily disarming its WMD 
program - a step that w ould be normally completely inconsistent w ith the objective to "resist 
against US pow er politics" -  the strive to implement this particular strategic goal w ere by and large 
misplaced during the Post-Agreement phase. The historic settlement that had been eventually 
achieved w ith the United States w as in many respects unlikely to be an expression of US pow er 
politics. Rather in represented a joint agreement. Nevertheless, w e cannot exclude that joint 
implementation w ould still have implication that stood against this particular policy goals w hich had 
been internalized by the Qaddafi regime during the past decades. 
75%
Search 
rapprochement 
with US
A jointly negotiated disarmament agreement w ould contribute substantially to the desired 
rapprochement w ith the United States. 
100%
Resist against US 
power politics 
In general, rejection to a positive US vote in the disarmament w ould perfectly serve Libya's goal of 
resistance. How ever, as the US activities to implement a jointly agreed disarmament accord is per 
se not an expression of U.S. pow er politics but rather manifest Washington's readiness to 
normalize the American-Libyan relationship, such a move w ould be misplaced to a considerable 
extent.
50%
Search 
rapprochement 
with US
This move w ould be completely inconsistent w ith the goal to achieve a rapprochement w ith 
Washington. 
0%
Resist against US 
power politics 
Reciprocated defection w ould fully comply to the goal of resistance. 100%
Search 
rapprochement 
with US
A rapprochement w ith Libya w ould not be possible in such a situation. How ever, as the US 
defection How ever, in light of the US defection a normalization of the American-Libyan relationship 
w ould be anyw ay uncertain. Moreover, not reciprocating the US defection w ould be run counter 
the idea of establishing a relationship on the same eye level. 
25%
Resist against US 
power politics 
This move w ould be completely inconsistent w ith the goal to resist U.S. pow er politics. 0%
Search 
rapprochement 
with US 
Although unilateral disarmament w ould increase the chance of a rapprochement w ith the United 
State, the fact that the Washington is not reciprocating and is rather playing defection, makes the 
prospect of a normalization in the American-Libyan relationship uncertain. There w ould be the 
danger that Libya's dismantles its WMD programs w ithout being rew arded by the US.  
50%
CD 
While Libya is 
implementing, 
the US is 
defecting  
4
* Libya's payoff structure in the Post-Agreement Phase is marked by a slight inconsistency w ith the findings revealed through the Operational Code survey 
DC 
While the US is 
implementing, 
Libya is 
defecting  
3
DD 
Both sides are 
not 
implementing 
the 
disarmament 
agreement 
2
POST-AGREEMENT PHASE (since January 2004)
LIBYA: the A-type payoff continues (CC > DD > DC > CD)* 
Strategic Options 
CC 
Both sides 
agree to 
implement the 
achieved 
disarmament 
accord 
1
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Annex 14: Recipients of Diplomatic Design Elements  
 
 
 
  
Fit Overfit Partial Fit Underfit Misfit Negativ Fit 
Libya = Receiver 7 1 1 4 7 3
Handling of the BBC China Interception (ch. 5.3.3.2) ●●
The Implementation of the Disarmament Accord (ch. 5.3.5.2)* ●●
U.S. Military Threats (ch. 5.3.1.2)* ● ● ●
U.S. Unilateral Sanctions (ch. 5.3.1.2) ●
U.S. Naming & Blaming  (ch. 5.3.1.2) ●
Quiet Diplomacy (during pre-agreement phase; ch. 5.3.3.2)* ●
Quiet Diplomacy (during pre-negotiation phase; ch. 5.3.2.2)* ●
Diplomatic Velocity (ch. 5.3.4.2 ) ●
Washington's Quid Pro Quo Approach (ch. 5.3.5.2)* ●
Disarmament Accord (ch. 5.3.4.2)* ●
Lockerbie Talks (ch. 5.3.2.2)* ●
Communication Channel on Implementation (ch. 5.3.5.2)* ●
Mediation by Arab States (ch. 5.3.1.2)* ●
Multilateral Sanctions (ch. 5.3.2.2) ● ●
UK mediation efforts (during pre-agreement phase; ch. 5.3.3.2) ●
UK mediation efforts (during pre-negotiation phase; ch. 5.3.2.2)* ● ●
UK mediation efforts (during agreement phase; ch. 5.3.4.2) ●
USA = Receiver 4 2 3 1 4 1
Libya's Charm Offensive (ch. 5.3.1.2) ● ●
Choreography of the Public Announcement (ch. 5.3.4.2) ●
The Implementation of the Disarmament Accord (ch. 5.3.5.2)* ●
Technical visits to Libya's WMD sites (ch. 5.3.4.2) ● ●
Quiet Diplomacy (during pre-agreement phase; ch. 5.3.3.2)* ●
Quiet Diplomacy (during pre-negotiation phase; ch. 5.3.2.2)* ●
Washington's Quid Pro Quo Approach (ch. 5.3.5.2)* ●
Disarmament Accord (ch. 5.3.4.2)* ●●
Lockerbie Talks (ch. 5.3.2.2)* ●
Communication Channel on Implementation (ch. 5.3.5.2)* ●
Mediation by Arab States (ch. 5.3.1.2)* ●
UK mediation efforts (during pre-negotiation phase; ch. 5.3.2.2)* ●
Total 11 3 4 5 11 4
* Design elements signifying dyads and were affecting the United States as well as Libya. 
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Annex 15: Initiators & Senders of Diplomatic Design Elements  
 
 
 
  
Fit Overfit Partial Fit Underfit Misfit Negativ Fit 
USA = Initiator 2 1 1 1 2 2
U.S. Military Threats (ch. 5.3.1.2) ● ● ●
Technical visits to Libya's WMD sites (ch. 5.3.4.2) ● ●
U.S. Unilateral Sanctions (ch. 5.3.1.2) ●
Handling of the BBC China Interception (ch. 5.3.4.2) ●●
U.S. Naming & Blaming  (ch. 5.3.1.2) ●
Libya = Initiator 1 1
Libya's Charm Offensive (ch. 5.3.1.2) ● ●
USA & Libya = Initiator 6 2 3 2 5
Quiet Diplomacy (during pre-negotiation phase; ch. 5.3.2.2) ● ●
Choreography of the Public Announcement (ch. 5.3.4.2) ●
The Implementation of the Disarmament Accord (ch. 5.3.5.2) ● ●●
Quiet Diplomacy (during pre-agreement phase; ch. 5.3.2.2) ● ●
Diplomatic Velocity (ch. 5.3.4.2) ●
Washington's Quid Pro Quo Approach (ch. 5.3.5.2) ● ●
Disarmament Accord (ch. 5.3.4.2) ● ●●
Lockerbie Talks (ch. 5.3.2.2) ● ●
Communication Channel on Implementation (ch. 5.3.5.2) ●●
Other Initiators (UK, International Community, Arab States) 3 2 3 1
Mediation by Arab States (ch. 5.3.1.2) ●●
Multilateral Sanctions (ch. 5.3.2.2) ● ●
UK mediation efforts (during pre-agreement phase; ch. 5.3.3.2) ●
UK mediation efforts (during pre-negotiation phase; ch. 5.3.2.2) ●● ●
UK mediation efforts (during agreement phase; ch. 5.3.4.2) ●
Total 11 3 4 5 11 4
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Annex 16: List of Interviewed Participants 
Dowse, Time (Director Cyber Policy, Foreign & Commonwealth Office), interviewed on 16
th
 February, 
2012, (3p.m.), London.  
Hadley, Stephen (former National Security Advisor, U.S. White House), interviewed on 11
th
 June 
2012 (10 a.m., Washington time), telephone interview.  
Indyk, Martin (former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs), interviewed on 10
th
 
November 2011 (10 a.m.), Washington D.C.  
Daniel, Jody (Lead Office of Regional Affairs, Middle East Team, Bureau of International Security and 
Non-proliferation, U.S. State Department), interviewed on 14
st
 December 2011 (3 p.m.), Washington 
D.C.  
Joseph, Robert (former Special Assistant on Proliferation Issues, National Security Council), 
interviewed on 3
rd
 November 2011 (2 p.m.), Fairfax, Virginia.  
Mininni, Margot (former U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA)), interviewed on 15
th
 December 2011 (2:30 p.m.), Arlington, Virginia  
Pillar, Paul (former CIA staff), interviewed on 7
th
 December 2011 (11 a.m.), Washington D.C.  
Ward, Ken (U.S. State Department, WMD issues), interviewed on 1
st
 June 2012, Washington D.C.  
White, Wayne (former U.S. State Department, Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research), 
interviewed on 8
th
 June 2012, telephone interview.  
 
 
